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2018-20-07: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Dassault Aviation Model MYSTERE-FALCON 50 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a determination that more restrictive maintenance requirements and airworthiness limitations are necessary. This AD requires revising the maintenance or inspection program, as applicable, to incorporate new and more restrictive maintenance requirements and airworthiness limitations. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
67-27-05: 67-27-05 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amdt. 39-486 Part 39 Federal Register September 26, 1967. Applies to Model DC-9 Series airplanes delivered prior to September 8, 1967. \n\n\tCompliance required prior to the next departure from a maintenance base where the inspection can be accomplished by the operator but not later than 5 hours' time in service after September 26, 1967, unless already accomplished in accordance with Douglas Alert Service Bulletin No. A54-15 dated September 12, 1967, or wire constituting said Service Bulletin dated September 11, 1967, or later FAA-approved revision. \n\n\tDue to a report of a missing bolt in the area where the engine aft mount attaches to the spar cap of the pylon rear spar (which was attributed to the absence of a bolt hole in the clip located on the aft side of the pylon rear spar), accomplish the following: \n\n\t1.\tInspect the outboard end of the upper and lower spar cap of each pylon rear spar in the vicinity of the first fastener inboard of the holesto which the rear engine mount attaches. \n\n\t2.\tReplace any missing bolt or nut before further flight with a bolt (P/N MS 21250-05010) and/or nut (P/N H16-5), except that the airplane may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a base where the replacement can be accomplished. \n\n\t3.\tReport in writing any instances of a missing bolt or nut to Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region, within three (3) days after discovery. \n\n\tThis amendment effective on September 26, 1967, for all persons except those to whom it was made effective immediately by telegram dated September 11, 1967.
2018-17-14: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain General Electric Company (GE) CF34-8E turbofan engines. This AD was prompted by a report from GE regarding a quality escape of nonconforming thrust reverser fire seals. This AD requires a one-time inspection of the gap between the core cowl seal and the pylon seal of the thrust reverser for correct gap width, and replacement of the seals, if needed. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
67-25-05: 67-25-05 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amdt. 39-470, Part 39, Federal Register September 6, 1967. Applies to Model DC-8 Series Airplanes listed in Douglas Aircraft Division Service Bulletin No. 76-26, Revision No. 2, dated October 12, 1967, and Model DC-9 Series Airplanes listed in Douglas Aircraft Division Service Bulletin No. 76-15 dated July 28, 1967. \n\n\tCompliance required as indicated. \n\n\tTo ensure proper stowage of the thrust reverser (piggy-back) levers, and to prevent possible deployment of the thrust reversers in the event of an electrical malfunction in the autothrottle computer that causes inadvertent movement of the throttles to the mechanical stop position, accomplish the following: \n\n\t1.\tUnless electrical deactivation of the autothrottle system has already been accomplished in accordance with Paragraph (1) of AD 67-20-03, before further flight, deactivate the autothrottle system by pulling the autothrottle computer/amplifier circuit breaker and securing the circuit breaker in the open position. \n\n\t2.\tUnless already accomplished in accordance with Paragraph (2) of AD 67-20-03, before further flight, install a placard on the throttle pedestal in clear view of the pilot stating "autothrottle inoperative". \n\n\t3.\tReactivation of the autothrottle system and removal of the placard specified in Paragraph 2 of this AD may be accomplished immediately following the installation of a spring on each throttle lever assembly in accordance with Douglas Aircraft Division Service Bulletin No. 76-26 dated July 31, 1967, or later FAA-approved revision (in the case of Model DC-8 Series Airplanes) or Douglas Aircraft Division Service Bulletin No. 76-15 dated July 28, 1967, or later FAA-approved revision (in the case of Model DC-9 Series Airplanes). \n\n\tThis supersedes Amendment 39-436 (issued telegraphically on June 10, 1967, and later published in 32 F.R. 8890), AD 67-20-03. \n\n\tThis Amendment effective September 6, 1967.
94-03-01: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9 series airplanes and C-9 (military) airplanes, that currently requires the implementation of a program of structural inspections to detect and correct fatigue cracking in order to ensure the continued airworthiness of these airplanes as they approach the manufacturer's original fatigue design life goal. This amendment requires, among other things, revision of the existing program to require visual inspections of additional structure. This amendment is prompted by new data submitted by the manufacturer indicating that certain revisions to the program are necessary in order to increase the confidence level of the statistical program to ensure timely detection of cracks in various airplane structures. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent fatigue cracking that could compromise the structural integrity of these airplanes.
67-24-01: 67-24-01 BELL: Amdt. No. 39-468, Part 39, Federal Register August 25, 1967. Applies to Model 204B Helicopters, Serial Numbers 2001 through 2064, with Slider, P/N 204-010-720-3, installed and to all Spare Sliders, P/N 204-010-720-3. Compliance required as indicated. To prevent failure of the Slider, accomplish the following one-time inspection for proper hardness: Remove the Slider in accordance with Section VI of the Model 204B Maintenance Manual. Determine the hardness of the Slider using hardness tester. Reading should be taken on the side of the flat plate. Reinstall only Sliders with a tensile hardness reading of 125,000 P.S.I. to 145,000 P.S.I. in accordance with Section VI of the Model 204B Maintenance Manual. For Sliders on tail rotor assemblies with less than 300 hours time in service, conduct the above inspection before further flight unless already accomplished. For sliders on tail rotor assemblies with 300 hours or more time in service, conduct the above inspection within the next 125 hours' time in service unless already accomplished. For spare Sliders, conduct the inspection before installation, unless already accomplished. (Bell Service Bulletin No. 204B-3 dated August 15, 1967, also pertains to this subject.) This amendment effective on August 16, 1967, for all persons except those to whom it was made effective immediately by telegram dated August 16, 1967.
2000-14-18: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 series airplanes. This action requires an inspection of the powered drive unit power wires within three feet of each affected powered drive unit termination for mechanical damage; and repair, if necessary. This action also requires revising the wire harnesses; splicing any additional length wire; routing and installing parts; and replacing the floor panels with new and retained floor panels. This action is necessary to ensure that the powered roller pans are positioned properly. Improperly positioned powered roller pans could pierce a powered roller wire harness and cause sparking that could ignite adjacent insulation material, which could result in smoke and fire in the center cargo compartment of the airplane. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.\n\n\tThe incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the regulations is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of August 11, 2000.Comments for inclusion in the Rules Docket must be received on or before September 25, 2000.
67-22-02: 67-22-02 BELL: Amdt. No. 39-452. Part 39, Federal Register July 29, 1967. Applies to Model 206A Helicopters, Serial Numbers 4 through 20, 22 through 48, 50 through 56, 59, 61, and 63. Compliance required as indicated below after the effective date of this airworthiness directive, unless already accomplished. To assure proper grounding of both fuel boost pumps and prevent a potentially explosive condition in the fuel tank due to improperly wired electric fuel boost pumps, accomplish the following inspection and modification: (a) Before further flight, determine by either of the following methods that the white wire from each fuel boost pump is connected to the aircraft system ground wire: (1) If the wire identification is legible, by reference to the Master Electrical Wiring Diagram in the Model 206A Maintenance and Overhaul Manual, confirm that helicopter system wires numbered Q2A18N (to the Forward Boost Pump), and Q4A18N (to the Aft Boost Pump) are connectedto the white wire from the corresponding boost pump. (2) If the wire identification is not legible, turn all switches off and disconnect each fuel boost pump white wire from the aircraft system wire. Check each aircraft system wire thus exposed for proper grounding using an ohmmeter or continuity checking device. If the grounding is confirmed by either of the above methods, disconnected wires may be reconnected and the helicopter returned to service for not more than 25 hours before the modification required by subparagraph 2 below is accomplished. If grounding is not confirmed by either of the above methods, the fuel pump leads may have been reversed. Use the Master Electrical Diagram in the Maintenance and Overhaul Manual to determine correct connections, and connect the pumps to the aircraft system accordingly. The helicopter may then be returned to service for not more than 25 hours' operation before the modification required by subparagraph 2 below is accomplished. (b) Within the next 25 hours' time in service, modify the fuel boost pump wiring in accordance with Part B, Bell Helicopter Company Service Letter, Model 206A-No. 21, Revision A, dated July 18, 1967, or an equivalent method approved by the Director, Southwest Region, Federal Aviation Administration. This amendment effective on July 29, 1967.
64-20-01: 64-20-01 HARTZELL: Amdt. 803 Part 507 Federal Register August 28, 1964. Applies to Models HC-C2YK-1/7666-2 Serial Numbers AW-1 to AW-603 and HC-E2YL-2B/7663-4 Propellers Serial Numbers BG-1 to BG-777. Compliance required as indicated. There have been incidents of failure of the plastic pitch change blocks in Hartzell HC- E2YL-2B and HC-C2YK-1 propellers which resulted in severe roughness or vibration in flight. To correct this condition, accomplish the following: (a) Inspect propeller blades for pitch change movement and replace plastic pitch change blocks as necessary in accordance with Hartzell Service Bulletin No. 86 revised June 17, 1964, within 10 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD unless already accomplished within the last 10 hours' time in service, and thereafter within every 10 hours' time in service from the last inspection. (b) When the modification specified in Hartzell Service Bulletin No. 86, revised June 17, 1964, has beenaccomplished, the repetitive inspections specified in paragraph (a) may be discontinued. (Hartzell Service Bulletin No. 86, revised June 17, 1964, covers this same subject.) This directive effective August 28, 1964.
2018-20-09: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Airbus Helicopters Deutschland GmbH (Airbus Helicopters) Model MBB-BK 117 C-2 and MBB-BK 117 D-2 helicopters. This AD requires altering and re- identifying the overhead panel shock mount assembly (shock mount). This AD was prompted by the manufacturer's stress recalculations. The actions of this AD are intended to correct an unsafe condition on these products.