Results
2020-24-05: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Piper Aircraft, Inc. (Piper) Models PA-28-140, PA-28-150, PA- 28-160, PA-28-180, PA-28-235, PA-32-260, and PA-32-300 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of corrosion found in an area of the main wing spar not easily accessible for inspection. This AD requires inspecting the left and right main wing spars for corrosion, and, if corrosion is found, taking all necessary corrective actions. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2003-03-15 R1: This amendment revises an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to various Boeing and McDonnell Douglas transport category airplanes, that currently requires revising the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) to advise the flightcrew to don oxygen masks as a first and immediate step when the cabin altitude warning horn sounds. The actions specified by that AD are intended to prevent incapacitation of the flightcrew due to lack of oxygen, which could result in loss of control of the airplane. This amendment removes certain requirements for certain airplanes and revises the direction to the flightcrew to don oxygen masks as a first and immediate step when the cabin altitude warning occurs, rather than "when the cabin altitude warning horn sounds." This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
94-09-12: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model DC-8, DC-9, and DC-9-80 series airplanes; Model MD-88 airplanes; and C-9 (military) airplanes; that requires inspection of the center and side windshields, and replacement of discrepant windshields. This amendment is prompted by reports that the core ply of certain windshields was incorrectly tempered during the manufacturing process. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of the windshield.
2020-23-02: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus Helicopters Model EC225LP helicopters. This AD was prompted by a report of a manufacturing and control issue regarding the ceramic balls in the bearing installed in the swashplate assembly of the main rotor mast assembly. This AD requires repetitive inspections of the bearing in the swashplate assembly of the main rotor mast assembly for discrepancies (ceramic balls that have a hard point or sensitive axial play or both) and, depending on the findings, replacement of an affected main rotor mast assembly with a serviceable main rotor mast assembly, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
78-09-04: 78-09-04 HAWKER SIDDELEY AVIATION LIMITED: Amendment 39-3200. Applies to Model DH-104 "Dove" airplanes, all series, certificated in all categories, except those airplanes incorporating Hawker Siddeley Model DH-104 Modification 779. Compliance is required as indicated. To detect cracking and prevent possible failure of the lugs of the lower center section main spar wing to fuselage attachment, accomplish the following: (a) Within one month after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the last month, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed two months from the last inspection, remove the lower wing to fuselage fairings and inspect the center section main spar bottom boom lugs for cracks using an ultrasonic inspection method in accordance with appendix 1 of Hawker Siddeley Aviation, Limited Technical News Sheet (TNS) 238, issue 2, dated January 24, 1977, or an FAA-approved equivalent. (b) The repetitive inspections required by paragraph(a) of this AD may be terminated upon incorporation of a steel lower boom in accordance with Hawker Siddeley Model DH-104 Modification 779, or an FAA-approved equivalent. (c) Within two months after accomplishing six repetitive inspections under paragraph (a) of this AD, a steel lower boom must be incorporated in accordance with Hawker Siddeley Model DH-104 Modification 779, or an FAA-approved equivalent. (d) If any crack is found during an inspection required by paragraph (a) of this AD, before further flight, replace the boom with a steel boom in accordance with Hawker Siddeley Model DH-104 Modification 779, or an FAA-approved equivalent. This amendment becomes effective May 24, 1978.
2003-22-13: The FAA adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all AeroSpace Technologies of Australia Pty Ltd. (ASTA) Models N22B and N24A airplanes. This AD requires you to visually inspect the ailerons for damage and replace if necessary; adjust the engine power levers aural warning microswitches; set flap extension and flap down operation limitations; and fabricate and install cockpit flap extension and flap down operation restriction placards. This AD is the result of mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the airworthiness authority for Australia. We are issuing this AD to prevent damage to the aileron due to airplane operation and pre-existing and undetected damage, which could result in failure of the aileron. Such failure could lead to reduced or loss of control of the airplane.
2009-18-14: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: * * * A number of * * * rudder spring tab lever assemblies [of the rudder] were found cracked. This condition, if not corrected, could lead to failure of the rudder flight control system and consequent loss of control of the aircraft. * * * * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products. DATES: This AD becomes effective October 14, 2009. The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in this AD as of October 14, 2009. On June 9, 2004 (69 FR 24953, May 5, 2004), the Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain other publications listed in this AD.
2020-23-07: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive for all Leonardo S.p.a. Model AB139 and AW139 helicopters. This AD requires removing certain emergency life raft (raft) reservoirs (reservoirs) from service, inspecting the reservoirs and raft actuator cables (actuator cables), and depending on the inspection results, replacing the reservoir or adjusting the actuator cable. This AD was prompted by the inadvertent activation and deployment of a raft while the helicopter was in flight. The actions of this AD are intended to address an unsafe condition on these products.
95-04-02: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Rolls- Royce, plc RB211-524 series turbofan engines, that requires a one-time modification of the nozzle guide vane (NGV) assembly to incorporate vane core reinforcement inserts which would prevent release of the stage 2 NGV seal ring, rotor contact, and severance of the rotor drive arm. This amendment is prompted by a report of an uncontained stage 1 low pressure turbine failure. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent release of the stage 2 NGV seal ring, which could result in an uncontained engine failure. The incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the regulations is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of May 8, 1995.
2020-23-05: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2018-08-01 for Airbus Helicopters Model EC225LP helicopters. AD 2018-08-01 required inspecting the control rod attachment yokes (yoke) of certain main rotor rotating swashplates (swashplate). This new AD retains the inspection requirements of AD 2018-08-01, expands the applicability, establishes a life limit, and adds a one-time inspection of stripped yokes. This AD was prompted by the identification of additional swashplate serial numbers affected by the unsafe condition and the establishment of a life limit for the swashplates. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2009-18-09: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: A recent design review has been carried out on the F28 Mark 0070/0100 fuel system in accordance with the guidelines related to FAA SFAR 88 [Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 88] (Fuel Tank Safety Program) and JAA [Joint Aviation Authorities] INT/POL/25/12. The review revealed that under certain failure conditions, prolonged dry running of the fuel transfer pumps may result in an ignition source in the centre wing fuel tank. This condition, if not corrected, could lead to ignition of flammable fuel vapors, resulting in fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the aircraft. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions tocorrect the unsafe condition on these products.
2020-22-15: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all The Boeing Company Model DC-10-10 and DC-10-10F airplanes, Model DC-10- 15 airplanes, Model DC-10-30 and DC-10-30F (KC-10A and KDC-10) airplanes, Model DC-10-40 and DC-10-40F airplanes, Model MD-10-10F and MD-10-30F airplanes, and Model MD-11 and MD-11F airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of cracked floor beams and floor beam supports in the area of the overwing exit doors located at certain stations (STA). This AD requires an inspection of the overwing floor beams for any repair, repetitive inspections of the overwing floor beams and floor beam supports at certain STA on the left and right sides for any crack, and applicable on-condition actions. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2003-23-02: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain Cessna Model 560 airplanes. This action requires disengaging and tie-strapping the pitch trim and autopilot servo (servo 1) circuit breakers. This action also provides an optional inspection and follow-on actions that, if accomplished, terminates the requirement to disengage and tie-strap those circuit breakers. This action is necessary to prevent a single-point failure in the trim system from causing a runaway trim condition that the pilot may be unable to stop by using the autopilot-disconnect switch. This condition could result in loss of control of the airplane. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2003-22-12: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Bombardier Model CL-600-1A11 (CL-600), CL-600- 2A12 (CL-601), and CL-600-2B16 (CL-601-3A, CL-601-3R, and CL-604) series airplanes. This amendment requires revising the airplane flight manual to provide the flightcrew with procedures and limitations for operating the airplane with out-of-tolerance angle of attack (AOA) transducers. This amendment also requires, among other actions, measuring the vane angles and voltage of the AOA transducers; reworking the AOA transducer assemblies; repetitive measurements of the resistance of both AOA transducers; and follow-on and corrective actions, as applicable. This action is necessary to prevent flat spots on the potentiometers of the AOA transducers due to wear, which may cause a delay in the commands for stall warning, stick shaker, and stick pusher operation. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
68-20-07: 68-20-07 DOWTY ROTOL: Amendment 39-664. Applies to Dowty Rotol Propellers (c) R.193/4-30-4/50 installed on Fairchild F. 27A-F-G-J, FH.227 and Fokker F.27 Mk 400, (c) R.257/4-30-4/60 installed on Fairchild FH.227B, FH.227C, FH.227D and FH.227E, and (c) R.184/4-30-4/50 installed on Grumman G-159. Compliance required as indicated unless already accomplished. To prevent failure of the propeller hub driving center, P/N RA 57500, accomplish the following: (a) For all propellers except the (c) R.184/4-30-4/50 propeller, incorporate Dowty Rotol Modification (c) VP.2486, in accordance with Dowty Rotol Service Bulletin No. 61.573B dated June, 1968, or later ARB approved issue, or FAA approved equivalent at the next scheduled overhaul or within the next 4500 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs first. (b) For (c) R.184/4-30-4/50 propellers accomplish the following: (1) For propeller hubs having 2500 or more hours time in service on the effective date of this AD and that have not been modified in accordance with paragraph (5), inspect the hub in accordance with paragraph (3) within the next 50 hours time in service and incorporate the modification specified in paragraph (5) at the next scheduled overhaul or prior to the accumulation of 400 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs first. (2) For propeller hubs having less than 2500 hours time in service on the effective date of this AD and that have not been modified in accordance with paragraph (5), inspect the hub in accordance with paragraph (3) prior to the accumulation of 2550 hours time in service and incorporate the modification specified in paragraph (5) within the next 400 hours time in service or prior to the accumulation of 2500 hours time in service, whichever occurs later. (3) Inspect the rear face of the hub driving center flange with a magnifying glass and by the magnetic particle fluid method in accordance with Dowty Rotol Service Bulletin 61-633 dated June 1968, or later approved ARB issue, or an FAA approved equivalent. (4) If cracked hub driving centers are detected during any inspection, before further flight replace the propeller hub driving center with a serviceable part of the same part number having no cracks. (5) Incorporate Dowty Rotol Modification No. (c) VP.2486 in accordance with Dowty Rotol Service Bulletin No. 61-573A dated June 1968, or later ARB approved issue, or an FAA approved equivalent. The inspection specified in paragraph (3) is not required in hubs modified in accordance with this paragraph. This supersedes Amendment 39-587 (33 F.R. 5866), AD 68-08-05. This amendment becomes effective October 8, 1968.
2020-22-20: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Airbus Helicopters Model AS350B, AS350B1, AS350B2, AS350B3, AS350BA, AS350D, AS350D1, AS355E, AS355F, AS355F1, AS355F2, AS355N, AS355NP, EC130B4, and EC130T2 helicopters. This AD requires visually inspecting each main rotor gearbox (MGB) suspension bar attachment bracket bolt for missing bolt heads. Depending on the outcome of the visual inspection, measuring the tightening torque, removing certain parts, sending photos and reporting information to Airbus Helicopters, and completing an FAA-approved repair is required. This AD was prompted by a report of a missing MGB suspension bar attachment bolt head. The actions of this AD are intended to address an unsafe condition on these products.
70-10-07: 70-10-07 HAWKER SIDDELEY: Amdt. 39-991. Applies to "Heron" Model DH.114 series 2 airplanes which have not incorporated HSA Modification 1093. Compliance is required as indicated. To prevent failure of the nose landing gear locking lever and jack attachment lever, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 150 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD unless already accomplished within the last 150 hours' time in service, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 300 hours' time in service since the last inspection, visually inspect the nose landing gear locking lever (P/N 4UN.41A) and jack attachment lever (P/N 4UN.323A) for cracks. (b) If cracks are found during the inspections required by paragraph (a), before further flight, either replace the cracked lever with a serviceable lever of the same part number or comply with paragraph (c). (c) Unless already accomplished in accordance with paragraph (b), on or before March 1, 1971, replacethe nose landing gear locking lever (P/N 4UN.41A) and jack attachment lever (P/N 4UN.323A) with HSA Modification 1093 levers in accordance with Hawker Siddeley Aviation Ltd. Technical News Sheet Heron (114) No. U.13 dated December 8, 1969, or an FAA- approved equivalent. (d) The inspections required by paragraph (a) may be discontinued following compliance with paragraph (c). (e) Upon request by the operator, an FAA maintenance inspector, subject to prior approval of the Chief, Aircraft Certification Staff, FAA Europe, Africa, and Middle East Region may adjust the repetitive inspection intervals specified in this AD to permit compliance at an established inspection period of the operator if the request contains substantiating data to justify the increase for that operator. Amendment 39-991 effective June 14, 1970. This Amendment (39-1062) becomes effective August 11, 1970.
95-03-14: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Teledyne Continental Motors (TCM) IO-346, IO-520, and IO-550 series reciprocating engines, that currently requires initial and repetitive inspections of the engine mount brackets for cracks, and if found cracked, replacement with improved design engine mount brackets. All engine mount brackets require replacement with improved design engine mount brackets at the next engine removal after the effective date of that airworthiness directive (AD). This amendment clarifies the identification procedures to determine which engine mount brackets must be inspected. This amendment is prompted by reports that the engine mount bracket part numbers, which are ink stamped, can be easily obliterated. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent engine separation from the aircraft due to cracks in the engine mount brackets.
55-09-04: 55-09-04 HAMILTON STANDARD: Applies to All 24260 Propeller Hub Barrels Used on Boeing 377 Aircraft. Compliance required as indicated. As a result of cracks occurring in several 24260 hubs when installed as noted, it is considered desirable to improve the strength characteristics of the hub by reworking and shotpeening the areas subject to such failures. Therefore, in order to minimize the possibility of failures of the nature indicated, accomplish the following: Inspection. Inspect at every overhaul Rework. Rework hubs at the earliest opportunity, but not later than at the next overhaul following June 15, 1955, for hubs with 6,000 or more hours of total operating time. (Hamilton Standard Service Bulletin No. 327 dated November 18, 1954, outlines the required rework.)
96-05-09: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), that is applicable to all Airbus Model A300, A300-600, A310, A330, and A340 series airplanes. The existing AD currently requires an inspection of the sliding side windows in the cockpit to identify suspect windows; and either deactivation of the sliding window defogging system; installation of thermo-sensitive indicators; or replacement of the window. This amendment adds a requirement to replace suspect windows with serviceable windows, which, when accomplished, terminates the requirements of the AD. The actions specified by this amendment are intended to prevent rupture of a cockpit sliding window and subsequent rapid decompression of the fuselage due to fracture of the window as a result of thermal stress created by overheating of the wires of the heating element in a localized area.
50-47-02: 50-47-02 CULVER: Applies to All Models V and V2 Aircraft Equipped With Sensenich Models C2FB3 or C2FB1 Propeller With C276A2, PC276A6, PC276A7 and C276A6 Blades. Compliance required as indicated. (1) Replacement required prior to January 31, 1951. In order to eliminate the continued occurrence of broken blade lag screws and/or cracked blade shanks and ferrules, all C276A2 blades must be retired from service and replaced with blade Model PC276A6, PC276A7 or C276A6. (2) Inspection required every 500 hours of operation after installation of blade Models PC276A6, PC276A7 and C276A6. The propeller blades should be removed from the hub, and the wood blade shank and the split retaining ring groove in the blade ferrule should be carefully inspected for cracks. The lag screws should be check-tightened to 160 inch-pounds torque. Blade with broken lag screws or cracked wood shank or ferrule must be removed from service. The ferrule and all ferrous metallic parts of the hubshould be magnetically inspected. The blades are subjected to excessive vibratory stresses when operation beyond the allowable engine r.p.m. ratings inadvertently occurs. It is recommended, therefore, that the accuracy of the tachometer be checked in order to preclude such operation. Operation between 1,800-2,000 r.p.m. is to be avoided when the nose landing gear is extended. (Sensenich Service Bulletins Nos. 133, 134 and 135 cover these same subjects.) This supersedes AD 47-47-09.
2020-22-06: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 99-01-19 and AD 2004-25-02, which applied to certain Airbus SAS Model A320 series airplanes. AD 99-01-19 and AD 2004-25-02 required repetitive inspections to detect fatigue cracking in certain areas of the fuselage, and corrective action if necessary. AD 2004-25-02 also provided an optional terminating action for the repetitive inspections. This AD continues to require, for certain airplanes, repetitive inspections of the fastener holes for any cracking, and repair if necessary, and provides an optional terminating action for the fastener hole inspections. This AD also revises the applicability to include additional airplanes and requires, for all airplanes, inspections of the emergency exit door structure for any cracking and repair if necessary; as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. This AD was prompted by a report that during full scale tests to support the Model A320 structure extended service goal (ESG) exercise, \n\n((Page 71241)) \n\nseveral cracks were found on both sides of the overwing emergency exit door cut-outs at fuselage section 15. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2003-22-09: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Pratt & Whitney PW4074, PW4074D, PW4077, PW4077D, PW4084, PW4084D, PW4090, PW4090D, PW4090-3, and PW4098 turbofan engines. This AD requires borescope inspection of the No. 3 bearing weep tube, on engines with high oil consumption that troubleshooting procedures fail to determine the source of oil loss. This AD also requires for all engines, initial and repetitive visual inspections of the turbine exhaust case (TEC) in the vicinity of the No 3 bearing oil vent tube for evidence of oil wetting or staining. If the vent tube borescope inspection is unsuccessful due to tube blockage, this AD also requires borescope inspections of the high pressure turbine (HPT) assembly for oil wetting or staining. This AD also requires removal of the HPT assembly and replacement of any heat distressed HPT assembly hardware if oil wetting or staining is found. This AD is prompted by reports of engine HPT assembly hardware being damaged as aresult of thermal distress from oil igniting after leaking from the No. 3 bearing compartment. We are issuing this AD to prevent thermal distressed HPT assembly hardware from remaining in service, which could result in a cracked HPT stage 1 disk or HPT stage 1-2 air seal and an uncontained engine failure.
95-02-11: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9-87 (MD-87) series airplanes. This action requires an inspection to detect chafing or arcing damage to the wiring of the aft right coatroom, the intercostal, and the recirculation duct assembly near longeron 5; and modification of the wiring installation for the aft right coatroom. This amendment is prompted by a report of an electrical fire that started due to a short in the coatroom wiring, which was caused by arcing and chafing damage to the wiring. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent severe damage to the airframe in the event of a fire caused by arcing and chafing damage to the coatroom wiring.
67-31-04: 67-31-04 CESSNA: Amdt. 39-516, Part 39, Federal Register November 29, 1967. Applies to Models 150G and 150H Airplanes, Serial Numbers 15064533 through 15067891. To prevent loss of longitudinal control, unless already accomplished, prior to further flight, remove the glove compartment from the aircraft. If after it is removed the glove compartment is modified, the modification must be approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Federal Aviation Administration, Central Region, before it is reinstalled in the aircraft and the aircraft returned to service. This amendment effective November 29, 1967, for all persons except those to whom it was made effective by air mail letter dated November 17, 1967.