Results
2010-20-23: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for certain serial numbers (S/Ns) of Bombardier-Rotax GmbH type 912 F and 914 F series reciprocating engines. That AD currently requires initial and repetitive visual inspections of the engine crankcase for cracks. This AD requires those same inspections, adds the 912 S series to the affected population, adds a test procedure to determine the engine suitability for a special flight permit, and changes applicability from engine S/N to crankcase S/N. This AD results from an increase in the affected crankcase population. We are issuing this AD to prevent oil loss caused by cracks in the engine crankcase, which could lead to in-flight failure of the engine and forced landing.
2010-22-06: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: An A330 experienced an uncommanded engine 1 in flight spool down, which occurred while applying fuel gravity feed procedure, in response to low pressure indications from all fuel boost pumps, in both left and right wings. The investigations revealed that the wing tank pressure switches P/N (part number) HTE69000-1 had frozen due to water accumulated in their external part, causing spurious low pressure indications. As per procedure, the main pumps are then switched off, increasing the level of unavailable fuel. This, in combination with very low fuel quantities or another independent trapped fuel failure scenarios, can lead to fuel starvation on the affected engine(s). * * * * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
89-10-01: 89-10-01 BOEING: Amendment 39-6200. \n\n\tApplicability: Model 737-300 series airplanes, listed in Being Alert Service Bulletin 737-28A1077, dated October 6, 1988, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required within three months after the effective date of this AD, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent a fire hazard associated with a fuel leak, due to the fuel feed tube assembly chafing against the thermal anti-ice duct, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tInspect and, if necessary, adjust fuel feed tube assembly clearance, in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-28A1077, dated October 6, 1988. Replace chafed tubes, before further flight, with a serviceable tube. \n\n\tB.\tAccomplishment of the procedures specified in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-28A1062 Revision 2, dated September 29, 1988, or Boeing Service Bulletin 737-28-1055 Revision 1, dated October 27, 1988, is an approved alternate means of compliance for the requirements of paragraph A., above. \n\n\tC.\tAn alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which proves an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tNote: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), who may add any comments and then send it to the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office. \n\n\tD.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6200, AD 89-10-01) becomes effective on May 30, 1989.
2010-22-05: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: When preparing for landing, the flight crew of a F28 Mark 0100 (Fokker 100) aeroplane observed a main landing gear (MLG) unsafe indication after landing gear down selection. * * * [T]he right (RH) MLG was partly extended and the left (LH) MLG door was open but without the MLG being extended. * * * Subsequent investigation revealed that the cause of the MLG extension problem was the (partially) blocked hydraulic return line from the MLG selector valve by pieces of hard plastic. These were identified as parts of the poppet seat of PBSOV [parking brake shut- off valve] Part Number (P/N) 70379. * * * This condition, if not detected and corrected, could lead to further events where the MLG fails to extend, possibly resulting in loss of control of the aeroplane during landing. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2008-23-17: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: [E]scape slide system installation [was found with] * * * tie- down straps which are used for escape slide packing [having not been removed]. The non-removal of the tie-down straps does not allow the aircraft door to reach the fully open position and the consequent deployment of the escape slide system in a * * * emergency evacuation, affecting the occupying safety. The unsafe condition is failure of an evacuation system, which could impede an emergency evacuation and increase the chance of injury to passengers and flightcrew during the evacuation. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
86-09-09: 86-09-09 BOEING: Amendment 39-5304. Applies to Boeing Model 757-200 airplanes, listed in Boeing Service Bulletin 757-25A0058, dated April 18, 1986, certificated in any category. Compliance required within 45 days after the effective date of this amendment, unless already accomplished. \n\n\tTo ensure proper door opening and escape slide deployment accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tModify slide pack release cable assemblies on Doors No. 1 and No. 2, left and right, in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 757-25A0058, dated April 18, 1986, or later FAA-approved revisions. \n\n\tB.\tAn alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tC.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of inspections and/or modifications required by this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this AD who have not already received copies of the service bulletin cited herein may obtain copies upon request from the Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. This document may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective May 30, 1986.
2010-21-01: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the specified Eurocopter model helicopters. This AD results from a mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) AD issued by the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Community. The MCAI AD states that the AD is issued following a report of a crack discovered in the area of the center cross-member at station X 2325, at the attachment point of the yaw channel ball-type control sheath stop, of a Model AS355N helicopter fitted with the collective-to-yaw control coupling. Investigations revealed that the helicopter did not have the structural doublers, which are combined with the collective-to-yaw control coupling installation. Repetitive loads on the non-modified cross- member may cause it to crack. A crack can reduce the yaw control travel. This AD requires actions that are intended to prevent reduced yaw control and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
2010-21-07: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the Eurocopter France Model AS350B3 and EC130 B4 helicopters. This amendment is prompted by a mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) AD issued by the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Community. The MCAI AD states that a dormant failure of one of the two contactors 53Ka or 53Kb can occur following certain modifications. Failure of a contactor can prevent switching from "IDLE'' mode to "FLIGHT'' mode during autorotation training making it impossible to execute a power recovery and compelling the pilot to continue the autorotation to the ground. This condition, if not corrected, can lead to an unintended touchdown to the ground during a practice autorotation at a flight-idle power setting, damage to the helicopter, and injury to the occupants.
84-15-05: 84-15-05 BELL HELICOPTER TEXTRON, INC.: Amendment 39-4891. Applies to all Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., Model 214ST helicopters certified in all categories equipped with main rotor collective lever assembly P/N 214-010-474-109 or -113. Compliance is required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent failure of the collective lever assembly, remove and replace the lever assembly prior to accumulating 1,250 hours time in service. For helicopters that have accumulated more than 1,250 hours time in service on the lever assembly, remove and replace the lever assembly within the next 50 hours time in service or by September 1, 1984, whichever comes first. This amendment becomes effective August 3, 1984.
2010-21-16: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. That AD currently requires modifying the auxiliary hydraulic power system (including doing all applicable related investigative and corrective actions). This new AD requires these same actions, using corrected service information. This AD was prompted by fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer, as well as reports of electrically shorted wires in the right wheel well and evidence of arcing on the auxiliary hydraulic pump power cables, which are routed within the tire burst area. We are issuing this AD to prevent electrically shorted wires or arcing at the auxiliary hydraulic pump power cables, which could result in a fire in the wheel well. We are also issuing this AD to reduce the potential of an ignition source adjacent to the fuel tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.