Results
2000-20-03: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain Bombardier Model CL-600-2B19 series airplanes. This action requires installation of shields for the aileron quadrants in the wheel bay of the main landing gear (MLG). This action is necessary to prevent the accumulation of water, ice, or slush on the aileron quadrants and control cable pulleys in the wheel bay of the MLG, which could freeze and result in reduced controllability of the airplane. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2015-25-04: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Agusta S.p.A. (Agusta) Model A109A and A109A II helicopters. This AD requires inspecting the slider assembly pitch control (slider) for play and replacing the slider if the play exceeds certain limits. This AD is prompted by a report of excessive slider play and wear that was detected during a scheduled inspection of a Model A109A II helicopter. These actions are intended to detect and prevent excessive wear and play on a slider, which could lead to loss of tail rotor pitch control and consequently loss of helicopter control.
2009-19-06: This document publishes in the Federal Register an amendment adopting airworthiness directive (AD) 2009-19-06 that was sent previously by individual notices to the known U.S. owners and operators of affected airplanes identified above. This AD requires installing certain equipment on the flight deck door. This AD was prompted by reports that the current design of the flight deck door is defective. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of this equipment, which could jeopardize flight safety.
2000-19-07: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain EMBRAER Model EMB-120, EMB-120ER, and EMB-120RT series airplanes, that requires removal of a certain fastener, if applicable, and sealing of the corresponding fastener hole. This action is necessary to prevent contact between one of the bolts that attaches the direct current (DC) relay box on the left-hand side of the airplane and one of the power terminals of electrical emergency contactor 2, which could result in a short circuit in the DC relay box, and consequent partial loss of the electrical system, and degraded operation of airplane systems. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
70-08-01: 70-08-01 HUGHES: Amdt. 39-971. Applies to Model 269A, 269A-1, 269A-2, and 269B Series helicopters, certificated in all categories, which incorporate lead-lag and flapping hinge bolts, P/N HS 1446-10-68, with vendor identification AC impression-stamped on top of the bolt heads (hereafter referred to as AC bolts). If bolts do not have the vendor identification AC on the bolt head they are acceptable for continued service and no further action is required by this airworthiness directive. Compliance required as indicated. To detect cracks and failures in the AC bolts, P/N HS 1446-10-68, accomplish the following: (a) Within 25 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, remove all AC bolts in accordance with Hughes Handbook of Maintenance Instruction (HMI). Perform a dye penetrant or magnaflux inspection of the AC bolts for evidence of cracking. NOTE: During this inspection particular attention should be directed to the area of the bolt shank at the radius of the bolt head. (b) Any AC bolt which shows evidence of cracking must be conspicuously and permanently marked to prevent its inadvertent return to service. Any AC bolt inspected per (a), above, which exhibits no evidence of cracking may be identified with a green dot painted in the recessed head of the bolt. (c) Prior to further operation following the accomplishment of (a), above, install bolts P/N HS 1446-10-68 without vendor identification AC on the bolt heads or AC bolts which have a green dot painted on the head as authorized by (b), above. (d) Prior to each flight following reinstallation of bolts per (c), above, visually check each AC bolt, using the green dot in the head for ease of identification, to ascertain if there is any evidence of head separation from the body of the bolt. Any bolt showing evidence of head separation must be replaced with a serviceable bolt prior to further flight. NOTE: The rotorcraft pilot may perform this visual check and determination regarding evidence of bolt head separation. For the requirements regarding this listing in the rotorcraft's permanent maintenance record of compliance and method of compliance with this provision of this AD, see FAR 91.173. (e) Within 225 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD but not prior to 175 hours time in service from such date, reinspect all AC bolts in service in accordance with (a), above. Permanently and conspicuously mark any AC bolts showing evidence of cracks as prescribed by (b), above, and replace such bolts with serviceable bolts prior to further operation. This one-time reinspection does not cancel the preflight check required by (d), above. (f) Prior to 400 hours' time in service or within six months, whichever occurs first, after the effective date of this AD, replace all AC bolts with bolts, P/N HS 1446-10-68, without vendor identification AC impression-stamped on top of the bolt heads. The special inspections required by this AD may be discontinued when this AC bolt replacement program is accomplished. (g) AC bolts removed from service prior to six months from the effective date of this AD for the purpose of compliance with (f), above, must be marked permanently and conspicuously to prevent their inadvertent return to service. (Hughes Service Information Notice No. N-75.1 covers this same subject.) This amendment becomes effective April 14, 1970.
92-17-14: 92-17-14 PRATT & WHITNEY CANADA: Amendment 39-8343. Docket No. 91-ANE-24. Applicability: Pratt & Whitney Canada (PWC) PW123, PW124B, PW125B, and PW126A turboprop engines installed on, but not limited to, DeHavilland of Canada DHC-8 Series 300, Canadair CL-215T, Aerospatiale ATR-42 and ATR-72, Fokker 50, and British Aerospace ATP aircraft. Compliance: Required at the next shop visit, or within 12 months from the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs first, unless accomplished previously. To prevent large engine torque variations and a subsequent aircraft asymmetric thrust condition, accomplish the following: (a) Install a new or reworked fuel pump in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of PWC Service Bulletin 20946R2, Revision 2, dated May 13, 1991, on those engines identified by serial number in the Effectivity paragraph of the incorporated service bulletin. (b) For the purpose of this AD, a shop visit is defined as the induction of an engine intoa maintenance facility for the conduct of maintenance. (c) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Engine Certification Office, FAA, Engine and Propeller Directorate. The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Engine Certification Office. NOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this airworthiness directive, if any, may be obtained from the Engine Certification Office. (d) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. (e) The installation procedure shall be done in accordance with the following Pratt & Whitney Canada manufacturer's service bulletin: DOCUMENT NO. PAGES ISSUE/REVISION DATE PWC SB20946R2 1-11 Revision 2 May 13, 1991 Total Pages: 11 This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from Pratt & Whitney Canada, Technical Publications Department, 1000 Marie Victorin, Longueuil, Quebec J4G 1A1. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, New England Region, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts, or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., Suite 700, Washington, DC 20001. (f) This amendment becomes effective on November 18, 1992.
88-17-04: 88-17-04 SCHWEIZER AIRCRAFT CORPORATION (MCDONNELL DOUGLAS HELICOPTER COMPANY, HUGHES HELICOPTERS, INC).: Amendment 39-5975. Applies to helicopter Models 269A, TH-55A (all S/N's operated in civil use), 269A-1, 269B, and 269C, certificated in any category. (Docket No. 88-ASW-26) Compliance is required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent possible loss of the tail boom support strut and tail boom which could result in loss of the helicopter, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 25 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, on Model 269C helicopters with S/N's 1166 through 1289, inspect aft cluster fittings (P/N's 269A2234-3 and 269A2235-3) for cracks and surface defects in accordance with the procedures section of Schweizer Service Information Notice (SIN) No. N-220, dated January 29, 1988. Note: SIN No. 220 provides repair procedures and limits for surface defects. (b) Within the next 25 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD conduct the following inspections: (1) On Models 269A, A-1, B, and TH-55A (all serial numbers) and Model 269C (for all S/N's prior to 1262) conduct a dimensional inspection of the aft cluster fittings (P/N's 269A2234, 269A2235, 269A2234-3, and 269A2235-3) in accordance with Part 1 of Schweizer SIN No. N-217, dated January 29, 1988. (2) On Model 269C helicopters (S/N's 1262 through 1289) and all other helicopters identified in paragraph (b)(1) as having aft cluster fittings, P/N's 269A2234-3 and 269A2235-3, with fittings purchased from Schweizer Aircraft Corporation between May 1, 1986 and October 22, 1987-- (i) Inspect the fittings for cracks using visual and dye penetrant methods in accordance with Parts II and IV of Schweizer SIN No. N-221, dated January 29, 1988; and (ii) Remove a sample piece from uncracked fittings and return to Schweizer Aircraft Corporation for laboratory analysis in accordance with Part III of Schweizer SIN No. 221, dated January 29, 1988. (c) Repeat the inspections of paragraph (b)(2)(i) at the following intervals until the P/N 269A2234-3 and P/N 269A2235-3 fittings are determined to meet the Schweizer process specification or until the aft cluster fittings are replaced with parts which do meet the specifications: (1) Conduct visual inspections in accordance with Part IV of Schweizer SIN No. N-221, dated January 29, 1988, prior to the first flight of each day. (2) Conduct dye penetrant inspections in accordance with Part II of Schweizer SIN No. N-221 dated January 29, 1988, at intervals not to exceed 100 hours' time in service from the previous inspections. (d) Replace fittings found to be cracked or to have surface defects with serviceable fittings before further flight. (e) No later than December 31, 1988, replace P/N 269A2234-3 and 269A2235-3 fittings not found to meet the Schweizer process specification. (f) Within the next 25 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, on all Model 269A, TH-55A (all S/N's operated in civil use), 269A-1 and 269B (all S/N's) and Model 269C (S/N's 0004 through 1289) install a "NO STEP" placard in accordance with Part II of Schweizer SIN No. N-217 dated January 29, 1988. (g) Alternative means of compliance which provide an equivalent level of safety with the requirements of this AD may be used when approved by the Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, New England Region. (h) Aircraft may be ferried in accordance with the provisions of sections 21.197 and 21.199 to a base where the AD can be accomplished. The procedure shall be done in accordance with Schweizer SIN Nos. N-217, N-220, N- 221, dated January 29, 1988. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from Schweizer Aircraft Corporation, P.O. Box 147, Elmira-Corning Regional Airport, Elmira, New York 14902. These documents also may be examined at the Office of the Regional Counsel, Federal Aviation Administration, Southwest Region, 4400 Blue Mound Road, Fort Worth, Texas, or at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L. Street NW, Room 8401, Washington, D.C. This amendment, 39-5975, becomes effective on August 19, 1988.
2015-24-06: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation Model GVI airplanes. This AD requires repetitive breakaway torque checks and torqueing of the brake inlet self-sealing couplings. This AD also requires revising the airplane flight manual to include procedures to follow in the event of certain display indications. This AD was prompted by reports of the self- sealing couplings on the brake inlet fitting that have been found backed out of the fully seated position. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct inadequate torque on the self-sealing coupling. This condition could result in an unannounced total loss of braking capability on one or multiple brakes, which could result in a runway overrun or asymmetrical braking that can lead to a lateral runway excursion.
2010-21-02: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: The landing gear alternate extension system in the cockpit is accessible through an access panel located on the cockpit floor. There have been reports of failure of the access panel latch assembly as a consequence of repeated closure of the access panel involving the use of excessive force. Failure of the latch assembly can result in the access panel being jammed in the closed position, and require mechanical prying to open. An undetected or uncorrected latch failure condition in the access panel can prevent immediate access to the landing gear alternate extension system by the flight crew during an emergency. * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2000-19-08: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all Boeing Model 777 series airplanes. The existing AD requires repetitive detailed visual inspections to detect cracking of the coveskin on the outboard leading edge slats; a slat adjustment check; and corrective actions, if necessary. This amendment reduces the repetitive inspection interval, but also provides for an optional modification that would significantly increase the repetitive inspection interval. This amendment also revises the applicability of the existing AD to remove certain airplanes. This amendment is prompted by findings of increased vibration of the coveskins due to air leaking and resonating within the cavity between the fixed leading edge and the coveskin; the vibration can result in fatigue cracking and high fatigue loads. The actions specified in this AD are intended to detect and correct cracking and/or missing pieces of the coveskin on the outboard leading edge slats on the wings, which could result in skin separation or structural damage to the leading edge slats and consequent reduced controllability of the airplane.