Results
2009-15-13: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Honeywell International Inc., T5313 and T5317 series turboshaft engines. This AD requires initial and repetitive visual inspections and initial and repetitive ultrasonic inspections of combustion chamber housings (CCHs) for cracks. This AD results from eight instances of cracks in CCHs. Two of the instances resulted in an engine shutdown during flight. We are issuing this AD to detect cracks in the CCH, which could result in rupture of the CCH, leading to loss of engine power and damage to the helicopter.
2009-15-12: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 747-400 and -400D series airplanes. This AD requires installing new relays to allow the flightcrew to turn off electrical power to the in-flight entertainment (IFE) system and other non- essential passenger cabin systems through the left and right utility bus switches, and other specified actions. This AD results from an IFE systems review. We are issuing this AD to ensure that the flightcrew is able to turn off electrical power to the IFE system and other non- essential passenger cabin systems through utility bus switches in the flight compartment, in the event of smoke or fumes. The flightcrew's inability to turn off electrical power to the IFE system and other non- essential passenger cabin systems could result in the inability to control smoke or fumes in the airplane flight deck or passenger cabin during a non-normal or emergency situation.
82-01-07: 82-01-07 SIKORSKY AIRCRAFT: Amendment 39-4293. Applies to Models S-58/S-58T series helicopters certificated in all categories, including Military Type HSS-1, HSS-1F, HSS-1N, HUS-1, HUS-1A, HUS-1AN, HUS-1G, HUS-1Z, H-34A, H-34C, H-34J, CH-34A, CH-34C, HH-34F, HH-34J, SH-34G, SH-34H, SH-34J, UH-34D, UH-34E, UH-34G, UH-34J, VH34C, and VH-34D. To prevent possible fatigue failure of the horizontal hinge pins, replace main rotor head horizontal hinge pins, P/Ns S1610-23020-2, -3, and -4 with a serviceable part prior to the accumulation of 1,000 hours time in service or within 100 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later. Thereafter, replace horizontal hinge pin with a serviceable part at intervals not to exceed 1,000 hours time in service. All horizontal hinge pins whose hours time in service cannot be established are to be replaced with a serviceable part within 100 hours time in service from the effective date of this AD. Otheractions which provide an equivalent level of safety with this AD may be approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, New England Region. This amendment becomes effective February 1, 1982.
80-22-03: 80-22-03 BRITISH AEROSPACE, AIRCRAFT GROUP (formerly British Aircraft Corporation): Amendment 39-3945. Applies to Model BAC 1-11 series airplanes, certificated in all categories. Compliance is required as indicated. To prevent incompatibility between the bayonet connection of Fixed Sockets and Flow Selectors and the hose connection of oxygen masks which could preclude access to oxygen in the passenger cabin or the flight deck, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 50 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, check each Fixed Socket and Flow Selector, Normalair P/N's OP4730, 1205X000, 1930W000, or 1931W000 in accordance with either subparagraph (a) or (b) of paragraph 2.1.1 of British Aerospace, Aircraft Group, Alert Service Bulletin 35-A-PM5723, Issue No. 1, dated September 20, 1979, or an FAA-approved equivalent. (b) If it is found during the check required by paragraph (a) of this AD that a plug gauge or hose connector cannot be inserted fully into one or more Fixed Socket and Flow Selector - (1) Rework any defective Fixed Socket and Flow Selectors in accordance with paragraph 2B of Normalair Garrett Alert Service Bulletin 35-A23, Revision 1, dated November 26, 1979, or an FAA-approved equivalent; or (2) Label each such Selector "INOPERATIVE" in accordance with paragraph 2.1.2 of British Aerospace, Aircraft Group, Alert Service Bulletin 35-A-PM5723, Issue No. 1, dated September 20, 1979, or an FAA-approved equivalent. (3) Pending the accomplishment of paragraph (b)(1) or (b)(2) of this AD, either - (i) Install a portable oxygen breathing set at each "INOPERATIVE" Selector; or (ii) Restrict the operating altitude for the airplane to 8,000 feet or less; or (iii) Limit the number of passengers to no more than the number of operative selectors. (c) If any Normalair P/N OP4730, 1205X000, 1930W000, or 1931W000 Fixed Socket and Flow Selector is installed in an airplane after accomplishment of the check required by paragraph (a) of this AD, comply with paragraph 2.1.1 of British Aerospace, Aircraft Group, Alert Service Bulletin 35-A-PM5723, Issue No. 1, dated September 20, 1979, or an FAA- approved equivalent, on the newly installed Selector at the time of installation. (d) If an oxygen mask is installed in an airplane after accomplishment of the check required by paragraph (a) of this AD and the method used was that specified in paragraph 2.1.1(b) of British Aerospace, Aircraft Group, Alert Service Bulletin 35-A-PM5723, Issue No. 1, dated September 20, 1979, or an FAA-approved equivalent, comply with paragraph 2.1.1(b) with newly installed mask. (e) Within the next 1,200 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, comply with paragraph 2.1.1(a) of British Aerospace, Aircraft Group, Alert Service Bulletin 35-A-PM5723, Issue No. 1, dated September 20, 1979, or an FAA- approved equivalent, and rework any defective Fixed Socket and Flow Selector in accordance with paragraph 2B of Normalair Garrett Alert Service Bulletin 35-A23, Revision 1, dated November 26, 1979, or an FAA-approved equivalent. After rework has been completed, remove the "INOPERATIVE" marking from reworked selectors. (f) If any Normalair P/N OP4730, 1205X000, 193W000, or 1931W000 Fixed Socket and Flow Selector is installed in an airplane after accomplishment of paragraph (e) of this AD, comply with paragraph 2.1.1(a) of British Aerospace, Aircraft Group, Alert Service Bulletin 35-A-PM5723, Issue No. 1, dated September 20, 1979, or an FAA-approved equivalent, and rework, if necessary, any defective Fixed Socket and Flow Selector in accordance with paragraph 2B of Normalair Garrett Alert Service Bulletin 35-A23, Revision 1, dated November 26, 1979, or an FAA-approved equivalent, at the time of installation. (g) If an equivalent means of compliance is used in complying with paragraph (a),(b), (c), (d), (e) or (f) of this AD, that equivalent must be approved by the Chief, Aircraft Certification Staff, AEU-100, Europe, Africa, and Middle East Office, FAA, c/o American Embassy, Brussels, Belgium. This amendment becomes effective October 28, 1980.
2009-14-13: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI (two different MCAI) describes the unsafe condition as: FOCA AD HB 2002-271 was issued because the Nose Landing Gear (NLG) Right Hand (RH) upper drag link, Part Number (P/N) 532.20.12.140 was found broken on some aircraft due to fatigue cracking, and therefore a life limit of 4,000 landings was introduced. Recent investigation of a new occurrence revealed that the replacement part NLG RH upper drag link P/N 532.20.12.289 also suffered fatigue cracking, however on a different location. Complete failure of the NLG RH upper drag link could result in NLG collapse during landing. and This Airworthiness Directive (AD) is prompted by reports of several in-service cracked torque tubes. A reduced wall thickness produced during the manufacturing process has been determined to be the initial cause. Additionally, all the involved torque tubes have been found to show fatigue cracking problems. Such a condition, if left uncorrected, could lead to failure of the torque tube and result in loss of the steering control on ground and consequent unsafe condition. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
83-02-10: 83-02-10 BOEING: Amendment 39-4550. Applies to Boeing Model 747 series aircraft certificated in all categories. Serial numbers as indicated in the following service bulletins. \n\n\tWithin the next 3000 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless previously accomplished, modify the affected aircraft as noted below in accordance with the following service bulletins or later FAA approved revisions: \n\n\t1.\tApplies to aircraft listed in Boeing 747 Service Bulletin 27-2065 dated February 22, 1971. To prevent icing of the aileron control cables in the right wing gear wheel well, modify the aircraft in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing 747 Service Bulletin 27- 2065 dated February 22, 1971. \n\n\t2.\tApplies to aircraft listed in Boeing 747 Service Bulletin 27-2095 dated June 5, 1972. To prevent icing of the aileron control cables in the left wing gear wheel well, modify the aircraft in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing747 Service Bulletin 27-2095 dated June 5, 1972. \n\n\t3.\tApplies to aircraft listed in Boeing 747 Service Bulletin 27-2161 dated March 4, 1977. To prevent icing of the aileron control cables in the left wing gear wheel well, modify the aircraft in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing 747 Service Bulletin 27- 2161 dated March 4, 1977. \n\n\t4.\tApplies to aircraft listed in Boeing 747 Service Bulletin 51-2032 dated November 20, 1981. To prevent icing of the aileron control cables in the left wing gear wheel well, modify the aircraft by installation of an MS28778-8 "O" ring or replace the knurled nut with an AN818L- 10 nut in accordance with Boeing 747 Service Bulletin 51-2032 dated November 20, 1981. \n\n\t5.\tAlternate means of compliance with this AD which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\t6.\tAircraft may be ferried to a base for maintenance in accordance with Section 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations. \n\n\tThe manufacturer's specifications and procedures identified and described in this directive are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. These documents may also be examined at FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective March 31, 1983.
80-02-13: 80-02-13 AVCO LYCOMING: Amendment 39-3671. Applies to TO-360-C1A6D series engines serial numbers L-101-69A through L-264-69A except L-200-69A, L-246-69A and L-254-69A and all TO-360-C1A6D series engines overhauled (also known as remanufactured) by Lycoming prior to May 4, 1977. Compliance required within the next 50 hours in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To prevent possible loss of engine oil due to the failure of turbocharger oil drain flange P/N LW-14391, replace the turbocharger oil drain flange with oil drain flange P/N LW-16036 in accordance with AVCO Lycoming Service Bulletin No. 426 or FAA-approved equivalent. Equivalent methods of compliance must be approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Federal Aviation Administration, Eastern Region. Upon submission of substantiating data by an owner or operator through an FAA Maintenance Inspector, the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Eastern Region may adjust the compliance time specified in this AD. This amendment is effective January 22, 1980.
61-15-02: 61-15-02 FAIRCHILD: Amdt. 308 Part 507 Federal Register July 13, 1961. Applies to Type F-27 aircraft, all serial numbers (including FH-227 serial numbers). Compliance required as indicated. Because of cases of failure of the gimbal nuts in the wing flap actuating screwjacks which render the gimbal nuts unsafe for further use, the following shall be accomplished: (a) Until such time as the wing flap gimbal support installation is modified and new gimbal nuts are installed in accordance with Fairchild Service Bulletin No. 27-28 or equivalent, the following inspections shall be made within 100 hours' time in service since last inspected per Amendment 66, AD 59-26-4 and every 100 hours' time in service thereafter. (1) Check flaps for proper rigging in accordance with F-27 Maintenance Manual, Chapter 27, Subject 5, making sure that no preload exists between the inboard and outboard screwjack of each inboard and outboard flap. Lower flaps to approximately 16 1/2 degreesposition. Move flap up and down at the trailing edge and measure or sense with fingers for radial or linear play between screwjack and gimbal nut. If relative movement between the screwjack and gimbal nut exceeds 0.010 inch radially or linearly, the gimbal nut must be removed from the screwjack and the threads visually inspected for damage. Any indication of thread extrusion or roll calls for immediate replacement. If relative motion between the screwjack and the gimbal nut exceeds 0.030 inch linear or 0.045 inch radial, the gimbal nut must be replaced. (2) Conduct visual inspection for freedom of movement and lubricate all inboard and outboard wing flap gimbal nuts P/N's 27-165012-3, -4, -5, -6; P/N's 27-175023-3, -4; bushings P/N 27-165013-3, and spindles P/N's 27175017-21, 27-175022-3, 27-165011-21, 27- 165023-21. (b) When the wing flap gimbal support installation is modified and new gimbal nuts are installed in accordance with Fairchild Service Bulletin 27-28 or equivalent, the inspections specified in paragraphs (c) and (d) shall be accomplished. (c) Either the (c) (1) or (c) (2) inspection and lubrication procedures must be accomplished. The specified time period for compliance shall commence either at the time the modifications specified in paragraph (b) are incorporated or at the time of the last inspection per paragraph (a). (1) Every 125 hours' time in service, conduct an inspection per (c)(3) and lubricate all inboard and outboard wing flap gimbal nuts and screwjacks with grease, ANDEROL L-736 or equivalent, and lubricate universal joints and spindle gimbal nut bushings with oil, Spec. MIL-L-15016. (2) Every 150 hours' time in service, conduct an inspection per (c)(3). Every 75 hours' time in service, lubricate all inboard and outboard wing flap gimbal nut and screwjacks with grease, ANDEROL L-736 or equivalent, and lubricate universal joints and spindle gimbal nut bushings with oil, Spec. MIL-L-15016. (3) Lower flaps to 16.5degrees position and move flaps up and down at the trailing edge and check for axial and radial play between the screwjacks and gimbal nuts. If the relative motion between the screwjacks and gimbal nut exceeds the values listed below, the gimbal nut must be replaced prior to further flight except ferry flight in accordance with the provisions of CAR 1.76. Also, visually check the gimbal nuts in place on the aircraft for indications of thread extrusion or roll. If thread extrusion or roll is found, the gimbal nut must be replaced prior to further flight except ferry flight in accordance with the provisions of CAR 1.76. Gimbal Nut Axial Inch Radial Inch P/N's 27-165012-9, -10, -13, -14 0.035 0.030 P/N's 27-165012-17, -18 .050 .045 P/N's 27-175023-5, -6 .035 .030 (d) Every 600 hours' time in service after the modifications specified in paragraph (b) have been accomplished, the gimbal nuts must be removed from the screwjacks and visually inspected for damage. Ifthread extrusion or roll is found, the gimbal nut must be replaced prior to further flight except ferry flight in accordance with the provisions of CAR 1.76. (e) On all F-27 type (including FH-227 models) aircraft, the repetitive inspection and lubrication intervals required by (c) may be increased as specified in Fairchild Hiller Service Bulletin 27-46 (F-27), dated April 4, 1967, and 27-3 (FH-227), dated April 4, 1967, or later revisions approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Eastern Region, when the improved flap gimbal nut and actuating shaft are incorporated in accordance with these service bulletins, or equivalent modification approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Eastern Region. If wear is found exceeding the limits specified in these Service Bulletins, or if thread extrusion or roll is found, the gimbal nut must be replaced before further flight with an unused part of the same part number, or an equivalent part approvedby the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Eastern Region, except that the airplane may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a base where the replacement can be made. (f) Upon request of the operator, an FAA maintenance inspector, subject to approval of the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Eastern Region, may adjust the repetitive inspection intervals specified in this AD to permit compliance at an established inspection period of the operator if the request contains substantiating data to justify the increase for such operator. (Fairchild Service Bulletin 27-18A dated October 27, 1959, partially covers the subject of paragraph (a).) This supersedes AD 59-26-4. This directive effective July 13, 1961. Revised August 19, 1961. Revised September 6, 1961. Revised October 20, 1966. Revised August 17, 1967.
2009-15-01: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Hawker Beechcraft Corporation (Type Certificate previously held by Raytheon Aircraft Company) Model G36 airplanes. This AD requires you to inspect for any improper installation and/or chafing of the P60/J60 electrical connector, associated wiring, and fuel line and, if found, correct the installation and replace damaged parts. This AD results from reports of chafing between the wire harness/connector(s) and fuel line. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct chafing between the wire harness/connector(s) and fuel line. This chafing could lead to fuel leaking into the cockpit and fire in the cockpit if wiring arcs through the fuel line.
83-15-02: 83-15-02 AVIONS MARCEL DASSAULT - BREGUET AVIATION: Amendment 39-4689. Applies to Falcon 10 aircraft serial numbers 1 through 153 inclusive. Compliance required within sixty days after the effective date of this AD. To prevent possible malfunction of the passenger door mobile latches and the door opening in flight, accomplish the following, unless already accomplished: 1. Install the stops for the passenger door mobile latches in accordance with paragraph 2, Accomplishment Instructions, of Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aviation Service Bulletin F10 0190 dated October 24, 1979. 2. Alternate means of compliance which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. 3. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of inspections and/or modifications required by this AD. This amendment becomes effective August 1, 1983.
86-19-03: 86-19-03 HTL ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY: Amendment 39-5397. Applies to HTL Advanced Technology fire extinguisher discharge outlets as listed in the service bulletins and installed on Boeing Model 707, 727, 737, 747, 757 and 767 series airplanes and on Airbus Industrie Model A300 and A310 series airplanes.\n \n\tTo preclude the potential for separation of the fire extinguisher discharge outlet and misdirection of the fire extinguishing agent, accomplish the following within twelve (12) months after the effective date of the AD, unless already accomplished: \n\n\tA.\tComplete the physical and top view x-ray inspections of the fire extinguisher discharge outlets specified in HTL Advanced Technology Service Bulletins listed below, or later revisions approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region: \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nHTL SERVICE BULLETINS\nMFRS. S/B \n35203000-26-A-3\nRev. C\n6-15-85\n747\nENG/APU\n747-26A2108\n35203000-26-A-3\nRev. C\n6-15-85\n767ENG/APU\n767-26A0019 \n35203010-26-A-1\nRev. A\n6-15-85\n707 \nENG \n707-A3441\n35203016-26-A-2\nRev. B\n6-15-85\n737 \nENG\n737-26A1029 \n35203018-26-A-2\nRev. B\n6-15-85\n727\nENG\n727-26A0034 \n35203021-26-A-2\nRev. B\n6-15-85\n737 \nAPU\n737-26A1029\n35203022-26-A-2\nRev. B\n6-15-85\n727 \nAPU\n727-26A0034\n35203037-26-A-3\nRev. C\n6-15-85\n767 \nENG/APU \n767-26A0019\n35203038-26-A-1\nRev. A\n6-15-85\n767 \nCargo\n767-26A0021\n35203039-26-A-1\nRev. A\n6-15-85\n767 \nENG/APU\n767-26A0019\n35203040-26-A-1\nRev. A\n6-15-85\n767 \nENG/APU\n767-26A0019\n35289950-26-A-1\nRev. A\n6-15-85\n747 \nENG/APU\n747-26A2110\n35289950-26-A-1\nRev. A\n6-15-85\n757 \nCargo\n757-26A0010 \n35289950-26-A-1\nRev. A\n6-15-85\n767 \nCargo\n767-26A0021 \n35290250-26-A-2\nRev. B\n6-15-85\n747 \nAPU\n747-26A2108\n\n\n\tB.\tIf a discharge outlet does not meet the criterion for acceptability specified in the above bulletins, replace with a serviceable unit before further flight. \n\n\tC.\tFor discharge outlets that meet the criterion for acceptance specified in the above service bulletins, accomplish the reidentification in accordance with the accomplishment instructions therein. \n\n\tD.\tRemove and replace the fire extinguisher discharge outlets specified in the HTL Advanced Technology Service Bulletins listed below, or later revisions approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\n\nHTL SERVICE BULLETINS\n\n\nMFRS. S/B\n33600005-1-26-1\nRev.\n10-15-84\nA300/APU\nA300-26-048\n33600005-1-26-1\n-\n10-15-84\nA310/APU\nA310-26-2004\n33600005-2-26-2\n-\n10-15-84\nA310/APU\nA310-26-2004\n35203030-26-A-1\n-\n8-31-84\nA310 ENG\nA310-26-2003\n\n\tE.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD.\n \n\tF.\tAlternate means of compliance which provide an acceptable level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region.\n \n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to HTL Advanced Technology, 1800 Highland Avenue, Duarte, California 91010, Attention: John Hansen, Director of Quality Assurance. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 4344 Donald Douglas Drive, Long Beach, California.\n \n\tThis amendment becomes effective September 26, 1986.
2009-15-04: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Several reports have been received from A330 and A340 operators concerning chafing of the electrical harness behind the lavatory, located at L (level) 53, resulting in a number of short-circuits. This harness contains cables for lighting, plugs, loudspeakers and oxygen controls and indications. This condition, if not corrected, could lead to the short circuit of wires dedicated to oxygen, which, in case of emergency, could result in a large number of passenger oxygen masks (up to 32% of all seats) not being supplied with oxygen, possibly causing personal injuries. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2009-15-05: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Cessna Aircraft Company (Cessna) Models 208 and 208B airplanes. This AD requires you to measure the roll and the yaw bridle cable tension (adjusting as necessary) and to torque the clamp screws. This AD results from two reported incidences of slack bridle cables with the swaged balls unseating from their drum recesses. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct loose bridle cable clamps, which could result in the swaged ball unseating from the recess in the servo drum and contacting the cable guard pin. This failure could lead to very limited control of the rudder and/or aileron with consequent loss of control.
82-19-03: 82-19-03 SOCIETE NATIONALE INDUSTRIELLE AEROSPATIALE (SNIAS): Amendment 39-4460. Applies to Model SA330J series helicopters certificated in all categories that are equipped with main rotor spindles P/N 330A31.1122.03, 330A31.1122.06 to 330A31.1122.08. Compliance required as indicated. To detect possible cracks and to prevent fretting corrosion and possible cracking of the main rotor head outboard spindle lugs, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 10 hours' spindle time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, remove the spindles from the helicopter and inspect each main rotor spindle lug bore for cracks using a magnetic particle inspection method. (b) Within 750 hours' spindle time in service after inspection per paragraph (a) of this AD, inspect each lug bore for cracks using a dye penetrant or equivalent inspection method. (c) Within 750 hours' spindle time in service after inspection per paragraph (b) of thisAD, remove the spindle from the helicopter and inspect each lug bore for cracks using a magnetic particle inspection method. (d) Within 1,500 hours' spindle time in service after the effective date of this AD or at next overhaul of the main rotor head, whichever comes first, install spindles that have bushings installed in accordance with Aerospatiale Modification Instructions, AMS 07.43.078, or FAA approved equivalent. The inspections, paragraphs (b) and (c) of this AD, are not required after these bushings are installed. (e) Replace spindles having a cracked bore prior to further flight. Install serviceable spindles. (f) Alternative modifications or other actions which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Chief, Aircraft Certification Staff, FAA, Europe, Africa, and Middle East Office, c/o American Embassy, Brussels, Belgium. (Aerospatiale Service Bulletin No. 01.35 pertains to visual inspections and protective finish of the spindle lug bore.) This amendment becomes effective September 27, 1982.
2009-14-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: There have been several Stick Pusher Capstan Shaft failures causing the dormant loss or severe degradation of the stick pusher function. * * * Dormant loss or severe degradation of the stick pusher function could result in reduced controllability of the airplane. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2009-14-09: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: An internal review of design data has shown that the web of the left hand side (LH) stringer 13 near frame 8 might have been improperly trimmed on a few aircraft. If not corrected, possible crack initiations could occur in the upper stringer web, and therefore could impair the structural strength of the adjacent door stop. This latent failure could ultimately lead to the loss of redundancy of the door stops, thereby affecting the structural integrity of the fuselage. * * * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2008-16-10: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: The 3 supporting blocks [installed on hydraulic tubes] were made of Teflon, which is unsuitable material for this application. Excessive wear of the blocks was discovered on numerous aircraft, as well as several cases of chafing between the loosely supported tubes. In one case, hydraulic fluid was lost due to fatigue failure of an inadequately supported tube. Loss of hydraulic fluid causes subsequent multiple failures of hydraulically operated systems. Multiple failures of hydraulically operated systems (for the flight air brake actuators, brake system, right thrust reverser, etc.) could result in reduced controllability of the airplane. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
79-24-06: 79-24-06 MESSERSCHMITT-BOLKOW-BLOHM GmbH: Amendment 39-3622. Applies to all Model BO-105 helicopters, certificated in any category, incorporating tail rotor blades P/N 105-31742 or P/N 105-87161 that have not been modified in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions, paragraph 2.B., of Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm Alert Service Bulletin No. AB-16, Revision 1, dated December 22, 1978, hereinafter referred to as the Service Bulletin, or an FAA-approved equivalent. Compliance required as indicated. To prevent in-flight loss of tail rotor balance trim weights, and consequent imbalance of the tail rotor blades, accomplished the following: (a) Within the next 10 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, and thereafter following the last flight of each day upon which the accumulated time in service since the preceding inspection reaches 10 hours, until the modifications required by paragraph (c) of this AD are accomplished, inspect the tail rotor blades for condition in accordance with paragraph 2.A. of the Accomplishment Instructions of the Service Bulletin, or an FAA-approved equivalent. (b) If the inspection required by paragraph (a) of this AD reveals any cracks, or bonding separation that is unacceptable in accordance with the inspection criteria contained in paragraph 2.A. of the Service Bulletin, or an FAA-approved equivalent, before further flight, except that the helicopter may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a place where the required work can be performed - (1) Replace the affected blade with a serviceable blade of the same part number and continue to comply with the repetitive inspection and modification requirements of paragraph (a) and (c) of this AD; or (2) Replace both blades with blades of improved design, P/N 105-31743 or P/N 105-31744 after which paragraphs (a) and (c) of this AD do not apply. (See paragraph (d) of this AD.) (c) Within the next 100 hours time in service after the effective date ofthis AD, inspect the tail rotor blades in accordance with paragraph 2.A. of the Service Bulletin or an FAA-approved equivalent and before further flight - (1) If the inspection reveals any cracks, or bonding separation that is not acceptable in accordance with the inspection criteria contained in paragraph 2.A. of the Service Bulletin or an FAA-approved equivalent - (i) Replace the affected blade with a serviceable blade of the same part number and modify the tail rotor blade balance provisions of both blades in accordance with paragraph 2.B. of Accomplishment Instructions of the Service Bulletin or an FAA-approved equivalent; or (ii) Replace both blades with blades of improved design, P/N 105-31743 or P/N 105- 31744. (See paragraph (d) of this AD.) (2) If the inspection does not reveal any cracks or bonding separation that is not acceptable in accordance with the inspection criteria contained in paragraph 2.A. of the Service Bulletin or an FAA-approved equivalent, modify the tail rotor blade balance provisions of both blades in accordance with paragraph 2.B. of the Service Bulletin or an FAA-approved equivalent. (d) If tail rotor blades are to be changed in compliance with this AD, both blades must be of the same part number. (e) For the purpose of this AD, an FAA-approved equivalent must be approved by the Chief, Aircraft Certification Staff, AEU-100, FAA, Europe, Africa, and Middle East Region, c/o American Embassy, Brussels, Belgium. This amendment becomes effective December 10, 1979.
2009-14-04: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 737-100, -200, -200C, -300, -400, and -500 series airplanes. For certain airplanes, this AD requires deactivating or modifying the wiring to the outboard landing lights, until the wire bundles and electrical connectors have been replaced. For all airplanes, this AD also requires inspecting for any broken, damaged, or missing fairleads, grommets, and wires in the four electrical junction boxes of the main wheel well, and corrective actions if necessary. For certain airplanes, this AD also requires replacing certain wire bundles for the landing lights and fuel shutoff valves, and related investigative, other specified, and corrective actions if necessary. For certain airplanes, this AD also requires replacing of certain electrical connectors and backshell clamps. This AD results from reports of uncommanded engine shutdowns and burned and damaged wire bundles associated with the outboard landing lights and engine fuel shutoff valves. This AD also results from reports of damaged and missing grommets and broken and damaged fairleads in the electrical junction boxes of the main wheel well. We are issuing this AD to prevent a hot short between the outboard landing light and fuel shutoff valve circuits, which could result in an uncommanded engine shutdown. We are also issuing this AD to prevent corrosion of the electrical connectors of the wing rear spars, which could result in short circuits and consequent incorrect functioning of airplane systems needed for safe flight and landing.
62-02-03: 62-02-03\tBOEING: Amdt 389 Part 507 Federal Register January 19, 1962. Applies to Models 707 and 720 Series Airplanes Which Have Not Previously Been Modified In Accordance With Boeing Service Bulletin No. 1359, Dated June 30, 1961, (Service Bulletin No. 1359 Contains a List of Such Airplanes), and to Model 707 Airplanes on Which Retractable Dump Chutes Have Been Installed Per Boeing Service Bulletin No. 1200. \n\tCompliance required as indicated. \n\tIn order to prevent leakage through the secondary seal of the fuel dump chute when fuel is allowed to enter the manifold for any reason, the following modification shall be accomplished within 3,250 hours' time in service after the effective date of this directive: \n\tRemove the secondary fuel seal assembly, Boeing P/N 66-2538, and rebuild using new parts from Boeing kit, P/N 65-9566-1. Upon completion of the rebuilding, change the part number of secondary seal assembly to 69-16258-1. Use new "O" ring seal P/N MS29513-238 when installingsecondary seal assembly, P/N 69-16258-1. \n\t(Boeing Service Bulletin No. 1359, dated June 30, 1961, covers this modification.) \n\tThis directive effective February 20, 1962.
79-24-05: 79-24-05 EMPRESA BRASILEIRA de AERONAUTICA, S.A. (EMBRAER): Amendment 39-3619. Models EMB-110P1 and EMB-110P2, certificated in all categories. Compliance is required within the next 50 hours time in service, unless already accomplished, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 250 hours time in service. To prevent failure of the flap supports and possible loss of the flaps, accomplish the following: A. With the wing flaps extended, using a 10-power magnifying glass or dye- penetrant method, conduct an inspection of all the flap supports, part numbers listed below, installed on the wing and on the flaps, for cracks in the components near the attachment bolts. Flap Support Part Numbers 4A-2611.46.01 4A-2621.46.01 4A-2611.47.01 4A-2611.48.01 4A-2621.48.01 4A-2116.01.01 4A-2116.02.01 or 4A-2116.02.01N 4A-2216.02.01 or 4A-2216.02.01N 4A-2116.03.01 4A-2216.03.01 If any cracks are found, replace the component before further flight. B. Uponrequest of the operator, an FAA maintenance inspector, subject to prior approval of the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Southern Region, may adjust the inspection interval if the request contains substantiating data to justify the increase for that operator. C. Compliance with the provisions of this AD may be accomplished in an equivalent manner approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Southern Region. This amendment is effective November 21, 1979.
78-23-12: 78-23-12 PRATT & WHITNEY AIRCRAFT: Amendment 39-3315. Applies to Pratt & Whitney Aircraft JT8D-1, -1A, -1B, -7, -7A, -7B, -9 and -9A turbofan engine models not incorporating third stage turbine blade retention rivets, P/N 759351 or P/N 618749. Compliance required as indicated unless already accomplished. To prevent third stage turbine blade rivet failure which could result in failure of the low turbine shaft and/or noncontainment of turbine blade and vane debris, accomplish the following: 1. Inspect engines for proper position of the third stage turbine blade in the disk blade slot in accordance with the procedures in the Pratt & Whitney Aircraft JT8D Maintenance Manual, P/N 481671, Section 72-00, Borescope or Radioisotope Inspection of Third Stage Turbine Blade, or equivalent means approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, New England Region, prior to the accumulation of 3,000 hours time in service since installed in disk or within the next 600 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, whichever is later. Engines with no measurable third stage turbine blade mismatch or displacement must be re-inspected every 1,000 hours time in service thereafter. Engines with third stage turbine blade roots displaced axially more than .032 inch relative to the disk rear surface or engines with third stage turbine blade root platform rear surface displaced axially more than .032 inch relative to an adjacent third stage turbine blade root platform rear surface must be removed prior to further flight. Engines with third stage turbine blade mismatch or axial displacement .032 inch or less shall be subject to 300 hour repetitive displacement inspections. Engines with third stage turbine blade mismatch confirmed by an initial displacement inspection and two 300 hour repetitive displacement inspections during which there is no change in blade position, indicating blades were mismatched at last assembly, may then revert to the 1,000 hour repetitive inspection interval. NOTE: a. Mismatch of the blade relative to the disk or the blade root platform rear surface relative to an adjacent blade root platform rear surface is the result of manufacturing tolerance build-up. b. Displacement of the blade is axial movement of the blade relative to its position when originally installed. c. A piece of .032 inch safety wire may be used with the borescope technique as a guide to determine the position of the blade relative to the disk rear face or the blade root platform rear surface relative to an adjacent blade root platform rear surface. d. The rigid borescope and radioisotope inspection methods provide blade displacement information by comparing one blade root platform rear surface to an adjacent blade root platform rear surface. The flexible borescope inspection method provides blade displacement information by comparing the blade root with the disk rear surface. 2. Install by June 30, 1980, improved third stage turbine blade retention rivets, P/N 759351, in accordance with Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Service Bulletin No. 4592, Revision 1, dated August 20, 1976, or later revision approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, New England Region. Upon request of the operator, an FAA maintenance inspector, subject to prior approval of the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, New England Region, may adjust the inspection intervals specified in this AD to permit compliance at an established inspection period of the operator if the request contains substantiating data to justify the increase for that operator. The manufacturer's alert service bulletin identified and described in this directive is incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). All persons affected by this directive who have not already received this document from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Pratt & Whitney Aircraft, Division of United Technologies Corporation, 400 Main Street, East Hartford, Connecticut 06108. This document may also be examined at the Federal Aviation Administration, New England Region, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts 01803, and at FAA Headquarters, 800 Independence Avenue, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20591. A historical file on this AD which includes the incorporated material in full is maintained by the FAA at its Headquarters in Washington, D.C., and at New England Region. This amendment becomes effective December 20, 1978.
2009-14-08: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for GE CF6-80C2B5F turbofan engines. This AD requires removing certain part number (P/N) high-pressure compressor rotor (HPCR) stages 11-14 spool/ shafts before they exceed a new, reduced life limit. This AD results from an internal GE audit that compared the life limited parts certification documentation to the airworthiness limitations section (ALS) of the instructions for continuing airworthiness (ICA). We are issuing this AD to prevent HPCR stages 11-14 spool/shaft fatigue cracks caused by exceeding the life limit, which could result in a possible uncontained failure of the HPCR spool/shaft and damage to the airplane.
2009-13-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 747-400 and -400F series airplanes. This AD requires modifying certain thrust reverser control system wiring to the flap control unit (FCU). This AD results from a report of automatic retraction of the leading edge flaps during takeoff due to indications transmitted to the FCU from the thrust reverser control system. We are issuing this AD to prevent automatic retraction of the leading edge flaps during takeoff, which could result in reduced climb performance and consequent collision with terrain and obstacles or forced landing of the airplane.
80-07-04: 80-07-04 HILLER HELICOPTERS: Amendment 39-3722. Applies to Hiller Model UH-12D, UH-12E and UH-12 (4 place) helicopters including military models UH-23D, OH-23G, H-23F and turbine-powered models, equipped with main rotor blade assembly, Parsons P/N 2253-1101-03 or 2253-1101-04 certificated in all categories. Compliance is required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent fatigue failure of the main rotor blade anti-node bars accomplish the following: a. Before the accumulation of 2500 hours' time in service, or within 10 additional hours' time in service on main rotor blades with 2500 or more hours' time in service on the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs sooner, inspect the threaded ends of the anti-node bar per instructions specified in Part II accomplishment instructions of Hiller Aviation Service Bulletin No. 51-5 dated January 22, 1980, to determine whether the threads are rolled or cut. b. If the anti-node bar thread inspection ofparagraph (a) of this AD reveals that the bar has cut threads, remove the anti-node bar from service and replace with like serviceable part in accordance with paragraph 4.55 of the UH-12E Structural Repair Manual. c. If the inspection of paragraph (a) of this AD does not provide satisfactory evidence that the threads are either cut or rolled, remove the rod from service and replace with a like serviceable part. d. If the inspection of paragraph (a) of this AD reveals that the bar has rolled threads and the total time on the bar is less than 6670 hours, reinstall the bar in accordance with the instructions of paragraph 4.55 of the UH-12E Structural Repair Manual. Note: Caution; Use extreme care in reinstalling the anti-node bar assembly to ensure that the screws attaching the anchor nut to the anti-node bar are not sheared during insertion. Hand pressure is the maximum force allowed in installing the anti-node bar. e. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate rotorcraft to a base for the accomplishment of inspections required by this AD. f. Alternative inspections, modifications or other actions which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. This amendment becomes effective March 31, 1980.