Results
2009-10-10: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: During testing, it was discovered that when the outflow valve (OFV) manual mode connector is not connected, the manual mode motor and altitude limitation are not properly tested. Consequently, a disconnect of the OFV manual mode and/or a related wiring failure could potentially result in a dormant loss of several CPC [cabin pressure control] backup/safety functions, including OFV manual control, altitude limitation, emergency depressurization and smoke clearance. * * * * * * * * This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
2009-10-09: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Cessna Aircraft Company (Cessna) 150 and 152 series airplanes. This AD requires you to either install a placard prohibiting spins and other acrobatic maneuvers in the airplane or to replace the rudder stop, rudder stop bumper, and attachment hardware with a new rudder stop modification kit and replace the safety wire with jamnuts. This AD results from follow-on investigations of two accidents where the rudder was found in the over-travel position with the stop plate hooked over the stop bolt heads. While neither of the accident aircraft met type design, investigations revealed that aircraft in full conformity with type design can exceed the travel limits set by the rudder stops. We are issuing this AD to prevent the rudder from traveling past the normal travel limit. Operation in this non-certificated control position is unacceptable and could cause undesirable consequences, such as contact between the rudder and the elevator.
2009-10-06: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 747-400 and 747-400D series airplanes. This AD requires repetitive inspections to detect cracks in the floor panel attachment fastener holes of the Section 41 upper deck floor beam upper chords, and related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. This AD results from reports of cracks found in the Section 41 upper deck floor beam upper chords. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct cracks in these chords, which could become large and cause the floor beams to become severed and result in rapid decompression or reduced controllability of the airplane.
2009-10-05: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: A number of Flap Actuators with P/N [part number] 601R93101-21 and 601R93101-25 were identified as having pinion gears that did not have acceptable certificates of conformance from the supplier. This condition could result in flap failure. * * * Endurance testing conducted at Eaton Aerospace with representative discrepant gears predicted a 3,000 flight cycle life limit for the affected actuators. Fleet leaders with suspect installed actuators are rapidly approaching this threshold. Failure of the flap actuator pinion gear set could cause the right or left inboard panel to disconnect, which could result in flap asymmetry and consequent reduced controllability of the airplane. This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
2009-10-08: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Pratt & Whitney models PW2037, PW2037(M), and PW2040 turbofan engines with high-pressure turbine (HPT) 2nd stage hubs that have previously been exposed to Pratt & Whitney cleaning procedure SPOP 10 or SPOP 9 or equivalent procedure. This AD requires a onetime optical comparator inspection (OCI) of the blade retention slots of the affected HPT 2nd stage hubs at the next HPT overhaul after the effective date of the AD. This AD results from an uncontained release of HPT 2nd stage blades and blade retention lugs. We are issuing this AD to remove nonconforming HPT 2nd stage hubs, which could result in an uncontained release of turbine blades and blade retention lugs, and damage to the airplane.
2009-08-51: This document publishes in the Federal Register an amendment adopting emergency airworthiness directive (AD) 2009-08-51 that was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of RRC AE 3007A series turbofan engines. This AD requires performing an eddy current inspection (ECI) or surface wave ultrasonic test (SWUT) inspection on each affected high-pressure turbine wheel. This AD results from additional reports of cracks in the high-pressure turbine (HPT) stage 2 wheels identified from the required inspections in AD 2008-26-06. A revised risk assessment that includes these additional reports indicates we need to require a higher inspection rate. We are issuing this AD to prevent an uncontained failure of the HPT stage 2 wheel and damage to the airplane.
2009-10-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: During a recent Aileron Dual Load Path and Linkage Inspection, which is a certification maintenance requirement (CMR) task, the installed control rods were found to be corroded. The affected rod assemblies were removed for investigation and it was found that the Tab Side Fitting was cracked. Subsequently, similar cracks were found on another aeroplane in a supporting lever of the Control Rod attachment fitting of the Trim Tab. Those cracks were found during the applicable CMR inspection. This condition, if not corrected, could lead to structural failure of the dual load path attachment arrangement of the affected trim and spring tabs, possibly resulting in a flutter problem that could lead to loss of control of the aeroplane. * * * * * This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
2009-10-02: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD), which applies to all BAE Systems (Operations) Limited (Jetstream) Model 4101 airplanes. That AD currently requires operators to determine the number of flight cycles accumulated on each component of the main landing gear (MLG) and the nose landing gear (NLG), and to replace each component that reaches its life limit with a serviceable component. The existing AD also requires operators to revise the Airworthiness Limitations (AWL) section of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA) in the aircraft maintenance manual to reflect the new life limits for structurally significant items. This new AD requires a new revision of the AWL section of the ICA to incorporate revised life limits for structurally significant items, operational and functional tests of certain systems, and instructions to retain critical ignition source prevention features during configuration changes. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of certain structurally significant items, including the MLG and the NLG, which could result in reduced structural integrity of the airplane; and to prevent fuel vapor ignition sources, which could result in fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.
2008-16-02: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Hawker Beechcraft Corporation Model 390 airplanes. This AD requires you to repetitively do a post-flight check (owner/operator holding at least a private pilot certificate checking for residual heat in the angle-of- attack (AOA) probes or an appropriately-rated mechanic doing a maintenance manual operational test of the heat of the AOA probes) after every flight and replace or modify (upload software) the stall warning AOA transmitters. This AD results from reports of the potential for unannunciated loss of the heating function in the left-hand (LH) and right-hand (RH) stall warning AOA transmitters of Model 390 airplanes. We are issuing this AD to correct potentially inadequate stall warning with loss of stick pusher function.
2009-09-06: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 737-100, -200, -200C, -300, -400, and -500 series airplanes. This AD requires repetitive detailed and high frequency eddy current inspections to detect cracks of the backup intercostals and the upper sill of the forward airstair doorway, and applicable corrective actions. This AD also provides for an optional terminating action, which would eliminate the need for repetitive inspections. This AD results from a report indicating that cracks were found in the backup intercostals and upper sill web of the forward airstair doorway. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct fatigue cracking of the backup intercostals and upper sill web of the forward airstair doorway, which could result in a rapid loss of cabin pressure.
2009-09-08: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 747 airplanes. This AD requires repetitive external surface high frequency eddy current inspections to detect cracks in the radius detail of the upper lobe doubler on both sides of the airplane, and applicable corrective action. This AD results from reports of cracks in the radius detail of the upper lobe doublers. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct cracks in the upper lobe doublers. Such cracks could result in significant degradation of the fuselage structure and reduce its ability to carry flight loads from the vertical stabilizer, which could adversely affect the controllability of the airplane.
2009-06-22: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: An A320 aircraft experienced an event where it was not possible to open the reinforced cockpit door, even after power had been removed from the aircraft. Investigation has identified that the cockpit door latch/striker assembly may have overheated, causing permanent internal damage prior to being electrically isolated by the internal thermal fuse. This condition, in case of a rapid decompression in the cockpit, would prevent the necessary unlocking/ opening of the door, which may lead to failure of the airplane structure. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2009-09-05: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD), which applies to certain Airbus Model A318-100 and A319-100 series airplanes; A320-111 airplanes; A320-200 series airplanes; and A321-100 and A321-200 series airplanes. That AD currently requires a one-time inspection of the horizontal hinge pin of the 103VU electrical panel in the avionics compartment to determine if the hinge pin can move out of the hinge, and related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. This new AD instead requires installing a hinge pin stopper on the internal door of the 103VU electrical panel. This AD results from a report indicating that electrical wire damage was found in the 103VU electrical panel due to contact between the hinge pin and the adjacent electrical wire harness. We are issuing this AD to prevent contact between the horizontal hinge pin and the adjacent electrical wire harness, which could result in damage to electrical wires, and consequent arcing and/or failure of associated systems.
2009-09-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Several cases of Gas Generator Turbine (HP Turbine) blade rearward displacement have been detected during borescope inspection or in repair centre following engine disassembly. Two of them resulted in blade rubs between the rear face of the fir-tree roots and the rear bearing support cover. High HP blade rearward displacement can potentially result in blade release due to fatigue of the blade, which would cause an uncommanded in-flight engine shutdown. We are issuing this AD to prevent an uncommanded in-flight engine shutdown which could result in an emergency autorotation landing or, at worst, an accident.
2009-09-01: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: During a routine inspection on an Airbus A321 aircraft, the operator discovered that a bearing of the flap track No. 1 pendulum assembly had migrated out of position. * * * This condition, if not corrected, could lead to separation of the bearing/flap track assembly, resulting in the detachment of the affected flap surface from the wing and consequent loss of control of the aircraft. * * * * * This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
2009-07-52: This document publishes in the Federal Register an amendment adopting Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2009-07-52 and supersedes Emergency AD 2009-07-51, issued March 17, 2009, which was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of Bell Helicopter Textron Canada Limited (Bell) Model 206A series, 206B series, 206L series, 407, and 427 helicopters by individual letters. This AD requires, before further flight, inspecting each cyclic control lever assembly (lever assembly) that has less than 50 hours time-in-service (TIS) to determine if it is correctly installed and properly staked in the lever assembly. This amendment is prompted by a Transport Canada AD report of a bearing incorrectly installed in the copilot lever assembly. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of a bearing, failure of the lever assembly, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter. DATES: Effective May 1, 2009, to all persons except those persons to whom it was made immediately effective by Emergency AD 2009-07-52, issued on March 19, 2009, which contained the requirements of this amendment. Comments for inclusion in the Rules Docket must be received on or before June 15, 2009.
2009-08-09: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: A damaged wiring harness which caused the air conditioning system circuit breaker to trip and evidencing a local overheating has been found on an in-service aircraft. The investigation revealed that the damage (chafed wires) found on the wiring harness resulted from an interference with the under- floor attachment fittings of the cabin partition net which was due to an incorrect routing of the harness while on the production line. Such conditions could result in an electrical short and potential loss of several functions essential for the safety of flight. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2009-08-06: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for GE CF6-80A series turbofan engines with certain stage 1 high-pressure turbine (HPT) rotor disks, installed. This AD requires removal from service of those stage 1 HPT rotor disks within 30 days after the effective date of the AD. This AD results from the FAA learning that those disks are susceptible to cracks developing at the aft chamfer of the blade dovetail slots. We are issuing this AD to prevent cracks developing at the aft chamfer of the blade dovetail slots that could propagate to a failure of the disk and cause an uncontained engine failure and damage to the airplane.
2009-08-07: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Honeywell International Inc. ALF502L-2 and ALF502L-2C turbofan engines with certain high-pressure compressor (HPC) first stage discs installed. This AD requires performing a dimensional inspection to determine if excessive disc balance material was removed and a magnetic particle inspection if the disc passes the dimensional inspection. This AD results from reports of discs found with excessive material removed from the balancing locations of the disc. We are issuing this AD to prevent the discs from fracturing before reaching the currently published life limit. A disc fracture could result in an uncontained failure of the disc and damage to the airplane.
2009-08-03: We are adopting a superseding airworthiness directive (AD) for the specified Bell Helicopter Textron Canada Limited (BHTC) Model 206A, 206B, 206L, 206L-1, 206L-3, 206L-4, 222, 222B, 222U, 230, 407, 427, and 430 helicopters. That AD currently requires replacing each affected tail rotor blade (blade) with an airworthy blade that has a serial number not listed in the Rotor Blades, Inc. (RBI) document that is attached to each of the Bell Helicopter Textron Alert Service Bulletins (ASBs) listed in the applicability section of the AD. That AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the aviation authority of Canada. The MCAI states that there have been three reports of blade tip weights departing from the blade during flight. Since issuing that AD, BHTC has issued revised service information to correct part numbers and serial numbers listed in the RBI document that is attached to each BHTC ASB and to add additional part-numbered and serial-numbered blades to the list. The actions of this AD are intended to prevent loss of a blade tip weight, loss of a blade, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
2009-08-05: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Liberty Aerospace Incorporated Model XL-2 airplanes. This AD requires you to repetitively inspect the exhaust muffler for cracks and to replace the exhaust muffler when cracks are found. This AD is the result of reports that cracks have been found in the exhaust muffler during maintenance and service inspections. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct cracks in the exhaust muffler, which could result in carbon monoxide entering the cabin through the heating system. Carbon monoxide entering into the airplane cabin could lead to incapacitation of the pilot.
2009-08-01: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD), which applies to all Honeywell FMSs served by Honeywell NZ-2000 navigation computers and IC-800 integrated avionics computers. That AD currently requires identifying affected computers by part number and software modification level and revising the Limitations section of applicable airplane flight manuals to provide procedures for retaining optimum position determination and intended navigation. This new AD requires upgrading new software, which terminates the existing requirements. This AD results from reports of in-flight unannunciated shifts of computed position in airplanes with the subject FMS computers. We are issuing this AD to prevent a shift in the FMS computed position, which could result in uncommanded deviations from the intended flight path of the airplane, and, if those deviations are undetected by the flight crew, compromised terrain/traffic avoidance. DATES: This AD becomes effective May 14, 2009. The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the AD as of May 14, 2009. On April 18, 2007 (72 FR 15818, April 3, 2007), the Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of Honeywell Technical Newsletter A23-6111-008, Revision 001, dated February 22, 2007.
2009-07-13: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the specified MD Helicopters, Inc. (MDHI) model helicopters that requires, within 30 days, reducing the current gross weight limit to a maximum gross weight limit of 5,400 pounds and inserting a copy of this AD into the Limitations section of the Rotorcraft Flight Manual (RFM) or making certain optional modifications that constitute terminating actions. This amendment is prompted by flight tests that show that the information currently listed in the Limitations section of the RFM is inconsistent with the actual performance of the helicopter. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent loss of directional control of the helicopter.
2009-08-02: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all McDonnell Douglas airplanes identified above. This AD requires revising the airplane flight manual to provide the flightcrew with procedures to preclude dry running of the fuel pumps. This AD results from fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer. We are issuing this AD to prevent pump inlet friction (i.e., overheating or sparking) when the fuel pumps are continually run as the center wing fuel tank becomes empty, and/or electrical arc burnthrough, which could result in a fuel tank fire or explosion.
2009-07-14: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: A number of wings manufactured by Diamond Aircraft Industries Inc. in Canada have been found to exhibit voids in the adhesive joint between the main spar caps and the upper wing skins. The available information indicates that wings with voids continue to meet the certification design limits, provided the voids are within established criteria. However, to detect any wings that may have voids exceeding these criteria, Diamond has issued Mandatory Service Bulletin MSB-40-060 and MSB-F4-016 (single document) that describes instructions for inspection of the aircraft that had these wings installed during manufacture. Aircraft that have voids within the inspectioncriteria may continue to operate without restriction, pending the outcome of ongoing investigations. Aircraft that have voids exceeding the inspection criteria must be repaired. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.