Results
2005-20-19: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Model ATP airplanes. This AD requires one-time inspections for corrosion of the engine sub-frame tubes in zone 1 and of the engine attachment struts in zone 5, and corrective action if necessary. This AD results from reports of reduced thickness in localized areas of the engine sub-frame tubes due to corrosion, and reports that corrosion may also exist in the engine attachment struts in zone 5. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of the engine sub- frame tubes or the engine attachment struts, which could result in separation of an engine from the airplane.
94-09-15: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Airbus Model A300 series airplanes, that currently requires repetitive inspections of the aft bulkhead to detect cracks, and repair, if necessary. This amendment requires expansion of the inspection area and modication of the aft pressure bulkhead, which terminates the inspection requirements. This amendment is prompted by a tear down inspection conducted by the manufacturer, which revealed fatigue cracking in additional areas of the aft pressure bulkhead. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent potential loss of cabin pressurization.
2005-20-07: The FAA adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus Model A330-300 series airplanes. This AD requires reinforcing the structure of the center fuselage by installing external stiffeners (butt straps) at frame (FR) 53.3 on the fuselage skin between left-hand and right-hand stringer 13, and related investigative actions. This AD results from a report that, during fatigue tests of the fuselage, cracks initiated and grew at the circumferential joint of FR53.3. We are issuing this AD to prevent fatigue cracking of the fuselage, which could result in reduced structural integrity of the fuselage.
91-23-03: 91-23-03 AVIONS MUDRY & CIE: Amendment 39-8072. Docket No. 91-CE-58-AD. Applicability: Model CAP10B Airplanes (serial numbers 01 through 208), certificated in any category. Compliance: Required within the next 100 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To prevent engine stoppage caused by air entering the inverted flight valve, accomplish the following: (a) Modify the fuel system in accordance with paragraph 2. ASSEMBLY INSTRUCTIONS of Avions Mudry & Cie Service Bulletin CAP10B No. 13, dated May 14, 1991. (b) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. (c) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an equivalent level of safety may be approved by the Manager, Brussels Aircraft Certification Office, Europe, Africa, Middle East office, FAA, c/o American Embassy, 1000 Brussels, Belgium. The request should be forwarded through an FAA Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Brussels Aircraft Certification Office. (d) The modifications required by this AD shall be done in accordance with Avions Mudry & Cie Service Bulletin CAP10B No. 13, dated May 14, 1991. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from Avions Mudry & Cie, B.P. 214, 27300 Bernay, France. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Central Region, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, Room 1558, 601 E. 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri, or at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L Street, NW; Room 8401, Washington, DC. This amendment (39-8072, AD 91-23-03) becomes effective on December 10, 1991.
94-16-01: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Airbus Industrie Model A340-211 and -311 series airplanes. This action requires modifying the bonding leads on the fuel quantity indicating (FQI) probes or the temperature sensor, on the fuel low pressure inlet pipe next to the compensator, and on the jet pump. This amendment is prompted by results of a quality survey, which revealed that there may be insufficient clearance between several bonding leads and certain FQI system probes or the temperature sensor, and between the bonding leads and the FQI probes and the compensator. The actions specified in this AD are intended to eliminate such insufficient clearance, which could lead to electrical arcing and a resultant fire in the event of a lightning strike.
2005-20-05: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 767-200 and 767-300 series airplanes. This AD requires performing a general visual inspection to determine the part number of the I-beams of the center overhead stowage bin modules to identify I-beams having 9.0g (gravitational acceleration) tie rods attached and to determine the configuration of the center overhead stowage bin modules. For certain center overhead stowage bin modules, this AD requires installing support straps. This AD results from tests conducted by the airplane manufacturer. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of the attachment of the 9.0g tie rods to the center overhead stowage bin modules. This failure could result in collapse of those stowage bin modules, and consequent injury to passengers and crew and interference with their ability to evacuate the airplane in an emergency.
47-32-02: 47-32-02 BELL: (Was Mandatory Note 2 of AD-1H-1.) Applies Only to Model 47B Serial Numbers 2 Through 6 and 8 Through 28. Compliance required not later than next 25-hour inspection after September 15, 1947. The correct amount of fixed ballast for the Model 47B helicopters, as listed in Bell Service Bulletin 47C27, dated June 25, 1947, should be installed in accordance with the instructions also contained in that Bulletin. Compliance is required in order that the correct center of gravity range may be maintained.
47-32-12: 47-32-12 BELL: (Was Mandatory Note 12 of AD-1H-1.) Applies to Models 47B and 47B3 Helicopters. Compliance required not later than the next 25-hour inspection after September 15, 1947. In order to provide more strength in the lateral cycle control system, the disc links should be replaced with forward and aft links, 47-725-047. (Bell Service Bulletin 47C35 dated June 18, 1947, also covers this same subject.)
98-12-11: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain British Aerospace Jetstream Model 3101 airplanes. This AD requires modifying the emergency hydraulic hand-pump by increasing the length of the access aperture. This AD is the result of mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the airworthiness authority for the United Kingdom. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent difficulty accessing the emergency hydraulic hand-pump because of the current design, which, in the event of a hydraulic system failure, could result in the inability to operate the flaps and landing gear.
94-24-11: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. Model 206A, 206B, 206L, 206L-1, and 206L-3 helicopters, that requires a one-time inspection for cracks in the tail rotor drive shaft hanger bearing support brackets (brackets), and repair or replacement, as necessary. This amendment is prompted by reports of cracks in the bend radius of the brackets. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent misalignment of the tail rotor drive shaft, failure of the tail rotor drive shaft system, loss of control of the tail rotor, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
2005-19-25: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 737-100, -200, -200C, -300, -400, and -500 series airplanes. This AD requires repetitive eddy current inspections for cracks of the countersunk rivet holes in the lower lobe, adjacent to the radio altimeter cutouts; additional inspections, for certain airplanes, for cracks and/or corrosion; and further investigative and corrective action if any crack is found. This AD also provides an optional terminating action for the repetitive inspections. This AD results from reports of cracks in the fuselage skin of the lower lobe. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct fatigue cracks of the countersunk rivet holes, which could result in cracks of the fuselage skin of the lower lobe, and consequent rapid depressurization of the cabin.
47-51-07: 47-51-07 CURTISS-WRIGHT Applies to all C-46 Series aircraft. Compliance required not later than March 1, 1948, and each 1,000 hours of operation thereafter. Inspect the landing gear drag strut support structure inside nacelle to determine if landing gear drag strut No. 20-720-1018 attaching bolts at the 70 percent spar have loosened and if angle assembly 20-720-1024-1 and bulkhead assemblies 20-720-1021-1 and 20-720-1023-6 are loose. All defective parts, loose or sheared attachment rivets should be replaced and loose bolts tightened. To accomplish the above, it is necessary to remove one outer panel or provide an access door in order to gain access to the interior of the center panel. (Curtiss-Wright Service Information Letter No. 735 dated August 20, 1947, covers an acceptable wing panel door installation.)
48-44-02: 48-44-02 CURTISS-WRIGHT Applies to all C-46 Series aircraft. Compliance required at original certification and at every 7,500 hours of operation thereafter, or at the approved airframe overhaul period for air carriers. Check the center wing-to-fuselage attachment bolts, P/N AN 8-23A, AN 8-25A, and AN 8-31A, to determine that they are properly torqued. The proper torque value for these bolts is between 480 to 690 inch-pounds as per Curtiss-Wright Drawing No. 20-230-1000. For access to the 30 percent spar fitting, a 1 1/2-inch diameter hole can be cut in the wing center section lower skin beneath the fitting, just forward of the beam, and far enough inboard so that the resultant opening will be completely covered upon reinstallation of the wing foot fairing. This supersedes AD 47-51-06.
2005-19-12: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus Model A330-301, -321, -322, -341, and -342 airplanes; and Model A340-200 and A340-300 series airplanes. This AD requires repetitive inspections for cracks of the inboard lower flange and radius of the left- and right-hand outboard floor beams at frame (FR) 48, and related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. This AD also provides an optional terminating action for the repetitive inspections. This AD results from reports that cracks were found during fatigue tests at the attachment between the canted lower flange of the floor beam and the pressure diaphragm in front of FR48 on both left- and right-hand floor beams; and that an additional crack was found in the flange radius of the floor beam. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct such cracking, which could propagate and result in reduced structural integrity of the fuselage.
49-46-01: 49-46-01 DOUGLAS: Applies to All Models DC-4 and DC-6 Aircraft Equipped With Vacuum systems, Incorporating Oil Separators Other Than the Type Mentioned in Item 2.\n\n\tTo be accomplished not later than April 1, 1950.\n\n\tTo guard against the possibility of excessive air temperatures in the vacuum system discharge line, one of the following modifications must be accomplished to this system:\n\n\t1.\tInstall a fusible plug in the side of the vacuum pump discharger port at the right angles to the axis of the discharge port boss. Some pumps incorporate a plugged hole in the discharge port which may be enlarged to a 3/8-inch pipe tapped hole to accommodate the fusible plug. This plug should employ an AN 840-8D fitting with a binary eutectic mixture of 67.8 percent tim and 32.2 percent cadmium, which has a melting point of 351 degrees F. Figure 2 describes the design of such a plug. The 3/8-inch fusible plug fitting is intended for pumps such as the Model 3P-211 and 3P-485. For smallerpumps such as the 3P-207, and AN 840-6D fitting, incorporating the same modification as shown below, should be used. Incorporation of an overboard drain line clamped to the fusible plug is recommended but is not mandatory.\n\n\n\n\n\tBrass fittings of the same design as the above dural fittings are acceptable. On installations which do not use an overboard discharge line the possibility exists that the plug may damage other nacelle components if it can hit them upon being out of the adapter as high velocity. Therefore, if no overboard discharge line is provided, the installation must be made in such a manner that the plug will not be directed toward any vulnerable components when it issues from the adapter.\n\n\t2.\tReplace the present oil separator with a new oil separator, Genisco No. 40081 or equivalent. The new separator incorporates a pressure relief valve and can be disassembled for cleaning.\n\n\t(Douglas Service Letter A-129-T-1271/WB-11-Q-4, dated April 1, 1949, covers this same modification.)
2005-18-10: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 777-200 and -300 series airplanes. This AD requires modification of the splice plate assemblies installed under the floor panels at the forward and aft edges of the cabin aisle. This AD results from reports of cracking of the aluminum splice plates under the floor panels in the cabin aisle. We are issuing this AD to prevent loss of the capability of the cabin floor and seat track structure to support the airplane interior inertia loads under emergency landing conditions. Loss of this support could lead to galley or seat separation from attached restraints, which could result in blocking of the emergency exits and consequent injury to passengers and crew.
49-15-01: 49-15-01 AERONCA: Applies to All Models 11AC, S11AC and 11BC Aircraft. To be accomplished not later than July 1, 1949. In order to prevent the seat belt anchorage from failing during crash landings, it has been found necessary to modify the seat installation as follows: 1. If there is no need for an adjustable seat, the rear sliding lugs on each side of the seat should be bolted to the slide tube using 3/16- or 1/4-inch diameter AN bolts. 2. If the seat is to remain adjustable, two 1/8 7 x 19 steel snare cables looped around each end of the seat frame cross tube and the lower end of the vertical slide fuselage tube located aft of the seat should be installed so that they will be taut with the seat in the most forward position. Any approved type cable clamp may be used for joining the ends of the cable. (Aeronca Helps and Hints No. 42 covers this same subject.) This supersedes AD 49-13-01.
92-15-07: 92-15-07 TEXTRON LYCOMING: Amendment 39-8301. Docket No. 91-ANE-40. Supersedes AD 87-11- 09, Amendment 39-5902. Applicability: Textron Lycoming LTS101 series turboshaft and LTP101 series turboprop engines installed on but not limited to Aerospatiale AS350, Bell 222, and MBB BK117 helicopters; and Piaggio P166-DL3, Airtractor AT302, and Cessna 421 airplanes. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. To prevent fracture of the integrally cast power turbine (PT) rotor blade, which can result in engine power loss and uncontained engine failure, accomplish the following: (a) Perform a Type I, Method C fluorescent penetrant inspection of Part Number (P/N) 4-141-070-XX and P/N 4-143-010-XX PT rotors installed in engines, in accordance with the procedures in Textron Lycoming Service Bulletin (SB) Number LT 101-72-00-0093, Revision 5, dated January 15, 1990, as follows: (1) Inspect for PT rotor blade cracks within 50 hours time in service (TIS) or 300 PT cycles in service (CIS), whichever occurs first, since accomplishing the last inspection performed in accordance with AD 87-11-09. (2) Thereafter, reinspect for PT rotor blade cracks at intervals not to exceed 50 hours TIS or 300 PT CIS, whichever occurs first, since the last Type I, Method C fluorescent penetrant inspection performed in accordance with paragraph (a) of this AD. (3) Remove from service prior to further flight, cracked PT rotors found during the inspections required by paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) of this AD. Prior to returning to service, replace with a serviceable PT rotor. NOTE: For information on PT rotor cycle and counting methodology consult the latest revision to Textron Lycoming SB No. LT 101-71-00-0002. (b) Perform a Type I, Method D fluorescent penetrant inspection of P/N 4-141-070-XX and P/N 4-143- 010-XX PT rotors prior to installation into a PT module or prior to returning to service, in accordance with Textron Lycoming SB No. LT 101-72-00-0093, Revision 5, dated January 15, 1990. Cracked PT rotors found during this fluorescent penetrant inspection shall not be returned to service and must be replaced with a serviceable PT rotor. (c) For PT rotors P/N 4-141-070-XX and P/N 4-143-010-XX installed in LTS101-650C-3, LTS101- 650C-3A, and LTS101-750C-1 series engines, avoid continuous operation at certain PT operating speeds in accordance with Textron Lycoming SB Number LTS 101C-72-00-0131, dated September 17, 1990, Bell Helicopter Textron Alert SB 222U-90-30, dated December 21, 1990, and Alert SB 22-90-57, dated December 21, 1990, within 20 hours time in service, after effective date of this AD, as follows: (1) Avoid continuous engine operation at 97% to 98.5% power turbine (Np) speed, including autorotation and single engine operation. Operation in this speed range is only permitted for topping checks and when operations in this range are necessary to maintain safe flight. (2) Install a cockpit tachometer decal and add the temporary rotorcraft flight manual supplement in accordance with applicable Bell Helicopter Textron ASB No. 222U-90-30 or Bell Helicopter Textron ASB No. 222-90-57, as applicable. (d) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Engine Certification Office, FAA, Engine and Propeller Directorate. The request should be forwarded through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Engine Certification Office. NOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this airworthiness directive, if any, may be obtained from the Engine Certification Office. (e) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. (f) The PT rotor inspection and removal criteria, the establishment of the PT rotor speed operation avoidance ranges, rotorcraft modification, and rotorcraft flight manual revisions shall be accomplished in accordance with the following service bulletins: DOCUMENT NO. PAGES ISSUE/REVISION DATE Textron Lycoming SB LT 101-72-00-0093 1-4 Revision 5 1-15-90 including Commercial Service Letter CSL 063 R-1 1-2 Revision 1 5-31-91 Textron Lycoming SB LTS 101C-72-00-0131 1-2 Original 9-17-90 Bell Helicopter Textron Alert SB 222-90-57 1-4 Original 12-21-90 Bell Helicopter Textron Alert SB 222U-90-30 1-4 Original 12-21-90 This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5. U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from Textron Lycoming, Technical Publications, Department 30V, 550 South Main Street, Stratford, Connecticut 06497, and Bell Helicopter Textron, P.O. Box 482, Fort Worth, Texas 76101. Copies may beinspected at the FAA, New England Region, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, Room 311, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L Street NW., Room 8401, Washington, D.C. (g) This amendment becomes effective on September 2, 1992.
47-33-05: 47-33-05 BEECH: (Was Service Note 3 of AD-75777-2 and Service Note 1 of AD-765-1.) Applies to AT-11, C18S and D18S Aircraft. C18S and AT-11 Airplanes: Inspection required prior to certification or, if certificated, on next periodic inspection but not later than November 1, 1947, and each 100 hours of operation thereafter. D18S Airplanes (Serial Numbers prior to A-378): Inspection required each 25 hours of normal operation or each 10 hours where the airplane is flown for pilot's transition or instrument training. Inspect the horizontal stabilizer front spar and subspar for cracks at the points of attachment to the fuselage. At each annual inspection remove stabilizer and the stabilizer lower front skin panel and check for evidence of cracks. If cracks are found the center section of the main spar must be revised or replaced with one having the lower flange-web radius cutout approximately 2 inches from either end. Two 0.064-inch dural channels (404-186053) should be installed between the new attachment fittings (437-186095 and 6) and the main spar web. At the main attachment fittings and 0.032-inch dural doubler (404-186052) should be riveted to the lower skin, the main spar, and the center nose rib flanges. The forward part of the upper flanges of each stabilizer-fuselage attaching angle should be cut off as far back as the sixth screw hole. The corresponding 12 holes in the stabilizer should be plugged. A three-screw outboard section of the gang nut on each side of the stabilizer subspar should be removed and the corresponding holes in the No. 13 bulkhead angle plugged. The revision of the stabilizer attachments eliminates the necessity for further inspection for cracks except as made during the normal periodic inspection. (Beech Service Bulletin No. D-18-48 revised April 1, 1948, covers this same subject.)
2005-18-15: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Dassault Model Falcon 2000EX airplanes. This AD requires revising the airplane flight manual (AFM) to extend runway length limits for takeoff and landing. This AD also provides for an optional terminating action for the AFM revision. This AD results from an event in which braking efficiency was temporarily lost during landing, but was recovered after the flightcrew fully released and then reapplied the brakes. We are issuing this AD to prevent a runway overrun in the event of loss of braking function, which could result in injury to passengers or flightcrew and damage to the airplane.
48-25-03: 48-25-03 CESSNA: Applies to All 120 and 140 Aircraft. Inspection required each 100 hours of operation. Inspect wing drag wire system for loose or broken drag wires and inspect ribs for damage. Inspection openings should be installed aft of the rear spar just inboard of Rib 5 and just outboard of Rib 10 if not already installed. Drag wires should be rerigged if loose, or replaced if broken, and drag ribs should be repaired or replaced if buckled. No. 6 drag wires in the outer wing panel found broken are to be replaced with No. 8. Buckling of the intermediate rib flanges at the spar cutouts does not render the wing unairworthy; however, reinforcement with Cessna P/N 10004-58 is recommended. If the flanges are cracked the reinforcement should be installed. (Cessna Service Letters 27 and 39 cover this same subject.)
2005-17-17: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Turbomeca S.A. Arrius 2F turboshaft engines. This AD requires replacing certain O-rings on the check valve piston in the lubrication unit. This AD results from a report of a forced landing of a Eurocopter EC120B helicopter. We are issuing this AD to prevent an uncommanded in-flight shutdown of the engine, which could result in a forced autorotation landing and damage to the helicopter.
98-26-17: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to all British Aerospace Jetstream Model 3201 airplanes. This AD requires accomplishing both a routine visual inspection and either a detailed visual inspection or x-ray inspection of the main landing gear (MLG) bay auxiliary spar booms for cracks or fuel leaks on both the left and right sides of the airplane. This AD also requires obtaining and incorporating repair procedures for the MLG bay auxiliary spar where fuel leaks or cracks are found. This AD is the result of mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the airworthiness authority for the United Kingdom. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent wing failure caused by cracks or fuel leaks in the area of the MLG bay auxiliary spar booms, which could result in loss of control of the airplane.
75-17-32: 75-17-32 DETROIT DIESEL ALLISON: Amendment 39-2336. Applies to Detroit Diesel Allison Model 501-D13 series engines which incorporate P/N 6829072 second stage turbine wheels with the following serial numbers: KK14208 KK14421 KK14443 KK14460 KK15456 KK15484 KK14210 KK14422 KK14445 KK14461 KK15457 KK15485 KK14211 KK14423 KK14446 KK14463 KK15471 KK15486 KK14403 KK14424 KK14447 KK14464 KK15472 KK15487 KK14405 KK14427 KK14448 KK14465 KK15473 KK15489 KK14406 KK14428 KK14449 KK14817 KK15474 KK15490 KK14407 KK14430 KK14450 KK14819 KK15475 KK15492 KK14408 KK14431 KK14451 KK14821 KK15476 KK15493 KK14409 KK14432 KK14452 KK14822 KK15477 KK15494 KK14413 KK14434 KK14453 KK14823 KK15478 KK15495 KK14414 KK14435 KK14454 KK14825 KK15479 KK15496 KK14416 KK14436 KK14455 KK15451 KK15480 KK15497 KK14417 KK14437 KK14456 KK15452 KK15481 KK15498 KK14418 KK14440 KK14457 KK15453 KK15483 KK15500KK14420 KK14442 KK14459 KK15454 Note: At time of overhaul, some wheels have R1, R2, R3, R4 or R5 added as a suffix to the wheel serial number. The suffix should be disregarded in determining the applicability of this airworthiness directive. Compliance required as indicated. I. Remove from service wheels which have not been inspected since installation as new wheels, according to the following schedule: (a) Remove from service within 100 cycles from the effective date of this Airworthiness Directive, wheels with more than 6900 cycles. (b) Remove from service prior to exceeding 7000 cycles, wheels with not more than 6900 cycles, on the effective date of this Airworthiness Directive. II. Remove from service wheels which have been inspected by fluorescent penetrant method FP- 30A/ZL-30A at last inspection, according to the following schedule: (a) Remove from service within 100 cycles from the effective date of this Airworthiness Directive, wheels with more than 3900 cycles since last inspection or more than 9400 total cycles, whichever occurs first. (b) Remove from service prior to exceeding 4000 cycles since last inspection or 9500 total cycles, whichever occurs first, wheels with not more than 3900 cycles since last inspection or not more than 9400 total cycles on the effective date of this Airworthiness Directive. Note: If the method of fluorescent penetrant inspection used at last inspection cannot be determined, it must be assumed that FP-30A/ZL-30A was not used. III. Remove from service wheels which have been inspected by a fluorescent penetrant method other than FP-30A/ZL-30A at last inspection, according to the following schedule: (a) Remove from service within 100 cycles from the effective date of this Airworthiness Directive, wheels with more than 2400 cycles since last inspection, or more than 9400 total cycles, whichever occurs first. (b) Remove from service prior to exceeding2500 cycles since last inspection or 9500 total cycles, whichever occurs first, wheels with not more than 2400 cycles since last inspection or not more than 9400 total cycles on the effective date of this Airworthiness Directive. IV. or the purposes of this airworthiness directive, a cycle is defined as one takeoff. V. Detroit Diesel Allison Commercial Service Letter 501D13 CSL-234 pertains to this subject. This amendment is effective August 14, 1975.
2005-17-07: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus Model A320-111 airplanes and Model A320-200 series airplanes. This AD requires doing a one-time general visual inspection of the axle nut on each main landing gear (MLG) wheel for the presence of locking bolts and associated hardware; doing any related investigative and corrective actions as applicable; and submitting an inspection report to the manufacturer. This AD results from a report that an axle nut had separated from an axle on a main landing gear (MLG) wheel, due to missing locking bolts. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct missing locking bolts on the axle nuts of the MLG wheels. Absence of the locking bolts could result in separation of a wheel(s) from the axle and consequent reduced controllability of the airplane during takeoff and landing, and possible injury to people on the ground.