Results
2000-03-22: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 747-100, -200, and 747SP series airplanes, that requires repetitive detailed visual and ultrasonic inspections to detect missing, damaged, or broken taperlock bolts in the diagonal brace underwing fittings; and corrective actions, if necessary. This AD also requires eventual replacement of the aft 10 taperlock bolts with new bolts, which constitutes terminating action for the repetitive inspections. This amendment is prompted by reports of damaged, broken, and corroded taperlock bolts of the diagonal brace underwing fittings on the outboard strut due to stress corrosion cracking. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent loss of the underwing fitting load path due to missing, damaged, or broken taperlock bolts, which could result in separation of the engine and strut from the airplane.
92-20-06: 92-20-06 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-8380. Docket No. 92-NM-88-AD. Supersedes AD 91-06-10, Amendment 39-6929. \n\n\tApplicability: Model DC-9 and Model DC-9-80 series airplanes, and Model MD-88 airplanes; equipped with BFGoodrich, Aircraft Evacuation Systems (formerly Sargent Industries, Pico Division; formerly Pico, Inc.) evacuation slides, P/N 11331; certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. \n\n\tTo prevent obstruction or hindrance with the emergency evacuation of the airplane and possible injuries to the passengers and the crew, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tFor airplanes on which the evacuation slides have been modified in accordance with Section 2, Accomplishment Instructions, of BFGoodrich Service Bulletin 11331-25-226, Revision 2, dated January 4, 1991: Within 12 months after the effective date of this AD, modify the girt bar flap in accordance with Paragraph 2B of BFGoodrich Service Bulletin 11331-25-248, dated April 15, 1992. \n\n\t(b)\tFor airplanes on which the evacuation slides have not been modified in accordance with Section 2, Accomplishment Instructions, of BFGoodrich Service Bulletin 11331-25-226, Revision 2, dated January 4, 1991: Within 12 months after the effective date of this AD, install a new girt bar flap and firing line, and modify the valise, in accordance with Paragraph 2A of BFGoodrich Service Bulletin 11331-25-248, dated April 15, 1992. \n\n\t(c)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Los Angeles ACO. \n\n\tNOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any,may be obtained from the Los Angeles ACO. \n\n\t(d)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. \n\n\t(e)\tThe installation and modifications shall be done in accordance with BFGoodrich Service Bulletin 11331-25-248, dated April 15, 1992. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from BFGoodrich Company, Aircraft Evacuation Systems, 3414 South 5th Street, Phoenix, Arizona 85040. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the FAA, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3229 East Spring Street, Long Beach, California; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC. \n\n\t(f)\tThis amendment becomes effective on November 20, 1992.
2000-04-03: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Models DC-3 and DC-4 series airplanes that requires an inspection to determine the type of airframe pneumatic deicing boots installed. This amendment also requires revising the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) to include requirements for activation of the pneumatic deicing boots for those airplanes equipped with "modern" boots. This amendment is prompted by reports of inflight incidents and an accident that occurred in icing conditions where the airframe pneumatic deicing boots were not activated. The actions specified by this AD are intended to ensure that flightcrews activate the pneumatic wing and tail deicing boots at the first signs of ice accumulation. This action will prevent reduced controllability of the aircraft due to adverse aerodynamic effects of ice adhering to the airplane prior to the first deicing cycle.
80-22-12 R2: 80-22-12 R2 BOEING: Amendment 39-3951 as amended by Amendment 39-4577 is further amended by Amendment 39-4661. Applies to all Model 707, 720, 727, and 737 series airplanes certificated in all categories. Compliance time as follows: To assure the flight crew has positive warning when the leading edge devices are not extended for takeoff, accomplish the following unless already accomplished: \n\n\tA.\tOn or before March 31, 1983, except as provided for in paragraph C., below, install leading edge device logic that will provide aural warning when the leading edge devices have not been extended prior to takeoff in accordance with the following: \n\n\t\t(1)\t(For Boeing 707/720 Series Airplanes) Boeing Service Bulletin No. 3404, Revision 2, dated January 21, 1983, or other previous or subsequent FAA approved revisions. \n\n\t\t(2)\t(For Boeing 727 Series Airplanes) Boeing Service Bulletins No. 727-31-50, Revision 1, dated January 15, 1982, or No. 727-31-52, dated January 15, 1982, or other previous or subsequent FAA approved revisions. \n\n\t\t(3)\t(For Boeing 737 Series Airplanes) Boeing Service Bulletin No. 737-31-1038, Revision 3, dated October 29, 1982, or other previous or subsequent FAA approved revisions.\n \n\tB.\tAlternate means of compliance which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tC.\tThis modification may be delayed until December 26, 1983, for the Model 727 and 737 series airplanes, provided the following cockpit checklist procedure, as implemented by each operator, is FAA approved by the appropriate Principal Operations Inspector: \n\n\t\t"The Leading Edge Device (LED) annunciator panel must be observed and must indicate proper leading edge device position prior to each takeoff."\n \n\tD.\tModification of the airplane in accordance with paragraph A. or B., above, constitutes terminating action for this AD. Once the modification is completed, the special cockpit procedure described in paragraph C., above, may be discontinued.\n \n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to the Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. These documents may also be examined at FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington 98108. \n\n\tAmendment 39-3951 became effective November 24, 1980. \n\n\tAmendment 39-4577 became effective March 7, 1983. \n\n\tThis Amendment 39-4661 becomes effective June 21, 1983.
80-02-16 R1: 80-02-16 R1 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-3674 as amended by Amendment 39-5438. Applies to McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9-10, -30, and C-9 (Military) series airplanes, Fuselage Numbers 1 through 735, certificated in any category, equipped with the aft pressure bulkhead auxiliary emergency exit door (P/N 5910367). \n\n\tCompliance required as indicated, unless already accomplished. \n\n\tTo detect fatigue cracks and prevent failure of the auxiliary emergency exit door, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tWithin 500 landings after the effective date of this AD and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 4,000 landings or one (1) year whichever comes first, inspect by x-ray each auxiliary emergency exit door shear pin fitting assembly in accordance with McDonnell Douglas DC-9 Alert Service Bulletin A52-116, dated December 12, 1979. \n\n\t(b)\tAny shear pin fitting assembly found cracked must be replaced with an FAA approved assembly prior to further flight. \n\n\t(c)\tNew shear pin fitting assemblies installed in accordance with paragraph (b), of the same type design, must be inspected initially before 20,000 landings after installation and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 4,000 landings or one (1) year whichever comes first, in accordance with paragraph (a). \n\n\t(d)\tAccomplishment of modification in accordance with McDonnell Douglas DC-9 Service Bulletin 52-117, R1, dated October 6, 1982, or later FAA-approved revisions, constitutes terminating action for the repetitive inspection requirements of this AD. \n\n\t(e)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of inspections required by this AD. \n\n\t(f)\tAlternative inspections, modifications or other actions which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. \n\n\t(g)\tFor the purposes of complying with this AD, subject to the acceptance by the assigned FAA Maintenance Inspector, the number of landings may be determined by dividing each airplane's hours' time in service by the operator's fleet average time from takeoff to landing for the DC-9 airplane. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Director, Publications and Training, C1-L65 (54-60). These documents also may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 4344 Donald Douglas Drive, Long Beach, California. \n\n\tAmendment 39-3674 became effective January 28, 1980. \n\n\tThis amendment, 39-5438, becomes effective November 14, 1986.
92-02-01: 92-02-01 BOEING: Amendment 39-8137. Docket No. 91-NM-103-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model 747 series airplanes, line number 001 through 113, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent sudden decompression of the airplane, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tWithin the next 500 flight cycles after the effective date of this AD, unless previously accomplished within the last 1,500 flight cycles, perform an initial high frequency eddy current inspection of the doorstop support fittings at the forward edge of the number 5 main entry doors, in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-53A2326, dated December 20, 1990, to determine material type, if not known, and accomplish the following prior to further flight: \n\n\t\t(1)\tFor doorstop support fittings which have been determined to be made of 7075-T73 aluminum: No further action is required under the inspection requirements of this AD. \n\n\t\t(2)\tFor doorstop support fittings which have been determined to be made of 7079-T6 aluminum: Visually inspect the fittings for cracking in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-53A2326, dated December 20, 1990. Repeat this inspection thereafter at intervals not to exceed 2,000 flight cycles. \n\n\t(b)\tIf cracking is found as the result of the inspections required by paragraph (a) of this AD, prior to further flight, replace the cracked doorstop support fittings with doorstop support fittings made of 7075-T73 aluminum, in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-53A2326, dated December 20, 1990. Continue to reinspect any remaining doorstop support fittings made of 7079-T6 material in accordance with paragraph (a)(2) of this AD. \n\n\t(c)\tReplacement of all doorstop fittings made of 7079-T6 material in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-53A2326, dated December 20, 1990, constitutes terminating action for the repetitive inspection requirements of this AD. \n\n\t(d)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Seattle ACO. \n\n\t(e)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\t(f)\tThe inspection and replacement shall be done in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-53A2326, dated December 20, 1990. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. Copies may be inspected at the FAA,Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington, or at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L Street NW., Room 8401, Washington, D.C. \n\n\t(g)\tThis amendment (39-8137, AD 92-02-01) becomes effective on March 23, 1992.
2013-25-07: We are superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2007-18-09 for all Airbus Model A318, A319, A320, and A321 series airplanes. AD 2007- 18-09 required repetitive inspections of the upper support of the nose landing gear (NLG), and related investigative and corrective actions if necessary; and also provided an optional terminating action for the [[Page 54580]] repetitive inspections. This new AD adds installation of a new enhanced manufacturing and maintainability (EMM) braking and steering control unit (BSCU) standard, and adds airplanes to the applicability. This AD was prompted by a determination that previously allowed terminating actions no longer address the unsafe condition and that a new terminating action is necessary. We are issuing this AD to prevent landings with the NLG turned 90 degrees from centerline, which could result in reduced controllability of the airplane.
2010-17-10: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Several low pressure turbine (LPT) shafts have been found with cracks originating from the rear cooling air holes. The cracks were found at normal component overhaul, by the standard Magnetic Particle Inspection (MPI) technique defined in the associated engine manual. The cracks have been found to initiate from corrosion pits. Propagation of a crack from the rear cooling air holes may result in shaft failure and subsequently in an uncontained Low Pressure Turbine failure. For the reasons stated above, this AD requires the inspection of the affected engines' LPT shafts and replacement of the shaft, as necessary. We are issuing this AD to detect cracks, initiated by corrosion pits, originating from the rear cooling air holes, which could result in shaft failure and subsequently in an uncontained failure of the LPT and damage to the airplane.
2010-17-01: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: A PW617F-E engine powered twin engined aircraft had recently experienced an uncommanded power reduction on one of its engines. Investigation showed that the Fuel Filter Bypass Valve poppet in the Fuel Oil Heat Exchanger (FOHE) on that engine had worn through the housing seat, allowing unfiltered fuel and debris to contaminate the Fuel Metering Unit (FMU), resulting in fuel flow drop and subsequent power reduction. Pratt & Whitney Canada Corp. issued an Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) No. PW600-72-A66019 to inspect and replace any discrepant valve with the same type new valve. The inspection results confirmed that failure of a worn through poppet is dormant and it can affect both engines at the same time that could result in an unsafe condition on PW617F-E powered aircraft. We are issuing this AD to prevent uncommanded power reduction, which could result in the inability to continue safe flight and safe landing.
2000-03-21: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 767 series airplanes, that requires a one-time detailed visual inspection to detect discrepancies of the wire expando sleeve of the wire bundles adjacent to the landing gear control lever module; certain follow-on actions and repair, if necessary; and wrapping the wire expando sleeve with tape, or with zippertubing and tape. This amendment is prompted by reports indicating that the landing gear failed to extend on an in-service airplane, and that the landing gear control cable was severed on a second in-service airplane. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent interference between the landing gear control lever and wire bundles adjacent to the landing gear control lever module, and to prevent wire chafing and arcing between the landing gear control cable and adjacent wire bundles, which could result in the inability to extend the landing gear prior to landing.