Results
98-08-11: This document publishes in the Federal Register an amendment adopting Airworthiness Directive (AD) 98-08-11 that was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of certain McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 and MD-11F series airplanes by individual notices. This AD requires opening the circuit breaker of the pneumatic sense line heater tape, installing an inoperative ring, and coiling and stowing the electrical wire to the circuit breaker of the pneumatic sense line heater tape. This AD also provides for an optional inspection, which, if accomplished, constitutes terminating action for deactivation of the pneumatic sense line heater tape. This action is prompted by a report indicating that, while an airplane was on the ground, fuel was found leaking from the fuel feed pipe of the number 2 engine due to inadequate clearance between the fuel feed pipe and the pneumatic sense line heater tape. The actions specified by this AD are intended to detect and correct such inadequate clearance, which could result in a hole in the fuel feed pipe caused by electrical arcing, and consequent fuel leakage and possible ignition of the fuel vapors.
98-09-02: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Systems (MDHS) Model 369 (YOH-6A), 369A (OH-6A), 369D, 369E, 369F, 369FF, 369H, 369HE, 369HM, and 369HS helicopters, that currently requires replacing overrunning clutch outer races (outer races) having certain heat treatment numbers. This amendment requires replacing all outer races with airworthy outer races, regardless of the heat treatment number, and is applicable to a particular model helicopter that was not included in the existing AD (Model 500N helicopters). This amendment is prompted by several reports of failed clutch races having heat treatment numbers other than the ones addressed in the earlier AD. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of the overrunning clutch assembly outer race, which could result in loss of engine drive to the rotor system and a subsequent forced landing.
2012-18-16: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Cessna Aircraft Company Model 750 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of direct current (DC) generator overvoltage events. This AD requires replacing the auxiliary power unit (APU) generator control unit (GCU). We are issuing this AD to prevent DC generator overvoltage events, which could result in smoke in the cockpit and loss of avionics and electrical systems.
2012-18-08: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Eurocopter France (Eurocopter) Model SA330F, SA330G, SA330J, AS332C, AS332L, AS332L1, and AS332L2 helicopters to require cleaning, inspecting, and lubricating each tangential gearbox (gearbox) and adjusting, as necessary, the fuel shut-off control lever. This AD was prompted by the jamming of one of two fuel shut-off control levers because of solidified grease in the gearbox. A companion gearbox had extensive corrosion. In case of an emergency, pilots may need to use the control levers to shut off fuel going into the engine and to shut off the helicopter's electrical power system. The jamming of the levers prevents the shut off of the engine fuel and prevents the parallel- mounted micro switches from switching off the electrical power system. These actions are intended to prevent the jamming of the control levers, which could prevent shut-off of the engine fuel and electrical power system during an emergency shutdown.
2010-11-05: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain AVOX Systems and B/E Aerospace oxygen cylinders, as installed on various 14 CFR part 23 or CAR 3 airplanes. This AD requires you to inspect for and remove substandard oxygen cylinders from the airplane. This AD was prompted by the reported rupture of a high-pressure gaseous oxygen cylinder, which had insufficient strength characteristics due to improper heat treatment. We are issuing this AD to prevent an oxygen cylinder from rupturing, which, depending on the location, could result in structural damage and rapid decompression of the airplane, damage to adjacent essential flight equipment, deprivation of the necessary oxygen supply for the flightcrew, and injury to cabin occupants or other support personnel.
2012-19-02: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus Model A330-243, -341, -342 and -343 airplanes. That AD currently requires modifying certain cowl assemblies of the left- and right-hand thrust reversers. This new AD requires removing certain C- duct assemblies of the left- and right-hand thrust reversers from service at certain designated life limits, and also adds airplanes to the applicability. This AD was prompted by new life limits on certain thrust reverser C-duct assemblies. We are issuing this AD to prevent fatigue cracking of the hinges integrated into the 12 o'clock beam of the thrust reversers, which could result in separation of a thrust reverser from the airplane, and consequent reduced controllability of the airplane.
74-10-09: 74-10-09 BOEING: Amendment 39-1838 as amended by Amendment 39-2825. Applies to Boeing Model 707-100 series, -100B series and -200 series airplanes certificated in all categories. \n\tCompliance required as indicated. To detect cracks in the upper wing splice plate and upper rib cap at wing station 360, accomplish the following: \n\tUnless X-Ray or low frequency eddy current inspected within the last 300 flights, X-Ray or low frequency eddy current inspect the upper wing surface splice plate and rib cap at wing station 360 within the next 25 flights after the effective date of this AD, on airplanes with more than 24,000 flights, or within the next 50 flights after the effective date of this AD, on airplanes with more than 17,000 flights in accordance with instructions in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin No. 3160 dated April 19, 1974, or later FAA approved revisions, or in a manner approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Northwest Region. If cracks are found, repair prior to further flight in accordance with Part VII or VIII or install external doubler in accordance with Part IX of Boeing Service Bulletin No. 2576, Revision 2, or later approved revisions or in a manner approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Northwest Region. \n\tThe Manufacturer's specifications and procedures identified and described in this directive are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). All persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents may obtain copies upon request to The Boeing Company, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. These documents may also be examined at FAA Northwest Region, Boeing Field, Seattle, Washington. \n\n\tAmendment 39-1838 became effective on May 10, 1974. \n\tThis amendment 39-2825 becomes effective February 21, 1977.
98-08-25: This amendment supersedes Airworthiness Directive (AD) 96-12-08 on certain Twin Commander Aircraft Corporation (Twin Commander) 500, 680, 690, and 695 series airplanes, which currently requires replacing the nose landing gear (NLG) drag link bolt with one that has been manufactured with the proper heat-treatment. This action will retain the requirements of AD 96-12-08, add an additional model and additional serial numbers to the applicability section of the AD, and require replacing bolt part number (P/N) ED10055 with bolt P/N 750076-1 on certain Models 690D and 695A airplanes. This action is prompted by a defective manufacture of a certain lot of drag link bolts used in the NLG. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent the NLG from collapsing caused by a failed drag link bolt, which could result in loss of control of the airplane during landing operations.
2012-18-09: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the Bell Helicopter Textron Canada Limited (BHTC) Model 407 helicopters. This AD requires you to replace tailboom-attachment hardware (attachment hardware), and perform initial and recurring determinations of the torque on the nuts of the tailboom-attachment bolts (bolts) at all four attachment locations. This AD was prompted by a review of the tailboom-attachment installation, which revealed that the torque value of the bolts specified in the BHTC Model 407 Maintenance Manual and applied during manufacturing was incorrect and exceeded the torque range recommended for the bolts. The actions required by this AD are intended to prevent an over-torque of a bolt, bolt failure, loss of the tailboom, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
2010-11-15: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: The Civil Aviation Authority of the United Kingdom (UK) has informed EASA that significant quantities of Halon 1211 gas, determined to be outside the required specification, have been supplied to the aviation industry for use in fire extinguishing equipment. Halon 1211 (BCF) is used in portable fire extinguishers, usually fitted or stowed in aircraft passenger cabins and flight decks. EASA published Safety Information Bulletin (SIB) 2009-39 on 23 October 2009 to make the aviation community aware of this safety concern. The results of the ongoing investigation have now established that LyonTech Engineering Ltd, a UK-based company, has supplied further consignments of Halon 1211 (BCF) to L'Hotellier that do not meet the required specification. This Halon 1211 has subsequently been used to fill certain P/N 863520-00 portable fire extinguishers that are now likely to be installed in or carried on certain TBM700 aeroplanes. The contaminated nature of this gas, when used against a fire, may provide reduced fire suppression, endangering the safety of the aeroplane and its occupants. In addition, extinguisher activation may lead to release of toxic fumes, possibly causing injury to aeroplane occupants. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
98-09-01: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain Gulfstream Model GV series airplanes. This action requires inspections and functional tests of the elevator Hardover Prevention System (HOPS) to detect any miswiring of electrical connectors, correction of any discrepancy found, and eventual modification of the HOPS wiring. This amendment is prompted by reports of incorrect matching of electrical connectors to the hydraulic deactivation valves of the elevator HOPS. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent the incorrect operation of the elevator HOPS, which could result in loss of control of the airplane
91-12-13: 91-12-13 DORNIER: Amendment 39-7024. Docket No. 90-CE-48-AD. Applicability: Model Dornier 228-100, Dornier 228-101, Dornier 228-200, Dornier 228- 201, Dornier 228-202, and Dornier 228-212 airplanes (serial numbers (S/N) 7005 through 7167, S/N 8002 through 8161, and 8163 through 8190), certificated in any category. Compliance: Required within the next 600 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To retain the reliability of the horizontal stabilizer electric trim system, accomplish the following: (a) Replace relays 4CC, 5CC, 8CC, and 9CC with improved relays and modify the electrical connections of these relays in accordance with the following: (1) For airplanes that utilize the autopilot and/or trim coupling option, perform the replacements and modification in accordance with the instructions in Dornier Service Bulletin No. SB-228-164, Revision 1, dated August 28, 1990. (2) For airplanes that do not utilize the autopilot and the trim coupling option, perform the replacements and modification in accordance with the instructions in Dornier Service Bulletin No. SB-228-160, dated December 18, 1989. (b) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. (c) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an equivalent level of safety may be approved by the Manager, Brussels Aircraft Certification Office, Europe, Africa and Middle East Office, FAA, c/o American Embassy, 1000 Brussels, Belgium. The request should be forwarded through an appropriate FAA Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Brussels Aircraft Certification Office. (d) The replacements and modifications required by this AD shall be done in accordance with Dornier 228 Service Bulletin (SB) No. SB-228-160, dated December 18, 1989, and Dornier 228 SB No. SB-228-164, Revision 1, dated August 28, 1990. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from Dornier Luftfahrt GmbH, Product Support, P.O. Box 3, D-8031 Wessling, Federal Republic of Germany. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Central Region, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, Room 1558, 601 E. 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri, or at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L Street, NW; Room 8401, Washington, DC. This amendment (39-7024, AD 91-12-13) becomes effective on July 19, 1991.
2012-18-17: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for all Pratt & Whitney Division (Pratt & Whitney) PW4052, PW4056, PW4060, PW4062, PW4062A, PW4074, PW4077, PW4077D, PW4084D, PW4090, PW4090-3, PW4152, PW4156A, PW4158, PW4164, PW4168, PW4168A, PW4460, and PW4462 turbofan engines. That AD currently requires initial and repetitive fluorescent penetrant inspections (FPI) for cracks in the blade loading and locking slots of the high-pressure compressor (HPC) drum rotor disk assembly rear drum. This new AD requires the same actions, requires replacement of the 13th, 14th, and 15th stage HPC seals with redesigned HPC seals as an additional action, and adds an optional terminating action to the repetitive inspection requirements by allowing replacement of the entire HPC drum rotor disk assembly with a redesigned HPC drum rotor disk assembly. This AD was prompted by Pratt & Whitney developing a redesigned HPC drum rotor disk assembly for certain affected engine models. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of the HPC drum rotor disk assembly, which could lead to an [[Page 57008]] uncontained engine failure, and damage to the airplane.
98-08-28: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to all Avions Pierre Robin (Avions) Model R3000/160 airplanes. This action requires replacing the top bolts in the front wheel fork assembly and the top bolts attaching the front landing gear to the engine mount. This AD is the result of mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the airworthiness authority for France. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent collapse of the nose landing gear, which could result in loss of control of the airplane during taxi and landing operations.
89-19-04 R1: 89-19-04 R1 BEECH: Amendment 39-6316 as amended by Amendment 39-6639. Applicability: Models 200 and B200 (Serials BB-2 through BB-1362); 200C and B200C (Serials BL-1 through BL-135); 200CT and B200CT (Serials BN-1 through BN-4); 200T and B200T (Serials BT-1 through BT-33); and 300 (Serials FA-2 through FA-206 and FF-1 through FF-19) airplanes equipped with wing fuel bay upper skin panels made with bonded (aluminum honeycomb sandwich) construction, certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished per AD 89-19-04 (Amendment 39-6316). To assure the continued structural integrity of the wing fuel bay upper skin panels, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 30 days after the effective date of this AD, check the airplane records or inspect the wing fuel bay upper skin panels (hereafter called "skin panels") for possible bonded (honeycomb sandwich) construction. Airplanes with serial numbers BB-2 through BB-613, BT-1 through BT-17, BT-19 and BL-1 through BL-6 were manufactured with a skin-and-stringer construction and are not affected by this AD unless bonded wing fuel bay upper skin panels were installed after manufacture. If the airplane has bonded skin panels, accomplish the following in accordance with Beech Service Bulletin No. 2040, Revision III, dated April 1990 (for civil registered airplanes), or Beech Service Instructions No. C-12-0094, Revision III, dated April 1990 (for military airplanes), as applicable: (1) If the skin panels are bonded and have blind rivets as shown in the shaded portions of Figure 2 in the service bulletin, inspect the skin panels for debonding within the next 150 hours time-in-service (TIS) or 6 calendar months, whichever occurs first. (i) If the skin panel has been previously repaired, per Beech Kit No. 101-4032-1S or 101-4032-3S, (A) and there is debonding, prior to further flight install an approved partial replacement panel per Paragraph (a)(3) of this AD. (B) and there is no debonding, prior to further flight reseal the blind rivets per instructions in Beech Kit 101-4048-1S and reinspect the skin panel for debonding within 6 calendar months, again within another 12 calendar months, and at 18 calendar months or 600 hour TIS intervals thereafter, whichever occurs first. (ii) If the skin panel has not been previously repaired, (A) and there is debonding, either: (1) prior to further flight install an approved partial replacement panel per Paragraph (a)(3) of this AD, or (2) prior to further flight install a temporary repair per Figure 1 of Beech Service Bulletin No. 2040, Revision III, dated April 1990, which can be used for no longer than 12 calendar months from the time of repair, at which time install an approved partial replacement panel per Paragraph (a)(3) of this AD. (B) and there is no debonding, prior to further flight resealthe blind rivets per instructions in Beech Kit No. 101-4048-1S and reinspect the skin panel for debonding within 6 calendar months, again within another 12 calendar months, and at 18 calendar months or 600 hour TIS intervals thereafter, whichever occurs first. (2) If the skin panels are bonded and do not have blind rivets as shown in the shaded portion of Figure 2 in the service bulletin, inspect the skin panels for debonding within the next 600 hours TIS or 18 calendar months, whichever occurs first. NOTE 1: The following airplanes were manufactured with bonded skin panels without rivets: Models B200 (above Serial Number BB-1238), B200C (above Serial Numbers BL-127), B200CT (above Serial Numbers BN-4), B200T (above Serial Numbers BT-30), 300 (above Serial Numbers FA-81 and all FF-serial numbers). (i) If there is debonding, either: (A) prior to further flight install an approved partial replacement panel per Paragraph (a)(3) of this AD, or (B) priorto further flight install a temporary repair per Figure 1 of Beech Service Bulletin No. 2040, Revision III, dated April 1990, which can be used for no longer than 12 calendar months from the time of repair, at which time install an approved partial replacement panel per Paragraph (a)(3) of this AD. (ii) If there is no debonding, reinspect for debonding at 18 calendar month intervals thereafter. (3) Approved partial replacement skin panels are defined by Kit Nos. 101-4045-3S (LH) and 101-4045-4S (RH). Compliance with this AD is no longer required for any skin panel modified by one of these kits. NOTE 2: These panels are bonded with Nomex honeycomb core and do not have rivets. (b) Airplanes may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a location where the AD may be accomplished. (c) An alternate method of compliance or adjustment of the initial or repetitive compliance times which provides an equivalent level of safety may be approved by the Manager, Wichita Aircraft Certification Office, 1801 Airport Road, Room 100, Mid-Continent Airport, Wichita, Kansas 67209. NOTE 3: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and send it to the Manager, Wichita Aircraft Certification Office, at the above address. All persons affected by this directive may obtain copies of the documents referred to herein upon request to the Beech Aircraft Corporation, Commercial Service, Department 52, Wichita, Kansas 67201-0085; or may examine these documents at the FAA, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, Room 1558, 601 E. 12th, Street, Kansas City, Missouri 64106. This amendment (39-6639) amends AD 89-19-04 (Amendment 39-6316) which superseded AD 87-17-05 R1, Amendment 39-5847. This amendment (39-6639, AD 89-19-04 R1) becomes effective on July 9, 1990.
81-18-02: 81-18-02 HILLER AVIATION: Amendment 39-4203. Applies to Hiller Model UH-12 series helicopters including military models H-23F and OH-23G, certificated in all categories. Compliance required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent tail rotor skin cracks, accomplish the following: (a) Prior to further flight after the effective date of this AD; 1) Visually inspect the tail rotor blades for skin cracks or loose rivets. If cracks or loose rivets are found, replace with like serviceable part prior to return to service. 2) Inspect the four vent holes in the tail rotor blades for obstruction as indicated in Part 2 of Hiller Aviation Service Bulletin UH-12-55-1 dated August 11, 1981. If either of the vent holes at the root end are found to be obstructed, remove the blade from service and replace with like serviceable part. If the root vent holes are found to be unobstructed, inspect the tip vent holes and clear of any obstruction prior to returnto service. (b) Prior to each flight after the inspections required by paragraph (a) of this AD, conduct a visual check to determine that the four vent holes are clear of obstruction. If obstructions are found, perform the appropriate corrective actions of paragraph (a) of this AD prior to further flight. NOTE: The checks required by paragraph (b) of this AD may be performed by the pilot. NOTE: For the requirements regarding recording compliance and method of compliance with this AD in the aircraft's permanent maintenance records, see FAR 91.173. (c) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes or helicopters to a base for the accomplishment of inspections or modifications required by this AD. (d) Alternative inspections, modifications or other actions which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Western Region. The manufacturer's specifications and procedures identified and described in this directive are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). All persons affected by this directive, who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer, may obtain copies upon request to Hiller Aviation, 2075 W. Scranton Avenue, Porterville, California 93257, telephone (209) 781-8000. These documents may also be examined at FAA Western Region Office, 15000 Aviation Boulevard, Hawthorne, California 90261 and at FAA Headquarters, 800 Independence Avenue, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20591. A historical file on this AD, which includes the incorporated material in full is maintained by the FAA at its headquarters in Washington, D.C. and at FAA Western Region Office. This amendment becomes effective September 10, 1981.
82-01-05 R2: 82-01-05 R2 GATES LEARJET: Amendment 39-4297 as amended by Amendment 39-4746 is further amended by Amendment 39-5245. Applies to the following models and serial number airplanes certificated in any category. MODEL SERIAL NUMBER 23 23-003 through 23-099 24, 24A 24A-011, 24A-012, 24-015, 24-019, 24-031, 24-043, 24-050, 24-051, 24-055,24-060, 24-065, 24-087, 24-096, and 24-100 through 24-180 24B, 24B-A 24-181 through 24-217, 24-219 through 24-229 24C, 24D, 24D-A 24-218, 24-230 through 24-328 24E, 24F, 24F-A 24-329 through 24-357 25D, 25F 25-206 through 25-336, 25-338 and on 28 28-001 and on 29 29-001 and on 35, 35A 35-001 through 35-505 36, 36A 36-001 through 36-053 COMPLIANCE: Required as indicated. A. To assure proper operation of the Stall Warning Accelerometer Unit, unless previously inspected in the last 200 hours time-in-service before the effective date of this AD, within the next 50 hours time-in-service, and at intervals not to exceed 220 hours time-in-service thereafter, perform the inspection of the Stall Warning Accelerometer in accordance with Gates Learjet Service Bulletins (SB) 23/24/25-301B, SB 28/29-27-3B, or SB 35/36-27-12B, as appropriate. Models 35 and 36 series airplanes incorporating Gates Learjet Airplane Accessory Kit 83-2 are exempt from the requirements of this AD. B. Airplanes may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a location where modifications required by this AD can be accomplished. C. Alternate means of compliance which provide an acceptable level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Wichita Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Central Region, 1801 Airport Road, Room 100, Mid-Continent Airport, Wichita, Kansas 67209. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Gates Learjet Corporation, P.O. Box 7707, Wichita, Kansas 67277. These documents may be examined at FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or FAA, Central Region, Wichita Aircraft Certification Office, 1801 Airport Road, Room 100, Mid- Continent Airport, Wichita, Kansas. Amendment 39-4297 became effective on January 8, 1982. Amendment 39-4746 became effective on October 31, 1983. This Amendment 39-5245 becomes effective on April 10, 1986.
2012-17-04: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Rolls-Royce plc (RR) RB211-Trent 800 series turbofan engines. This AD requires removing from service certain intermediate pressure (IP) turbine discs that have a serial number listed in this AD. This AD was prompted by RR performing an evaluation that determined that the current lives for certain IP turbine discs with a steel inclusion may fail before they reach their current mandatory life limits. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of the IP turbine disc, which could result in uncontained failure of the engine and damage to the airplane.
2012-17-10: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for various restricted category Model HH-1K, TH-1F, TH-1L, UH-1A, UH-1B, UH-1E, UH- 1F, UH-1H, UH-1L, and UH-1P helicopters with certain main rotor (M/R) blade assemblies installed, to require inspecting the grip plates, doublers, and upper and lower surfaces of the M/R blades in the area between blade stations 24.5 and 40 for an edge void, corrosion, or a crack. This AD is prompted by several reports of fatigue cracks on M/R blades installed on Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. (Bell) Model 212 helicopters. These same part-numbered M/R blades may also be installed on certain FAA-approved modified restricted category helicopters. These actions are intended to detect an edge void, corrosion, or a crack on an M/R blade, which could lead to loss of the M/R blade and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
98-07-07: This amendment supersedes existing airworthiness directive (AD) 96-13-04, applicable to Rolls-Royce, plc RB211 series turbofan engines, that currently requires removing and replacing a rigid low pressure (LP) fuel system tube assembly with a tube assembly incorporating flexible sections and revised clip points in order to preclude cracking and subsequent fuel leakage. This amendment requires replacing one of the flexible fuel tube assemblies installed in accordance with AD 96-13-04 with an alternate flexible fuel tube assembly that is not prone to rupture. This AD also requires immediate replacement of any rigid fuel tubes not previously removed from service as required by AD 96-13-04. The amendment is prompted by reports of fuel line rupture on one of the flexible fuel tube assemblies installed in accordance with AD 96-13-04. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent high volume fuel leaks and reported fuel collection inside the engine nacelle, which couldresult in an uncontrolled engine fire. The incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the regulations is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of April 29, 1998. Comments for inclusion in the Rules Docket must be received on or before June 15, 1998.
98-08-16: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Saab Model SAAB SF340A and 340B series airplanes, that requires a one-time inspection to detect discrepancies of the flight idle stop override mechanism, and corrective action, if necessary. This amendment is prompted by the issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent increased braking distance for landings that require the flight idle stop override, resulting from the combination of failure of the override mechanism and inability of the power levers to be moved below the flight idle position after touchdown.
2012-15-07 R1: We are revising an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for Glasflugel Models Standard Libelle-201B, Club Libelle 205, Mosquito, and Kestrel gliders. That AD currently requires actions to address the unsafe condition on these products. This new AD includes clarification that the replacement control rod has an additional drain hole at the rod bottom between the forks and is the acceptable configuration for compliance. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as corrosion damage to the elevator control rod that could lead to failure of the elevator control rod, possibly resulting in loss of control of the glider. We are issuing this AD to require actions to address the unsafe condition on these products.
98-08-17: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to various turbo-propeller powered General Dynamics (Convair) Model 240, 340, and 440 series airplanes, that requires revising the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) to modify the limitation that prohibits positioning the power levers below the flight idle stop during flight, and to provide a statement of the consequences of positioning the power levers below the flight idle stop during flight. This amendment is prompted by incidents and accidents involving airplanes equipped with turboprop engines in which the ground propeller beta range was used improperly during flight. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent loss of airplane controllability, or engine overspeed and consequent loss of engine power caused by the power levers being positioned below the flight idle stop while the airplane is in flight.
98-08-14: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) applicable to Eurocopter France (Eurocopter) Model SA-365N, N1 and AS-365N2 helicopters that requires inspections of the main gearbox suspension diagonal cross-member (diagonal cross-member) for cracks, and removal of the diagonal cross-member and replacement with an airworthy diagonal cross-member if any crack is found. This amendment is prompted by several reports of the discovery of cracks in diagonal cross-members. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of the diagonal cross-member which could cause the main gearbox to pivot, resulting in severe vibrations and a subsequent forced landing.
2012-17-12: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 747-400 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of water leaking into electrical and electronic equipment in the main equipment center (MEC). This AD requires modifying the floor panels; removing drains; installing floor supports, floor drain trough doublers, drain troughs, and drains; and sealing and taping the floor panels. We are issuing this AD to prevent water from entering the MEC, which could result in an electrical short and potential loss of several functions essential for safe flight.