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64-27-03: 64-27-03 SUD AVIATION: Amdt. 39-8 Part 39 (New) Federal Register December 2, 1964. Applies to Model SE 210 Caravelle VIR Aircraft. Compliance required as indicated. In order to prevent fatigue failure of the main landing gear steel axle beams accomplish the following: (a) Within 430 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD and thereafter at intervals not exceeding 430 hours' time in service from the last inspection, visually inspect all main landing gear steel axle beams, P/N's 269028B and 269029B, for cracks around threaded holes, as specified in Hispano Suiza Aeroservice Bulletin No. 91 Section 1, No. 34 dated January 4, 1963. (Note: This inspection may be made without disassembly of tubing support components.) (b) Within 860 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD and thereafter at intervals not exceeding 860 hours' time in service from the last inspection, remove the lower tubing support shield and visually inspect witha magnifying glass the lower threaded holes in the main landing gear steel axle beams for cracks. (c) Unless previously accomplished remove the lower tubing support shielding and inspect for cracks all lower threaded holes in the main landing gear steel axle beams and surrounding areas using fluorescent magnetic particle inspection or FAA approved equivalent at the following times: (1) For landing gear with between 4,500 hours' and 5,100 hours' total time in service as of the effective date of this AD accomplish the inspection before the accumulation of 5,530 hours' total time in service. (2) For landing gear with 5,100 or more hours' total time in service as of the effective date of this AD accomplish the inspection within 430 hours' total time in service after the effective date of this AD. (d) Within 8,000 hours' total time in service rework all the lower threaded holes on axle beams as specified in Hispano Suiza Aero-service Bulletin No. 91 Section 1, No. 34dated January 4, 1963, or an FAA approved equivalent. The repetitive inspections specified in (b) and the inspection specified in (c) need not be performed after this rework has been accomplished. (e) Within 12,000 hours' total time in service rework in accordance with Hispano Suiza Aeroservice Bulletin No. 91 Section 1, No. 34 dated January 4, 1963, or an FAA approved equivalent all holes in the landing gear which have not previously been reworked in accordance with (d). This AD no longer applies to aircraft on which this rework has been accomplished. (f) Replace any parts found cracked before further flight. (g) Upon request of the operator, an FAA maintenance inspector, subject to prior approval of the Chief, Aircraft Certification Division, Paris, France, may adjust the repetitive inspection intervals specified in this AD to permit compliance at an established inspection period of the operator if the request contains substantiating data to justify the increase forsuch operator. (Hispano Suiza Aeroservice Bulletin No. 91 Section 1, No. 34 dated January 4, 1963, covers this same subject.) This directive effective January 1, 1965.
2019-12-05: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain CFM International S.A. (CFM) CFM56-5B, CFM56-5C, and CFM56-7B model turbofan engines with a certain rotating air high-pressure turbine (HPT) front seal. This AD requires replacement of the affected rotating air HPT front seal with a part eligible for installation. This AD was prompted by cracks found in the rotating air HPT front seal. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
98-13-33: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all Airbus Model A300, A300-600, and A310 series airplanes, that requires repetitive tests to detect desynchronization of the rudder servo actuators, and adjustment or replacement of the spring rods of the rudder servo actuators, if necessary. For certain airplanes, this AD also requires repetitive inspections to detect cracking of the rudder attachments, and repair, if necessary; or modification of the rudder attachments. This proposal is prompted by issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified by the proposed AD are intended to detect and correct desynchronization of the rudder servo actuators, which could result in reduced structural integrity of the rudder attachments and reduced controllability of the airplane.
2006-24-09: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as a discrepancy between the design documentation and the Technical Service Manual. In 1981, a castellated nut with cotter pin was introduced to secure the rudder, replacing the self-locking nut through PZL-Bielsko Bulletin No. BE-06/50-3/81. This change has not been introduced to the Technical Service Manual and use of a self-locking nut, in accordance with the Manual, is still possible. We are issuing this AD to require actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
80-17-09: 80-17-09 BELL: Amendment 39-3876. Applies to Models 204B, 205A-1, 212, 214B, and 214B-1 helicopters and military UH-1 series helicopters certified in all categories. Compliance required as indicated for helicopters equipped with main rotor straps, P/N 204-012-122-1, -5, or 214-010-179-1. To preclude possible separation of a main rotor blade tension-torsion strap and loss of a main rotor blade, accomplish the following: a. Within the next 100 hours' time in service after the effective date of this airworthiness directive (AD), remove and replace main rotor straps having: (1) 1,100 or more hours of total time in service on the effective date of this AD, or (2) 24 or more months elapsed calendar time in service as of the effective date of this AD, whichever comes first. b. Remove and replace main rotor straps having less than 1,100 hours' total time in service or having less than 24 months elapsed time in service on the effective date of this AD:(1) Prior to attaining 1,200 hours' total time in service, or (2) Prior to exceeding 24 months elapsed time in service, whichever comes first. c. The helicopter may be flown in accordance with FAR's 21.197 and 21.199 to a base where this AD may be accomplished. (Bell Helicopter Textron Alert Service Bulletin No. 212-80-17 pertains to this subject.) This amendment becomes effective September 15, 1980.
2019-11-09: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus SAS Model A319-113 and -114 airplanes, and Model A320-211 and - 212 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report that a life-limit of 64,000 flight cycles has been established for certain titanium crossbeams of the forward engine mount. This AD requires repetitive replacements of all affected crossbeams of the forward engine mount, as specified in European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) ADs, which are incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2006-22-15: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD), which applies to all Boeing Model 747 series airplanes. That AD currently requires repetitive inspections for cracking of the top and side panel webs and panel stiffeners of the nose wheel well (NWW), and corrective actions if necessary. This new AD reduces the interval for certain repetitive inspections and removes a certain optional inspection. This new AD also requires replacing the NWW side and top panels with new panels, which terminates the repetitive inspections. This AD results from the development of a new modification. We are issuing this AD to prevent fatigue cracks in the top and side panel webs and stiffeners of the NWW, which could compromise the structural integrity of the NWW and could lead to the rapid decompression of the airplane. \n\nDATES: This AD becomes effective December 11, 2006. \n\n\tThe Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of a certain publication listed in the AD as of December 11, 2006. \n\n\tOn May 10, 2005 (70 FR 21141, April 25, 2005), the Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-53A2465, Revision 4, dated February 24, 2005.
96-10-01: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain The New Piper Aircraft, Inc. (Piper) Models PA-28-140, PA-28-150, PA-28-160, and PA-28-180 airplanes. This action requires a complete landing light support replacement. This AD action is prompted by reports of two accidents and two incidents resulting from the landing light retainer support seal breaking apart and entering the carburetor. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent the landing light retainer support seal from being ingested by the updraft carburetor, which, if not detected and corrected, could result in rough engine operation or possible engine failure and loss of control of the airplane.
2019-10-06: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Aviat Aircraft Inc. Models A-1C-180 and A-1C-200 airplanes equipped with a Rapco part number RA1798-00-1 fuel vent check valve installed on either wing or both. This AD was prompted by a report that the fuel tank vent check valves are sticking in the closed position causing fuel starvation to the engine. This AD requires revision of the airplane flight manual (AFM) to add a pre-flight check of the fuel vent check valves for proper operation and replacing any inoperative fuel vent check valve with an airworthy part. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2019-11-08: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all International Aero Engines, LLC (IAE) PW1133G-JM, PW1133GA-JM, PW1130G- JM, PW1129G-JM, PW1127G-JM, PW1127GA-JM, PW1127G1-JM, PW1124G-JM, PW1124G1-JM, and PW1122G-JM model turbofan engines. This AD requires the removal of the main gearbox (MGB) assembly and electronic engine control (EEC) software and the installation of a part and software version eligible for installation. This AD was prompted by multiple reports of in-flight engine shutdowns (IFSDs) as the result of high- cycle fatigue causing fracture of certain parts of the MGB assembly. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.