Results
2020-22-06: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 99-01-19 and AD 2004-25-02, which applied to certain Airbus SAS Model A320 series airplanes. AD 99-01-19 and AD 2004-25-02 required repetitive inspections to detect fatigue cracking in certain areas of the fuselage, and corrective action if necessary. AD 2004-25-02 also provided an optional terminating action for the repetitive inspections. This AD continues to require, for certain airplanes, repetitive inspections of the fastener holes for any cracking, and repair if necessary, and provides an optional terminating action for the fastener hole inspections. This AD also revises the applicability to include additional airplanes and requires, for all airplanes, inspections of the emergency exit door structure for any cracking and repair if necessary; as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. This AD was prompted by a report that during full scale tests to support the Model A320 structure extended service goal (ESG) exercise, \n\n((Page 71241)) \n\nseveral cracks were found on both sides of the overwing emergency exit door cut-outs at fuselage section 15. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2003-22-09: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Pratt & Whitney PW4074, PW4074D, PW4077, PW4077D, PW4084, PW4084D, PW4090, PW4090D, PW4090-3, and PW4098 turbofan engines. This AD requires borescope inspection of the No. 3 bearing weep tube, on engines with high oil consumption that troubleshooting procedures fail to determine the source of oil loss. This AD also requires for all engines, initial and repetitive visual inspections of the turbine exhaust case (TEC) in the vicinity of the No 3 bearing oil vent tube for evidence of oil wetting or staining. If the vent tube borescope inspection is unsuccessful due to tube blockage, this AD also requires borescope inspections of the high pressure turbine (HPT) assembly for oil wetting or staining. This AD also requires removal of the HPT assembly and replacement of any heat distressed HPT assembly hardware if oil wetting or staining is found. This AD is prompted by reports of engine HPT assembly hardware being damaged as aresult of thermal distress from oil igniting after leaking from the No. 3 bearing compartment. We are issuing this AD to prevent thermal distressed HPT assembly hardware from remaining in service, which could result in a cracked HPT stage 1 disk or HPT stage 1-2 air seal and an uncontained engine failure.
95-02-11: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9-87 (MD-87) series airplanes. This action requires an inspection to detect chafing or arcing damage to the wiring of the aft right coatroom, the intercostal, and the recirculation duct assembly near longeron 5; and modification of the wiring installation for the aft right coatroom. This amendment is prompted by a report of an electrical fire that started due to a short in the coatroom wiring, which was caused by arcing and chafing damage to the wiring. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent severe damage to the airframe in the event of a fire caused by arcing and chafing damage to the coatroom wiring.
67-31-04: 67-31-04 CESSNA: Amdt. 39-516, Part 39, Federal Register November 29, 1967. Applies to Models 150G and 150H Airplanes, Serial Numbers 15064533 through 15067891. To prevent loss of longitudinal control, unless already accomplished, prior to further flight, remove the glove compartment from the aircraft. If after it is removed the glove compartment is modified, the modification must be approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Federal Aviation Administration, Central Region, before it is reinstalled in the aircraft and the aircraft returned to service. This amendment effective November 29, 1967, for all persons except those to whom it was made effective by air mail letter dated November 17, 1967.
2021-11-04: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain De Havilland Aircraft of Canada Limited Model DHC-8-400, -401, and -402 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report of main landing gear (MLG) retractions after striking an obstacle or severe wheel imbalance after a tire failure. This AD requires inspections for correct height of the lock link over-center stop pin and for correct gaps of the left-hand and right-hand MLG downlock proximity sensors, replacement of the shim if necessary, corrective actions, and installation of a new, improved proximity sensor electronic unit (PSEU) with software changes. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2020-23-01: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all GE Aviation Czech s.r.o. (GEAC) M601D-11, M601E-11, M601E-11A, M601E- 11AS, M601E-11S, M601F, H75-200, H80-100, H80-200, and H85-200 model turboprop engines. This AD was prompted by reports of engine power fluctuations occurring during ground tests. This AD requires the removal and replacement of the fuel control unit (FCU). The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2003-22-11: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for the specified Eurocopter France (Eurocopter) Model AS350B, B1, B2, B3, BA, D, and AS355E helicopters, that currently requires removing certain serial-numbered main servocontrols before further flight. This amendment contains the same requirements but also requires removing certain other main and tail servocontrols on or before 550 hours time- in-service (TIS) or 24 months, whichever occurs first. Also, this amendment adds the Eurocopter Model AS350C, D1, and AS355F, F1, F2, and N helicopters to the applicability. This amendment is prompted by the discovery of a manufacturing defect in another set of servocontrols. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of a main or tail servocontrol in the flight control system and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
2021-09-19: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus SAS Model A319-171N airplanes, Model A320-271N, -272N, and -273N airplanes, and Model A321-271N, -272N, -271NX, and -272NX airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report indicating that during a full scale fatigue test of the forward engine mounts, premature wear was identified on the forward engine mount shackle assemblies; in addition, during bearing replacement, the bearing lock washer was found broken. This AD requires replacing any forward engine mount shackle assemblies having a certain part number with a serviceable part, and re- identifying the engine mount, or replacing any forward engine mount assemblies having a certain part number, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2007-21-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: * * * * * * * * the FAA set-up in January 1999 an Ageing Transport Systems Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ATSRAC) to investigate the potential safety issues in aging aircraft as a result of wear and degradation in their operating systems. Under this plan, all Holders of type Certificates aircraft are required to conduct a design review, to preclude the occurrence of potential unsafe conditions as the aircraft aged. * * * * * The unsafe condition is degradation of the fuel system, which could result in loss of the airplane. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
95-02-08: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 737 series airplanes, that requires modification of certain fuselage support structure for the number 2 galley. This amendment is prompted by results of engineering tests and analyses which revealed that certain fuselage support structure for the number 2 galley is unable to support certain loads that may occur during emergency landing conditions. If the fuselage support structure breaks, the galley may shift and cause blockage of the forward service door (galley door). The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent inability of passengers and crew to exit the airplane through this door after an emergency landing.
96-02-06: 96-02-06 BOEING; MCDONNELL DOUGLAS; LOCKHEED; FOKKER; AND BRITISH AEROSPACE REGIONAL AIRCRAFT LIMITED, AVRO INTERNATIONAL AEROSPACE DIVISION (Formerly British Aerospace, plc; British Aerospace Commercial Aircraft, Limited): Amendment 39-9494. Docket 95-NM-55-AD. Supersedes AD 95-04-01, Amendment 39-9153; and AD 95-09-05, Amendment 39-9208. \n\n\tApplicability: The following models and series of airplanes, certificated in any category, equipped with Honeywell Standard Windshear Detection Systems (WSS): \n\n\nManufacturer and \nModel of Airplane\n\nType of Computer\n\nPart Numbers \nBoeing 727-100 and -200\nStandard Windshear\n(Honeywell STC)\n4061048-902, -903, and-904 \n4068054-901 \n4068060-901 \nBoeing 737-100 and -200\nStandard Windshear\n\n4061048-903, -904, and -905 4068058-903\nBoeing 737-200\t\nPerformance\nManagement\n(Honeywell STC)\n4050730-904 through -911 \n4051819-906 \nBoeing 737-300\nStandard Windshear\n(Honeywell STC) \n4068060-901 \nBoeing 747-100 and -200\nStandard Windshear\n(Honeywell STC) \n4061048-904 \nMcDonnell Douglas\nDC-8-50, -60, and -70\nStandard Windshear\n(Honeywell STC) \n4068046-903 \nMcDonnell Douglas\nDC-9-10, -21, -31\n-41, and -51 \nStandard Windshear\n(Honeywell STC)\n4068046-901, -902\n4068048-901, -902 \nMcDonnell Douglas\nDC-9-80 and MD-88 \nWindshear (OEM TC)\n4059845-902\nMcDonnell Douglas\nMD-90-30 \nWindshear (OEM TC)\n4059845-910 \nMcDonnell Douglas\nMD-11\nFlight Control\n(OEM TC)\n4059001-901 \nthrough -905 \n(with windshear \n\toption selected) \nLockheed L-1011-385-1,\n-385-1-14, -385-1-15,\nand -385-3 \nStandard Windshear\n(OEM TC) \n4068044-901\nFokker F28\nMark 1000, 2000,\n3000, and 4000 \nStandard Windshear\n(Honeywell STC) \n4068052-901\nFokker F28 Mark 0100\nFlight Management\n(OEM TC)\n4052502-951 \n(with windshear \n\toption selected) \nBritish Aerospace Avro\n146-RJ70A, -RJ85A,\nand -RJ100A \nFlight Control\n(OEM TC)\n4068300-902\n \n\tNOTE 1: This AD applies to each airplane identified in the precedingapplicability provision, regardless of whether it has been modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the requirements of this AD. For airplanes that have been modified, altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of this AD is affected, the owner/operator must use the authority provided in paragraph (d) of this AD to request approval from the FAA. This approval may address either no action, if the current configuration eliminates the unsafe condition; or different actions necessary to address the unsafe condition described in this AD. Such a request should include an assessment of the effect of the changed configuration on the unsafe condition addressed by this AD. In no case does the presence of any modification, alteration, or repair remove any airplane from the applicability of this AD. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. \n\n\tTo prevent significant delays in the Honeywell Standard Windshear Detection Systems(WSS) detecting hazardous windshear, which could lead to the loss of flight path control, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tRevise the Limitations Section of the FAA-approved Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) to include the following statement, at the time specified in either paragraph (a)(1) or (a)(2) of this AD, as applicable. This may be accomplished by inserting a copy of this AD in the AFM. \n\n\n"During sustained banks of greater than 15 degrees or during flap configuration changes, the Honeywell Windshear Detection and Recovery Guidance System (WSS) is desensitized and alerts resulting from encountering windshear conditions will be delayed." \n\n\t\t(1)\tFor all Boeing, McDonnell Douglas, Lockheed, and Fokker airplanes specified in the applicability statement of this AD: Within 14 days after March 8, 1995 (the effective date of AD 95-04-01, amendment 39-9153). \n\n\t\t(2)\tFor British Aerospace Model Avro airplanes specified in the applicability statement of this AD: Within 14 days after May 15, 1995 (the effective date of AD 95-09-05, amendment 39-9208). \n\n\t(b)\tWithin 36 months after the effective date of this AD, replace the currently-installed line replaceable unit (LRU) with a modified LRU having new software that eliminates delays in the WSS detecting windshear when the flaps of the airplane are in transition, in accordance with a method approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Accomplishment of this replacement constitutes terminating action for the requirements of paragraph (a) of this AD; after the replacement has been accomplished, the AFM limitation required by paragraph (a) of this AD may be revised to read as follows: \n\n"During sustained banks of greater than 15 degrees, the Honeywell Windshear Detection and Recovery Guidance System (WSS) is desensitized and alerts resulting from encountering windshear conditions will be delayed." \n\n\t(c)\tAs of 18 months after the effective dateof this AD, no person shall install on any airplane an LRU that has not been modified in accordance with paragraph (b) of this AD. An unmodified LRU may be installed up to 18 months after the effective date of this AD, provided that, during that time, the AFM limitation required by paragraph (a) of this AD remains in effect. \n\n\t(d)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Los Angeles ACO. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Los Angeles ACO. \n\n\tNOTE 2: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Los Angeles ACO. \n\n\t(e)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. \n\n\t(f)\tThis amendment becomes effective on February 26, 1996.
2003-22-03: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Rolls-Royce plc (RR) RB211 Trent 768-60 and Trent 772-60 turbofan engines. This AD requires reworking the low pressure (LP) turbine nozzle vane case, the LP turbine bearing support exhaust case, and the support arm bracket assemblies. This AD is prompted by a report of an LP stage 4 blade failure at the blade shank, resulting in severe radial distortion of the rear flange of the LP turbine case and failure of a number of attaching bolts, resulting in enough flange separation to allow the release of high energy debris. We are issuing this AD to prevent possible uncontained LP turbine case failure and damage to the airplane.
2020-22-08: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus SAS Model A320-251N and -271N airplanes; Model A321- 251N, -271N, -272N, -252NX, and -271NX airplanes; Model A330-243, -343, and -941 airplanes; and Model A350-941 and -1041 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of removable \n\n((Page 70052)) \n\ndisplay units (RDUs) found undocked from the hosting display docking stations (DDSs). This AD requires removal of the RDUs or implementation of an operational restriction, and a one-time inspection of the RDU installation onto the DDS and, depending on findings, accomplishment of applicable corrective actions, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
66-22-04: 66-22-04 HILLER: Amdt. 39-280 Part 39 Federal Register September 2, 1966. Applies to Model UH-12D, UH-12E, UH-12E-L, UH-12L, and UH-12L4 Helicopters Equipped With Clutches, Mercury Clutch Corporation P/N's 4578-6 and 4692-6, Clutch Serial Numbers 8584 through 9317. Compliance required within the next 100 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To prevent failures of the mercury clutch due to cracking at the inner corners of driver lug slots in the side plates, accomplish the following: (a) Visually inspect the side plates for cracks using at least 8-power magnification. (b) If cracks are found, replace clutch before further flight with a clutch of the same part number that has been inspected in accordance with this AD and found free of cracks. (Fairchild Hiller Service Information Letters Nos. 3052 and 5009, dated July 20, 1966, pertain to this subject). This directive effective September 2, 1966.
94-05-07: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 747 series airplanes, that currently requires repetitive visual inspections of wire bundles to detect damage due to chafing, and repair of damaged wires. This amendment revises the inspection and repair procedures, and provides a terminating action, which, if accomplished, will eliminate the need for the currently required inspections. This amendment is prompted by data that substantiates the need for new inspection and repair procedures. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent smoke and fire in the cockpit emanating from wire bundles and loss of essential cockpit instruments necessary for continued safe flight and landing of the airplane.
69-20-04: 69-20-04 FAIRCHILD-HILLER: Amdt. 39-849. Applies to F-27 and FH-227 type airplanes certificated in all categories and incorporating rear passenger door spindle, P/N 27-313006-3, -5, -7, or -9. Compliance required within the next 100 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To provide a more positive retention of the passenger door locking mechanism accomplish the following: (a) For F-27 type airplanes with spindle, P/N 27-313006-3, installed in the door lock mechanism, comply with Section D(1) through D(8) of Revision 1 of Fairchild Hiller Service Bulletin No. F-27-52-27 dated June 17, 1969. In place of Step "D(5)", rig the door mechanism in accordance with Fairchild Hiller Service Bulletin No. F-27-52-19, dated June 17, 1969. (b) For F-27 type airplanes with spindle, P/N 27-313006-5, 27-313006-7, or 27-313006-9, installed in the door lock mechanism, comply with Section E(1) through E(8) of Revision 1- of Fairchild Hiller Service Bulletin No. F-27-52-27, dated June 17, 1969. Rig the door mechanism in accordance with Fairchild Hiller Service Bulletin No. F-27-52-19, dated June 17, 1969. (c) For FH-227 type airplanes with spindle, P/N 27-313006-5, 27-313006-7, or 27-313006-9, installed in the door lock mechanism, comply with the "Accomplishment Instructions" of Fairchild Hiller Service Bulletin No. FH-227-52-13, dated June 17, 1969. (d) An equivalent alteration approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Eastern Region may be used in lieu of the foregoing methods. (e) Upon request with substantiating data submitted through an FAA maintenance inspector, the compliance time specified in this AD may be increased by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Eastern Region. This amendment effective November 3, 1969.
2003-22-02: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Rolls-Royce (RR) plc RB211 Trent 556-61 turbofan engines. This AD requires a gauge inspection of the space between the high pressure (HP) fuel tubes adaptor face and seals, and a gauge inspection of the space between the fuel flow transmitter and seals, for evidence of permanent distortion of the face of the fuel tube connecting flanges, and replacement of parts if necessary. This AD is prompted by a report of fuel leaking from the engine fan cowl during an aircraft taxi. We are issuing this AD to prevent in-flight fuel leaks, which could result in an engine fire.
2020-22-13: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus Helicopters Model AS332C1 and AS332L1 helicopters. This AD was prompted by a report that the affected helicopters use the same ''flight/ground'' logic signal, instead of independent redundant signals. This AD requires amending the emergency procedures of the existing rotorcraft flight manual (RFM) for your helicopter, a wiring modification of the ''flight/ground'' logic signal source of the attitude and heading reference system (AHRS) 1, and then removal of the amendment to the existing RFM for your helicopter. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2009-15-15: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Bell Helicopter Textron Canada (BHTC) Model 427 helicopters. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by the aviation authority of Canada to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. Transport Canada, the aviation authority of Canada, with which we have a bilateral agreement, states that it has been determined that the existing hardware connecting the vertical fin to the tail rotor gearbox needs to be upgraded to prevent the vertical fin from becoming loose. BHTC has received reports of loose vertical fins discovered during inspections. Investigation revealed that the current vertical fin attachment hardware may not provide adequate clamp-up. If not corrected, the vertical fin could become loose and cause vibration, which could lead to subsequent loss of control of the helicopter. This AD requires actions that are intended to address this unsafe condition.
2020-22-07: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Bell Textron Inc. (Type Certificate previously held by Bell Helicopter Textron Inc.) Model 412, 412CF, and 412EP helicopters. This AD requires revising the existing Rotorcraft Flight Manual (RFM) for your helicopter. This AD was prompted by an accident and multiple reports of a cracked main gearbox (MGB) support case. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
67-19-03: 67-19-03 CANADAIR: Amdt. 39-431, Part 39, Federal Register June 6, 1967. Applies to CL-44D4 Type airplanes. Compliance required as indicated. To detect cracks in the horizontal stabilizer front spar web, accomplish the following: (a) For horizontal stabilizers with 13,500 or more hours' time in service on the effective date of this AD inspect in accordance with (c) within the next 25 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the last 225 hours' time in service, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 250 hours' time in service from the last inspection. (b) For horizontal stabilizers with less than 13,500 hours' time in service on the effective date of this AD, inspect in accordance with (c) before the accumulation of 13,525 hours' time in service unless accomplished after the accumulation of 13,275 hours' time in service, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 250 hours' time in service from the last inspection. (c) Remove the horizontal stabilizer leading edge access panels, P/N 912-2 and P/N 913-2 (Station 52 to 59), and visually inspect the front spar web for cracks from Station 56 to 77, or use an FAA-approved equivalent inspection. If a crack is found comply with (d) before further flight. (d) Repair cracked parts with an FAA-approved repair or replace the cracked part with a part of the same part number that has been inspected in accordance with (c) and found free of cracks, or with an FAA-approved equivalent part. (e) The repetitive inspection required by (a) and (b) may be discontinued when the horizontal stabilizer front spar web is modified in accordance with an FAA-approved modification. (f) Equivalent inspections may be approved by an FAA maintenance inspector. Equivalent repairs, parts, and modifications must be approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Eastern Region. (g) Upon request with substantiating data submitted through an FAAmaintenance inspector, the compliance times specified in this AD may be increased by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Eastern Region. This amendment effective June 10, 1967.
2003-22-06: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for the specified Eurocopter France (ECF) model helicopters that currently requires measuring the tail rotor pitch control rod (control rod) outboard spherical bearing (bearing) for radial and axial play. This amendment revises the requirement to measure control rod play. This amendment also adds the Eurocopter France Model AS350B3 helicopter and an additional control rod to the applicability, a daily check of the control rod bearing, a larger axial play limit, a more frequent AD compliance interval, and makes editorial changes for clarification. This amendment is prompted by additional service information and comments resulting in the FAA determination that the inspection interval should coincide with the normal maintenance interval, that the AD should apply to the ECF Model AS350B3 helicopter and an additional control rod, that the daily inspection should be a daily check, and that certain editorial changes are needed for clarification. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent separation of the bearing ball from its outer race, rubbing of the body of the control rod against the tail rotor blade pitch horn clevis, failure of the control rod, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
63-20-04: 63-20-04 GENERAL DYNAMICS: Amdt. 622 Part 507 Federal Register September 26, 1963. Applies to All Models 22 and 22M Aircraft. Compliance required as indicated. Due to failures of flap actuator screwjacks, accomplish the following: (a) Within 1,500 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD unless already accomplished, replace all flap actuator screwjack end cap assemblies P/N 1162D53 and P/N 1162D54, with end cap assemblies reworked to provide additional lateral movement in accordance with General Dynamics/Convair 880 Alert Service Bulletin No. A27-68 dated March 22, 1963, or 880M Alert Service Bulletin No. A27-36 dated March 22, 1963, as applicable, or an FAA, Western Region, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch approved equivalent modification. (b) Within 3,500 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD unless already accomplished, conduct a magnetic particle inspection or an FAA approved equivalent inspection of all flap actuatorscrewjack shafts paying particular attention to the section of the screwjack shaft that is above the main thread. Replace a cracked flap actuator screwjack shaft with an uncracked screwjack shaft before further flight. (General Dynamics/Convair 880 Alert Service Bulletin No. A27-68 dated March 22, 1963, and 880M Alert Service Bulletin No. A27-36 dated March 22, 1963, pertain to this same subject.) This directive effective October 28, 1963.
69-18-01: 69-18-01 BEECH: Amdt. 39-830. Applies to all Model 35, A35, B35 and C35 (Serial Numbers D-1 through D-2900) airplanes equipped with Beech P/N 35-924065 fuel unit. Compliance: Required as indicated. Within the next 100 hours' time-in-service, but not to exceed August 30, 1970, unless already accomplished, accomplish either A or B: A) Replace Beech P/N 35-924065 fuel unit with Beech P/N 35-924230 fuel unit having separate selector valve and pump controls or with any other modification of this portion of the fuel system approved by Chief, Engineering & Manufacturing Branch, Central Region, FAA. B) Install Beech fuel selector valve disengagement warning light, Kit No. 35-5030, in accordance with Beech Service Instructions No. 0243-289, or any other modification of this portion of the fuel system approved by the Chief, Engineering & Manufacturing Branch, Central Region, FAA. This AD supersedes AD 53-20-02. This amendment becomes effective August 30, 1969.
2020-21-12: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Pilatus Aircraft Ltd Model PC-24 airplanes. This AD was prompted by mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as the vinyl grommets on the upper panel assembly on the left-hand (LH) and right-hand (RH) emergency exits becoming rigid after exposure to low temperatures, which could result in failure of the emergency exits to open during an evacuation. This AD requires replacing the grommets. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.