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82-16-07: 82-16-07 HILLER AVIATION: Amendment 39-4469. Applies to Hiller Aviation Model UH-12E and L and OH-23F and G Series helicopters certificated in all categories that are equipped with engine drive torsional coupling assemblies, P/N 21047-9 and P/N 21047-11 (S/N 704 through 766) and P/N 21047-15 (all serial numbers), Airworthiness Docket No. 82-ASW-52. Compliance required as indicated unless already accomplished. To detect possible cracks and prevent failure of the engine drive torsional coupling assembly, accomplish the following: 1. Within 10 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 50 hours' time in service: (a) Remove from the helicopter torsional coupling assemblies P/N 21047-9 and -11 (S/N 704 through 766) and P/N 21047-15 (all serial numbers). These have a stamped rubber cure date of December 1980 or later. (b) Clean and inspect the lower housing P/N 21046 in the eight window areas adjacent to the engine attach flange using a fluorescent penetrant inspection method. (c) Replace assemblies with cracked housings before further flight and install a serviceable assembly as prescribed in the appropriate model maintenance manual or FAA approved equivalent. 2. The inspections required by this AD are not applicable to UH-12E, or OH-23F and G series helicopters converted to the turbine engine installation by STC SH178WE. 3. Equivalent means of compliance must be approved by the Manager, Western Aircraft Certification Field Office, P.O. Box 92007, World Way Postal Center, Los Angeles, California 90009. 4. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and FAR 21.199 to fly aircraft to a base where compliance with this AD can be accomplished. Hiller Aviation Service Bulletin S.B. UH-12-21-3 dated August 4, 1982, contains information regarding this AD. This amendment becomes effective October 15, 1982, to all persons, except those to whomit was made immediately effective by priority mail AD 82-16-07 issued July 23, 1982.
76-09-11: 76-09-11 LOCKHEED: Amendment 39-2601 as amended by Amendment 39-2615. Applies to all Model 382 series airplanes below serial number 4673. Before further flight, unless already accomplished, perform the crank arm inspection for rudder, aileron and elevator in accordance with Lockheed Alert Service Bulletin A 382-27-17. If the crank arms do not pass the inspection requirements, replace the crank arm or servo valve assembly prior to further flight. The Lockheed Alert Service Bulletin stated that acceptable replacement cranks were identified with a "V" index mark. However, some of the replacement cranks are being made from a different material than those identified with a "V" index mark. These new cranks are identified with a straight line index mark and either of the cranks identified with a "V" or a straight line index mark are acceptable. Amendment 39-2601 was effective May 14, 1976 and was effective on receipt for all recipients of the telegram dated April 23, 1976, whichcontained this amendment. This Amendment 39-2615 becomes effective immediately.
2013-22-18: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Empresa Brasileira de Aeronautica S.A. (EMBRAER) Model EMB-135ER, - 135KE, -135KL, and -135LR airplanes; and Model EMB-145, -145ER, -145MR, -145LR, -145XR, -145MP, and -145EP airplanes. This AD requires repetitive detailed inspections to detect discrepancies on the attaching parts of the lower eyelet fitting of the cockpit windshield center-post, and, if no discrepancy is found, a check to make sure the bolts are tight, and replacement of the attaching parts if necessary. This AD also provides an option to accomplish the replacement of the attaching parts, which terminates the repetitive inspections. This AD was prompted by reports of failure of the bolts that connect the lower eyelet fitting of the cockpit windshield center-post to the forward fuselage. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct failed bolts and attaching parts of the lower eyelet fitting of the cockpit windshield center-post, which could lead to loss of structural integrity of the airplane.
77-14-02: 77-14-02 SOCIETE NATIONALE INDUSTRIELLE AEROSPATIALE: Amendment 39- 2950. Applies to Puma Model SA 330F and SA 330G helicopters that have not been modified in accordance with Puma Service Bulletin No. 53.13. Compliance is required within the next 50 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 50 hours time in service since the last inspection, until accomplishment of Puma Service Bulletin No. 53.13, dated May 29, 1974, or an FAA- approved equivalent. To prevent possible failure of the forward engine mount support structure, accomplish the following: (a) Inspect for cracks in beams under attachment fittings for the forward engine mounts located between frames 3245 and 3550 in accordance with subparagraph 1C(1) of Puma Service Bulletin No. 05.35, dated April 9, 1974, or an FAA-approved equivalent. (b) If cracks are found which exceed the criteria for continued service set forth in subparagraph 1C(2) of PumaService Bulletin No. 05.35, before further flight, except that the helicopter may be flown in accordance with FAR Sections 21.197 and 21.199, to a base where the work can be performed, replace the beams in accordance with Puma Service Bulletin No. 53.13, dated May 29, 1974, or an equivalent approved by the Chief, Aircraft Certification Staff, FAA, Europe, Africa, and Middle East Region, c/o American Embassy, APO, New York, N.Y. 09667. This amendment becomes effective August 1, 1977.
2013-20-16: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for MDHI Model MD900 helicopters with certain main rotor blade (MRB) retention bolts (bolts) installed. This AD requires a daily check of the position of each bolt, a daily check and a repetitive inspection for a gap in each bolt, and, if necessary, removing and inspecting the bolt for a crack and replacing any cracked bolt with an airworthy bolt. This AD was prompted by multiple reports of in-service bolt failures. The actions are intended to prevent failure of a bolt, which could lead to loss of MRB structural integrity and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
2013-20-15: We are superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 97-19-10 for Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation-manufactured Model S-64E helicopters (type certificate currently held by Erickson Air-Crane Incorporated (Erickson)). AD 97-19-10 required inspecting and reworking the main gearbox (MGB) assembly second stage lower planetary plate (plate). This action establishes or reduces the life limits for certain flight- critical components, removes from service various parts, requires repetitive inspections and other corrective actions, and requires replacing any cracked part discovered during an inspection. This AD is prompted by further analysis performed by the current type certificate holder and the service history of certain parts. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent a crack in a flight critical component, failure of a critical part, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
2013-20-10: We are superseding airworthiness directive (AD) 2000-12-11, for certain Model A300 B4-600 and Model A300 B4-600R series airplanes. AD 2000-12-11 required repetitive inspections to detect cracks in the bolt holes inboard and outboard of rib 9 on the bottom booms of the front and rear wing spars, and repair if necessary. This new AD reduces the initial inspection compliance time and repetitive inspection interval. This AD was prompted by a fleet survey and an updated fatigue and damage tolerance analysis indicating a high risk for fatigue cracking on the front and rear spar bottom booms. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct fatigue cracks in the bolt holes of the wing spars, which could result in reduced structural integrity of a wing spar.
76-07-13: 76-07-13 HAMBURGER FLUGZEUGBAU GmbH: Amendment 39-2579. Applies to Model HFB-320 airplanes, S/N 1021 thru 1023, 1026 thru 1028, 1030 thru 1040, 1045, and 1049 thru 1057, certificated in all categories. Compliance is required within the next 25 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To detect possible incorrect adjustment of camlocks that could result in cracking of the camlock housing, possible inadvertent opening of the door, and inflight explosive decompression, accomplish the following: (a) Inspect the camlocks for correct adjustment in accordance with the accomplishment instructions contained in Section B, Part 1, of HFB Hansa Alert Service Bulletin 53-21A, dated October 13, 1975, as revised January 20, 1976, or an FAA-approved equivalent. (b) If a camlock is found out of adjustment beyond the tolerances specified in HFB Hansa Alert Service Bulletin 53-21A, dated October 13, 1975, as revised January 20, 1976,or an FAA-approved equivalent, rectify the camlock adjustment in accordance with the accomplishment instructions contained in Section B, Part 2, of Service Bulletin 53-21A, dated October 13, 1975, as revised January 20, 1976, or an FAA-approved equivalent. (c) Inspect the door frame camlock housings, which house the camlocks for which adjustment is required in accordance with paragraph (b) of this AD, for cracks, using a dye penetrant method in accordance with the instructions contained in Section B, Part 3, of HFB Hansa Alert Service Bulletin 53-21A, dated October 13, 1975, as revised January 20, 1976, or an FAA-approved equivalent. (d) If any cracks are found in the door frame camlock housing during the inspection required by paragraph (c) of this AD, before further flight, except that the aircraft may be flown unpressurized in accordance with FAR's 21.197 and 21.199 to a base where the replacement can be accomplished, replace the camlock housing with a new part of the samepart number. This amendment becomes effective, April 26, 1976.
2013-22-07: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 747-400 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of fasteners missing on an airplane undergoing a passenger- to-freighter conversion. This AD requires doing a general visual inspection of the station 1920 splice clip for correct fastener installation, and related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct missing or incorrect fasteners, which can lead to cracking and loss of load carrying capacity, resulting in a possible decompression event.
90-21-03: 90-21-03 BELL HELICOPTER TEXTRON, INC. (BHTI): Amendment 39-7072. Docket No. 90-ASW-44. Final Rule of Priority Letter AD 90-21-03. Applicability: All BHTI Model 206A, 206A-1, 206B, 206B-1, 206L, 206L-1 and 206L-3 helicopters, certificated in any category, with tail rotor blade assembly, P/N 206-016-201-125 or - 127. Compliance: Required before further flight, unless already accomplished. To prevent the loss of a tip weight, failure of the tail rotor blade assembly, loss of the tail rotor hub assembly and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter, accomplish the following: (a) Before further flight, inspect the aircraft to determine the part number and serial number of the installed tail rotor blade assembly. If P/N 206-016-201-125 or -127 with a serial number listed below is installed on the helicopter, remove and replace the assembly with an airworthy blade assembly. For 206-016-201-127 T/R BLADE CS-0203 CS-0206 CS-0238 CS-0985 CS-1141 CS-1153 CS- 1207 CS-1210 CS-1219 CS-1229 CS-1232 CS-1235 CS-1252 CS- 1304 CS-1306 CS-1316 CS-1325 CS-1332 CS-1337 CS-1342 CS- 1351 CS-1354 CS-1359 CS-1360 CS-1368 CS-1373 CS-1375 CS- 1380 CS-1391 CS-1461 CS-1466 CS-1476 CS-1489 CS-1519 CS- 1523 CS-1524 CS-1525 CS-1528 CS-1533 CS-1544 CS-1553 CS- 1555 CS-1556 CS-1557 CS-1559 CS-1563 CS-1564 CS-1566 CS- 1577 CS-1579 CS-1580 CS-1584 CS-1585 CS-1588 CS-1594 CS- 1597 CS-1599 CS-1612 CS-1614 CS-1635 CS-1642 CS-1647 CS-1656 CS-1670 CS-1673 CS-1685 CS-1705 CS-1716 CS-1726 CS- 1733 CS-1734 CS-1737 CS-1740 CS-1744 CS-1745 CS-1754 CS- 1756 CS-1760 CS-1771 CS-1778 CS-1784 CS-1827 CS-1830 CS- 1842 CS-1844 CS-1855 CS-1856 CS-1881 CS-1890 CS-1893 CS- 1894 CS-1900 CS-1901 CS-1907 CS-1909 CS-1913 CS-1914 CS- 1940 CS-1944 CS-1953 CS-1957 CS-1958 CS-1958 CS-1959 CS- 1961 CS-1978 CS-1979 CS-1981 CS-1982 CS-1983 CS-1985 CS- 1986CS-1989 CS-1994 CS-1997 CS-1998 CS-2000 CS-2003 CS- 2007 CS-2016 CS-2019 CS-2027 CS-2033 CS-2037 CS-2088 T-47310 T-47361 T-47371 T-47378 T-47397 T-47398 T- 47401 T-47426 T-47458 For 206-016-201-125 T/R BLADE CS-136 CS-158 CS-398 CS-534 CS-625 CS-658 CS- 684 CS-685 CS-688 CS-690 CS-711 CS-715 CS-716 CS- 719 CS-720 CS-738 CS-740 CS-752 CS-807 CS-832 CS- 865 CS-871 CS-874 T-61995 (b) An alternate method of compliance which provides an equivalent level of safety, may be used if approved by the Manager, Rotorcraft Certification Office, Southwest Region, Federal Aviation Administration, Fort Worth, Texas 76193-0170, telephone (817) 624-5170. This amendment (39-7072, AD 90-21-03) becomes effective on August 14, 1991, as to all persons except those persons to whom it was made immediately effective by Priority Letter AD 90-21-03 issued October 5, 1990, which contained this amendment.
91-26-02: 91-26-02 BOEING OF CANADA, LTD., DE HAVILLAND DIVISION: Amendment 39- 8113. Docket No. 91-NM-183-AD. Applicability: Model DHC-8-102 and -103 series airplanes, serial numbers 3 through 287, certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. To prevent reduced engine-out takeoff and climb performance of the airplane, accomplish the following: (a) Within 7 days after the effective date of this AD, remove Supplement No. 21, dated May 30, 1990 (for Model DHC-8-102 series airplanes), or September 26, 1990 (for Model DHC-8-103 series airplanes), from the de Havilland Airplane Flight Manual PSM 1-81-1A. (b) Within 7 days after the effective date of this AD, revise the Limitations Section of the FAA-approved Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) by inserting the following statement. This may be accomplished by inserting a copy of this AD into the AFM. "Supplement No. 21, dated May 30, 1990 (for Model DHC-8-102 series airplanes), or September 26, 1990 (for Model DHC-8-103 series airplanes), of the de Havilland Airplane Flight Manual PSM 1-81-1A, is withdrawn. Use of engine bleed air during takeoffs and landings is prohibited." (c) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. NOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113. (d) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. (e) This amendment (39-8113, AD 91-26-02) becomes effective on December 23, 1991.
2013-21-02: We are superseding airworthiness directive (AD) 2012-24-09 for Lycoming Engines TIO-540-AK1A, and Continental Motors, Inc. (CMI) TSIO- 360-MB, TSIO-360-SB, and TSIO-360-RB reciprocating engines, with certain Hartzell Engine Technologies (HET) turbochargers, model TA0411, installed. AD 2012-24-09 required removing certain HET turbochargers from service before further flight. This AD also requires removing certain HET turbochargers from service before further flight. This AD was prompted by a report that an additional engine, the CMI LTSIO-360- RB, has the affected HET turbochargers installed. We are issuing this AD to prevent turbocharger turbine wheel failure, reduction or complete loss of engine power, loss of engine oil, oil fire, and damage to the airplane.
51-11-01: 51-11-01 MARTIN: Applies to All Models 202 and 202A Airplanes Except as Noted. Compliance required as specified herein. Compliance with this note cancels the requirements of AD 50-41-02. In order to comply with the recommendations of the Martin 202 Modification Board, the following items must be accomplished. In all cases, modifications which are demonstrated to provide a level of safety equivalent to that provided by the modifications listed herein will be acceptable in lieu of the listed modifications. Compliance required by August 16, 1951. 1. Decrease breaker rating for propeller anti-icing circuit to 5 amperes to accommodate No. 20 wire. (Applies to Model 202 airplanes only.) 2. Install negative pressure scoop on battery vent line. Compliance require by November 16, 1951. 1. Add manually operated charging valve in the emergency brake hydraulic system in accordance with Glenn L. Martin Co. Service Bulletin No. 185. Compliance required by December 1, 1951. 1. Provide circuit protection for voltmeter. 2. Provide circuit protection at main bus for generator tip light circuit. 3. Provide circuit protection for ammeter wires. Compliance required by February 1, 1952. 1. Install circuit breaker in circuit breaker panel with wire routed back to auxiliary bus control relay.
2013-20-09: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Bombardier, Inc. Model CL-215-6B11 (CL-415 Variant) airplanes. This AD requires replacing the panel assembly of the main distribution center (MDC) rack. This AD was prompted by findings of chafed power wires due to flexing of the MDC rack panel. We are issuing this AD to prevent damage to power wires, which could cause simultaneous loss of systems such as electrical power, pilot indications, and caution/advisory lighting systems, which are essential for safe flight.
2013-03-11: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus Model A300 B4-600, B4-600R, and F4-600R series airplanes, and Model A300 C4-605R Variant F airplanes (collectively called A300-600 series airplanes); and Model A310 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of cracking through the honeycomb core closed with phenolic resin. This condition could result in extended debonding and could adversely affect the structural integrity of the rudder. This AD requires inspecting to determine the serial number of a certain rudder and replacing the rudder with a new or serviceable rudder if necessary. We are issuing this AD to prevent extended de-bonding, which could result in loss of the rudder and consequent reduced controllability of the airplane.
77-21-06: 77-21-06 PIPER: Amendment 39-3058. Applies to Models PA-25, PA-25-235 and PA-25-260, Serial Nos. 25-1 and up, certificated in all categories. To prevent weakening of the fuselage steel tubing cluster in the area of the rear wing spar attachment due to corrosion of the fuselage tubing, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 30 days in service after the effective date of this AD or upon the attainment of a total of 1 year in service, whichever occurs later, unless previously accomplished within the last year and at intervals not to exceed 1 year from the last inspection, inspect the fuselage steel tubing cluster in the area of the rear wing spar attachment and repair if necessary, in accordance with the "Instructions" section of Piper Service Bulletin No. 551 dated April 22, 1977, or equivalent. The aircraft may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a base where inspection and repair can be made. (b) Equivalent inspections and repairs must be approved bythe Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Eastern Region. (c) Upon submission of substantiating data by an owner or operator through an FAA Maintenance Inspector, the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Eastern Region may adjust the inspection intervals specified in this AD. This amendment is effective October 19, 1977.
2013-19-13: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 747-100, 747-100B, 747-100B SUD, 747-200B, 747-200C, 747-300, 747-400, 747-400D, and 747SP series airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of worn or incorrectly assembled latches on main deck escape slides installed on airplane doors. This AD requires determining if the latches are correctly assembled; and doing corrective actions if necessary. This AD also requires, for certain airplanes, modifications to the escape slide/rafts and escape slides. We are issuing this AD to prevent a latch hook moving from closed to open in an escape slide/raft or escape slide, which could result in the escape slide/raft or escape slide not deploying correctly in an emergency, or releasing/inflating into the passenger cabin and causing injury to passengers and crew.
91-24-03: 91-24-03 PRATT & WHITNEY CANADA: Amendment 39-8088. Docket No. 91-ANE-36. Supersedes AD 90-24-05, Amendment 39-6812. Applicability: Pratt & Whitney Canada (PWC) PW123, PW124B, PW125B, and PW126A turboprop engines installed on but not limited to DeHavilland Dash 8 Series 300, Aerospatiale ATR72, Fokker 50, and British Aerospace ATP aircraft. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. To prevent a low pressure turbine (LPT) overspeed, that could result in uncontained disk failure, and subsequent damage to the aircraft, accomplish the following: (a) For PW123 and PW124B engines that have not been modified in accordance with any revision level of PWC Service Bulletin (SB) 21018, prior to the effective date of this AD, accomplish the following: (1) Within 5 days after the effective date of this AD, perform a turbomachinery magnetic chip detector (MCD) continuity check in accordance with PWC SB 20938, Revision 2, dated November 18, 1991. (2) Within 5 days after the effective date of this AD, perform a turbomachinery MCD functional check in accordance with PWC SB 20938, Revision 2, dated November 18, 1991. (3) Thereafter, at intervals not to exceed 25 flight hours since last inspection, perform the turbomachinery MCD continuity check specified in paragraph (a)(1) of this AD. (4) Thereafter, at intervals not to exceed 300 flight hours since last inspection, perform the turbomachinery MCD functional check specified in paragraph (a)(2) of this AD. (b) In addition to the requirements of paragraph (a) of this AD, for PW123 engines that have not been modified in accordance with any revision level of PWC SB 21018, prior to the effective date of this AD, accomplish the following: (1) Within 5 days after the effective date of this AD, perform a turbomachinery MCD airframe circuitry check in accordance with PWC SB 20938, Revision 2, dated November 18, 1991. (2) Thereafter, at intervals not to exceed 300 flight hourssince last inspection, perform the turbomachinery MCD airframe circuitry check specified in paragraph (b)(1) of this AD. (c) For PW125B and PW126A engines that have not been modified in accordance with any revision level of PWC SB 21018, prior to the effective date of this AD, accomplish the following: (1) Within the next 125 flight hours after the effective date of this AD, unless previously accomplished within the last 875 flight hours, perform a turbomachinery MCD operational check in accordance with the applicable engine maintenance manual. NOTE: Further information on the turbomachinery MCD operational check specified in paragraph (c)(1) can be found in PWC Maintenance Manual Part Number 3034932 for the PW125B, and PWC Maintenance Manual Part Number 3034922 for the PW126A. (2) Within the next 125 flight hours after the effective date of this AD, unless previously accomplished within the last 875 flight hours, perform an operational check of the turbomachinery MCD airframe circuitry and indicating system in accordance with the applicable aircraft maintenance manual. NOTE: Further information on the turbomachinery MCD airframe circuitry and indicating system specified in paragraph (c)(2) of this AD can be found in Fokker 50 Maintenance Manual, Chapter 77-33-00, for the PW125B, and BAe ATP Aircraft Maintenance Manual, Chapter 79-33-00, for the PW126A. (3) Thereafter, at intervals not to exceed 1,000 flight hours since last inspection, perform the turbomachinery MCD operational check specified in paragraph (c)(1) of this AD. (4) Thereafter, at intervals not to exceed 1,000 flight hours since last inspection, perform the operational check of the turbomachinery MCD airframe circuitry and indicating system in paragraph (c)(2) of this AD. (d) The initial inspections of paragraphs (a)(1), (a)(2), and (b)(1) of this AD need not be accomplished for those PW123 and PW124B engines previously inspected in accordance with AD 90-24-05. (e) Forengines that have not been modified in accordance with any revision level of PWC SB 21018, prior to the effective date of this AD, incorporate a new low pressure rotor balancing assembly in accordance with PWC SB 21018, Revision 2, dated November 25, 1991, at the next engine shop visit or by June 30, 1994, whichever occurs first. The incorporation of a new low pressure rotor balancing assembly in accordance with this paragraph constitutes a terminating action for paragraphs (a), (b), or (c), as applicable, of this AD. (f) For the purpose of this AD, an engine shop visit is defined as the induction of an engine into a maintenance facility for the conduct of any type of maintenance. (g) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Engine Certification Office, ANE-140, Engine and Propeller Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, FAA, New England Region, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts. The request shall be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Engine Certification Office. (h) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. (i) The inspections and modifications shall be done in accordance with the following Pratt & Whitney Canada service documents: Document Number Page Number Issue/Rev Date PWC SB 21018R2 1-36 Revision 2 11/25/91 Total: 36 pages PWC SB 20938R2 1-8 Revision 2 11/18/91 Total: 8 pages This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from Pratt & Whitney Canada, Technical Publications Department, 1000 Marie Victorin, Longueuil, Quebec J4G 1A1. Copiesmay be inspected at the FAA, New England Region, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, 12 New England Executive Park, Room 311, Burlington, Massachusetts, or at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L Street NW., Room 8401, Washington, D.C. (j) This amendment becomes effective on May 26, 1992.
78-03-01: 78-03-01\tBELL 47 SERIES AS MODIFIED BY STC SH357SW: Amendment 39- 3131. To preclude failure of the hopper upper support bracket, accomplish the following: \n\n\tWithin the next 25 hours flight time and at each 25 flight hours thereafter, inspect the hopper upper support bracket (P/N B630224) for cracks and/or deformation. If cracks and/or deformation are found, replace or repair. Inspections may be discontinued upon installation of Simplex Modification No. E201 (See Fig. 1), or equivalent modification or repair approved by an FAA Maintenance Inspector. \n\n\tThe manufacturer's repair, identified and described in this directive is incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the repair documents from the manufacturer, may obtain copies upon request to Simplex Manufacturing Company, 5224 N.E. 42nd Avenue, Portland, Oregon 97218. This repair document may also be examined at FAA Northwest Region, 9010 E. Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington 98108. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective March 6, 1978.
2013-19-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 737-600, -700, -700C, -800, -900, and -900ER series airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report of chafing damage to a wire bundle that was arcing to hydraulic tubing and caused by insufficient separation between the wire bundle and the hydraulic tubing in the main landing gear (MLG) wheel well. This AD requires an inspection for damage of wire bundles and hydraulic tubing on the right side of the forward bulkhead of the MLG wheel well; installation of new clamps; and corrective actions, as applicable. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct possible damage caused by insufficient separation between the wire bundles and hydraulic \n\n((Page 59799)) \n\ntubing to prevent electrical arcing in a flammable fluid leakage zone, which could lead to a wheel well fire.
90-09-10: 90-09-10 TEXAS INSTRUMENTS: Amendment 39-6565. Docket No. 89-ANE-38. Applicability: To circuit breaker Models 6TC6-7.5 and -10 and 6TC20-7.5 and -10, all with date codes 8150 and earlier. Compliance is required no later than November 1, 1990, unless already accomplished. (a) To prevent potential overheating of the applicable circuit breakers, replace Texas Instruments circuit breaker Models 6TC6-7.5 and -10 and Models 6TC20-7.5 and -10, all with date codes 8150 and earlier. These circuit breakers may be replaced with the same model numbers with the manufacturing date codes of 8151 and later. NOTE: The circuit breakers are installed in, but not limited to, aircraft manufactured by Boeing Commercial Airplanes and Lockheed Corporation. Service bulletins published to date, which may be helpful in identifying replacement circuit breakers, are as follows: (1) The Boeing Commercial Airplanes' service bulletins 757-24-0054, 747-24-2135, and 767-24-0060, all dated August 31, 1989. Their part numbers BACC18AC7 and BACC18AC10 are used to identify Texas Instruments Model 6TC6-7.5 and 6TC6-10, respectively. (2) The Lockheed Corporation service bulletin 093-24-134, dated August 12, 1987. Their part numbers LS10159-7 and LS10159-10 are used to identify Texas Instruments Model 6TC20-7.5 and 6TC20-10, respectively. (b) Upon submission of substantiating data by an owner or operator through an FAA Airworthiness Inspector, an alternate method of compliance with the requirements of this AD or adjustments to the compliance times specified in this AD may be approved by the Manager, Boston Aircraft Certification Office, Engine and Propeller Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, Federal Aviation Administration, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts 01803. This amendment (39-6565, AD 90-09-10) becomes effective on May 30, 1990.
57-12-02: 57-12-02 BELL: Applies to Model 47H1 Helicopters Serial Numbers 1349, 1351 Through 1360, 1362, 1363, 1365 Through 1371. Compliance required as soon as possible but not later than August 1, 1957. In order to prevent possible failure of the tail boom attach bolts the following inspection and rework should be accomplished. 1. Visually inspect the four (4) tail boom attach fittings 47-265-026-1 and -2 on the forward bulkhead to determine if all eight (8) bolt hole locations (2 in each fitting) have been spot faced. It is necessary to remove the baggage compartment floor section in order to make this inspection. 2. If it is found that any or all the bolt hole locations have not been spot faced, it is required that they be spot faced in accordance with the instructions given in Bell Mandatory Service Bulletin No. 116, dated November 9, 1956.
2013-19-02: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus Model A330-200, -200 Freighter, and -300 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report that a certain wire harness located in the tail cone has wiring of a narrower gauge than design requires. This AD requires replacing the affected wire harness. We are issuing this AD to prevent damage to the affected wiring, which could create an ignition source in an area that might contain fuel vapors, possibly resulting in an uncontrolled fire and subsequent loss of the airplane.
2013-16-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Eurocopter France (Eurocopter) Model AS350 and AS355 helicopters, to require inspecting for a crack in the control lever attachment yokes, and if needed, replacing the tail rotor gearbox (TGB). This AD is prompted by improper casting of TGB casing assemblies, which may lead to cracking. A crack in the control lever attachment yokes could cause a loss of tail rotor pitch control, and consequently, loss of control of the helicopter.
2012-12-13: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Model BAe 146 and Avro 146-RJ airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of baggage bay fire bottles that can be misassembled such that two squib electrical connectors can be cross- connected. This AD requires a general visual inspection of certain baggage bay fire bottles for correct connection and for the length of the wiring loom, modification of the wiring loom to certain squib connectors, and corrective actions if necessary. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct excessive wiring loom length and improper connection of the squib connecters, which in conjunction with a fire in one of the baggage bays, could result in the fire extinguishing agent being discharged into a wrong compartment and consequent damage to the airplane.