Results
2021-13-19: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2014-11-02 for Airbus Helicopters Model SA-365N, SA-365N1, AS-365N2, and AS 365 N3 helicopters. AD 2014-11-02 required repetitively inspecting frame number (No.) 9 for a crack. This AD was prompted by Airbus Helicopters developing a modification that provides an optional terminating action for the repetitive inspections required by AD 2014-11-02. This AD retains the requirements of AD 2014-11-02, provides an optional terminating action for the repetitive inspections, and reduces the applicability by excluding certain post-modified helicopters. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
76-11-04: 76-11-04 DORNIER GmbH: Amendment 39-2631. Applies to Model Do 28D-1 airplanes certificated in all categories, serial numbers 4001 through 4039. Compliance is required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent smoke and fire resulting from the chafing of teleflex engine control cables against electrical cables, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 10 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, visually inspect the electrical cable insulation under each engine for chafing damage at those points where the throttle and mixture control teleflex cables cross the electrical cables. Actuate the teleflex dables during the inspection. If a chafed electrical cable is found, repair the cable in accordance with paragraph (c) of this AD before further flight. (b) Within the next 100 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless earlier compliance is required pursuant to paragraph (a) of this AD, comply with paragraph (c) of this AD. (c) Wrap helical Rapidon wear protection material, or FAA-approved equivalent material, around the electrical cables and teleflex cables under each engine in accordance with Dornier Service Bulletin 1031-1901, dated March 25, 1971, or an FAA approved equivalent. This amendment becomes effective June 15, 1976.
97-15-15: This document publishes in the Federal Register an amendment adopting Airworthiness Directive (AD) 97-15-15, which was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of Eurocopter France Model SA-365N, SA-365N1, and SA-366G1 helicopters by individual letters. This AD requires an inspection of the main gearbox magnetic plug (magnetic plug) and the main gearbox oil filter (oil filter) for ferrous chips; vibration measurements, if necessary; and replacement of the main gearbox if a specified quantity of ferrous chips are discovered, or if abnormal vibrations are identified at a certain frequency. This amendment is prompted by two recent reports of cracks found in planetary gear shafts (gear shafts) in main gearboxes that have not been modified in accordance with MOD 077244. The actions specified by this AD are intended to detect cracks in the gear shaft which could lead to failure of the gear shaft, failure of the transmission, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
78-11-08: 78-11-08 BRITTEN NORMAN: Amendment 39-3219. Applies to Models BN-2A Islander and BN-2A Mark III Trislander series airplanes, certificated in all categories, that have not been modified in accordance with Britten-Norman Modification NB/M/929. Compliance required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To detect and prevent electrolytic corrosion of the elevator and flap control rods, accomplish the following in accordance with Britten-Norman Service Bulletin No. BN-2/SB.101, Issue 2, dated August 10, 1977, or an FAA-approved equivalent: (a) Within the next 2 weeks after the effective date of this AD, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 6 months, inspect the elevator and flap control rods at bonding clip attachment points for electrolytic corrosion. (b) If during an inspection required by paragraph (a) of this AD corrosion is found, before further flight - (1) Replace the control rod with a part of the same part number; or (2) Clean the partuntil the metal is free of corrosion. However, if the metal cleaned from the control rod reduces the rod diameter in excess of 0.010 in., replace the control rod with a part of the same part number. (c) The inspections required by this AD may be discontinued upon the replacement of the installed elevator and flap control rod untreated bonding clips with light alloy or cadmium coated clips in accordance with Britten-Norman Modification No. NB/M/929 or an FAA-approved equivalent. (d) Airplanes may be flown in accordance with the requirements of FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to a base where the inspections and repairs required by this AD may be performed. This amendment becomes effective June 6, 1978.
2004-07-03: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Dassault Model Mystere-Falcon 50 series airplanes, that requires one-time detailed inspections for structural discrepancies of various fuselage attachments; and corrective actions, if necessary, to restore the structure to the original design specifications. This action is necessary to prevent early fatigue, corrosion, or fretting, which could result in structural failure of major components of the airplane and reduced structural integrity of the airplane. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
98-03-08: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Fokker Model F27 Mark 050 series airplanes. This action requires modification of the window frames surrounding the windshield windows and installation of reinforcement plates on all window frames of the flight compartment. For certain airplanes, this action requires modification of the window frames surrounding the sliding windows and direct vision windows of the flight compartment. This amendment is prompted by the issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent structural degradation of the window frames of the flight compartment, which could result in depressurization of the airplane during flight.
90-21-19: 90-21-19 BOEING: Amendment 39-6765. Docket No. 90-NM-195-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model 727 and 727-100 series airplanes, equipped with main deck cargo doors installed in accordance with Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) SA1368SO, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\tTo prevent inadvertent in-flight opening of the main deck cargo door, accomplish the following: \n\tA.\tWithin 5 days after the effective date of this AD, perform a visual inspection of the main deck cargo door to determine the number of cargo door latch lockpins installed. If 7 latch lockpins are installed, no further action is required. \n\n\tB.\tIf fewer than 7 latch lockpins are installed, within 10 days after the effective date of this AD, accomplish the following: \n\n\t\t1.\tInstall a warning placard in a prominent place in the cockpit stating: "Main Deck Cargo Door Latch Locks Missing - See AFM Limitations Section for Instructions." \n\n\t\t2.\tIncorporate the following into the Limitations Section of the FAA-approved Airplane Flight Manual (AFM). This may be accomplished by inserting a copy of this AD in the AFM. \n\n\t\t\ta.\tPrior to takeoff after operation of the main cargo door: From outside the airplane, verify that the door in the closed position is flush with the fuselage and that the torque tube position indicator is visible through the view port indicating that the torque tube has rotated to the latched position. \n\n\t\t\tb.\tPrior to takeoff after operation of the main cargo door: From inside the airplane: \n\n\t\t\t\t(1)\tVerify that all seven latches are engaged; that latch alignment marks, which indicate latch in overcenter position, are aligned; and that the lockpin in the forward latch position (Position No. l) is properly engaged. \n\n\t\t\t\t(2)\tOn the cargo door control panel, verify that all lights are extinguished, and that the door master power switch, if installed, is in the OFF position. If the master power switch isnot installed, prior to each flight, pull the three cargo door hydraulic pump circuit breakers located on the P6-12B circuit breaker panel. These circuit breakers are to remain pulled during flight. \n\n\t\t\t\t\tWARNING: Do not pull the cargo door control circuit breaker located on the P6-2 circuit breaker panel. This deactivates the cargo door warning annunciator system. \n\n\tC.\tWithin 10 days after the effective date of this AD, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 30 days, accomplish the following: \n\n\t\t1.\tVerify proper rigging of the door latches in accordance with the procedures specified in Section IV, page 8, of Aeronautical Engineers, Inc. (AEI), Service Bulletin Report No. R-690, dated August 22, 1990. \n\n\t\t2.\tPerform a visual inspection of the cargo door warning annunciator system wiring, connectors, and switches for continued proper installation and continued integrity. If deficiencies are found, including broken or frayed wiring, repair prior to further flight.3.\tPerform a functional inspection of the cargo door warning annunciator system, to verify that: \n\n\t\t\ta.\tThe "door closed," "latch lock," and "pin lock" limit switches (and corresponding lights on the door control panel) are functioning properly and in sequence; and \n\n\t\t\tb.\tThe cargo door warning light on the cargo door control panel and the cargo door warning light on the flight engineer's panel are illuminated when the main cargo door is open, and extinguished when the door is verified closed, latched, and locked. \n\n\t\t4.\tWith the cargo door properly rigged and in the closed, latched, and locked position, verify that the torque tube position indicator is properly indexed, and visible through the external view port. \n\n\tD.\tWithin 60 days after the effective date of this AD, install six cargo door latch locking mechanisms in accordance with AEI Service Bulletin Report No. R-690, dated August 22, 1990. Once this installation is accomplished, the repetitive inspections requiredby paragraph C. of this AD may be terminated, and the placard and AFM revision required by paragraph B. of this AD may be removed. \n\n\tE.\tAn alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), ACE-130A, FAA, Central Region. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be submitted directly to the Manager, Atlanta ACO, and a copy sent to the cognizant FAA Principal Inspector (PI). The PI will then forward comments or concurrence to the Manager, Atlanta ACO.\n\n\tF.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service information from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Aeronautical Engineers, Inc., P.O. Box 661027, Miami, Florida 33166. This information may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue S.W., Renton, Washington, or at the FAA, Central Region, Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office, 1669 Phoenix Parkway, Suite 210C, Atlanta, Georgia. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6765, AD 90-21-19) becomes effective on October 29, 1990.
2021-14-12: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all True Flight Holdings LLC Models AA-1, AA-1A, AA-1B, AA-1C, and AA-5 airplanes. This AD was prompted by the report of an accident of an airplane exhibiting bondline corrosion and delamination of the horizontal stabilizers. This AD requires inspecting the horizontal stabilizers, including the bondlines, for cracks, buckles, corrosion, delamination, rust, and previous repair and repairing or replacing parts and applying corrosion inhibitor as necessary. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2021-13-09: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Airbus Helicopters Model SA330J helicopters, all serial numbers. This AD was prompted by reports of the failure of the lower bearing cage of the main rotor hub (MRH) flapping hinges and of the presence of metallic particles at the bottom of a drag hinge. This AD requires repetitive inspections of the MRH chip detectors, or for helicopters not equipped with chip detectors, repetitive inspections of the oil for contamination by metallic particles, and corrective actions if necessary, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2021-15-01: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Rolls-Royce Deutschland Ltd & Co KG (RRD) Trent XWB-75, Trent XWB-79, Trent XWB-79B, Trent XWB-84, and Trent XWB-97 model turbofan engines. This AD was prompted by the manufacturer revising the time limits \n\n((Page 36488)) \n\nmanual (TLM) to incorporate repairs to the low-pressure compressor (LPC) blades and introduce a new fan blade inspection. This AD requires revisions to the airworthiness limitations section (ALS) of the Rolls- Royce (RR) Trent XWB TLM and the operator's existing approved aircraft maintenance program (AMP). The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2004-06-17: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all BAE Systems (Operations) Limited (Jetstream) Model 4101 airplanes, that requires repetitive inspections for damage of the horizontal and vertical stabilizer attachment fittings, and corrective action if necessary. This action is necessary to detect and correct damage of the horizontal and vertical stabilizer attachment fittings, which could result in reduced structural integrity of the horizontal and vertical stabilizers and consequent reduced controllability of the airplane. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2011-10-10: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: [T]he FAA has published SFAR 88 (Special Federal Aviation Regulation 88). In their letters referenced 04/00/02/07/01-L296, dated March 4th, 2002, and 04/00/02/07/03-L024, dated February 3rd, 2003, the JAA [Joint Aviation Authorities] recommended the application of a similar regulation to the National Aviation Authorities (NAA). Under this regulation, all holders of type certificates for passenger transport aircraft * * * are required to conduct a design review against explosion risks. During improvement of the protection of fuel pump wiring against short-circuit by accomplishment of Airbus Service Bulletin (SB) A300-24-6094, a study led by themanufacturer concluded that the harness, installed through the wing panel needed to be protected to prevent possible damage in case of chafing which could potentially lead to short-circuit [and intermittent function or loss of the inner tank fuel pump. Loss of both inner tank fuel pumps could result in inability to use the remaining fuel supply in the inner tank. A short-circuit could also result in an ignition source in a flammable leakage zone]. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2004-06-13: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Airbus Model A319 and A320 series airplanes, that currently requires repetitive inspections to detect cracking and delamination of the containers in which the off-wing emergency evacuation slides are stored, and corrective actions if necessary. That AD also requires eventual modifications of the slides, which terminates the requirement for repetitive inspections. This action removes the currently required repetitive inspections, and requires an additional modification of the off-wing emergency evacuation slides. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent the loss of the emergency evacuation slides during flight, which could result in damage to the fuselage, and to prevent incorrect inflation of the emergency evacuation slides, which could result in the emergency exits being unusable during an emergency evacuation. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition. DATES: Effective April 30, 2004. The incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the regulations is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of April 30, 2004. The incorporation by reference of a certain other publication was approved previously by the Director of the Federal Register as of February 1, 2000 (64 FR 72533, December 28, 1999).
96-09-28: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all Aerospatiale Model ATR-42 and ATR-72 series airplanes. Unless modifications are accomplished or alternative procedures and training are adopted, that AD currently prohibits operation of the airplane in certain icing conditions, and requires restrictions on the use of the autopilot in certain conditions. That AD was prompted by an FAA determination that, during flight, in certain icing conditions, and with the airplane in a specific flight configuration, a ridge of ice can form on the wing and cause an interruption in the airflow over the ailerons, aileron deflection, and resultant lateral control forces. The actions specified by that AD are intended to prevent a roll upset from which the flight crew may be unable to recover. This action adds requirements for modification of the deicing boots on the leading edge of the wing and various follow-on actions. This action also removes certainlimitations and procedures.
2021-14-02: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Aircraft Industries a.s. Models L-420, L 410 UVP-E20, and L 410 UVP-E20 CARGO airplanes. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI identifies the unsafe condition as cracking of the retaining bolt on the nose landing gear (NLG) control. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
92-16-12 R1: 92-16-12 R1 BRITISH AEROSPACE: Amendment 39-8702. Docket 93-NM-157-AD. Revises AD 92-16-12, Amendment 39-8321. Applicability: Model DH/BH/HS/BAe 125 series airplanes, as listed in British Aerospace Service Bulletin SB.53-74-3193C&D, Revision 1, dated March 12, 1992; certificated in any category. NOTE 1: Model BAe 125-1000A airplanes are not affected by this AD. Compliance: Required within 4 months after the effective date of this AD, unless accomplished previously. To prevent fire in the tail cone, accomplish the following: (a) Install fluid vent masts on the undercarriage fairing, and plug certain existing vent holes, in accordance with British Aerospace Service Bulletin SB.53-74-3193C&D, dated January 7, 1992; or Revision 1, dated March 12, 1992. (b) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113. NOTE 2: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Standardization Branch, ANM-113. (c) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. (d) The installation shall be done in accordance with British Aerospace Service Bulletin SB.53-74-3193C&D, dated January 7, 1992; or British Aerospace Service Bulletin SB.53-74-3193C&D, Revision 1, dated March 12, 1992. (The issuance date of Revision 1 of this service bulletin appears only on page 1 of the document.) The incorporation by reference of the former service bulletin was approved previously by the Directorof the Federal Register, in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51, as of September 28, 1992 (57 FR 38266, August 24,1992). The incorporation by reference of the latter service bulletin was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from British Aerospace, PLC, Librarian for Service Bulletins, P.O. Box 17414, Dulles International Airport, Washington, DC. 20041-0414. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC. (e) This amendment is effective on September 28, 1992.
2021-13-03: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Safran Helicopter Engines, S.A. (Safran Helicopter Engines) Arriel 2B, 2B1, 2C, 2C1, 2C2, 2S1 and 2S2 model turboshaft engines. This AD was prompted by reports of non-conforming fuel filter pre- blockage pressure switches. This AD requires repetitive visual inspections of the fuel filter by-pass indicator pop-up, a one-time operational test of the fuel filter pre-blockage pressure switch and, depending on the findings, replacement of the fuel filter pre-blockage pressure switch with a part eligible for installation. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
98-01-06: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to Precision Airmotive Corporation carburetors, that currently requires the inspection of those carburetors equipped with a two-piece venturi at each annual inspection to determine if the primary venturi is loose or missing, and requires the replacement of a two-piece venturi with a one-piece venturi within 48 months after the effective date of the existing AD. This amendment eliminates the requirement to install a one-piece venturi, and allows the installation of a one-piece venturi on affected carburetors as an optional terminating action; or, requires repetitive inspections of a two-piece venturi on affected carburetors. This AD also adds an additional carburetor model, and requires the installation of a new fuel nozzle on certain carburetors when a one-piece venturi is installed. This amendment is prompted by service difficulty reports describing engines that fail to attain rated power, runrough, or experience power loss after installation of a one-piece venturi in accordance with the existing AD, and by incidents of forced landings of aircraft powered by engines modified to comply with the existing AD. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent disruption of fuel flow to the engine resulting in failure to attain rated power, power loss in flight, and forced landings.
98-01-03: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Fokker Model F27 Mark 050 series airplanes. This action requires modification of the air outlet opening of the engine air bypass duct. This amendment is prompted by issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent accumulation of ice in the engine air intake duct and subsequent ingestion of ice into the engine, which could result in engine power fluctuations and reduced controllability of the airplane.
2021-12-07: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Rolls-Royce Deutschland Ltd & Co KG (RRD) BR700-710A1-10, BR700-710A2-20 and BR700-710C4-11 model turbofan engines. This AD was prompted by an investigation by RRD, which revealed a quality escape during the high-pressure turbine (HPT) stage 1 disk rim cooling air hole manufacturing process. This AD requires removing affected HPT disks from service prior to reaching specified compliance times or at the next engine shop visit, whichever occurs first. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2021-13-04: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus Helicopters Model AS332C, AS332C1, AS332L, and AS332L1 helicopters. This AD was prompted by a report of a yaw control failure that was the result of the disconnection of the tail rotor hub (TRH) pitch control rod from the tail rotor servo-control, which resulted from a seized TRH bearing. The TRH bearing had grease dissolving after contamination by leaked hydraulic fluid from the tail rotor servo- control that came through the TRH assembly boot. This AD requires repetitive inspections for hydraulic leaks, corrective actions if necessary, and an optional modification which constitutes terminating action, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
97-26-22: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to all EMBRAER Model EMB-120 series airplanes. This action requires a one-time inspection of the movable backstop of the elevator pitch trim command system to ensure that it is installed correctly, and corrective action, if necessary. This action also requires installation of a guide to maintain the movable backstop in its correct position. This amendment is prompted by issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent a sudden change in pitch attitude caused by autopilot disconnect, which could result in reduced controllability of the airplane.
2004-06-11: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Airbus Model A330-301, -321, -322, -341, and -342 series airplanes; and certain Model A340 series airplanes, that requires inspecting for and repairing cracking of the wire harness slots in the inner rear spars of the wings between ribs 4 and 5, and cold-expanding crack-free wire harness slots and bolt holes. This action is necessary to prevent cracking of the wire harness slot, which could result in reduced structural integrity of the wing. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
65-19-03: 65-19-03\tBOEING: Amdt 39-118 Part 39 Federal Register August 24, 1965. Applies to Models 707 and 720 Series Airplanes Listed in Boeing Service Bulletin No. 2014 (R-2). \n\tCompliance required as indicated. \n\n\t(a)\tFor Model 720 Series airplanes with 4,500 or more hours' time in service on the effective date of this AD, comply with (c) within the next 600 hours' time in service, unless accomplished within the last 600 hours' time in service, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 1,200 hours' time in service from the last inspection. \n\n\t(b)\tFor Model 720 Series airplanes with less than 4,500 hours' time in service on the effective date of this AD, comply with (c) before the accumulation of 5,100 hours' time in service, unless accomplished after the accumulation of 3,900 hours' time in service, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 1,200 hours' time in service from the last inspection. \n\n\t(c)\tInspect visually for cracks in the left-hand and right-hand frames at Body Stations 760 and 780 on Model 720 Series airplanes except 720-025 Series and at Body Station 800 on all Model 720 Series airplanes in the vicinity of waterline 208.1 (top of floor beam). If cracks are found, rework the frames before further flight in accordance with paragraph 3 of Boeing Service Bulletin No. 2014(R-2) or later FAA-approved revision; Boeing Structural Repair Manual D6- 1891, paragraph 53-3-5, page 1; or a method approved by the Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. The repetitive inspections required by (a) and (b) of this AD may be discontinued when cracked frames have been reworked in accordance with this paragraph, or when uncracked frames have been reworked in accordance with Boeing Drawing 65-42173, or a method approved by the Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. \n\n\t(d)\tFor Model 707 Series airplanes with 10,000 or more hours' time in service on the effective date of this AD, comply with (f) within the next 600 hours' time in service, unless accomplished within the last 600 hours' time in service, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 1,200 hours' time in service from the last inspection. \n\n\t(e)\tFor Model 707 Series Airplanes with less than 10,000 hours' time in service on the effective date of this AD, comply with (f) before the accumulation of 10,600 hours' time in service, unless accomplished after the accumulation of 9,400 hours' time in service, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 1,200 hours' time in service from the last inspection. \n\n\t(f)\tInspect visually for cracks in the left-hand and right-hand frames at Body Station 800 in the vicinity of waterline 208.1 (top of floor beam). If cracks are found, rework the frames before further flight in accordance with paragraph 3 of Boeing Service Bulletin No. 2014(R-2) or later FAA-approved revision; Boeing Structural Repair Manual D6-1649, paragraph 53-3-5, page 1, for 707-100/200 Series airplanes, and Boeing Structural Repair Manual D6-2962 for 707- 300/400 Series airplanes; or a method approved by the Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. The repetitive inspections required by (d) and (e) of this AD may be discontinued when cracked frames have been reworked in accordance with this paragraph, or when uncracked frames have been reworked in accordance with Boeing Drawing 65-42173, or a method approved by the Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. \n\n\t(g)\tUpon request of an operator, an FAA maintenance inspector, with prior approval of the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region, may adjust the repetitive inspection intervals required by this AD to permit compliance at an established inspection period of the operator if the request contains substantiating data to justify the increase for the operator. \n\n\tThis directive effective September 23, 1965.
2021-14-15: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2002-08-16 for certain Eurocopter France SA341G, SA342J, and SA-360C helicopters. AD 2002-08-16 required removing certain main rotor head torsion tie bars (tie bars) from service and revising the limitations section of the existing maintenance manual for your helicopter by adding life limits for certain other tie bars. This AD was prompted by the determination that another part-numbered tie bar is affected by the same unsafe condition. This AD continues to require removing certain tie bars from service and establishing a life limit for certain other tie bars. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.