Results
95-20-01 R1: This document publishes in the Federal Register an amendment adopting Airworthiness Directive (AD) 95-20-01 R1, which was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of certain Beech Aircraft Corporation (Beech) Models 65 and L-23F (military conversion) airplanes. This AD requires fabricating and installing a placard that specifies not to operate the airplane with the cabin door removed, and incorporating a copy of the AD into the Limitations Section of the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM). A recent accident of one of the affected airplanes that was operating with the cabin door removed prompted the existing AD. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent the possibility of a reduction in stability, controllability, or airplane climb performance during operation, particularly in single-engine operations at high gross weights. Comments for inclusion in the Rules Docket must be received on or before December 27, 1995.
2011-09-17: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above that supersedes an existing AD. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: * * * * * The revision 01 of Airbus A340 ALS [Airworthiness Limitations section] Part 3 introduces more restrictive maintenance requirements and/or airworthiness limitations. Failure to comply with this revision constitutes an unsafe condition. * * * * * The unsafe condition is a safety-significant latent failure that would, in combination with one or more other specific failures or events, result in a hazardous or catastrophic failure condition. This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
2010-07-09: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for Rolls-Royce plc RB211-Trent 700 series turbofan engines. That AD currently requires initial and repetitive borescope inspections of the high-pressure-and-intermediate pressure (HP-IP) turbine internal and external oil vent tubes for coking and carbon buildup, and cleaning or replacing the vent tubes if necessary. This AD requires the same actions, but adds additional inspections of the vent flow restrictor. This AD results from further analysis that the cleaning of the vent tubes required by AD 2007-02-05 could lead to loosened carbon fragments, causing a blockage downstream in the vent flow restrictor. We are issuing this AD to prevent internal oil fires due to coking and carbon buildup that could cause uncontained engine failure and damage to the airplane.
96-14-03: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain de Havilland Model DHC-8-301, -311, and -315 series airplanes, that currently requires modification of the airspeed limitations placard and revision of the Airplane Flight Manual to specify operating at lower airspeeds when the airplane is operating at full flaps. That action also provides for the optional termination of the requirements of the AD for certain airplanes. That action was prompted by a report that incorrect rivets were installed on the outboard flaps assemblies of these airplanes. The actions specified by that AD are intended to prevent structural failure of the outboard flaps of the wings due to the installation of incorrect rivets in the flap assemblies, which could result in reduced controllability of the airplane. This new amendment requires the installation of the previously optional terminating modification on certain airplanes.
2011-09-12: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: There have been several in-service reports of finding trapped water on the bottom of the cockpit windshield frames (or lower windshield frames) that resulted in either corrosion or water ingress into the cockpit. In one occurrence, the trapped water caused severe corrosion of numerous anchor nuts that secure the windshield to the lower windshield frame, such that the intended fastening function was seriously compromised. Corrosion of the lower windshield frames, including the anchor nuts that secure the windshield to the aircraft structure, can result in a serious structural degradation possibly leading to the loss of the windshield during flight. Also, water could leak into the cockpit and cause either a malfunction or failure of the electrical and electronics systems in the area of the cockpit instrument panels. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2011-09-13: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Further to accomplishment of A340 ALI tasks 545104, which require a rototest inspection as per Non Destructive Testing Manual (NTM) 54-51-04 of engine pylon pyramid attachment areas at aft end of lower arms between Rib 1 and Rib 2 (2 fastener locations/pylon), four findings have been reported and repaired. * * * * * The unsafe condition is cracking, which might impact the structural integrity of the airplane. This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
74-08-09 R2: This amendment revises an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all transport category airplanes, that currently requires installation of placards prohibiting smoking in the lavatory and disposal of cigarettes in the lavatory waste receptacles; establishment of a procedure to announce to airplane occupants that smoking is prohibited in the lavatories; installation of ashtrays at certain locations; and repetitive inspections to ensure that lavatory waste receptacle doors operate correctly. That AD was prompted by fires occurring in lavatories, which were caused by, among other things, the improper disposal of smoking materials in lavatory waste receptacles. The actions specified by that AD are intended to prevent such fires. This amendment revises the existing AD to allow dispatch relief in the event a lavatory door ashtray is missing.
99-15-12: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Saab Model SAAB 2000 series airplanes. This action requires repetitive detailed inspections to detect looseness or gap of the press fit bushing installation of the actuator fittings of the aileron trim tabs, and eventual replacement of the bushings with new, staked bushings. Accomplishment of such replacement terminates the repetitive inspections. This action also provides for an optional temporary preventive action, which, if accomplished, would terminate the repetitive inspections until the terminating action is accomplished. This amendment is prompted by issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent looseness or gap of the bushings. In the event of failure of the redundant trim tab actuator, such looseness or gap of the bushings could lead to trim tab flutter and consequent structural failure of the trim tab and reduced controllability of the airplane.
2011-09-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Model 382, 382B, 382E, 382F, and 382G airplanes. This AD requires repetitive eddy current inspections to detect cracks in the center wing upper and lower rainbow fittings, and corrective actions if necessary; and repetitive replacements of rainbow fittings, which would extend the repetitive interval for the next inspection. This AD results from a report of fatigue cracking of the wing upper and lower rainbow fittings during durability testing and on in-service airplanes. Analysis of in- service cracking has shown that these rainbow fittings are susceptible to multiple site fatigue damage. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct such fatigue cracks, which could grow large and lead to the failure of the fitting and a catastrophic failure of the center wing.
96-13-03: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9 and C-9 (military) series airplanes, that currently requires the implementation of a program of structural inspections to detect and correct fatigue cracking in order to ensure the continued airworthiness of these airplanes as they approach the manufacturer's original fatigue design life goal. This amendment requires, among other things, revision of the existing program to require additional visual inspections of additional structure. This amendment is prompted by new data submitted by the manufacturer indicating that certain revisions to the program are necessary in order to increase the confidence level of the statistical program to ensure timely detection of cracks in various airplane structures. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent fatigue cracking that could compromise the structural integrity of these airplanes.
78-26-12: 78-26-12 CESSNA: Amendment 39-3382. Applies to Models 210G, H, J (Serial Number 21058819 through 21059199); 210M, N (Serial Numbers 21062274 through 21063025); T210G, H, J (Serial Number T210-0198 through T210-0454 and 21058140); T210M, N (Serial Numbers 21062274 through 21063025); and P210N (Serial Numbers P21000001 through P21000141) airplanes. COMPLIANCE: Required as indicated unless already accomplished. To detect binding of fuel quantity transmitter float arms and assure proper operation of the fuel quantity indicating system accomplish the following: A) On Models 210M, N and T210M, N (Serial Numbers 21062761 through 21063025) and P210N (Serial Numbers P21000063 through P21000141) airplanes, before next flight (except that the airplane may be flown to a location where this inspection may be accomplished, provided the pilot visually verifies through the fuel filler neck that adequate fuel is available to complete the flight), completely fill, then drain the leftand right fuel tanks with the engine inoperative and the airplane stationary in the level ground attitude. Observe the fuel quantity gauge during draining and upon completion of drainage, verify that the respective fuel quantity gauge indicates empty. Remove any Cessna P/N C668002-0101 or -0102 fuel quantity transmitter from which an erroneous fuel quantity reading is observed and check for binding of the float arm. Replace any fuel quantity transmitter found binding with an airworthy component. After replacement, check for fuel leaks and proper functioning of the fuel gauging system. B) For Models 210G, H, J, M (Serial Numbers 21058819 through 21059199 and 21062274 through 21062760), T210G, H, J, M (Serial Numbers T210-0198 through T210-0454, 21058140 and 21062274 through 21062760) and P210N (Serial Numbers P21000001 through P21000062) airplanes, before next flight, review the aircraft maintenance records to determine if a fuel quantity transmitter has been replaced since June7, 1978. 1. If a fuel quantity transmitter has not been replaced since June 7, 1978, make an entry in the aircraft maintenance records indicating that this Airworthiness Directive has been accomplished and the airplane may be returned to service. 2. If a fuel quantity transmitter has been replaced since June 7, 1978, comply with the requirements of Paragraph A). C) The review of the aircraft maintenance records required by Paragraph B) may be accomplished by the holder of a Pilot's Certificate issued under Part 61 of the Federal Aviation Regulations on any aircraft owned or operated by that person. D) Any equivalent method of compliance with this AD must be approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Central Region. Cessna Service Letter SE 78-69, dated November 15, 1978, or later approved revisions pertains to the subject matter of this AD. This amendment becomes effective on January 4, 1979, to all persons except those to whom it has already been made effective by an airmail letter from the FAA dated November 15, 1978.
2011-09-05: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD requires installing an auto shutoff feature for the center override/jettison fuel pumps, and installing power control circuitry for the center override/jettison and main jettison fuel pumps. This AD also requires installing new software in the electrical load management system (ELMS) electronics units in certain power management panels; installing airplane information management system 2 (AIMS-2) software in the AIMS-2 hardware; and making certain wiring changes. This AD was prompted by results from fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer. We are issuing this AD to prevent potential ignition sources inside fuel tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.
96-12-27: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to AlliedSignal Inc. (formerly Textron Lycoming) LTS 101 series turboshaft and LTP 101 series turboprop engines, that requires removal from service of suspect disks for a one-time inspection of the disk tenon area of the gas generator turbine disk. This amendment is prompted by a report of a gas generator turbine disk tenon failure. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent total loss of engine power, inflight engine shutdown, and possible damage to the aircraft.
68-01-06 R1: 68-01-06 R1 CANADAIR: Amendment 39-537 as amended by Amendment 39-5989. Applies to all Model CL-44D4 series airplanes, certificated in any category. Compliance required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. To prevent failure of the main landing gear during landing or takeoff due to cracks in the main landing gear bogie beam, accomplish the following: A. Within the next 20 landings after the effective date of this AD, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 20 landings, perform a visual inspection of the left and right main landing gear bogie beam, P/N 44-87574, for cracks, in accordance with paragraph 2.A.(1) of Canadair Service Bulletin 493-CL44, dated February 29, 1988. B. At intervals not to exceed 500 landings or 12 months, whichever occurs first, perform the inspection and modification, if necessary, in accordance with paragraphs 2.A.(2), 2.A.(3), 2.A.(4) and 2.A.(5) of Canadair Service Bulletin 493-CL44, dated February 29, 1988. C. Any structure found to be cracked as a result of the inspections required by paragraph A. or B., above, must be replaced, prior to further flight, with an airworthy part or an FAA-approved equivalent part. 1. Replacement parts must be inspected prior to installation, in accordance with paragraph 2.A.(3) of Canadair Service Bulletin 493-CL44, dated February 29, 1988. 2. Replacement parts must be repetitively inspected in accordance with paragraphs A. and B., above. D. An alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, New England Region. E. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service document from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Canadair, LTD., Commercial Aircraft Technical Services, Box 6087, Station A, Montreal, Quebec H3C 3G9, Canada. This document may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the FAA, New England Region, New York Aircraft Certification Office, 181 South Franklin Avenue, Room 202, Valley Stream, New York. This action amends AD 68-01-06, Amendment 39-537. This amendment, 39-5989, becomes effective September 5, 1988.
2011-09-08: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: This AD is prompted by a report from the manufacturer of finding cracks in rudder pedal assemblies at the quadrant attachment weld on early 750 XL aircraft. This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
96-12-05: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to AlliedSignal, Inc. (formerly Textron Lycoming) LTS101 series turboshaft and LTP101 series turboprop engines, that requires identifying, removing, and replacing certain defective power turbine rotors. This amendment is prompted by reports of workmanship deficiencies on certain power turbine rotors that can reduce the published life limit of the disk. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent power turbine rotor failure, which could result in loss of engine power.
2011-08-12: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Surface defects were visually detected on the rudder of one Airbus A319 and one A321 in-service aeroplane. Investigation has determined that the defects reported on both rudders corresponded to areas that had been reworked in production. The investigation confirmed that the defects were the result of de-bonding between the skin and honeycomb core. Such reworks were also performed on some rudders fitted on A330-300 and A340-200/-300 aeroplanes. An extended de-bonding, if not detected and corrected, may degrade the structural integrity of the rudder. The loss of the rudder leads to degradation of the handling qualities and reduces the controllabilityof the aeroplane. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
96-12-06: This amendment supersedes two existing airworthiness directives (AD's), applicable to Teledyne Continental Motors and Rolls-Royce, plc O-200 series reciprocating engines, that currently require resetting engine timing to 24o Before Top Center (BTC). This amendment returns to the 28o BTC engine timing for those engines equipped with improved cylinders that have strengthened heads. In addition, this amendment drops the TCM O-200C model which never went into production. This amendment is prompted by the availability of improved cylinders. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent possible cylinder cracking with subsequent loss of engine power.
2010-06-14: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: During 2004, an incident was reported involving uncontained multiple intermediate-pressure (IP) turbine blade release on a Trent 700 engine. The blade release was the result of an overspeed of the IP turbine rotor that was initiated by an internal fire in the high- pressure/intermediate-pressure (HP/IP) bearing chamber. Post- incident analysis and investigation has established that blockage of the HP/IP turbine bearing oil vent tube due to carbon deposits was a significant factor in the failure sequence. The Trent 800 has a similar type design standard to that of the Trent 700 and has also been found in service to be susceptible to carbon deposits in the oilvent tube. We are issuing this AD to prevent internal oil fires due to coking and carbon buildup in the HP/IP turbine bearing oil vent tube that could cause uncontained engine failure and damage to the airplane.
91-11-13: 91-11-13 LOCKHEED AERONAUTICAL SYSTEMS COMPANY-GEORGIA: Amendment 39-7011. Docket No. 91-NM-106-AD. Applicability: Model 1329-23A, -23D, and -23E (JetStar) series airplanes, Serial Numbers 5001 through 5162; and 1329-25 (JetStar II) series airplanes, Serial Numbers 5201 through 5240; certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. To prevent failure of the empennage pivot fitting assembly, loss of the empennage, and subsequent reduction of controllability of the airplane, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 10 hours time-in-service, or within 20 days after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs first, perform an eddy current inspection of the JE24 series empennage pivot fitting assemblies to detect cracks, in accordance with Revision 1 of Lockheed Alert Service Bulletins A329II-55-3 (for Model 1329-25) and A329-299 (for Models 1329-23A, - 23D, and -23E), both dated April 12, 1991, as applicable.Repeat this inspection thereafter at intervals not to exceed 300 hours time-in-service. (b) If cracks are found as a result of the eddy current inspections required by paragraph (a) of this AD, prior to further flight, replace the JE24 series empennage pivot fitting, or repair the fitting in a manner approved by the Manager, Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office. After replacement or repair, continue to perform the repetitive eddy current inspections required by paragraph (a) of this AD. (c) Within 7 days after the initial inspection required by paragraph (a) of this AD, submit a report of the inspection results, positive or negative, to the Manager, Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office, 1669 Phoenix Parkway, Suite 210C, Atlanta, Georgia 30349, telefax (404) 991-3606. NOTE: Negative results of the repetitive inspections need not be reported. (d) Within the next 10 hours time-in-service, or within 20 days after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs first, perform a visual inspection of all fasteners attaching the pivot fitting assembly to the vertical stabilizer rear beam caps to detect loose, missing, or broken fasteners, or improper countersinks, in accordance with Revision 1 of Lockheed Alert Service Bulletins A329II-55-3 (for Models 1329-25) and A329-299 (for Model 1329-23A, -23D, and - 23E), both dated April 12, 1991, as applicable. Repeat this inspection thereafter at intervals not to exceed 300 hours time-in-service. (e) If loose, missing, or broken fasteners, or improper countersinks, where applicable, are found as a result of the visual inspection required by paragraph (d) of this AD, prior to further flight, repair or replace defective or missing fasteners in accordance with Revision 1 of Lockheed Alert Service Bulletins A329II-55-3 (for Models 1329-25) and A329-299 (for Model 1329-23A, -23D, and -23E), both dated April 12, 1991, as applicable. (f) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office, ACE-115A, FAA, Small Airplane Directorate. NOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office, ACE-115A. (g) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. The inspection and repairs shall be done in accordance with Revision 1 of Lockheed Alert Service Bulletins A329II-55-3 (for Model 1329-25) and A329-299 (for Models 1329-23A, -23D, and -23E), both dated April 12, 1991, as applicable. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from Lockheed Aeronautical Systems Company-Georgia,Attn: Commercial and Customer Support, Dept. 73-05, Zone 0199, 86 South Cobb Drive, Marietta, Georgia 30063. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue S.W., Renton, Washington; or at the FAA, Small Airplane Directorate, Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office, 1669 Phoenix Parkway, Suite 210C, Atlanta, Georgia; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L Street N.W., Room 8401, Washington, D.C. This amendment (39-7011, AD 91-11-13) becomes effective on June 24, 1991.
90-12-03: 90-12-03 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS HELICOPTER COMPANY (MDHC): Amendment 39-6618. Docket No. 90-ASW-21. Applicability: Model 369D, E, F, and FF helicopter, certificated in any category. Compliance is required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent tail rotor malfunction, which could result in loss of control and possible loss of the helicopter, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 10 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, check the tail rotor swashplate bearing assembly to determine the color (green, yellow, or black) of the bearing seal, P/N 369D21832. The check required by this paragraph may be performed by a pilot. The bearing seal can be observed by looking into the outboard end of the T/R swashplate bearing assembly. If necessary, clean the face of the bearing seal so that the color can be determined. NOTE: Part I of MDHC Service Information Notice DN-167, EN-58, and FN-46 pertains to this one-time check. (b) Ifthe bearings have green or yellow seals, record the seal color in the logbook together with the record of compliance with this AD, and no further action is required. (c) For bearings with black seals which have a serial number in the range of 059150- 0001 through 059150-0692, or 059150-0734 through 059150-0742, or which have unidentified serial numbers, conduct the following inspections within the next 10 hours' time in service, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 10 hours' time in service from the last inspection until the bearing is replaced: (1) Disconnect the outboard end of the bellcrank. (2) Disconnect the dust boot from the inboard end of the pitch assembly. This will allow rotation of the tail rotor swashplate housing. (3) While applying a down load on top of the housing by hand, slowly rotate the pitch control housing to verify smoothness of operation. The bearing must rotate smoothly and without roughness to be acceptable. A slight feeling of grit in the grease, with smooth areas in between, is considered acceptable for an additional 10 hours' time in service. If the gritty feeling is continuous, replace the bearings. (4) If the roughness is beyond that allowed in paragraph (c)(3) or if the gritty feeling is continuous, replace the tail rotor swashplate bearing with an airworthy bearing before further flight. (5) Install and lockwire the dust boot on the inboard end of the pitch control housing. (6) Service the tail rotor swashplate pivot bearing assembly with an acceptable grease as specified in the Handbook of Maintenance Instructions. (7) Reconnect the bellcrank to the outboard end of the pitch control assembly as specified in the Handbook of Maintenance Instructions. (8) If an acceptable black seal bearing (i.e., a bearing having a serial number exclusive of the specified unacceptable ranges) is installed or has been installed as a replacement, apply a white paint dot on the outside face ofthe housing and record this action in the helicopter log book. (9) Record compliance in the helicopter log book, together with the serial number of the newly installed bearing. NOTE: Part II of MDHC Service Information Notice DN-167, En-58, and FN-46 pertains to this inspection procedure. (d) Replace any bearings with black seals which have any serial number in the range of 059150-0001 through 059150-0692 or 059150-0734 through 059150-0742, or which have unidentified serial numbers as follows: (1) For bearings which have 290 or more hours' time in service on the effective date of this AD, replace the bearing with an airworthy part within the next 10 hours' time in service. (2) For bearings which have less than 290 hours' time in service on the effective date of this AD, replace the bearing with an airworthy part before the accumulation of 300 hours' time in service. (e) Prior to the installation of new or replacement bearing sets, P/N 369D21832; pitch control assemblies, P/N 369D21800 or 369D21820 series; or tail rotor assemblies, P/N 369D21600 or 369D21610 series, determine the color of the swashplate bearing seal and record in the logbook. If a bearing set has a black seal, install only parts that are verified to have serial numbers other than those listed in paragraph (c). (f) In accordance with FAR Sections 21.197 and 21.199, the helicopter may be flown to a base where compliance with this AD may be accomplished. (g) An alternate method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time which provides an equivalent level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, 3229 E. Spring Street, Long Beach, California. This amendment (39-6618, AD 90-12-03) becomes effective on June 22, 1990.
2011-08-02: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: [T]he Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has published Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) 88, and the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) has published Interim Policy INT/POL/25/ 12. The design review conducted by Fokker Services on the Fokker 50 and Fokker 60 in response to these regulations revealed that, if chafing occurs between the Fuel Quantity Probe (FQP) and the probe wiring, with additional factors, this may result in an ignition source in the wing tank vapour space. This condition, if not corrected, in combination with flammable fuel vapours, could result in a wing fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the aeroplane. ThisAD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
66-06-03: 66-06-03 LYCOMING: Amdt. 39-708. Applies to Model IO-360-A1A Engines with Serial Numbers 101-51 through 1231-51A, and All Engines Remanufactured by Lycoming Prior to December 1, 1964. Compliance required as indicated. To prevent further failures of connecting rod assemblies, P/N 74503 and P/N 74308, accomplish the following: (a) Replace connecting rod assemblies P/N 74503 and P/N 74308 with 200 or more hours' time in service on the effective date of this AD with connecting rod assembly P/N 75059 within the next 50 hours' time in service in accordance with Lycoming Service Bulletin No. 302 or later FAA-approved revision. (b) Replace connecting rod assemblies P/N 74503 and P/N 74308 with less than 200 hours' time in service on the effective date of this AD with connecting rod assembly P/N 75059 before the accumulation of 250 hours' time in service in accordance with Lycoming Service Bulletin No. 302 or later FAA-approved revision. Effective March 13, 1966.Revised January 16, 1969.
96-12-24: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to all Lockheed Model L-1011-385 series airplanes. This action requires inspections to detect cracking and other discrepancies of certain web-to-cap fasteners of the rear spar between inner wing stations (IWS) 310 and 343, and of the web area around those fasteners; and various follow-on actions. This AD also provides for an optional modification which, if accomplished, will defer the initiation of the inspections for a certain period of time. This amendment is prompted by a report of fatigue cracking in the web of the rear spar of the wing. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent such fatigue cracking, which could result in failure of the rear spar of the wing and consequent fuel spillage.
2008-08-13: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Due to the recalculation of loads for the Multi Role Transporter and Tanker (MRTT) aircraft, it has been found that a structural reinforcement at the aft section of the fuselage (FR (frame) 87- FR91) is required for A300-600 aircraft and A310 aircraft with a Trim Tank installed. * * * * * * * The unsafe condition is the potential loss of structural integrity in the aft section of the fuselage between FR87 through FR91, inclusive, during extreme rolling and vertical maneuver combinations. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.