Results
96-25-12: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to Sundstrand T-62T-40C series auxiliary power units (APUs). This action requires removal from service of certain compressor wheels in accordance with a drawdown schedule, and replacement with serviceable parts, and establishes a new cyclic life limit for the existing compressor wheels. This amendment is prompted by reports of compressor wheel ruptures. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent compressor wheel rupture, which could result in an uncontained APU failure and damage to the aircraft.
92-04-07: 92-04-07 BOEING: Amendment 39-8178. Docket 92-NM-16-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: All Model 737-300, 737-400, and 737-500 series airplanes, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. \n\n\tTo prevent the occurrence of fire and smoke in the passenger cabin and cockpit, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tWithin 20 days after the effective date of this AD, visually inspect the wire bundles above the cockpit-to-cabin door header frame for damage due to chafing or interference with the door header frame. Pay particular attention to the wire bundle crossing over the right- hand corner of the header frame. Proper inspection requires removal of the aft center ceiling panel located just forward of the cockpit-to-cabin door. Ensure that the wire bundle clamps above the cockpit-to-cabin door header frame located approximately at Station 282.5, stringers 2R and 2L, are connected securely to stringer clip standoffs. (These should not befree floating clamps.) If any damaged wire bundle or loose clamp is found, prior to further flight, repair and/or secure it, in accordance with Boeing Standard Wiring Practices Document. \n\n\t(b)\tRepeat the inspection procedure required by paragraph (a) of this AD at intervals not to exceed 120 days. \n\n\t(c)\tWithin 30 days after the effective date of this AD, sleeve the wire bundles in the area where they cross the cockpit-to-cabin door header frame with Expando PT or equivalent protective sleeving. Ensure that there is a minimum of 0.25 inch of clearance between these bundles and the cockpit-to-cabin door frame header, to prevent chafing or interference. If rework is necessary, perform it prior to further flight, in accordance with Boeing Standard Wiring Practices Document. \n\n\t(d)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office(ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. The request shall be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO). \n\n\t(e)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. \n\n\t(f)\tThis amendment (39-8178, AD 92-04-07) becomes effective on February 21, 1992.
89-25-04: 89-25-04 BELL HELICOPTER TEXTRON, INC.: Amendment 39-6380. Docket No. 89-ASW-39. Applicability: Model 222 helicopters, serial numbers (S/N) 47006 through 47079 and 47081 through 47084, and Model 222B helicopter, S/N 47132. This AD applies to these helicopters, certificated in any category, with tail rotor boost cylinder support bracket, part number (P/N) 222-031-471-001, installed. Compliance: Required within 50 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To prevent failure of the tail rotor boost cylinder support bracket bulkhead, which could result in loss of the helicopter, accomplish the following: (a) Modify the Station 340 bulkhead in accordance with Appendix I of this AD. (Note: Appendix I refers to Bell Helicopter Textron Alert Service Bulletin No. 222-89-55, dated August 24, 1989, which is not reprinted in this AD.) (b) Compliance with BHTI Technical Bulletin No. 222-83-55, dated April 25, 1983, orPart II of Alert Service Bulletin No. 222-89-55, dated August 24, 1989, constitutes compliance with this AD. (c) An alternate method of compliance which provides an equivalent level of safety, may be approved by the Manager, Rotorcraft Certification Office, Southwest Region, Federal Aviation Administration, Fort Worth, Texas 76193-0170. This amendment (39-6380, AD 89-25-04) becomes effective on December 20, 1989.
86-06-06: 86-06-06 BOEING: Amendment 39-5261. Applies to Boeing Model 767 airplanes, certificated in any category, equipped with the following PICO, Inc., emergency evacuation slides: \n\n\nPART NUMBER\nSERIAL NUMBERS\n101623-( )\nB23-001 thru and including B23-383 \n101630-( )\nB101-001 thru and including B101-140\nB102-001 thru and including B102-143 \n101651-( )\nB51-001 thru and including B51-291 \n101654-( )\nL54-001 thru and including L54-041 \nR54-001 thru and including R54-038 \n101655-( ) \nL55-001 thru and including L55-032 \nR55-001 thru and including R55-031 \n101656-( ) \nL56-001 thru and including L56-013 \nR56-001 thru and including R56-012 \n\n\tNOTE: Empty parentheses indicate any number. \n\tCompliance is required as indicated in the body of the AD, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent the failure of the emergency evacuation slides accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tFor airplanes equipped with PICO, Inc., emergency evacuation slides manufactured prior to June 30,1983, within 30 days after the effective date of this AD, unless the slide has been inflated and inspected within the last one year prior to the effective date of this AD in accordance with the applicable PICO Component Maintenance Manual Numbers 25-61-20, 25-61-21, or 25-61-22, all dated April 1, 1985, or PICO Service Bulletin No. 101623/30/51/54/55-25-130, dated February 6, 1986, conduct inflation and inspection of the emergency evacuation slides AD in accordance with PICO Service Bulletin No. 101623/30/51/54/55-25-130, dated February 6, 1986, or later revision approved by the Manager, Western Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tB.\tFor airplanes equipped with PICO, Inc., emergency evacuation slides manufactured between July 1, 1983, and January 31, 1986, within 120 days after the effective date of this AD, unless the slide has been inflated and inspected within the last one year prior to the effective date of this AD, in accordance with the applicablePICO Component Maintenance Manual Numbers 25-61-20, 25-61-21 or 25-61-22, all dated April 1, 1985, or PICO Service Bulletin No. 101623/30/51/54/55-25-130, dated February 6, 1986, conduct an inflation and inspection of the emergency evacuation slides in accordance with PICO Service Bulletin No. 101623/30/51/54/55-25-130, dated February 6, 1986, or later revision approved by the Manager, Western Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tC.\tFor airplanes equipped with slides not inspected in accordance with paragraph A. or B. of this AD, those slides must be inflated and inspected in accordance with PICO Service Bulletin No. 101623/30/51/54/55-25-130 dated February 6, 1986, or later revision approved by the Manager, Western Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, within 18 months from the date of the last inflation and inspection. \n\n\tD.\tRepeat the inflation and inspection specified in paragraphs A., B., and C. of this AD at intervals notto exceed 18 months. \n\n\tE.\tAny defective slide discovered during accomplishment of paragraphs A., B., C., or D. of this AD must be replaced or repaired, prior to next flight, in accordance with the Repair Section of applicable PICO Component Maintenance Manual Numbers 25-61-20, 25-61-21, or 25-61-22, all dated April 1, 1985, or later revision approved by the Manager, Western Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tF.\tReport any seam separation or slide failure discovered during accomplishment of paragraphs A., B., C., or D. of this AD to the Manager, Western Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tG.\tThe inspection intervals of paragraph D. of this AD may be adjusted by the Manager, Western Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, based on the results of accomplishment of paragraphs A., B., and C. of this AD, or any other substantiating data submitted to justify a change. \n\n\tH.\tAlternate means of compliance which provide an acceptable level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Western Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to PICO, Inc., 15350 Stafford Street, City of Industry, California 91744. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or at the Western Aircraft Certification Office, 15000 Aviation Boulevard, Hawthorne, California. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective April 15, 1986.
93-17-08: 93-17-08 BOEING: Amendment 39-8679. Docket 92-NM-200-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model 737-100, 737-200, 737-200C airplanes, certificated in any category.\n \n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. \n\n\tTo prevent structural failure, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tExcept as provided below, prior to reaching the incorporation thresholds listed in Boeing Document No. D6-38505, "Aging Airplane Service Bulletin Structural Modification and Inspection Program--Model 737-100/-200/-200C," Revision F, dated April 23, 1992, or within the next 4 years after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, accomplish the structural modifications listed in Appendices A.3 and B.3 of the Boeing Document. Service bulletins whose threshold is specified in the Boeing Document by a calendar date must be modified by that date in lieu of the 4 years specified in this paragraph. \n\n\tNOTE 1: The modifications required by this paragraph do not terminate the inspection requirements of any other AD unless that AD specifies that any such modification constitutes terminating action for the inspection requirements. \n\n\t(b)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Seattle ACO. \n\n\tNOTE 2: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Seattle ACO. \n\n\t(c)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. \n\n\t(d)\tThe modifications shall be done in accordance with Boeing Document No. D6-38505, "Aging Airplane Service Bulletin Structural Modification and Inspection Program-- Model 737-100/-200/-200C," Revision F, dated April 23, 1992, which includes the following list of effective pages: \n\n\n\nPage Number\nRevision\nShown on Page\nDate\nShown on Page \nList of Active \n\n\nPages: Page c\nF\n(This page is not dated) \n\t\t\t\n(NOTE: The issue date of Revision F is indicated only on page c of the List of Active Pages; no other page of the document is dated.) This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC. \n\n\t(e)\tThis amendment becomes effective on October 1, 1993.
96-24-16: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Raytheon Model BAe 125-800A, Model Hawker 800, and Model Hawker 800XP series airplanes, that requires the filling of two tooling holes on the firewalls of the left and right engine pylons with sealant. This amendment is prompted by notification from the manufacturer that these holes were not sealed during production. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent an engine fire from moving to the fuselage and to the lines that carry flammable fluid that are located inboard of the firewall.
96-25-19: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 series airplanes, that currently requires either the application of a vapor sealant on the back of the receptacle of the auxiliary power unit (APU) power feeder cable; or a one-time visual inspection for gold-plating and evidence of damage of the connector contacts of the power feeder cable of the APU generator, and various follow-on actions. This amendment adds a requirement for replacement of certain connector contacts (pins/sockets) with gold-plated contacts. This amendment is prompted by reports of burning and arcing of the connector contacts of the power feeder cable of the APU generator. The actions specified by this AD are intended to reduce the potential for a fire hazard as a result of such burning or arcing.
92-25-01: 92-25-01 BOEING: Amendment 39-8416. Docket No. 92-NM-85-AD. Supersedes AD 90-08- 16, Amendment 39-6574. \n\n\tApplicability: Model 757 series airplanes; line numbers 1 through 411, inclusive, and 413 through 432, inclusive; certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. \n\n\tTo prevent damage caused by skewed flaps resulting from excessive wear of the splines of the trailing edge flap drive torque tube coupling, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tPrior to the accumulation of 2,000 flight cycles, or within the next 200 flight cycles after April 30, 1990, (the effective date of AD 90-08-16), whichever occurs later, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 2,000 flight cycles, perform an inspection of the torque tube coupling splines, in accordance with Boeing Service Letter 757-SL-27-52-B, dated April 30, 1990. \n\n\tNOTE: Operators who have conducted inspections of the torque tube coupling splines prior to the effective dateof this AD, in accordance with Boeing Service Letter 757-SL-27-52, dated January 31, 1990, or Boeing Service Letter 757-SL-27-52-A, dated March 21, 1990, are considered to be in compliance with paragraph (a) of this AD. \n\n\t\t(1)\tIf the measurement over the pin, as detailed in the service letter, is less than 1.8605 inches but equal to or greater than 1.8533 inches, repeat the inspection prior to the accumulation of 1,000 additional flight cycles. \n\n\t\t(2)\tIf the measurement over the pin, as detailed in the service letter, is less than 1.8533 inches, replace the coupling prior to further flight, in accordance with the service letter. \n\n\t(b)\tReplacement of the torque tube assemblies with improved torque tube assemblies, part number 251N4281-20 (one on each wing), and installation of a sealant plug in the shafts of the four gearboxes, in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 757-27-0099, dated March 12, 1992, constitutes terminating action for the inspections required by paragraph(a) of this AD. \n\n\t(c)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Seattle ACO. \n\n\tNOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Seattle ACO. \n\n\t(d)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. \n\n\t(e)\tThe inspection and replacement shall be done in accordance with Boeing Service Letter 757-SL-27-52-B, dated April 30, 1990. The replacement with improved torque tube assemblies shall be done in accordance with Boeing ServiceBulletin 757-27-0099, dated March 12, 1992. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC. \n\n\t(f)\tThis amendment becomes effective on December 23, 1992.
80-21-08: 80-21-08 PIPER: Amendment 39-3934. Applies to Model PA-25 series airplanes certificated in all categories which have incorporated STC SA501SW. (Docket No. 80-ASW-42.) Compliance required as indicated. For airplanes with forward wing spar(s) with 500 hours or more time in service since incorporation of STC SA501SW, compliance is required within 5 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. For airplanes with forward wing spar(s) with less than 500 hours time in service since incorporation of STC SA501SW, compliance is required upon accumulation of 500 hours time in service since incorporation of STC SA501SW or within the next 5 hours time in service, whichever is later. \n\n\tTo detect cracks or other damage in the forward wing spar cap, accomplish the following. \n\n\t(a)\tRemove the wing walk lower rear and lower front (leading edge) skin panels from each wing. \n\n\t(b)\tDetach the leading edge skin panel covering the wing strut attachment to the main spar sufficiently to allow inspection of the rear flange of the lower spar cap. \n\n\t(c)\tVisually inspect the upright, bulbed flange on the aft side of the front and rear spars (upper and lower) of both wings for misdrilled holes common to the bulbed spar flange and skin attach angles. Conduct this inspection in the areas uncovered by (a) and (b). \n\n\t\t(1)\tThe center unit of each fastener hole must be between .18 and .34 inches from the free end of the bulbed spar flange. \n\n\t\t(2)\tA gage fabricated as shown in figure number 1 may be used to check for misdrilled holes. \n\n\t\t(3)\tFigures 2 and 3 show how the gage is used. \n\n\t(d)\tInspect the uncovered spar caps for cracks visually and with standard dye or fluorescent penetrant inspection procedures. Place special attention to the inboard 10 inches of the front spar aft, lower cap. \n\n\t(e)\tIf misdrilled holes or cracks are found in (c) or (d), parts must be replaced with serviceable parts of the same part number. Replace blind fasteners common to the spar cap and skin angles (if removal is necessary) with MS20600M4 rivets. \n\n\t(f)\tVisually inspect the left and right lower spar web at the inboard end for installation of the fatigue resistant doubler plates, Piper P/N 60373 and Moore/Hutcherson P/N's SPD 20025-1 and -2. The fatigue resistant doublers extend outboard of the wing-fuselage attach lug 15 inches while the original single spar web doubler extends only 6 inches outboard of the attach lug. If the fatigue resistant doubler plates are not installed, accomplish the following within the next 100 hours time in service: \n\n\t\t(1)\tRemove left and right wing from fuselage. \n\n\t\t(2)\tRemove wing attach fitting located on each forward wing spar root. \n\n\t\t(3)\tUsing standard dye or fluorescent penetrant inspection procedures, inspect the inboard end of the forward spars for a distance of 24 inches outboard of the wing-fuselage attach lug for cracks. Inspect both the spar web and the spar cap with particular attention placed on the inboard 10 inches of the rear flange of the lower spar cap. \n\n\t\t(4)\tIf cracks are found, part must be replaced with serviceable parts of the same part number before further flight. Replace blind fasteners common to the spar cap and skin angles (if removal is necessary) with MS20600M4 rivets. \n\n\t\t(5)\tAfter the inspections and repair of (f)(3) and (f)(4), respectively, install the doubler plates of Moore/Hutcherson drawing SPD 20025. \n\n\t\t(6)\tReinstall the wing attach fittings and the wings. \n\n\t(g)\tReinstall the leading edge skin covers and walkway lower skin panels. \n\n\t(h)\tAircraft may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a base where inspections can be accomplished. \n\n\t(i)\tEquivalent methods of complying with this AD may be approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Southwest Region. This supersedes Amendment 39-1755 (38 FR 34460), AD 73-26-02, as amended by Amendment 39-1792 (39 FR 7164). \n\n\tThis amendmentbecomes effective October 15, 1980. \n\n\n\nFIGURE NO. 1 GAGE (.06" ALUM. OR STL.) \nAD 80-21-08 \n\n\n\nAD 80-21-08\n\n\n\nAD 80-21-08
2011-18-19: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. That AD currently requires frequent inspections of the fuel pressure supply for excessive oscillations to determine if high-pressure (HP) fuel pumps have been exposed to damaging pressure oscillations. Pumps that have been exposed require replacement before further flight. This new AD requires the initial and repetitive inspections of AD 2010-23-09, but also requires installing HP fuel pump part number (P/N) E4A-30-200-000, as mandatory terminating action to the repetitive inspections. We are issuing this AD to prevent engine power loss or in-flight shutdown, which could result in loss of control of the airplane.
58-11-01: 58-11-01 DOUGLAS: Applies to All DC-6 and DC-7 Series Aircraft as Indicated. \n\n\tSeveral instances have been reported wherein cracks have been found or failures have occurred in the nose wheel upper retract link assembly, P/N 5325437. In at least one case, failure resulted in folding of the nose gear when the aircraft stopped, following landing and taxi. \n\n\tThe failures occurred in the forged end fitting, P/N 5328993, caused by a crack starting in the vicinity of the 1/8-inch radius where the fitting is machined to the O.D. of the tube, P/N 2329712. Cracks in the unfailed parts were found in the same location. Failures occurred on two airplanes having a total of 24,000 and 13,800 hours respectively and a crack was reported on one airplane with 7,521 hours. The airplane time is not significant since the interchange of landing gear components at major overhaul may result in the gear components actually having more or less time than the airplanes themselves. \n\n\tSubsequent to DC-6 Series fuselage No. 435 and DC-7 Series fuselage No. 434, Douglas increased the 1/8-inch radius to 3/4-inch radius. The following must be accomplished on all nose gear upper retract link assemblies, P/N 5325437, delivered by the manufacturer that do not incorporate the larger radius. \n\n\t1.\tInspect the right and left hand forged end fitting with the 1/8-inch radius at the earliest possible opportunity where facilities are available, and in any case, at the inspection period nearest 100 hours. Inspection should preferable be accomplished by magnaflux; however, dye penetrant inspection can be considered satisfactory if parts are uniformly warned to open tight cracks. \n\n\t2.\tIf cracks are found, parts must be replaced. No rework is considered feasible. \n\n\t3.\tParts which are not cracked should be reworked at the earliest practicable opportunity to increase the 1/8-inch radius to 3/4-inch and polish the area to a 32-micro-inch finish. The reworked area should be protected with zinc chromate primer and aluminized lacquer and the reworked parts properly identified to distinguish them from those manufactured with the 3/4-inch radius. \n\n\t4.\tAfter the initial inspection, all parts must be inspected regularly at the inspection period nearest to 300 hours until rework is accomplished. \n\n\t5.\tAfter rework, inspections at frequent intervals should continue to assure that the rework has removed damaged material and/or incipient cracks. \n\n\t(Douglas Alert Service Bulletin A-677 for the DC-6 Series and A-139 for the DC-7 Series cover the above subject and describe how to increase the 1/8-inch radius to a 3/4-inch radius.)
96-24-14: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all Lockheed Model 382 series airplanes, that requires that all landing gear brakes be inspected for wear and replaced if the wear limits prescribed in this AD are not met, and that the new landing gear brake wear limits be incorporated into the FAA-approved maintenance inspection program. This amendment is prompted by an accident in which a transport category airplane executed a rejected takeoff (RTO) and was unable to stop on the runway due to worn brakes; and the subsequent review of allowable brake wear limits for all transport category airplanes. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent loss of brake effectiveness during a high energy RTO.
96-25-10: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to Pratt & Whitney JT9D series turbofan engines, that requires installing an improved design turbine exhaust case (TEC) with a thicker containment wall, modifying the existing TEC to incorporate a containment shield, or modifying the existing TEC to replace the "P" flange and case wall. This amendment is prompted by reports of 64 uncontained engine failures since 1972. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent release of uncontained debris from the TEC following an internal engine failure, which can result in damage to the aircraft.
96-23-14: This amendment supersedes two existing airworthiness directives (ADs), applicable to Pratt & Whitney (PW) JT8D series turbofan engines, that currently require repetitive eddy current, fluorescent penetrant, fluorescent magnetic penetrant, or visual inspections for cracks in the rear flange, and ultrasonic, fluorescent penetrant, or fluorescent magnetic penetrant inspections for cracks in the PS4 boss, and drain bosses of the combustion chamber outer case (CCOC); and an additional inspection of the CCOC rear flange for intergranular cracking. This amendment requires reducing the rear flange inspection interval for CCOCs when only the aft face of the rear flange has been inspected, and introducing an improved ultrasonic probe assembly. In addition, this amendment introduces a rotating eddy current probe for shop inspections in which the case is removed from the engine. Also, this amendment eliminates fluorescent penetrant inspection (FPI), fluorescent magnetic particle inspection (FMPI), and visual inspections from hot section disassembly level inspection procedures. This amendment is prompted by reports of crack origins in the forward face of the rear flange that could not be detected by the inspection methods for installed CCOC's that were mandated in the current ADs. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent uncontained engine failure, inflight engine shutdown, engine cowl release, and airframe damage.
92-26-03: 92-26-03 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-8430. Docket No. 92-NM-207-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model MD-11 series airplanes; as listed in McDonnell Douglas MD-11 Alert Service Bulletin A27-30, dated August 20, 1992; certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. \n\n\tTo prevent uncommanded slat deployment during flight at cruise altitude, which could create significant vibrations and cause damage to the elevators, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tWithin 60 days after the effective date of this AD, install a cover on the flap/slat control module quadrant in the flight compartment in accordance with McDonnell Douglas MD-11 Alert Service Bulletin A27-30, dated August 20, 1992. \n\n\t(b)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Los Angeles ACO. \n\n\tNOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Los Angeles ACO. \n\n\t(c)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. \n\n\t(d)\tThe installation shall be done in accordance with McDonnell Douglas MD-11 Alert Service Bulletin A27-30, dated August 20, 1992. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from McDonnell Douglas Corporation, P.O. Box 1771, Long Beach, California 90846-0001, Attention: Business Unit Manager, Technical Publications - Technical Administrative Support, C1-L5B. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3229 East Spring Street, Long Beach, California; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC. \n\n\t(e)\tThis amendment becomes effective on December 23, 1992.
2011-17-08: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: * * * * * The airworthiness limitations applicable to Damage Tolerant Airworthiness Limitation Items (DT ALI) are currently given in Airbus A330 ALI Document reference AI/SE-M4/95A.0089/97, which is approved by the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and referenced in Airbus Airworthiness Limitations Section (ALS) Part 2. The issue 17 of Airbus A330 ALI Document introduces more restrictive maintenance requirements/airworthiness limitations. Failure to comply with this issue constitutes an unsafe condition. This [EASA] AD supersedes EASA AD 2009-0102 [and retains the requirements therein], and requires the implementationof the new or more restrictive maintenance requirements/airworthiness limitations as specified in Airbus A330 ALI Document issue 17. The unsafe condition is fatigue cracking, damage, and corrosion in certain structure, which could result in reduced structural integrity of the airplane. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
96-23-03: This document publishes in the Federal Register an amendment adopting Airworthiness Directive (AD) 96-23-03 that was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of Textron Lycoming IO-320, LIO-320, AEIO-320, IO-360, LIO-360, AEIO-360, HIO-360, TO-360, IO-540, O-540-L, LIO-540, and AEIO-540 series reciprocating engines by individual letters. This AD requires a maintenance records check to determine if suspect high pressure fuel pumps are installed, and inspection to determine if the high pressure fuel pump has one of the suspect date codes. If the high pressure fuel pump has a suspect date code, this AD requires disassembly and inspection of the high pressure fuel pump, and, if necessary, removal from service and replacement with a serviceable part. In addition, this AD requires reporting findings of unserviceable high pressure fuel pumps. This amendment is prompted by reports of inflight failures of high pressure fuel pumps. The actions specified by this AD areintended to prevent an inflight engine failure due to fuel starvation, which could result in a forced landing.
93-08-07: 93-08-07 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-8554. Docket 93-NM-25-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model MD-11 series airplanes, manufacturer's fuselage numbers up to and including 532, and 535; certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. \n\n\tTo prevent chafing of the electrical power system control (EPSC) wire assemblies located in the center accessory compartment (CAC), which potentially could result in a fire, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tWithin 60 days after the effective date of this AD, perform a one-time visual inspection to detect chafing or preload in the EPSC wire assemblies located in the forward cargo, aft bulkhead area of the CAC, and to determine if clamps and spacers are properly installed, in accordance with McDonnell Douglas Alert Service Bulletin A24-64, dated March 29, 1993. \n\n\t\t(1)\tIf no chafing or preload is detected, and a clamp and spacer are installed, no further action is required by this AD. \n\n\t\t(2)If no chafing or preload is detected, but the clamp and/or spacer are missing, prior to further flight, modify the wire assembly in accordance with "Condition I" of the Accomplishment Instructions of the service bulletin. \n\n\t\t(3)\tIf chafing or preload is detected, and the clamp and spacer are installed, prior to further flight, modify the wire assembly in accordance "Condition II" of the Accomplishment Instructions of the service bulletin. \n\n\t\t(4)\tIf chafing or preload is detected, and the clamp and/or spacer are missing, prior to further flight, modify the wire assembly in accordance with "Condition III" of the Accomplishment Instructions of the service bulletin. \n\n\t(b)\tWithin 30 days after accomplishing the one-time visual inspection required by paragraph (a) of this AD, submit a report of the results, both positive and negative, to the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), ANM-100L, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 3229 East Spring Street, Long Beach,California 90806-2425, or fax (310) 988-5210. Information collection requirements contained in this regulation have been approved by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.) and have been assigned OMB Control Number 2120-0056. \n\n\t(c)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Los Angeles ACO, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Los Angeles ACO. \n\n\tNOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Los Angeles ACO. \n\n\t(d)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. \n\n\t(e)\tThe inspection and modification shall be done in accordance with McDonnell Douglas Alert Service Bulletin A24-64, dated March 29, 1993. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from McDonnell Douglas Corporation, P.O. Box 1771, Long Beach, California 90846-1771, Attention: Business Unit Manager, Technical Publications - Technical Administrative Support, C1-L5B. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3229 East Spring Street, Long Beach, California; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC. \n\n\t(f)\tThis amendment becomes effective on May 11, 1993.
2011-17-14: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the specified Agusta S.p.A. (Agusta) helicopters with a certain tail rotor special hub plug (hub plug) installed. This action requires a one-time inspection to determine the tightening torque value of the hub plug, and depending on the inspection results, replacing certain parts or disassembling the tail rotor hub and blades assembly and inspecting for damage. If the tightening torque value is between 600 kgcm and 700 kgcm, the lock washer and o-ring must be replaced with airworthy parts, and no further action is required. If the tightening torque value is greater than 700 kgcm, the hub plug must be replaced with an airworthy part. Torque the new hub plug to the specified tightening torque between 600 and 700 kgcm. If the tightening torque value of the hub plug is less than 600 kgcm, the tail rotor hub and blades assembly must be disassembled and inspected for damage. If a part is found that is outside allowable damage tolerances, that part must be replaced with an airworthy part. This amendment is prompted by the discovery that a wrong tightening torque value for the hub plug was contained in a revision to the helicopter maintenance manual. The actions specified in this AD are intended to detect an improperly torqued hub plug that could lead to tail rotor failure and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
2011-17-13: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for ECF Model EC120B helicopters. This action requires inserting an emergency procedure appendix from an ECF Emergency Alert Service Bulletin into the Rotorcraft Flight Manual (RFM). This action also requires modifying the emergency switch electrical wiring and performing tests to ensure correct operation of the emergency switch. This action also requires removing the emergency procedure appendix from the RFM after modifying the emergency switch electrical wiring and performing tests to ensure correct operation. This amendment is prompted by the discovery that simultaneously setting the emergency switch to the low position ``CUT-OFF'' and the generator (GENE) pushbutton to ``OFF'' position caused the starter-generator to restart. Investigation revealed that cross-wiring at the emergency switch caused this malfunction. This condition, if not corrected, could lead to the inability to isolate electrical equipment during anemergency, creating the risk of an uncontrolled electrical fire and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
2011-18-08: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: There has been one reported case of an aft equipment bay fire occurring due to arcing of chafed integrated drive generator (IDG) power cables. Additionally, the hydraulic line support brackets located at the fuselage station (FS) 672 have been found broken in service on several aeroplanes. A broken hydraulic line support bracket at FS 672 could result in inadequate clearance between the IDG power cables and hydraulic lines, potentially resulting in chafing of the IDG power cables. Chafed IDG power cables can generate high energy arcing, which can result in an uncontrolled fire in the aft equipment bay. * * * * * This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
96-24-13: This document supersedes AD 75-26-18, which currently requires modifying the landing gear selector cable forward attachment pin assembly by installing a safety lock wire on certain The New Piper Aircraft Inc., (Piper) PA-31, PA-31P, and PA-31T series airplanes. The action will require the same action as AD 75-26-18. An incorrect designation of Piper Model PA-31 airplanes as Piper Model PA-31-310 airplanes in AD 75-26-18 prompted the proposed AD action. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent the landing gear selector cable forward attachment pin assembly from becoming separated from the powerpack control arm, which, if not corrected, could cause loss of landing gear retraction or extension.
2011-18-01: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD requires performing a fluorescent penetrant inspection (FPI) of the low-pressure turbine (LPT) rotor stage 3 disk at every shop visit at which the LPT module is separated from the engine. This AD was prompted by seven reports of uncontained failures of LPT rotor stage 3 disks and eight reports of cracked LPT rotor stage 3 disks found during shop visit inspections. We are issuing this AD to prevent LPT rotor separation, which could result in an uncontained engine failure and damage to the airplane.
2010-08-07: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Following successive ECAM [electronic centralized aircraft monitoring] warnings during the approach phase, just after the landing gear extension sequence and an uneventful landing, the maintenance inspection on an Airbus A340 has revealed a hydraulic leak that was caused by the failure of the Yellow high pressure (HP) hydraulic pipe supplying the back-up Nose Wheel Steering (NWS) which runs along the lower part of the avionic bay from frame 17 to frame 20. This leak resulted in the loss of the Yellow hydraulic system and contamination of the avionics bay with sprayed hydraulic fluid. This condition, if not detected and corrected, could result in aningestion of hydraulic fluid in the electrical connectors, which could generate an arcing phenomenon and, if sufficient energy is provided by the arcing, lead to an ignition source, which would be an unsafe condition. * * * * * This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
96-24-08: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain Air Tractor, Inc. (Air Tractor) Models AT-250, AT-300, AT-301, AT-302, AT-400, AT-400A, AT-401, AT-402, AT-501, and AT-502 airplanes that are equipped with a Gerdes part number (P/N) A-850-5 or Cleveland P/N 60-9 parking brake valve. This action requires replacing the parking brake valve with a Scott P/N 4500A-2 parking brake valve. This AD results from several reports of the parking brake valve inadvertently slipping to the "PARK" position during flight, which causes constant pressure on the brakes. When the pilot applies the brake upon landing, this pressure causes the airplane to overturn. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent the airplane from overturning because of extreme pressure applied to the brake if the parking brake valve inadvertently slips to the "PARK" position during flight.