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2010-16-01: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an airworthiness authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The earlier MCAI, Brazilian Airworthiness Directive 2007-08-02, effective September 27, 2007, describes the unsafe condition as: Fuel system reassessment, performed according to RBHA-E88/SFAR- 88 (Regulamento Brasileiro de Homologacao Aeronautica 88/Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 88), requires the inclusion of new maintenance tasks in the Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations (CDCCL) and in the Fuel System Limitations (FSL), necessary to preclude ignition sources in the fuel system. * * * The new MCAI, Brazilian Airworthiness Directive 2009-08-03, effective August 20, 2009, describes the unsafe condition as: An airplane fuel tank systems review required bySpecial Federal Aviation Regulation Number 88 (SFAR 88) and "RBHA Especial N[uacute]mero 88'' (RBHA E 88) has shown that additional maintenance and inspection instructions are necessary to maintain the design features required to preclude the existence or development of an ignition source within the fuel tanks of the airplane. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products. DATES: This AD becomes effective September 9, 2010. The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in this AD as of September 9, 2010. On July 30, 2008 (73 FR 35904, June 25, 2008), the Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of a certain publication listed in this AD.
2010-15-06: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: During an annual inspection, a water ballast hose connector was found disconnected from the fuselage wall of an Astir CS. The investigation has shown that the hose-fuselage connection bonding has been degraded over years of service. This condition, if not corrected, could lead to the following consequences: --The water contained in the wing tanks could run down into the fuselage and fuselage tail which could cause a displacement of the sailplane centre of gravity and consequently may lead to the loss of the sailplane controllability, or/and --The loosened hose may jam the flight controls (push rods) and consequently may lead to the loss of thesailplane controllability. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
65-19-04: 65-19-04 LOCKHEED: Amdt. 39-124 Part 39 Federal Register August 26, 1965. Applies to Model 1329 Airplanes, Serial Numbers 5001 through 5050. Compliance required within the next 100 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the last 20 hours' time in service, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 120 hours' time in service from the last inspection. (a) Inspect and repair as necessary the landing gear emergency extension system in accordance with Lockheed Alert Service Bulletin No. 329-176, dated July 9, 1964, or an FAA-approved equivalent. (b) Inspect the main landing gear inboard door latch rollers and actuating mechanisms for improper action or binding. If improper action or binding is found, disassemble the mechanism, clean and inspect all parts, correct the cause of the improper action or binding, and reassemble the latch mechanisms following the lubrication instructions of Lockheed Handbook of Operating and Maintenance Instruction, SMR-151, Section 12-47. (c) The repetitive inspections required by this AD may be discontinued when the modification described in Lockheed Service Bulletin 329-177 or 329-186, or an FAA-approved equivalent is accomplished. (d) Upon request of an operator, an FAA maintenance inspector, subject to prior approval of the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Southern Region, may adjust the repetitive inspection intervals specified in this AD to permit compliance at an established inspection period of the operator if the request contains substantiating data to justify the increase for such operator. This supersedes AD 64-19-05. This directive effective September 25, 1965.
93-24-07: 93-24-07 CORPORATE JETS LIMITED (FORMERLY BRITISH AEROSPACE, HAWKER SIDDELEY AVIATION, AND DE HAVILLAND AIRCRAFT CO., LTD): Amendment 39-8756. Docket 93-NM-185-AD. Applicability: Model BH/HS 125-600A, HS 125-700A, and BAe 125-800A series airplanes equipped with a Sundstrand Turbomach auxiliary power unit (APU) Model T-62T-39 installed in accordance with Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) SA1923SW; certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. To prevent failure of the sealant installed around the over-temperature sensor located in the fuel control enclosure box of the APU, which could allow any fuel leakage from the APU into the fuel control enclosure box to leak into the aft equipment bay, thus creating a fire hazard, accomplish the following: (a) Within 14 days after the effective date of this AD, deactivate the APU by pulling and collaring in the OFF position the circuit breakers for the APU ignition, APUfuel supply, and the electric power supply for the APU starter circuit. (b) Within 14 days after the effective date of this AD, revise the Limitations Section of the FAA-approved Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) to include the following statement. This may be accomplished by inserting a copy of this AD in the AFM. "Operation of the Sundstrand Turbomach auxiliary power unit Model T-62T-39 installed in accordance with Supplemental Type Certificate SA1923SW is prohibited." (c) Replacement of the sealant installed around the over-temperature sensor located in the fuel control enclosure box of the APU with new sealant, in accordance with Arkansas Aerospace, Inc., Service Bulletin S.B. 49-72-02, Revision 1, dated August 13, 1993, constitutes terminating action for the requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this AD. After such replacement, the APU may be reactivated and the AFM revision may be removed. (d) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliancetime that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Special Certification Office, FAA, Rotorcraft Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Special Certification Office. NOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Special Certification Office. (e) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. (f) This amendment becomes effective on December 23, 1993.
79-18-07: 79-18-07 MOONEY: Amendment 39-3547. Applies to Mooney Mite Models M-18L S/N's 2 and up, M- 18C S/N's 201 and up, M-18LA S/N's 100 through 200, M-18C55 S/N's 323 and up, certificated in all categories. Compliance required as indicated: To prevent failure of structural areas due to wood deterioration and to detect other wood and glue joint deterioration in the fuselage and wood wing, accomplish the following within the next 30 days after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the last 35 months, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 36 months from the last inspection. (1) Remove the fabric inboard of station 12 on both wings over the main and auxiliary wing spars. Inspect spars for cracks and delaminations especially at all bolt hole locations and in the area of the landing gear attachments. (2) If not already provided, apply a water resistant cloth or plastic adhesive such as duct tape at the wing to fuselage joint from the wing leading edgeto the wing trailing edge under the metal fairing strip, to prevent entry of water at this point. (3) Inspect all wood and glue joints in the wheel well area for cracks and wood deterioration. (4) Remove fabric between fuselage stations 29 to 35.5. Inspect plywood joints for wood deteriorations. (5) Apply hand pressure on top of plywood turtleback in the area of fuselage station 105. If softness is detected, remove fabric and inspect for wood cracks. (6) Inspect welds for cracks and welds which do not completely fill fillet cross section area at rudder and elevator hinges and control horns with a 10-power glass. (7) Inspect the fuel tank attachment points to the fuselage in the areas of the attachment bolts for deterioration. (8) Inspect glue joints in the area of the battery for separation and deterioration. (9) Clear all drain holes in fuselage. (10) If any defects noted in paragraphs (1) through (8) above are detected, repair in accordance with FAA AdvisoryCircular AC 43.13-1A or approved equivalent, or replace with an identical new part or equivalent, prior to further flight. Equivalent repairs or parts must be approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Eastern Region. (11) Upon submission of substantiating data by an owner or operator through an FAA Maintenance Inspector, the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Eastern Region, may adjust the inspection time in this airworthiness directive. This amendment is effective September 3, 1979.
73-19-03: 73-19-03 MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES, LTD: Amdt. 39-1716. Applies to Mitsubishi Model MU-2B airplanes (S/N 004, and 006 through 038); MU-2B-10, and -15 airplanes (S/N 101, and 103 through 120); MU-2B-20, and -25 airplanes (S/N 005, 102, and 121 through 271). Compliance is required as indicated. To prevent the failure of the nose gear actuating system, accomplish the following: Within the next 100 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, modify the nose gear actuating assembly and its supporting structure in accordance with Mitsubishi MU-2 Service Bulletin No. 155, dated June 26, 1972, or an equivalent method approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Pacific- Asia Region. This amendment becomes effective October 8, 1973.
69-11-04: 69-11-04 BELL: Amdt. 39-778. Applies to Model 206A helicopters. Compliance required as indicated. To balance directional control pedal forces at cruise flight, to prevent pedal creep and to eliminate a possible interference between the pilots' feet and protruding head screws in the instrument console, accomplish the following: a. Install and adjust the spring, P/N 206-001-721, and friction clamp, P/N 206-001- 710, within 50 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, in accordance with the instructions in Bell Helicopter Company Service Bulletin No. 206A-5, Reissue dated May 23, 1969, or later FAA-approved revision or in accordance with instructions approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Flight Standards Division, Southwest Region, FAA. b. Inspect and adjust, if necessary, the spring, P/N 206-001-721, and friction clamp, P/N 206-001-710, within 50 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless accomplished within the last 50 hours' time in service, in accordance with Item 4 on Page 2 of Bell Helicopter Company Service Bulletin No. 206A-5, Reissue dated May 23, 1969, or later FAA-approved revision, or in accordance with instructions approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Flight Standards Division, Southwest Region, FAA. c. Replace the three protruding head screws on the right and left side of the instrument panel console that are adjacent to the pilots' pedals and install equivalent flat head screws within 50 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, in accordance with the instructions in Bell Helicopter Company Service Letter No. 206A-120, dated May 16, 1969, or later FAA-approved revision or in accordance with an equivalent method approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Flight Standards Division, Southwest Region, FAA. (Bell Helicopter Company Model 206A Maintenance and Overhaul Instructions Interim Revisions No. 206A-69-20 and No. 206A-69-21 dated May 15, 1969, and No. 206A-69-22 dated May 23, 1969, pertain to this subject.) This amendment becomes effective May 28, 1969. Revised June 14, 1969.
93-17-11: 93-17-11 DE HAVILLAND, INC.: Amendment 39-8682. Docket 93-NM-41-AD. Applicability: Model DHC-8-100 series airplanes, serial numbers 003 through 315 inclusive, 317 through 344, inclusive, and 346 through 349 inclusive; and Model DHC-8-300 series airplanes, serial numbers 100 through 319 inclusive, 321 through 337 inclusive, 339, 341, and 342; certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. To prevent reduced strength and fail-safe capability of the structural attachment of the horizontal stabilizer to the airplane, accomplish the following: (a) Within 250 landings after the effective date of this AD, perform a one-time magnetic particle inspection of the horizontal stabilizer midspar attachment bolts to detect cracks at the radius transition between the bolt head and shank in accordance with de Havilland Alert Service Bulletin S.B. A8-55-18, dated February 5, 1993. (b) If any crack is found in a bolt, priorto further flight, replace both midspar attachment bolts with serviceable bolts in accordance with de Havilland Alert Service Bulletin S.B. A8-55-18, dated February 5, 1993. (c) As of the effective date of this AD, no person shall install a midspar attachment bolt, part number MS21250-10070, on any airplane unless, prior to installation, the bolt has been inspected using magnetic particle techniques to detect cracks in accordance with de Havilland Alert Service Bulletin S.B. A8-55-18, dated February 5, 1993. (d) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Engine and Propeller Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, New York ACO. NOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the New York ACO. (e) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. (f) The inspection and replacement shall be done in accordance with de Havilland Alert Service Bulletin S.B. A8-55-18, dated February 5, 1993. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from de Havilland, Inc., Garratt Boulevard, Downsview, Ontario M3K 1Y5, Canada. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC. (g) This amendment becomes effective on October 8, 1993.
57-24-01: 57-24-01 WRIGHT: Applies to All TC18DA and TC18EA Series Engines. Compliance required at next overhaul but not later than July 31, 1958. To improve the durability of the impeller drive gear assemblies of the subject engines, intermediate impeller drive gear P/N 145316 must be replaced with P/N 138464 gear, or any gear approved after December 1, 1957.
99-10-07: This document publishes in the Federal Register an amendment adopting Airworthiness Directive (AD) 99-10-07, which was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of Raytheon Aircraft Corporation (Raytheon) Beech Models 65-90, 65-A90, 65-A90-1, 65-A90-2, 65-A90-3, 65-A90-4, B90, C90, C90A, E90, H90, and F90 airplanes. This AD requires inspecting for interference or damage between the elevator control cable and equipment under the cockpit floor panels (wire harnesses, stainless steel clamps, etc.) and running a cloth wrap around the control cable to detect broken strands of the control cable. This AD also requires replacing or repairing any damaged items, securing any component that is interfering with the elevator control cable, and installing additional supports and clamps as necessary to prevent sagging or further interference. This AD resulted from reports of reduced or loss of elevator control on five of the affected airplanes. The actions specified by thisAD are intended to detect and correct interference between the elevator control cable and equipment under the cockpit floor panels before the elevator control cable breaks, which could result in loss of elevator control with potential loss of control of the airplane. Comments for inclusion in the Rules Docket must be received on or before July 6, 1999.