Results
2023-14-11: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Bombardier, Inc., Model BD-100-1A10 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of unexpected pitch upset upon autopilot disconnect. This AD requires revising the Non-Normal Procedures section of the existing airplane flight manual (AFM) associated with Auto Flight. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2023-15-01: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Pratt & Whitney Canada Corp. (P&WC) Model PW307D engines. This AD is prompted by a root cause analysis of an event involving an uncontained failure of a high-pressure turbine (HPT) 1st-stage disk, on an International Aero Engines AG (IAE) Model V2533-A5 engine, that resulted in high-energy debris penetrating the engine cowling and an aborted takeoff. This AD requires removing certain HPT 2nd-stage disks from service and also prohibits installation of certain HPT 2nd-stage disks on any affected engine. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
60-03-10: 60-03-10 WRIGHT: Amdt. 90 Part 507 Federal Register January 26, 1960. Applies to All TC18DA and TC18EA Series Engines. Compliance required at first engine overhaul after February 1, 1960, but not later than October 1, 1960. To prevent inadvertent loss of oil from the power recovery turbine fluid couplings, the PRT oil control valve must incorporate a WAD P/N 147825 valve body, or subsequently released part. This valve body incorporates three flats to provide a permanent oil bypass to insure an adequate supply of turbine coupling oil in the event of a regulator spring failure. (WAD Service Bulletins Nos. TC18-390 and TC18E-210 cover this same subject and furnish instructions for the rework of the superseded valve bodies to the P/N 147825 configuration.) This supersedes and cancels item No. (8) of AD 58-13-05.
97-04-12: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain Pratt & Whitney Canada (PWC) PT6 series turboprop engines. This action requires a one-time visual inspection of compressor bleed-off valves (BOVs) to determine if an affected supplier's code number is on the cover; and, if so, this AD requires the removal of the bleed valve cover assembly from the compressor bleed valve housing assembly and inspection of the cotter pin and the guide shaft pin. If the cotter pin or guide shaft pin is not acceptable, this AD requires modifying the compressor BOV or replacing it with a serviceable part. This amendment is prompted by reports of two malfunctions of compressor BOVs that resulted in inflight engine power reduction. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent engine power reduction due to malfunction of the compressor BOV, which could result in a forced landing and loss of the aircraft.
2005-02-03: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for Pratt & Whitney (PW) JT8D-209, -217, -217A, -217C, and -219 series turbofan engines. That AD currently requires torque inspection of the 3rd stage and 4th stage low pressure turbine (LPT) blades for shroud notch wear and replacement of the blade if wear limits are exceeded. This AD continues to require those torque inspections at shorter inspection intervals of the refurbished 3rd stage and 4th stage LPT blades, but the same or longer inspection intervals of the new 3rd stage and 4th stage LPT blades, for shroud notch wear and replacement of the blade if wear limits are exceeded. This AD also requires replacing LPT-to-exhaust case bolts and nuts with bolts and nuts made of Tinidur material. This AD results from reports of 194 blade fractures since 1991, with 37 of those blade fractures resulting in LPT case separation, and three reports of uncontained 3rd stage and 4th stage LPT blade failures with cowl penetration. We are issuing this AD to prevent an uncontained blade failure that could result in damage to the airplane.
2023-12-22: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Model 4101 airplanes. This AD was prompted by in-service cracking of the passenger door edge member, seal carrier, and inner skin, adjacent to the roller guide bracket. This AD requires a one-time inspection of the external visible surface of the inner skin, door edge member, and seal carrier adjacent to the roller bracket attachment brackets; and the inner skin, door edge member, and seal carrier at the roller bracket attachment bore, and repair if necessary. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
82-23-07: 82-23-07 RATIER-FIGEAC FH.146: Amendment 39-4490. Applies to Ratier-Figeac propeller Model FH.146. Compliance required within the next 100 hours of operation after the effective date of this AD unless already accomplished. To preclude the possibility of propeller blade failure, accomplish the following: (a) In accordance with Ratier-Figeac Service Bulletin No. 61-142 dated June 1, 1982, or an equivalent method approved by the Manager, Aircraft Certification Division, Federal Aviation Administration, New England Region: 1. Measure electrical resistance at end of disconnected wires of slip ring assembly. 2. Measure electrical resistance of insulation between wires and each propeller blade. (b) Remove propellers with measurements outside the limits of Bulletin No. 61-142 from service prior to further flight. This airworthiness directive becomes effective November 15, 1982.
55-23-02: 55-23-02 LOCKHEED: Applies to Models 1049C, D, E, and G, Serial Numbers 4163 Through 4166, 4520 Through 4581, 4583 Through 4605, 4608 Through 4615, and 4620. Compliance required as indicated. 1. Inspect the outer wing main beam web between wing Stations 510 and 668 left and right for cracks as soon as practical and repeat at 125-hour intervals until reinforcement in accordance with paragraph 2 is accomplished. If cracks are found repair immediately in accordance with Lockheed Repair Manual, Report 8882, and continue 125-hour inspections until reinforcement per paragraph 2 is accomplished. Inspection for fuel stains alone as an indication of a crack is not sufficient because of the presence of fuel sealant on the forward side of the web. 2. To be accomplished as soon as possible, but not later than next scheduled progressive overhaul time, and in no case later than December 1, 1956, whichever occurs first: Reinforce the main beam web, left and right, between wing Stations510 and 668. This shall be accomplished by the addition of three extruded 75S-T6 stiffeners, (LS2186 or LS6097) or equivalent between each of the original stiffeners. The LS347-3 stiffeners added previously in accordance with AD 54-24-02 on some of these aircraft may be retained. In these cases, one new (LS2186 or LS6097 or equivalent) stiffener must be added between each of these and the original stiffeners in this area. (Lockheed Service Bulletin No. 1049/SB-2753 also covers this subject.)
2014-21-06: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Beechcraft Corporation (Type Certificate Previously Held by Hawker Beechcraft Corporation; Raytheon Aircraft Company; Beech Aircraft Corporation) Model 400, 400A, 400T, and MU-300 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report of a failure of the Acme nut threads in a pitch trim actuator (PTA). This AD requires an inspection to determine if PTAs having a certain serial number and part number are installed, and replacement if they are installed. This AD also requires repetitive replacements of PTAs with new PTAs or certain overhauled PTAs. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of the Acme nut threads in the PTA, which could lead to loss of control of pitch trim and reduced controllability of the airplane.
2000-13-05: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to Rolls-Royce plc. (RR) RB211 Trent 768-60, Trent 772-60, and Trent 772B-60 turbofan engines. This action requires initial and repetitive ultrasonic inspections for cracks in fan blade dovetail roots, and if necessary, replacement with serviceable parts. This amendment is prompted by reports of fan blade failures due to dovetail root cracks in factory engine. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent possible multiple fan blade failures, which could result in an uncontained engine failure and damage to the airplane.