Results
2011-15-08: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: A specific failure case of the THSA [trimmable horizontal stabilizer actuator] upper primary attachment, which may result in a loading of the upper secondary attachment, has been identified by analysis. Primary load path failure can be caused by bearing migration from the upper attachment gimbal by failure or loss of a retention bolt. In case of failure of the THSA upper primary attachment, the THSA upper secondary attachment would engage. Because the upper attachment secondary load path can only withstand the loads for a limited period of time, the condition where it would be engaged could lead, if not detected, to the failure of the secondary load path, which would likely result in loss of control of the aeroplane. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2011-09-09: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: During flight-testing of a wing anti-ice piccolo tube containing a deliberate small breach, it was determined that the wing leading edge thermal switches were not detecting the consequent bleed leak at the design threshold. As a result, new [[Page 41654]] Airworthiness Limitation tasks, consisting of a functional test of the wing leading edge thermal switches and an inspection of the wing anti-ice duct piccolo tubes, have been introduced in order to limit exposure to dormant failure of the switches in the event of piccolo tube failure, which could potentially compromise the structural integrity of the wing leading edge and the effectiveness ofthe wing anti-ice system. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
92-06-01: 92-06-01 BOEING: Amendment 39-8181. Docket No. 91-NM-169-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model 747-200, 747-300, and 747-400 series airplanes, equipped with General Electric CF6-80C2 engines; as listed in Boeing Service Bulletin 747-28-2153, dated July 18, 1991, and Boeing Service Bulletin 747-28-2154, dated June 27, 1991; certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required within 6 months after the effective date of this AD, unless accomplished previously. \n\n\tTo prevent the possibility of a fire as a result of fuel leaks, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tFor airplanes listed in Boeing Service Bulletin 747-28-2153, dated July 18, 1991: Replace one fuel tube in the number one engine strut and two fuel tubes in the number four engine strut in accordance with the procedures described in that service bulletin. \n\n\t(b)\tFor airplanes listed in Boeing Service Bulletin 747-28-2154, dated June 27, 1991: Replace two fuel tubes in the number three strut in accordance with the proceduresdescribed in that service bulletin. \n\n\t(c)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. The request shall be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Seattle ACO. \n\n\t(d)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. \n\n\t(e)\tThe replacement shall be done in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747- 28-2153, dated July 18, 1991, or Boeing Service Bulletin 747-28-2154, dated June 27, 1991. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from Boeing Commercial Airplane Group,P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L Street NW., Room 8401, Washington, DC. \n\n\t(f)\tThis amendment becomes effective on April 13, 1992.
2011-15-02: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for all Model 382, 382B, 382E, 382F, and 382G airplanes. That AD currently requires revising the FAA-approved maintenance program by incorporating new airworthiness limitations for fuel tank systems to satisfy Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 88 requirements. That AD also requires the accomplishment of certain fuel system modifications, the initial inspections of certain repetitive fuel system limitations to phase in those inspections, and repair if necessary. This new AD corrects certain part number references, adds an additional inspection area, and for certain airplanes, requires certain actions to be re-accomplished according to revised service information. This AD was prompted by a report of incorrect accomplishment information in the service information cited by the existing AD. We are issuing this AD to prevent the potential for ignition sources inside fuel tanks caused by latent failures, alterations, repairs, or maintenance actions, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.
2011-15-03: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to the products listed above. That AD currently requires repetitive inspections to detect damage of the sleeving and wire bundles of the boost pumps of the numbers 1 and 4 main fuel tanks, and of the auxiliary tank jettison pumps (if installed); replacement of any damaged sleeving with new sleeving; and repair or replacement of any damaged wires with new wires. For airplanes on which any burned wires are found, that AD also requires an inspection to detect damage of the conduit, and replacement of any damaged conduit with a serviceable conduit. This new AD reduces the initial compliance time and repetitive inspection interval in the existing AD. This AD was prompted by fleet information indicating that the repetitive inspection interval in the existing AD is too long because excessive chafing of the sleeving continues to occur much earlier than expected between scheduled inspections. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct abrasion of the Teflon sleeving and wires in the bundles of the fuel boost pumps for the numbers 1 and 4 main fuel tanks and of the auxiliary tank jettison pumps (if installed), which could result in electrical arcing between the wires and aluminum conduit and consequent fire or explosion of the fuel tank.
65-05-03: 65-05-03 FAIRCHILD CAMERA AND INSTRUMENT CORPORATION: Amdt. 39-38 Part 39 Federal Register February 19, 1965. Applies to Fairchild Camera and Instrument Corporation Model 5424 ( ) Series Flight Data Recorders Installed in Aircraft as Required by Applicable Operating Rules. Compliance required within eight months after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To improve the crash survivability of the flight record, modify the Fairchild Camera and Instrument Corporation Model 5424 ( ) Series flight data recorder as follows: Replace the front panel assembly with a reinforced front panel assembly and install two stainless steel sideplates in accordance with Fairchild Field Service Bulletin No. 159 dated September 1, 1964, or No. FDR-159 (revised), dated November 24, 1964, or later FAA-approved revision. This directive effective March 21, 1965. Revised June 25, 1965. Revised July 30, 1965.
97-07-10 R1: This document clarifies information in an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to de Havilland DHC-6 series airplanes that do not have a certain wing strut modification (Modification 6/1581) incorporated. That AD currently requires inspecting the wing struts for cracks or damage (chafing, etc.), replacing wing struts that are found damaged beyond certain limits or are found cracked, and incorporating Modification No. 6/1581 to prevent future chafing damage. The actions specified in that AD are intended to prevent failure of the wing struts, which could result in loss of control of the airplane. This document clarifies the requirements of the current AD by eliminating all reference to repetitive inspections. The AD results from several reports of wing strut damage caused by the upper fairing rubbing against the wing strut. The incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the regulations was approved previously by the Director of the Federal Register as of April 1, 1997 (62 FR 15373).
97-09-11: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Aerospatiale Model ATR42 and ATR72 series airplanes, that requires modification of the handle of the passenger/crew door to change the "down-to-open" configuration of the handle to an "up-to-open" configuration. This amendment is prompted by a report indicating that, immediately after takeoff, the passenger/crew door opened and separated from the airplane, due to the inadvertent operation of the door handle. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent inadvertent opening of the passenger/crew door during unpressurized flight, or delays in opening the door during an emergency evacuation.
2011-15-01: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD requires a detailed inspection to detect distress and existing repairs to the leading edge structure of the vertical stabilizer at the splice at Station Zfs = 52.267; repetitive inspections for cracking in the front spar cap forward flanges of the vertical stabilizer, and either the aft flanges or side skins; repetitive inspections for loose and missing fasteners; and related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. This AD was prompted by reports of cracked vertical stabilizer skin, a severed front spar cap, elongated fastener holes at the leading edge of the vertical stabilizer, and a cracked front spar web and front spar cap bolt holes in the vertical stabilizer. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct such cracking damage, which could result in the structure being unable to support limit load, and could lead to the loss of the vertical stabilizer.
97-10-06: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain IAI Model 1125 Westwind Astra series airplanes, that requires repetitive inspections to detect loose or damaged rivets that fasten a certain support beam to the frame of the fuselage; and modification of the attachment between the support beam and fuselage by installation of additional fasteners, if necessary. This amendment also will require the eventual accomplishment of this modification on all airplanes, which will terminate the repetitive inspections. This amendment is prompted by reports indicating that the attachment between this beam and the fuselage has become loose on several airplanes. Movement of this beam could restrict the movement of the elevator and rudder controls that run through the bellcranks attached to it. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent movement of this beam, which could restrict movement of the elevator and rudder controls, and consequently leadto reduced controllability of the airplane.