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47-42-08: 47-42-08 DOUGLAS: (Was Mandatory Note 5 of AD-781-1.) Applies to DC-6 Airplane Serial Numbers 42854, 42855, 42857, 42858, 42860 to 42865, Inclusive; 42867, 42869 to 42880, Inclusive; 42882 to 42891, Inclusive; 43000, 43001, 43003 to 43009, Inclusive; 43055 and 43056. \n\nTo be accomplished not later than next No. 3 inspection (or not later than next 150 hours for non-air-carrier operations). \n\nCertain cases have been found wherein the 5240452 horizontal stabilizers do not have the rivet pattern specified on Drawings Nos. 5248752 and 5249045. The following specific cases should be inspected and rivets should be added if the numbers are less than the following: \n\nReferring to Drawing 5248752 "Horizontal Stabilizer Rear Spar Assembly", zone 4, directly outboard of Station 63: \n1.\tThere should be at least 12 AD5 rivets top and bottom through the web and cap between the -14 and -12 stiffeners, not counting those through the stiffeners. \n2.\tThere should be at least 4 AD5 rivets through the -68 doubler, spar web and spar cap. \n3.\tThere should be at least 6 AD5 rivets top and bottom between the -12 stiffener and the -68 doubler through web and cap. \n\nWith reference to Drawing No. 5249045 "Horizontal Stabilizer Panel and Spar Structure Assembly" zone 3, section L-L, directly inboard of Station 69.5 both top and bottom, the existing rivet pattern of either 1/8 or 5/32 rivets should be continued inboard with AD5 rivets using the present pattern of 3/4 inch O.C. to within 3 1/16 inches from the end of the spar cap. Existing 1/8-inch rivets are satisfactory. \n\nIt should be noted that the foregoing inspections and riveting can be accomplished without removing the elevators. \n\n(Douglas Service Letter A-214-529.010/RLT, and attached sketches, dated July 14, 1947, covers the same subject.)
65-11-04: 65-11-04 PIPER: Amdt. 39-66 Part 39 Federal Register May 14, 1965. Applies to Models PA-24-250, PA-24-260, PA-24-400, and PA-30 Aircraft Equipped with a Mitchell Altimatic II Autopilot. Compliance required within the next 25 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To prevent further jamming of the stabilator control system by the autopilot pitch servo breakaway ball link, accomplish the following: (a) On autopilots with pitch servos, Mitchell P/N 1X312C, having serial numbers listed on page 2 of Mitchell Service Information Bulletin No. A55, dated March 23, 1965, install pitch servo rack, Mitchell P/N 44A75-1, and spacer, Mitchell P/N 43A284 or Piper P/N 25422, in accordance with the accomplishment instructions in that Service Bulletin, or later FAA-approved revision, or an FAA-approved equivalent. Attach spacer using AN510-10R16 screws, AN960-10 washers, and MS20365-1032C nuts, or FAA-approved equivalents. (b) Install a fairlead in the fuselage in accordance with the sketch in Piper Service Bulletin No. 224, dated April 7, 1965, or later FAA-approved revision, or an FAA-approved equivalent. This directive effective May 15, 1965.
49-30-01: 49-30-01 DOUGLAS AND CONVAIR: Applies to All DC-6 and 240 Aircraft Equipped With Curtiss Model C632S-A Propellers. \n\n\tCompliance required as soon as possible but not later than August 15, 1949. \n\n\tBecause of a number of cracks having been discovered in the threaded portion of the hub barrels of the C632S-A propellers, preflight visual inspections must be made in accordance with Curtiss Instructions to all owners dated May 12, 1949. \n\n\tIt is strongly recommended that wherever the necessary equipment is available, magnetic inspections be made in accordance with Curtiss Instructions entitled, "Field Magnetic Inspection of C632S-A Hubs". \n\n\tAny hubs revealing cracks must be retired from service immediately. \n\n\tThe above inspections are to remain in effect as long as these propellers are in service regardless of any rework accomplished. \n\n\tOperational procedures for the Douglas DC-6 during ground run, takeoff and climb, as recommended by the Douglas Co. telegram of May 25, 1949, must also be complied with.
47-16-02: 47-16-02 DOUGLAS: (Was Mandatory Note 17 of AD-762-7.) Applies to C-54 and DC-4 Aircraft. \n\n\tTo be accomplished not later than June 1, 1947. \n\n\tIn case of leakage of the oil dilution solenoid, fuel may flow down the flexible conduit between the solenoid and the firewall junction box and into the junction box, thus creating a fire hazard. To correct this condition, remove the existing flexible conduit and wire between the solenoid and junction box and install new 18-gage wire. Support wire with AN 755-4-4-8 clamps spaced approximately 10-inches apart. \n\n\tThis change is similar to the removal of the flexible conduit for the primer solenoid as covered in item 25 of Douglas Service Bulletin 266 in accordance with Note 47-02-04. \n\t(Part 2A, item 4 of Douglas Service Bulletin DC-4, No. 66, dated June 18, 1947, covers this same subject.)
2005-19-22: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus Model A330-322, -341, and -342 airplanes, and Model A340-200 and -300 series airplanes. This AD requires modifying the left and right ram air outlets of the two air conditioning packs. The modification includes replacing the old air outlet assembly with a new air outlet assembly, and modifying the web. This AD results from a report of fatigue cracks that initiated in the duct structure of the ram air outlet, which is adjacent to the hydraulics compartment. We are issuing this AD to prevent fatigue cracks in the duct structure of the ram air outlet, which could lead to hot air damage and consequent loss of function of the hydraulics systems.
65-08-01: 65-08-01 HAWKER SIDDELEY: Amdt. 39-52 Part 39 Federal Register April 2, 1965. Applies to de Havilland Model 114 "Heron" Aircraft. Compliance required as indicated. To prevent further cases of overheating of electric cables in the cockpit and fuselage nose area, accomplish the following: Within the next 25 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, dismantle, clean, inspect, replace and modify as required, the main ground (earth) assembly in the forward fuselage in accordance with Hawker Siddeley Technical News Sheet Heron (114) No. N.4, Issue 1, dated July 20, 1964. (Hawker Siddeley Aviation, de Havilland Division, Technical News Sheet Heron (114) No. N.4, Issue 1, dated July 20, 1964, covers this same subject.) This directive effective May 3, 1965.
2018-14-01: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Piper Aircraft, Inc. (Piper) Models PA-46-600TP (M600) airplanes. This AD requires inserting temporary airspeed limitations into the pilot's operating handbook, installing a temporary placard, inspecting rivets on the cockpit canopy above the left and right cockpit side windows, and installing a repair kit based on the findings of the rivet inspection. This AD was prompted by a report of undersized fasteners installed during manufacturing. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
65-06-04: 65-06-04 EUREKA WILLIAMS: Amdt. 39-44 Part 39 Federal Register March 6, 1965. Applies to All Aircraft with Life Preservers or Liferafts Equipped with Eureka Williams Survivor Locator Light Model EW-101-WL-( )-8 with a Yellow Polyethylene Lower Battery End Cap. Compliance required within 30 days after the effective date of this AD unless already accomplished. To prevent further damage to life preservers or liferafts from acid emitted from survivor locator light batteries, accomplish the following: (a) Inspect life preservers and liferafts for acid damage from survivor locator light batteries. Repair or replace damaged life preservers and liferafts before further service. (b) Replace survivor locator light with FAA-approved lights other than Eureka Williams EW-101-WL-( )-8 lights with a yellow polyethylene lower battery end cap before further service. NOTE: Number denoted by empty brackets varies with lead length. All lights with yellow caps were manufactured after December 9, 1964, and are stamped with manufacturer codes 1-65, 2-65, or 12-64. (Eureka Williams Service Bulletin No. ADV SCI 101-1 dated February 19, 1965, covers this subject.) This directive effective March 6, 1965.
47-10-17: 47-10-17 LOCKHEED: (Was Mandatory Note 19 of AD-763-3.) Applies to All Model 49 Serials Up to and Including 2075. Compliance required prior to resumption of cabin supercharger operation. Prior to resumption of cabin supercharger operation, the following Lockheed Service Bulletins must be complied with: 49/SB-107, revised November 22, 1946 - Replacement of Cabin Supercharger Drive Shafts. 49/SB-141, revised August 7, 1946 - Replacement of Cabin Supercharger. 49/SB-156, revised September 17, 1946 - Installation of Supercharger Oil Temperature Indicator. The revision dates given for these three Bulletins are later than those listed in the Supplement to AD-763 (Special) dated September 25, 1946. Aircraft on which the cabin supercharging equipment was rendered operative in accordance with that Supplement should be checked for compliance with these later revisions dates within the next 150 hours of operation.
2003-16-11: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the specified MD Helicopters, Inc. (MDHI) model helicopters that requires reducing the life limit of the main rotor drive shaft (drive shaft) and changing the life limit on the component history card or equivalent record. This amendment is prompted by the review of final fatigue test data, which indicates that the life limit of the drive shaft should be reduced by 2000 hours time-in-service (TIS). The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of the drive shaft, loss of drive of the main rotor system, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
45-04-01: 45-04-01\tBOEING: (Was Service Note 1 of AD-704-1.) Applies to 314 Aircraft. \n\tThe 24SRT aluminum alloy tubular members must be inspected for stress corrosion and fatigue cracks by visual and x-ray methods in accordance with the instructions listed below: STRESS CORROSION CRACKS \n\tINSPECTION PERIODS AND LOCATIONS \n\t\t(a)\tInspection required every 250 hours of operation or 60 days, whichever occurs first. Inspect the visible portion of all readily accessible aluminum alloy 24SRT members for cracks. \n\t\t(b)\tInspection required every 750 hours of operation or 120 days, whichever occurs first. Inspect the visible faces of all aluminum alloy 24SRT tubing structure for cracks. In addition, inspect by x-ray the inaccessible face of the spar chord members from Station 6 to Station 13 which is hidden by the wing skin attach to the chord (i.e., chord face areas hidden by gusset plates used to attach web members are excluded). \n\t\t(c)\tInspection required annually. Inspect by x-ray all inaccessible portions of 24SRT spar chord members for their entire length. This inspection period may coincide with the inspection periods in paragraph (b) above. \n\tINSPECTION PROCEDURES \n\tThe required visual inspection for new or elongated cracks shall be done in a manner satisfactory to FAA. The following procedure is an acceptable method for making these visual inspections: \n\t\t(a)\tClean the surfaces of the members with a rag as necessary and closely examine the members (especially around gussets) with the naked eye. Direct a light on each member at varying angles so that no defects will be overlooked. Make certain to inspect all sides of each member using a mirror where necessary. \n\t\t(b)\tExamine any suspicious indication with a magnifying glass (10 power or over preferred). A crack will appear to have jagged edges and considerable depth. A scratch will appear to have smooth edges and the bottom of the groove should be visible. \n\t\t(c)\tIf a new crack is found, the finish (if otherRoxalin Clear Primer) should be removed around the crack to facilitate inspection. Extreme care should be exercised while stripping areas immediately adjacent to gusset plates in order to prevent the stripping solvent from entering the inaccessible regions between the gussets and members. The crack should be further inspected for corrosion and its length measured to the nearest 1/16 inch. The two ends of a stress corrosion crack should be marked with a sharp indelible pencil, and Roxalin Clear Primer No. 3200 brushed over the stripped area. \n\t\t(d)\tInspect known cracks for elongation by noting the pencil lines placed at the previous ends of each crack the same as for new cracks. (See (c) above.) \n\tThe required x-ray inspections should be done with suitable equipment and by a company or personnel that have demonstrated to the FAA that their procedure will adequately show the condition of the hidden faces of the chord members. \n\tIDENTIFICATION AND LIMITS \n\tStress corrosion typesof failures are denoted by longitudinal fissures in the members. These cracks may have a small transverse component. They vary in length and, as time elapses, may run together or continue from one rivet hole to another. If stress-corrosion cracks are within certain limits the airplane may be operated without reinforcing the affected member; however, if the magnitude, direction, or location of the crack is such as to violate any of the following provisions, the affected member shall be reinforced or replaced in a manner satisfactory to the FAA. \n\t\t(1)\tNo crack should be allowed to exceed 8 inches in length. Diagonal (or transverse) cracks should in no case extend transversely in the member for a distance greater than the largest rivet or bolt diameter in the nearest fitting. \n\t\t(2)\tCracks should not be allowed in joints, fittings, rivet holes, reduced sections, etc., unless it can be determined that the affected area is not critical or that adequate margins of safety exist to compensate for such cracks. \n\t\t(3)\tIf two or more parallel cracks exist in the same face, none should exceed 6 inches in length. \n\t\t(4)\tIf numerous small longitudinal cracks exist in one face of a member but are not joined by diagonal or transverse cracks, the length of the member so affected should not exceed 12 inches. \nFATIGUE CRACKS \n\tINSPECTION PERIODS AND LOCATIONS. \n\tInspection required every 35 hours of operation. Inspect the visible portions of all the wing spar 24SRT diagonal tube members, between Stations 1 and 30 on the front spar and between Stations 5 and 23 on the rear spar, for fatigue cracks at intervals not to exceed 35 hours flight time. \n\tINSPECTION PROCEDURES. \n\tSame as parts (a) and (b) of the inspection procedures for stress-corrosion cracks. \n\tIDENTIFICATION AND LIMITS. \n\tFatigue types of failures are denoted by fine hairline transverse cracking in the members. These cracks generally emanate from rivet holes under gussets and progress transversely or diagonally around the periphery of the tube. They may also originate from a longitudinal crack, scratch or other stress-raising discontinuity. In case fatigue cracks of any length are found, the defective member should be reinforced before flight is continued and upon arrival at the home base, the member should replaced. A proposed repair to take care of this contingency should be submitted to the FAA for approval. It shall also be the operators' responsibility to keep a record of all the cracks on each airplane. This record shall be revised periodically to show the status of existing cracks and to record newly developed cracks. Copies of the original reports and all revised pages should be submitted to the FAA for examination.
2018-14-02: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 777-200, -200LR, -300, and -300ER series airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports that additional areas of Boeing Material Specification (BMS) 8-39 flexible urethane foam were found during a routine inspection. This AD requires an inspection for foam insulation on the dripshield above the overhead panel support structure and replacement if necessary. For certain airplanes, this AD also requires replacement of foam insulation on the overhead panel support structure. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products. \n\n((Page 31651))
47-49-11: 47-49-11 LOCKHEED: (Was Service Note 11 of AD-763-3.) Applies to Models 49, 649, and 749 Serials as Noted. At periods not to exceed 50 hours of operation, inspect the following fuel system elements to determine that they are tight and will not permit leakage or other hazardous conditions: (a) Fuel dump valve shaft gland nuts (Serials up to and including 2075). (b) Valves on drain lines from outboard portion of inboard fuel tanks, fuel system crossfeed lines, and cabin heater fuel lines (Serials 2047 to 2088, inclusive, and 2501 to 2503, inclusive). If safety wiring of these items is provided, the required inspections may be discontinued. (Lockheed Service Bulletin 49/SB-215 covers part (a), and Lockheed Service Instruction 49/SI-10A covers part (b).)
48-12-02: 48-12-02 DOUGLAS: Applies to All C54-DC Serial and the Following DC-4 Airplanes: 42904 Through 42943, 42948 Through 42952, 42982 Through 42996, 43065 Through 43068, 43071, 43072, 43093, 43094, and 43102. \n\n\tTo be accomplished not later than the date established in accordance with the provisions of Special Civil Air Regulation Serial Number SR-329, or any subsequent regulation affecting this compliance date. \n\n\tAs a result of investigation of heater fires, the following changes are to be accomplished in the nose and cabin heater installation: \n\n\t1.\tInstall steel firewall at Station 260 (cabin forward bulkhead) from ceiling level to top of bulkhead to provide isolation between heater compartment and the space between cabin ceiling and top of fuselage. Also, replace present wood panels under heaters with metal panels. \n\n\t(Douglas Service Bulletin DC-4 No. 47 covers this same subject.) \n\n\t2.\t(a)\tInstall all heater control components in airtight steel containers. \n\t\t(b)\tReplace present heater fuel supply pumps with a single electric driven pump attached to No. 2 main fuel tank. \n\n\t\t(c)\tProvide shrouds around all heater fuel line fittings in fuselage. \t \n\n\t\t(d)\tInstall a fire detector and extinguisher system for the nose heater and cabin heaters. \n\n\t(Douglas Service Bulletins DC-4 Nos. 64 and 64 addendum cover this same subject.) \n\n\tIn some cases, operators have obtained approval from FAA Regional Offices for systems which differ in arrangement and detail from the above provisions. Designs which have been separately approved in this manner are considered to meet the intent of this Note. \n\n\tThis supersedes AD 46-39-02.
2005-19-19: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 737-300, -400, -500, -600, -700, -700C, -800 and - 900 series airplanes. This AD requires installing an updated version of the operational program software (OPS) and certain other software in the flight management computers (FMCs); and doing configuration checks to ensure that certain software is properly installed and doing other specified actions. This AD also requires reinstalling software, if necessary. This AD results from one operator reporting FMC map shifts on several Model 737-400 series airplanes with dual FMCs, using OPS version U10.4A. We are issuing this AD to prevent the FMC from displaying the incorrect actual navigation performance value to the flightcrew, which could prevent adequate alerting of a potential navigation error. This condition could result in a near miss with other airplanes or terrain, or collision if other warning systems also fail.
65-04-01: 65-04-01 BELL: Amdt. 39-36 Part 39 Federal Register February 17, 1965. Applies to Model 47 Series Helicopters Equipped With Transmissions Serial Numbers B12-885 through B12-969. Compliance required within 25 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless previously accomplished in accordance with Bell Helicopter Company Service Bulletin No. 141SB. Some of the P/N 47-620-535-1 outer races installed in the freewheeling clutch of transmissions listed herein may not have been tempered properly. To eliminate the possibility of excessive wear of these races and subsequent malfunction of the freewheeling clutch, conduct a hardness test on these races as described by Bell Service Bulletin No. 141SB. If the hardness does not fall within the limits prescribed by the bulletin, replace the outer race with one which is within the limits before further flight. This directive effective February 17, 1965.
2018-12-03: We are superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2013-11-09 for all Safran Helicopter Engines, S.A., Arrius 2B1 and 2F turboshaft engines. AD 2013-11-09 required the repetitive replacement of the fuel injector manifolds and privilege injector, or only the privilege injector. This AD retains the repetitive hardware replacement requirements of AD 2013-11-09, but only allows replacement pipe injector preferred assembly, part number (P/N) 0 319 73 044 0, on the Arrius 2F engines. This AD was prompted by reports of engine flameouts as a result of reduced fuel flow due to the presence of coking. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
65-03-01: 65-03-01 BEECH: Amdt. 39-26 Part 39 Federal Register January 28, 1965 is amended by Amendment 39-1263. Applies to Models AT-11, C18S, D18S, E18S and C-45 series airplanes which have been modified in accordance with one or more of Airline Training, Inc. Supplemental Type Certificates Nos. SA4-113, SA-119, SA4-128, SA2-280, SA2-383, SA2-523, SA2-820, SA2-1016 and SA2-1246. Compliance required as indicated. Freezing of moisture in the continuous (piano) hinges which attach the stabilizer-to- elevator gap seal strips causes the spring loaded strips to stick in a deflected position. The deflected strips act as aerodynamic spoilers which cause serious longitudinal control difficulties. In order to preclude this condition, accomplish the following: Within 25 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, and thereafter at intervals not exceeding 50 hours' time in service, or 60 days, whichever occurs first, accomplish the following or equivalent approved by Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Southern Region. (a) Apply a good coverage of Federal Specification VV-L-800 oil to the top and bottom sides of both upper and lower stabilizer-to-elevator gap seal strip piano-type hinges. An acceptable alternate lubricant is a mixture of MIL-G-81322 (MIL-G-25760) or MIL-G-23827 (MIL-G-7118) grease and methyl ethyl ketone or aliphatic naphtha (Varsol), to a consistency suitable for application with a squirt-type oil can or an equivalent material approved by Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Southern Region. (b) While the mixture is being applied, deflect the seal strips several times to assure maximum penetration of the fluid into the hinge pin and hinge mating areas. Amendment 39-26 was effective February 8, 1965. Amendment 39-1263 becomes effective upon publication in the Federal Register.
47-21-05: 47-21-05 NAVION: (Was Mandatory Note 4 of AD-782-3.) Applies to Serial Numbers NAV-4-11 Through 21 and 44 Through 47. To be accomplished not later than August 1, 1947. Replace the original propeller control with one that incorporates a positive friction lock in accordance with NAA Kit Drawing 145-89011. (NAA Field Service Bulletin No. 5 covers this change.)
47-32-05: 47-32-05 BELL: (Was Mandatory Note 5 of AD-1H-1.) Applies to Model 47B. Compliance required before next flight. Remove the main rotor mast spinner assembly from all Model 47B helicopters, in order that the possibility of its jamming the mast control tubes, in the event it becomes loose during flight, is eliminated. (Bell Service Bulletin 47C38 dated May 15, 1947, also covers this same subject.)
49-26-01: 49-26-01 BEECH: Applies to All Models 35 and A35 Airplanes Equipped With an Automatic Reel Trailing Antenna. Compliance required by January 1, 1950. Because of reported cases of jamming of the controls due to the rear antenna guide rail being knocked loose by the movable pulley assembly (P/N 1X007) when the antenna wire was broken or came loose in flight, the following should be accomplished: (1) Tack a plywood block to the wood antenna strip in the aft section of the fuselage, with 3/4 inch No. 18 flathead nails. The rear end of the block should be at least 1 1/4 inches forward of the centerline of the aft pulley. (2) Stretch a rubber bumper ring over the block. (Beech Service Bulletin Model 35 No. 13 and Model A-35 No. 4 dated March 15, 1949, covers this same subject.)
2018-13-05: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Honeywell International Inc. (Honeywell) TPE331 turboprop and TSE331 turboshaft engines. This AD was prompted by recent reports of failures of the direct drive fuel control gears and bearings in the hydraulic torque sensor gear assembly, part number (P/N) 3101726-3. This AD requires initial and repetitive engine oil filter sampling and analysis of the affected engines and inspections of certain hydraulic torque sensor gear assemblies. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2018-12-07: We are superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2015-24-06 for certain Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation Model GVI airplanes. AD 2015- 24-06 required repetitive breakaway torque checks and torqueing of the main landing gear (MLG) brake inlet self-sealing couplings and inserting a dispatch and takeoff limitation to the limitations section of the airplane flight manual. This AD requires modifying the MLG and brake assembly. This AD was prompted by reports of the self-sealing couplings on the MLG brake inlet fitting backing out of the fully seated position. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
89-02-02: 89-02-02 BOEING: Amendment 39-6100. Applicability: Model 757 series airplanes, Group 1 and Group 2, as listed in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 757-32A0081, dated June 24, 1988, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required within the next 120 days after the effective date of this AD, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent the loss of airplane braking due to a single hydraulic failure, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tInspect Group 1 and 2 airplanes left and right alternate antiskid valve module return ports for proper check valve configuration, and correct, if necessary, in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 757-32A0081, dated June 24, 1988. \n\n\tB.\tOn Group 1 airplanes, remove the reducer unions installed in the left and right alternate brake metering valve module return ports and install check valves, in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 757-32A0081, dated June 24, 1988. \n\n\tC.\tAn alternate means of compliance or adjustment ofthe compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\t\tNOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), who may add any comments and then send to the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office. \n\n\tD.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of the inspections and/or modifications required by this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6100, AD 89-02-02) becomes effective February 8, 1989.
2005-19-01: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all EMBRAER Model ERJ 170 airplanes. This AD requires inspecting the hydraulic pressure tubes at the outlet of the engine-driven hydraulic pumps to determine the part and serial numbers; and replacing hydraulic pressure tubes having certain serial numbers with new hydraulic pressure tubes. This AD results from failure of a hydraulic system due to leakage of hydraulic fluid from a crack in the pipe coming from the pressure side of the engine-driven pump. We are issuing this AD to prevent cracking of the hydraulic pressure pipes, which could result in failure of hydraulic system 1 or 2 or both, and consequent reduced controllability of the airplane.