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2009-15-01: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Hawker Beechcraft Corporation (Type Certificate previously held by Raytheon Aircraft Company) Model G36 airplanes. This AD requires you to inspect for any improper installation and/or chafing of the P60/J60 electrical connector, associated wiring, and fuel line and, if found, correct the installation and replace damaged parts. This AD results from reports of chafing between the wire harness/connector(s) and fuel line. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct chafing between the wire harness/connector(s) and fuel line. This chafing could lead to fuel leaking into the cockpit and fire in the cockpit if wiring arcs through the fuel line.
83-15-02: 83-15-02 AVIONS MARCEL DASSAULT - BREGUET AVIATION: Amendment 39-4689. Applies to Falcon 10 aircraft serial numbers 1 through 153 inclusive. Compliance required within sixty days after the effective date of this AD. To prevent possible malfunction of the passenger door mobile latches and the door opening in flight, accomplish the following, unless already accomplished: 1. Install the stops for the passenger door mobile latches in accordance with paragraph 2, Accomplishment Instructions, of Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aviation Service Bulletin F10 0190 dated October 24, 1979. 2. Alternate means of compliance which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. 3. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of inspections and/or modifications required by this AD. This amendment becomes effective August 1, 1983.
86-19-03: 86-19-03 HTL ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY: Amendment 39-5397. Applies to HTL Advanced Technology fire extinguisher discharge outlets as listed in the service bulletins and installed on Boeing Model 707, 727, 737, 747, 757 and 767 series airplanes and on Airbus Industrie Model A300 and A310 series airplanes.\n \n\tTo preclude the potential for separation of the fire extinguisher discharge outlet and misdirection of the fire extinguishing agent, accomplish the following within twelve (12) months after the effective date of the AD, unless already accomplished: \n\n\tA.\tComplete the physical and top view x-ray inspections of the fire extinguisher discharge outlets specified in HTL Advanced Technology Service Bulletins listed below, or later revisions approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region: \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nHTL SERVICE BULLETINS\nMFRS. S/B \n35203000-26-A-3\nRev. C\n6-15-85\n747\nENG/APU\n747-26A2108\n35203000-26-A-3\nRev. C\n6-15-85\n767ENG/APU\n767-26A0019 \n35203010-26-A-1\nRev. A\n6-15-85\n707 \nENG \n707-A3441\n35203016-26-A-2\nRev. B\n6-15-85\n737 \nENG\n737-26A1029 \n35203018-26-A-2\nRev. B\n6-15-85\n727\nENG\n727-26A0034 \n35203021-26-A-2\nRev. B\n6-15-85\n737 \nAPU\n737-26A1029\n35203022-26-A-2\nRev. B\n6-15-85\n727 \nAPU\n727-26A0034\n35203037-26-A-3\nRev. C\n6-15-85\n767 \nENG/APU \n767-26A0019\n35203038-26-A-1\nRev. A\n6-15-85\n767 \nCargo\n767-26A0021\n35203039-26-A-1\nRev. A\n6-15-85\n767 \nENG/APU\n767-26A0019\n35203040-26-A-1\nRev. A\n6-15-85\n767 \nENG/APU\n767-26A0019\n35289950-26-A-1\nRev. A\n6-15-85\n747 \nENG/APU\n747-26A2110\n35289950-26-A-1\nRev. A\n6-15-85\n757 \nCargo\n757-26A0010 \n35289950-26-A-1\nRev. A\n6-15-85\n767 \nCargo\n767-26A0021 \n35290250-26-A-2\nRev. B\n6-15-85\n747 \nAPU\n747-26A2108\n\n\n\tB.\tIf a discharge outlet does not meet the criterion for acceptability specified in the above bulletins, replace with a serviceable unit before further flight. \n\n\tC.\tFor discharge outlets that meet the criterion for acceptance specified in the above service bulletins, accomplish the reidentification in accordance with the accomplishment instructions therein. \n\n\tD.\tRemove and replace the fire extinguisher discharge outlets specified in the HTL Advanced Technology Service Bulletins listed below, or later revisions approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\n\nHTL SERVICE BULLETINS\n\n\nMFRS. S/B\n33600005-1-26-1\nRev.\n10-15-84\nA300/APU\nA300-26-048\n33600005-1-26-1\n-\n10-15-84\nA310/APU\nA310-26-2004\n33600005-2-26-2\n-\n10-15-84\nA310/APU\nA310-26-2004\n35203030-26-A-1\n-\n8-31-84\nA310 ENG\nA310-26-2003\n\n\tE.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD.\n \n\tF.\tAlternate means of compliance which provide an acceptable level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region.\n \n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to HTL Advanced Technology, 1800 Highland Avenue, Duarte, California 91010, Attention: John Hansen, Director of Quality Assurance. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 4344 Donald Douglas Drive, Long Beach, California.\n \n\tThis amendment becomes effective September 26, 1986.
2009-15-04: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Several reports have been received from A330 and A340 operators concerning chafing of the electrical harness behind the lavatory, located at L (level) 53, resulting in a number of short-circuits. This harness contains cables for lighting, plugs, loudspeakers and oxygen controls and indications. This condition, if not corrected, could lead to the short circuit of wires dedicated to oxygen, which, in case of emergency, could result in a large number of passenger oxygen masks (up to 32% of all seats) not being supplied with oxygen, possibly causing personal injuries. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2009-15-05: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Cessna Aircraft Company (Cessna) Models 208 and 208B airplanes. This AD requires you to measure the roll and the yaw bridle cable tension (adjusting as necessary) and to torque the clamp screws. This AD results from two reported incidences of slack bridle cables with the swaged balls unseating from their drum recesses. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct loose bridle cable clamps, which could result in the swaged ball unseating from the recess in the servo drum and contacting the cable guard pin. This failure could lead to very limited control of the rudder and/or aileron with consequent loss of control.
82-19-03: 82-19-03 SOCIETE NATIONALE INDUSTRIELLE AEROSPATIALE (SNIAS): Amendment 39-4460. Applies to Model SA330J series helicopters certificated in all categories that are equipped with main rotor spindles P/N 330A31.1122.03, 330A31.1122.06 to 330A31.1122.08. Compliance required as indicated. To detect possible cracks and to prevent fretting corrosion and possible cracking of the main rotor head outboard spindle lugs, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 10 hours' spindle time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, remove the spindles from the helicopter and inspect each main rotor spindle lug bore for cracks using a magnetic particle inspection method. (b) Within 750 hours' spindle time in service after inspection per paragraph (a) of this AD, inspect each lug bore for cracks using a dye penetrant or equivalent inspection method. (c) Within 750 hours' spindle time in service after inspection per paragraph (b) of thisAD, remove the spindle from the helicopter and inspect each lug bore for cracks using a magnetic particle inspection method. (d) Within 1,500 hours' spindle time in service after the effective date of this AD or at next overhaul of the main rotor head, whichever comes first, install spindles that have bushings installed in accordance with Aerospatiale Modification Instructions, AMS 07.43.078, or FAA approved equivalent. The inspections, paragraphs (b) and (c) of this AD, are not required after these bushings are installed. (e) Replace spindles having a cracked bore prior to further flight. Install serviceable spindles. (f) Alternative modifications or other actions which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Chief, Aircraft Certification Staff, FAA, Europe, Africa, and Middle East Office, c/o American Embassy, Brussels, Belgium. (Aerospatiale Service Bulletin No. 01.35 pertains to visual inspections and protective finish of the spindle lug bore.) This amendment becomes effective September 27, 1982.
2009-14-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: There have been several Stick Pusher Capstan Shaft failures causing the dormant loss or severe degradation of the stick pusher function. * * * Dormant loss or severe degradation of the stick pusher function could result in reduced controllability of the airplane. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2009-14-09: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: An internal review of design data has shown that the web of the left hand side (LH) stringer 13 near frame 8 might have been improperly trimmed on a few aircraft. If not corrected, possible crack initiations could occur in the upper stringer web, and therefore could impair the structural strength of the adjacent door stop. This latent failure could ultimately lead to the loss of redundancy of the door stops, thereby affecting the structural integrity of the fuselage. * * * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2008-16-10: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: The 3 supporting blocks [installed on hydraulic tubes] were made of Teflon, which is unsuitable material for this application. Excessive wear of the blocks was discovered on numerous aircraft, as well as several cases of chafing between the loosely supported tubes. In one case, hydraulic fluid was lost due to fatigue failure of an inadequately supported tube. Loss of hydraulic fluid causes subsequent multiple failures of hydraulically operated systems. Multiple failures of hydraulically operated systems (for the flight air brake actuators, brake system, right thrust reverser, etc.) could result in reduced controllability of the airplane. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
79-24-06: 79-24-06 MESSERSCHMITT-BOLKOW-BLOHM GmbH: Amendment 39-3622. Applies to all Model BO-105 helicopters, certificated in any category, incorporating tail rotor blades P/N 105-31742 or P/N 105-87161 that have not been modified in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions, paragraph 2.B., of Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm Alert Service Bulletin No. AB-16, Revision 1, dated December 22, 1978, hereinafter referred to as the Service Bulletin, or an FAA-approved equivalent. Compliance required as indicated. To prevent in-flight loss of tail rotor balance trim weights, and consequent imbalance of the tail rotor blades, accomplished the following: (a) Within the next 10 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, and thereafter following the last flight of each day upon which the accumulated time in service since the preceding inspection reaches 10 hours, until the modifications required by paragraph (c) of this AD are accomplished, inspect the tail rotor blades for condition in accordance with paragraph 2.A. of the Accomplishment Instructions of the Service Bulletin, or an FAA-approved equivalent. (b) If the inspection required by paragraph (a) of this AD reveals any cracks, or bonding separation that is unacceptable in accordance with the inspection criteria contained in paragraph 2.A. of the Service Bulletin, or an FAA-approved equivalent, before further flight, except that the helicopter may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a place where the required work can be performed - (1) Replace the affected blade with a serviceable blade of the same part number and continue to comply with the repetitive inspection and modification requirements of paragraph (a) and (c) of this AD; or (2) Replace both blades with blades of improved design, P/N 105-31743 or P/N 105-31744 after which paragraphs (a) and (c) of this AD do not apply. (See paragraph (d) of this AD.) (c) Within the next 100 hours time in service after the effective date ofthis AD, inspect the tail rotor blades in accordance with paragraph 2.A. of the Service Bulletin or an FAA-approved equivalent and before further flight - (1) If the inspection reveals any cracks, or bonding separation that is not acceptable in accordance with the inspection criteria contained in paragraph 2.A. of the Service Bulletin or an FAA-approved equivalent - (i) Replace the affected blade with a serviceable blade of the same part number and modify the tail rotor blade balance provisions of both blades in accordance with paragraph 2.B. of Accomplishment Instructions of the Service Bulletin or an FAA-approved equivalent; or (ii) Replace both blades with blades of improved design, P/N 105-31743 or P/N 105- 31744. (See paragraph (d) of this AD.) (2) If the inspection does not reveal any cracks or bonding separation that is not acceptable in accordance with the inspection criteria contained in paragraph 2.A. of the Service Bulletin or an FAA-approved equivalent, modify the tail rotor blade balance provisions of both blades in accordance with paragraph 2.B. of the Service Bulletin or an FAA-approved equivalent. (d) If tail rotor blades are to be changed in compliance with this AD, both blades must be of the same part number. (e) For the purpose of this AD, an FAA-approved equivalent must be approved by the Chief, Aircraft Certification Staff, AEU-100, FAA, Europe, Africa, and Middle East Region, c/o American Embassy, Brussels, Belgium. This amendment becomes effective December 10, 1979.