Results
2016-18-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Bombardier, Inc. Model CL-600-2B19 (Regional Jet Series 100 & 440) airplanes. This AD was prompted by two in-service incidents of a loss of all air data information in the flight deck. This AD requires a revision of the airplane flight manual (AFM) emergency procedures section to provide procedures to guide the crew on how to stabilize the airplane airspeed and attitude for continued safe flight when a loss of all air data information has occurred in the flight deck. We are issuing this AD to prevent loss of control when a loss of all air data information has occurred in the flight deck.
70-25-03: 70-25-03 BOEING: Boeing 747 and PRATT AND WHITNEY JT9D. Amdt. 39-1116 as amended by Amendment 39-1149. Applies to Boeing Model 747 Series Airplanes and Pratt and Whitney Aircraft Model JT9D Series Engines. \n\n\tCompliance required within the next 600 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo reduce the possibility of engine surge during thrust reversal, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tModify the engine Air-Automatic Deceleration System in accordance with Pratt and Whitney Aircraft Service Bulletin Number 2841, dated August 21, 1970, or later FAA approved revision or an equivalent method approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Eastern Region.\n \n\t(b)\tModify the engine controls mixing box, airplane electrical wiring system, engine cowl panel, bleed duct bracket and pressure regulator vent line in accordance with the Boeing Company Service Bulletin Number 75-2002, dated September 25, 1970, or later FAA approved revision or an equivalent method approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA, Western Region. \n\n\t(c)\tUpon completion of the work described in (a) and (b) on all four engines, reverse thrust may be used to landing roll speeds as noted in the FAA approved Boeing 747 Airplane Flight Manual Normal Operating Procedures entitled RABS PROCEDURE (OPTIONAL), or an alternate procedure approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA, Western Region. \n\n\tUntil such time as the modification of all four engines on an aircraft is accomplished, install the placard described in Boeing Service Bulletin Number 78-2016, dated November 10, 1970, and referenced at Paragraph C(iv), of Boeing Service Bulletin Number 75-2002, dated September 25, 1970, or later FAA approved revisions or an equivalent placard approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA, Western Region. The placard may be removed after the modifications in (a) and (b) are accomplished. Theplacard need not be installed if RABS PROCEDURES (OPTIONAL) is not used as an optional procedure by the operator. \n\n\tAmendment 39-1116 effective January 5, 1971. \n\n\tThis amendment 39-1149 becomes effective January 29, 1971.
86-06-05: 86-06-05 BRITISH AEROSPACE AIRCRAFT GROUP: Amendment 39-5263. Applies to all BAe Model HS 748 airplanes, certificated in any category. Compliance is required within 60 days after the effective date of this AD. To prevent the detachment of the windshield wiper actuating arm, accomplish the following, unless already accomplished: A. Inspect and modify, as necessary, the windshield actuating arm in accordance with Dunlap Limited Aviation Division Service Bulletin 30-92, dated March 7, 1985. B. Alternate means of compliance which provide an acceptable level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. C. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of inspections and/or modifications required by this AD. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service document from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to British Aerospace, Inc., Librarian, Box 17414, Dulles International Airport, Washington, D.C. 20041. This document may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. This amendment becomes effective May 2, 1986.
2024-17-09: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Embraer S.A. (Embraer) Model EMB-505 airplanes. This AD was prompted by analysis of the left-hand (LH) refreshment center and LH forward cabinet that identified the need for installing structural reinforcements. This AD requires installing structural reinforcements as specified in an Ag[ecirc]ncia Nacional de Avia[ccedil][atilde]o Civil (ANAC) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2016-18-01: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 737-600, -700, -700C, -800, -900, and -900ER series airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of heavy corrosion and chrome damage on the forward and aft trunnion pin assemblies of the right and left main landing gears (MLGs). This AD requires repetitive lubrication of the forward and aft trunnion pin assemblies of the right and left MLGs; repetitive inspections of these assemblies for corrosion and chrome damage, and related investigative and corrective actions if necessary; and installation of new or modified trunnion pin assembly components, which will terminate the repetitive lubrication and repetitive inspections. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct heavy corrosion and chrome damage on the forward and aft trunnion pin assemblies of the right and left MLGs, which could result in cracking of these assemblies and collapse of the MLGs.
71-01-05: 71-01-05 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amdt. 39-1140. Applies to DC-9 series airplanes certificated in all categories. \n\n\tCompliance required within the next 500 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent failures in the deployment of the emergency evacuation slide, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tModify the Douglas Aircraft Company P/N 3753213-39 latch clip in accordance with Douglas Aircraft Company All Operators Letter (AOL) 9-370, dated November 17, 1969, or Revision A thereto, dated November 19, 1970, or later FAA approved revisions, to provide a notch in the latch clip at the point of interference with the clevis pin in the swaged head of the emergency evacuation slide deployment cable assembly, or \n\n\t(b)\tReplace Douglas P/N 3753213-39 latch clip with Douglas P/N 3753213-99 latch clip, or \n\n\t(c)\tAn equivalent modification approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective February 17, 1971.
84-25-06: 84-25-06 HAMILTON STANDARD: Amendment 39-4970. Applies to Hamilton Standard Model 23LF-335 and -371 variable pitch propellers installed on, but not limited, to British Aerospace HP137 aircraft certificated in any category. Compliance is required within the next 20 hours time in service or before the next propeller landing reversal, whichever occurs first, following the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, and at every 50 propeller landing reversals thereafter. To detect cracks in the blades/counterweights which could cause possible propeller failure, accomplish the following: (a) Clean and inspect for cracks in the propeller blades and counterweights in accordance with section 2, paragraphs A and B of Hamilton Standard ASB No. A27, Revision 1, November 1, 1984, or FAA approved equivalent. (b) Blades and counterweights found to have evidence of cracks must be removed from service and replaced with a serviceable assembly prior to further flight.Aircraft may be ferried in accordance with the provisions of Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) 21.197 and 21.199 to a base where the AD can be accomplished. Upon request, an equivalent means of compliance with the requirements of this AD may be approved by the Manager, Engine and Propeller Standards Staff, ANE-110, FAA, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts 01803. The manufacturer's specifications and procedures identified and described in this directive are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). All persons affected by this directive who have not already received this document from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Hamilton Standard, Division of United Technologies Corporation, Windsor Locks, Connecticut 06096. These documents also may be examined at the Office of the Regional Counsel, FAA, Attn: Rule Docket No. 84-ANE-22, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts 01803. This amendment becomes effective on January 3, 1985.
52-23-01: 52-23-01 EDISON FIRE DETECTORS: Applies to All Aircraft Equipped With Edison P/N 35534, Fire Detectors Installed in Junction Boxes. To be accomplished not later than next engine change after January 1, 1953. In order to prevent grounding of either or both terminals of Edison P/N 35534 fire detectors due to inadequate clearance between the detector terminals and the structure to which the junction box and detector assembly are mounted, or the junction box cover in some instances, the following corrective action must be accomplished. The dimensions of the P/N 35534 Edison fire detector should be compared with the dimensions of the junction box employed by each operator to assure that there is sufficient clearance between the detector terminals and the structure to which it is mounted, or the cover. Sufficient clearance will depend on the construction of the junction box, but 3/16 of an inch may be used as a general guide. If such clearance does not exist an appropriate modification should be made, or appropriate insulation provided between the terminals and the structure or the junction box cover, as the case may be. (Douglas General Service Letter DC-6 No. 115, dated January 29, 1952, covers this same subject.)
2024-20-05: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Columbia Helicopters, Inc., Model 234 helicopters and restricted category Model CH-47D helicopters. This AD was prompted by two reports of a flight control rigid connecting link (link) failure, due to a manufacturing defect. This AD requires removing certain links from service and prohibits installing those links. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2016-17-15: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Bombardier, Inc. Model CL-600-2B19 (Regional Jet Series 100 & 440) airplanes. This AD was prompted by the need for more stringent inspection requirements for certain affected components. This AD requires revising the maintenance or inspection program to incorporate certain revised airworthiness limitations (AWL) and require repairs of affected components. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct fatigue cracking in the affected components; such cracking could result in loss of structural integrity.