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96-12-26: This document publishes in the Federal Register an amendment adopting Airworthiness Directive (AD) AD 96-12-26 which was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. (BHTI)-manufactured Model AH-1, HH-1K, TH-1F, TH-1L, UH-1A, UH-1B, UH-1E, UH-1F, UH-1H, UH-1L, and UH-1P helicopters by individual letters. This AD requires a visual inspection of each tail rotor (T/R) blade (blade) for peeling, flaking, or bubbling paint that may indicate corrosion; an inspection for corrosion, if necessary; and replacement of the T/R blade with an airworthy blade if corrosion is discovered. This amendment is prompted by an FAA determination, based on the manufacturer's data, that certain serial-numbered T/R blades were manufactured with internal leading edge doublers fabricated from clad aluminum instead of bare aluminum material. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent debonding of the main spar internal leading edge doubler, which could lead to failure of a T/R blade and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
89-08-05: 89-08-05 BELL HELICOPTER TEXTRON, INC.: Amendment 39-6403. Final copy of a Priority Letter AD. Docket No. 89-ASW-11. Applicability: All Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. (BHTI) Model 204B, 205A, 205A-1, 212, and 412 helicopters, certificated in any category, with main transmission spiral bevel gear, P/N 204-040-701-103, having less than 250 hours' time in service upon effective date of this AD and delivered as spares or in a new transmission between January 1, 1988, and April 4, 1989. The spare (uninstalled) spiral bevel gears, P/N 204-040-701-103, affected serial numbers are as follows: A-3819 A-3821 A-3825 A-3826 A-3829 A-3833 A-3834 A-3836 A-3838 A-3840 A-3845 A-3847 A-3848 A-3850 A-3855 A-3856 A-3857 A-3858 A-3861 A-3878 A-3880 A-3885 A-3886 A-3889 A-3891 A-3892 A-3893 A-3895 A-3896 A-3897 A-3899 A-3901 A-3911 A-3915 A-3916 A-3919 A-3920 A-4008 A-4014 A-4017 A-4019 A-4020 A-4021 A-4027 A-4029 A-4068 A-4069 A-4071A-4075 A-4077 A-4078 A-4079 A-4080 A-4081 A-4083 A-4084 A-4085 A-4087 A-4089 A-4090 A-4091 A-4092 A-4093 A-4094 A-4095A A-4096 A-4097 A-4098 A-4107 A-4108 A-4109 A-4147 A-4184 A-4186 A-4187 A-4188 A-4191 A-4192 A-4193 A-4213 A-4229 A-4233 A-4235 A-4236 A-4241 A-4243 A-4244 A-4245 A-4254 A-4266 A-4267 A-4274 A-4275 A-4280 A-4282 A-4288 A-4289 A-4290 A-4303 A-4319 A-4320 A-4325 A-4327 A-4328 A-4329 A-4332 A-4333 A-4334 A-4335 A-4336 A-4337 A-4358 A-4366 A-4368 A-4369 A-4370 A-4371 A-4372 A-4374 A-4376 A-4377 A-4378 A-4379 A-4380 A-4383 A-4385 A-4386 A-4387 A-4394 A-4395 A-4397 A-4400 A-4401 A-4403 A-4411 A-4417 A-4418 A-4428 The following Model 212 serial numbered helicopters were delivered with affected main transmission spiral bevel gears; S/N's 31304, 31305, and 31307. The following Model 412 serial numbered helicopters were delivered with the affected main transmission spiral bevel gears: S/N's 33175, 33177, 33178, 33179, 33181, 33182, 33185, 33186, 33190, 33192, 33194, and 33195. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent failure of the main transmission spiral bevel gear which could result in possible loss of the helicopter, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 10 hours' time in service upon effective date of this AD and thereafter, before the first flight of each day, accomplish the following: (1) Remove and inspect the transmission internal sump oil filter for evidence of metal contamination (e.g., steel particles in splinter, granular, or flake form). (2) If metal contamination is evident, disassemble the main transmission to determine the extent of damage and replace any unserviceable parts with serviceable parts before further flight. (b) Within the next 10 hours' time in service upon effective date of this AD and thereafter, at intervals not to exceed 50 hours' time in service from the last inspection, accomplish the following: (1) Remove a quill pad cover, P/N 204-040-174-001, or rotor brake quill from the transmission main ring gear case to gain access to the main transmission spiral bevel gear. (2) Utilizing a bright light and a dental mirror, inspect all teeth in the spiral bevel gear, P/N 204-040-701-103, for evidence of cracks, chipping, and metal deformation. If cracks, chipping, or metal deformation is evident, the part must be removed from service and replaced with a serviceable part before further flight. (3) Reinstall pad cover, P/N 204-040-174-001, or rotor brake quill, whichever is applicable. (c) The provisions of this AD do not apply when the time in service of the spiral bevel gear, P/N 204-040-701-103, reaches or exceeds 250 hours' time in service. NOTE: Spiral bevel gear, P/N 204-040-701-103, affected by this AD may be returned to Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., Attn: CPR Monitor, 3000 South Norwood & Trinity Boulevard, Hurst, Texas 76053, for inspection and reidentification. After reidentification, the provisions of this AD no longer apply. (d) An alternate method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an equivalent level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Rotorcraft Certification Office, Rotorcraft Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, FAA, Southwest Region, Fort Worth, Texas. (e) In accordance with FAR Sections 21.197 and 21.199, flight is permitted to a base where the inspection requirements of this AD may be accomplished. This amendment becomes effective on January 3, 1990, as to all persons except those persons to whom it was made immediately effective by Priority Letter AD 89-08-05, issued April 12, 1989, which contained this amendment.
2011-13-04: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: A Trent 500 engine has been found with thermal distress of the Intermediate Pressure (IP) Turbine Nozzle Guide Vanes. The resultant investigation found the root cause to be carbon blockage of the fuel spray nozzles. The source of the carbon has been identified to be the RH fuel manifold assembly. Analysis has verified that low fuel velocity and thermal input may cause formation of carbon in a specific region of the RH fuel manifold. As advanced thermal distress of IP Turbine components may potentially result in uncontained, high energy debris release, the formation of carbon in the RH fuel manifold constitutes a potentially unsafe condition. To address andcorrect this unsafe condition, Rolls Royce have developed a cleaning or replacement programme of the RH fuel manifold and an optional part replacement. We are issuing this AD to prevent the release of uncontained high- energy debris in the event of IP turbine component failure, which could result in damage to the airplane.
2011-13-07: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Several occurrences of untimely radio-altimeter lock-up have been reported, where the failed radio-altimeter indicated a negative distance to the ground despite the aircraft was flying at medium or high altitude. A locked radio-altimeter 1 leads to untimely inhibition of warnings that could be displayed along with certain abnormal conditions while the avionic system switches into landing mode during altitude cruise. * * * * * [Untimely radio altimeter lock-up] may cause the crew to be unaware of possible system failures that could require urgent crew's actions. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions tocorrect the unsafe condition on these products.
96-18-07: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to Bellanca, Incorporated (Bellanca) Models 17-30, 17-30A, 17-31, 17-31A, 17-31TC, and 17-31ATC airplanes. This action requires repetitively inspecting, testing, and possibly replacing the nose landing gear (NLG) strut and brackets. A collapse of a Bellanca airplane's NLG during a landing prompted this action. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent possible failure of the nose landing gear, which, if not detected and corrected, could result in loss of control of the airplane during landing operations.
76-06-04: 76-06-04 HAWKER SIDDELEY AVIATION, LTD: Amendment 39-2553. Applies to Model DH-104 "Dove" airplanes, all series, certificated in all categories. Compliance is required as indicated. To prevent the possible failure of engine mounting pick-up brackets, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 50 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the preceding 250 hours' time in service, inspect the following engine mounting pickup brackets in accordance with paragraph (b) of this AD, and comply with paragraph (c), (d), and (e), as appropriate. (1) For aircraft that do not incorporate Hawker Siddeley Modification 38, inspect - (i) Inboard top joint assembly inner brackets, P/N 4 W.3433-4, and outer brackets, P/N 4 W.3435-6; and (ii) Outboard top joint assembly inner brackets, P/N 4 W.3437-8, and outer brackets, P/N 4 W.3439-40. (2) For aircraft that incorporate Hawker Siddeley Modification 38, inspect - (i) Inboard top joint assembly inner brackets, P/N 4 W.4239-40, and outer brackets, P/N 4 w.4241-2; and (ii) Outboard top joint assembly inner brackets, P/N 4 W.3437-8, and outer brackets, P/N 4 W.3439-40. (b) Remove the cowling over the oil tank and inspect the engine mounting pick-up brackets specified in paragraph (a)(1) or (a)(2) of this AD, as applicable, for cracks using a dye penetrant method, and comply with paragraph (c) or (d) of this AD, as appropriate. NOTE. In conducting inspections required by paragraph (b) of this AD particular attention should be given to the top flanged edges of the brackets. (c) If a crack is found during an inspection required by paragraph (b) of this AD, before further flight, replace the affected bracket with a new bracket of the same part number or an FAA-approved equivalent. (d) If no crack is found during an inspection required by paragraph (b) of this AD, before further flight, inspect the flange edges of the brackets specified in paragraph (a)(1) or (a)(2), as appropriate, for cut-outs, nicks, rough edges, and similar defects. (e) If a defect is found during an inspection required by paragraph (d) of this AD, comply with the following, as appropriate: (1) If the defect can be blended out over a length of at least 0.5 inches along the flange edge, without a material loss in excess of 0.05 inches from the edge of the flange, accomplish the following: (i) Before further flight, blend out the defect, and (ii) Thereafter, continue to comply with paragraph (b) of this AD at intervals not to exceed 1200 hours' time in service. (2) If the defect can be blended out over a length of at least 0.5 inches along the flange edge, with a material loss in excess of 0.05 inches, but not in excess of 0.20 inches, from the edge of the flange, accomplish the following: (i) Before further flight, blend out the defect, and (ii) Thereafter, continue to complywith paragraph (b) of this AD at intervals not to exceed 300 hours' time in service. (3) If the defect cannot be blended out over a length of at least 0.5 inches along the flange edge, or a material loss in excess of 0.20 inches from the edge of the flange would result if the defect were blended out, before further flight, except that the airplane may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to a base where the repair can be performed, replace the affected bracket with a new bracket of the same part number, or an FAA-approved equivalent. (f) The blending out of defects as required by paragraphs (e)(1)(i) and (e)(2)(i) of this AD must be accomplished in such a manner that all reworked edges are smooth, free of burrs, and reprotected in accordance with FAR 43.13. NOTE. The Hawker Siddeley Aviation Limited Model DH-104 Maintenance Manual contains instructions for the blending out of defects. Also Hawker Siddeley Aviation Limited Technical News Sheet CT(104)No. 226, Issue 1, dated October 25, 1971, deals with this subject. This amendment becomes effective March 29, 1976.
87-03-08: 87-03-08 TAYLORCRAFT: Amendment 39-5521. Applies to the following models and serial number airplanes certificated in any category: \n\n\nMODELS\nSERIAL NUMBERS\nBC, BCS, BC-65, BCS-65, BC12-65\n\n (Army L-2H), BCS12-65, BC12-D\nall serial numbers \n19, F19\nall serial numbers\nF21\nF-1000 through F1499 except F-1022\nF21A\nF-1500 through F-1506 \n\nCompliance: Required within the next 50 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. \n\nTo prevent loss of engine oil and possible failure of the engine, accomplish the following: \n\n(a)\tVisually inspect the oil pressure gauge hose assembly at the engine to determine whether the type of hose assembly installed is P/N B7071. (See Fig. 1) \n\n(1)\tIf the oil pressure hose assembly is not of the type illustrated in Figure 1, no further action in accordance with this AD is required. \n\n(2)\tIf the oil pressure hose assembly is of the type illustrated in Figure 1, prior to the next flight, replacewith a new P/N B7071 hose assembly identified by Taylorcraft with a "T" stamped on one of the wrenching flats on one of the hose assembly brass fittings. \n\n(b)\tAirplanes may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a location where this AD may be accomplished. \n\n(c)\tAn equivalent means of compliance with this AD may be used if approved by the Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office, ANE-170, 181 South Franklin Avenue, Room 202, Valley Stream, New York 11581. \n\nAll persons affected by this AD may obtain copies of documents referred to herein upon request to the Taylorcraft Aviation Corporation, P.O. Box 947, Lock Haven, Pennsylvania 17745; or FAA, Central Region, Office of the Regional Counsel, Room 1558, 601 East 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri 64106. \n\nThis amendment becomes effective on March 1, 1987. \n\n\nFIGURE 1 AD 87-03-08
97-07-13: 97-07-13 CONSTRUCCIONES AERONAUTICAS, S.A. (CASA): Amendment 39-9987. Docket 96-NM-127-AD. Applicability: Model CN-235 series airplanes; as listed in CASA Service Bulletin SB-235-53-21M, Revision 1, dated November 21, 1994 (military airplanes), and CASA Service Bulletin SB-235-53-21, Revision 3, dated November 30, 1994 (non-military airplanes); certificated in any category. NOTE 1: This AD applies to each airplane identified in the preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been otherwise modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the requirements of this AD. For airplanes that have been modified, altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of this AD is affected, the owner/operator must request approval for an alternative method of compliance in accordance with paragraph (b) of this AD. The request should include an assessment of the effect of the modification, alteration, or repair on the unsafe condition addressedby this AD; and, if the unsafe condition has not been eliminated, the request should include specific proposed actions to address it. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. To prevent fatigue from causing the center wing attachment rods to fail, which consequently could reduce the structural integrity of the wing-to-fuselage attachment, accomplish the following: (a) Prior to the accumulation of 16,000 total landings, replace center wing attachment rods having CASA part number (P/N) 35-22058-0003 or 35-22067-0001 with new rods having CASA P/N 35-22067-0003, in accordance with CASA Service Bulletin SB-235-53-21M, Revision 1, dated November 21, 1994 (for military airplanes); or CASA Service Bulletin SB-235-53-21, Revision 3, dated November 30, 1994 (for non-military airplanes); as applicable. (b) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113. NOTE 2: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Standardization Branch, ANM-113. (c) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. (d) The replacement shall be done in accordance with CASA Service Bulletin SB-235-53- 21M, Revision 1, dated November 21, 1994; or CASA Service Bulletin SB-235-53-21, Revision 3, dated November 30, 1994; as applicable. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. Copies may be obtained from Construcciones Aeronauticas, S.A., Getafe, Madrid, Spain. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC. (e) This amendment becomes effective on May 12, 1997.
2011-12-11: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. That AD currently requires, for certain airplanes, reworking the bonding jumper assemblies on the drain tube assemblies of the slat track housing of the wings. For certain other airplanes, the existing AD requires repetitive inspections of the drain tube assemblies of the slat track housing of the wings to find discrepancies, corrective actions if necessary, and terminating action for the repetitive inspections. This new AD also requires replacing the drain tube assemblies. For certain airplanes, this new AD also requires installing an additional electrostatic bond path for the number 5 and 8 inboard slat track drain tube assemblies. For certain other airplanes, this new AD also requires reworking the bonding jumper assembly. This new AD also revises the applicability to include additional airplanes. This AD was prompted by (1) reports of fuel leaks from certain drain locations of the slat track housing near the engine exhaust nozzle, which could result in a fire when the airplane is stationary, or taxiing at low speed; (2) reports of a bonding jumper assembly of certain drain tubes that did not meet bonding specifications and could result in electrostatic discharge and an in-tank ignition source; and (3) reports of fuel leaks onto the main landing gear (MLG) as a result of a cracked drain tube at the number 5 or 8 slat track housing, which could let fuel drain from the main fuel tanks into the dry bay area of the wings and onto hot MLG brakes and result in a fire.
2011-12-12: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD requires a detailed inspection to detect distress and existing repairs to the leading edge structure of the vertical stabilizer at the splice at Station Zfs=52.267; repetitive inspections for cracking in the front spar cap forward flanges of the vertical stabilizer, and either the aft flanges or side skins; repetitive inspections for loose and missing fasteners; and related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. This AD was prompted by reports of cracked vertical stabilizer skin, a severed front spar cap, elongated fastener holes at the leading edge of the vertical stabilizer, and cracked front spar web and front spar cap bolt holes in the vertical stabilizer. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct such cracking damage, which could result in the structure being unable to support limit load, and could lead to the loss of the vertical stabilizer.