Results
97-10-16: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to Hiller Aircraft Corporation Model UH-12, UH-12A, UH-12B, UH-12C, UH-12D, UH-12E, CH-112, H-23A, H-23B, H-23C, H-23D, H-23F, HTE-1, HTE-2, and OH-23G helicopters, and UH-12D and UH-12E helicopters converted to turbine engine power in accordance with Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) No.'s SH177WE and SH178WE, having a certain control rotor blade spar tube (blade spar tube) or cuff installed, that currently requires inspections of the blade spar tube and cuff for cracks, and repair or replacement as necessary. This amendment requires inspections of the blade spar tube and cuff for corrosion or cracks, or elongation, corrosion, burrs, pitting or fretting of the bolt holes, and repair as necessary, and defines specific intervals in which the inspections must be performed. This amendment is prompted by analyses that show that the amount of calendar time that elapses between the current repetitiveinspections may allow corrosion to develop. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent separation of the control rotor blade assembly and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
81-03-51: 81-03-51 DEHAVILLAND: Amendment 39-4513. Applies to model DHC-7 airplanes serial numbers 3 through 36 certificated in all categories that have flap screw jacks 2 and 3, left and right hand, part numbers 24020-11, -111, -or -115; or 24040-11, -111, or -115 and are fitted with lock nuts, part number MS9952-08. To prevent possible damage to the flap system due to the disengagement of the lock nut, accomplish the following within the next 25 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. 1. Inspect the flap screw jack tracks 2 and 3, Menasco part numbers 24020-11, -111 or -115 and 24040-11, -111 or -115 for correct locking feature of lock washer against the dome nut. To ensure the nuts are correctly installed, ensure that the cup lock washer P/N MS9952-08 has been tapped into groove of the lock nut P/N 24156-1 (Typical 6 places). 2. Lubricate the aft end bearing (P/N AD50991) lightly with grease P/N MIL-G- 23877 or equivalent. 3.Alternate means of compliance which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA Northwest Mountain Region. 4. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of inspections and/or modifications required by this AD. The manufacturer's specifications and procedures identified and described in this directive are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). This amendment becomes effective December 21, 1982, and was effective earlier to those recipients of telegraphic AD T81-03-51, dated January 23, 1981.
88-25-04: 88-25-04 CESSNA: Amendment 39-6081. Applies to Models T210L, T210M, T210N, P210N, and T303 (all serial numbers) airplanes certificated in any category, that are equipped with Slick Aircraft Products Division, Unison Industries, Inc., Model 6220 or 6224 pressurized magnetos. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To preclude magneto moisture contamination, which could result in dual magneto failure, engine stoppage, and forced landing, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 50 hours time-in-service (TIS) after the effective date of this AD, accomplish the following: (1) Revise the "NORMAL PROCEDURES" section of the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) or the airplane Pilot's Operating Handbook (POH), by inserting the AFM/POH Supplement, dated April 1, 1988, provided in Appendix 1 of this AD. (2) Fabricate and install on the instrument panel in clear view of the pilot a placard with letters not less than 1/10 inches in heightwith the following wording: "PRIOR TO EACH FLIGHT, CONDUCT MAGNETO CHECKS IN ACCORDANCE WITH AFM/POH SUPPLEMENT DATED APRIL 1, 1988." and operate the airplane accordingly. (3) The requirements of paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) of this AD may be accomplished by the owner/operator of any airplane owned or operated by him. The person accomplishing these actions must make the appropriate airplane maintenance record entry per FAR 43.9 and 91.173. (b) Within the next 50 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, inspect the airplanes in accordance with Paragraph III of Slick Aircraft Products Division Service Bulletin SB 1-88, dated April 10, 1988, and: (1) For airplanes operating for compensation or hire, at intervals not to exceed 100 hours TIS after the initial inspection, inspect the Model 6220 or 6224, as applicable, pressurized magnetos in accordance with paragraph III of Slick Aircraft Products Division Service Bulletin SB 1-88, dated April 10,1988. Prior to further flight repair any defects found in accordance with the instructions contained in the above referenced service bulletin. (2) For airplanes operating under FAR 91, after the initial inspection, at each annual inspection, inspect the Model 6220 or 6224, as applicable, pressurized magnetos in accordance with paragraph III of Slick Aircraft Products Division Service Bulletin SB 1-88, dated April 10, 1988. Prior to further flight repair any defects found in accordance with the instructions contained in the above referenced service bulletin. (c) Airplanes may be flown in accordance with provisions of FAR 21.197 to a base where the requirements of this AD may be accomplished. (d) The 100 hour TIS repetitive inspection interval specified in paragraph (b) of this AD may be extended up to an additional 10 hours TIS to allow compliance with previously scheduled maintenance. (e) An equivalent means of compliance with the requirements of this AD maybe used, if approved by the Manager, Chicago Aircraft Certification Office, ACE-115C, Federal Aviation Administration, 2300 East Devon Avenue, Des Plaines, Illinois 60018. All persons affected by this directive may obtain copies of the document(s) referred to herein upon request to Slick Aircraft Products Division, Unison Industries, Inc., 530 Blackhawk Park Avenue, Rockford, Illinois 61108 or may examine these documents at the FAA, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, Room 1558, 601 East 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri 64106. This amendment, 39-6081, becomes effective on December 26, 1988. APPENDIX 1 FAA APPROVED SUPPLEMENT TO THE PILOT'S OPERATING HANDBOOK AND FAA APPROVED AIRPLANE FLIGHT MANUAL FOR CESSNA MODELS T210L, T210M, T210N, P210N, AND T303 SERIES AIRCRAFT REG. NO. SER. NO. This supplement must be attached to the FAA Approved Airplane Flight Manual on which Slick Aircraft Products Division, Unison Industries, Inc., Models 6220 or 6224 pressurized magnetos are installed. The information contained herein supplements or supersedes the basic manual only in those areas listed. For limitations, procedures, and performance information not contained in this supplement, consult the basic Airplane Flight Manual. FAA APPROVED: Original signed by W. F. Horn, Manager Chicago Aircraft Certification Office, FAA Central Region DATE: April 1, 1988 AFMS for Cessna T210L, T210M, T210N, P210N, and T303 Series Aircraft SECTION II. Limitations No change. SECTION III. Emergency Procedures. No change. SECTION IV. Normal Operating Procedures. BEFORE TAKEOFF Perform a magneto check of each engine at 1,700 RPM as follows: move ignition switch first to R position and note RPM. Next, move switch back to BOTH, to clear the other set of plugs. Then, move switch to the L position, note RPM and return the switch to the BOTH position. RPM drop should not exceed 150 RPM on either magneto or show greater than 50 RPM differential between magnetos. If there is doubt concerning operation of the ignition system, RPM checks at higher engine speed will usually confirm whether a deficiency exists. CAUTION Many non-ignition system factors influence engine performance during a magneto check, and the replacement or repair of ignition components may not remedy problems in all cases. After verifying that all non-ignition system related causes for problems have been explored, proceed with the inspection procedures as stated below. If the magneto check exceeds either of the above limits, both magnetos must be disassembled and inspected in accordance with Section III, 100- hour inspection of Slick Aircraft Products Division, Unison Industries, Inc., SB 1-88, dated April 10, 1988, or FAA approved equivalent. An absence of RPM drop may be an indication of faulty grounding of one side of the ignition system or should be cause for suspicion that the magneto timing is set in advance ofthe setting specified. Check ignition ground and magneto timing. FAA APPROVED DATE: April 1, 1988
2011-26-05: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain Bombardier, Inc. Model DHC-8-300 series airplanes. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Several cases of aileron terminal quadrant support brackets that were manufactured using sheet metal have been found cracked on DHC-8 Series 300 aircraft. Investigation revealed that the failure of the support bracket was due to fatigue. Failure of the aileron terminal quadrant support bracket could result in an adverse reduction of aircraft roll control. * * * * * These conditions could result in loss of control of the airplane. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2011-25-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Learjet Inc. Model 45 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report of the potential for fatigue cracking of the end cap of the main landing gear (MLG) prior to the published life limitation. This AD requires revising the maintenance program to incorporate life limits for the MLG actuator end cap. We are issuing this AD to prevent fatigue cracking of the end cap of the MLG, which could result in the failure of the MLG actuator upon landing, and failure of the MLG to extend or retract during flight.
97-10-14: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to Raytheon Aircraft Company (Raytheon) Model 1900D airplanes (formerly referred to as Beech Aircraft Corporation Model 1900D). This action requires inspecting the stabilon attachment angles for the correct thickness, repetitively inspecting for cracks, and replacing the attachment angles that are the incorrect thickness with ones of the correct thickness. Recent reports of the affected airplanes having the incorrect size stabilon attachment angles prompted this action. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent separation of the stabilon from the airplane, which could cause loss of airplane stability during flight.
2011-25-11: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for all The Boeing Company 757-200, 757-200PF, 757-200CB, 757-300, 767- 200, 767-300, and 767-300F series airplanes. That AD currently requires revising the Limitations section of the airplane flight manual (AFM) to advise the flightcrew of procedures to follow to ensure that a fuel filter impending bypass condition due to gross fuel contamination is detected in a timely manner. This new AD requires installing new operating program software (OPS) (Version 7) of the engine indication and crew alerting system (EICAS) in the EICAS computers. This AD also requires various concurrent actions. This AD also retains the existing AD provision that relieves certain airplanes (those equipped with certain EICAS OPS versions) from the requirements. Accomplishment of the new actions terminates the requirements of the existing AD. This AD was prompted by an error in the EICAS OPS. The error prevents the display of an advisory message to the flightcrew of a left engine fuel filter contamination and imminent bypass condition, which may indicate an imminent multiple engine thrust loss or engine malfunction event due to fuel contamination. We are issuing this AD to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
85-25-12: 85-25-12 ALLISON GAS TURBINE DIVISION, GENERAL MOTORS CORP. (ALLISON, formerly DETROIT DIESEL ALLISON): Amendment 39-5191. Applies to Allison Model 250-C28B and -C28C engines, which incorporate P/N 23008080 turbine-to-compressor-coupling, installed in rotorcraft certificated in any category. Compliance is required as indicated unless already accomplished. To prevent possible cracks in turbine-to-compressor coupling P/N 23008080 from progressing to where a disconnect failure could occur and subsequently could result in an overspeed uncontained failure of the gas producer turbine rotor, accomplish the following: Within the next 100 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, or at the next turbine repair/inspection when access to P/N 23008080 coupling is gained, whichever occurs first, but not later than March 6, 1986, perform the following: Replace P/N 23008080 turbine-to-compressor-coupling with P/N 23032345 and install two P/N AS 3085- 018 O-rings on the aft end of the spur adapter gearshaft in accordance with Allison Commercial Engine Alert Bulletin CEB-A-72-2127, Revision 1, dated September 15, 1985, or FAA approved equivalent. Aircraft may be ferried in accordance with the provisions of FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to a base where the AD can be accomplished. Upon request, an equivalent means of compliance with the requirements of this AD may be approved by the Manager, Chicago Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, 2300 East Devon Avenue, Des Plaines, Illinois 60018. Upon submission of substantiating data by an owner or operator through an FAA maintenance inspector, the Manager, Chicago Aircraft Certification Office may adjust the compliance time specified in this AD. Allison CEB-A-72-2127, Revision 1, dated September 15, 1985, is incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). All persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Allison Gas Turbine Division, General Motors Corp., P.O. Box 420, Indianapolis, IN 46206-0420. These documents also may be examined at the Office of Regional Counsel, FAA, ATTN: Rules Docket No. 85-ANE-40, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts 01803, weekdays, except Federal holidays, between 8:00 a.m. and 4:30 p.m. This amendment becomes effective January 6, 1986.
96-26-52 R1: This amendment revises an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 747 series airplanes, that currently requires repetitive inspections of the access doors to the midspar/spring beam fuse pins on all engine pylons to detect cracks on the external surface; repetitive inspections of each midspar/spring beam fuse pin to detect if it protrudes beyond its mating nut by a specified distance; and repair of any discrepancy found. The actions specified by that AD are intended to prevent migration of this fuse pin, which, if not detected and corrected in a timely manner, could result in failure of the engine pylon and consequent separation of the engine from the wing. This amendment increases the intervals between inspections of the access doors and each midspar/spring beam fuse pin, and consequently decreases the frequency of inspections. This amendment is prompted by new data provided by the manufacturer indicating that the reported migration of the fuse pin was apparently the result of an incorrectly installed nut.
97-10-10: This amendment supersedes Airworthiness Directive AD 85-21-06 which applies to all Aerospace Technologies of Australia (ASTA) Nomad N22 and N24 series airplanes and currently requires replacing the attachment fittings of the upper fin rear spar and the fin/horizontal stabilizer. This action requires removing the upper fin to stub fin forward attachment bolts, inspecting the attachment fittings for cracks, and, if no cracks are found, replacing the attachment bolts with bolts of improved design until the life limit of the attachment fittings is reached, at which time the attachment fittings would be replaced with improved attachment fittings. If cracks are found, this AD requires replacing the attachment bolts and attachment fittings. Cracks found in the underhead radius and at the base of the thread of the bolt prompted this action. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent cracking in the upper fin and horizontal stabilizer attachment fittings, which if not corrected, could result in loss of control of the airplane.
75-19-04: 75-19-04 RAVEN: Amendment 39-2363. Raven Model S-40A, S-50A, S-55A, S-60A, and RX-6 Hot Air Balloons: Applies to Rego 7553S series blast valves installed on all models of the Raven hot air balloons certificated in all categories. Compliance required as indicated below after the effective date of this AD unless already accomplished. To prevent failures of the "O" ring on the valve stem; valve seat washer loosening; or valve actuating handle rollpin becoming dislodged, accomplish the following or an equivalent modification approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Rocky Mountain Region. Within the next 25 hours time in service unless already accomplished within the last 25 hours time in service, accomplish Paragraph a, b, c, and d. Paragraph "a" and "c" are to be accomplished thereafter at each 100 hours time in service or at intervals not to exceed 12 calendar months from the last inspection, whichever comes first. a. Remove the valveactuating lever rollpin P/N 7553S-8 from actuating lever. (Be careful to remove any burrs in the stem area around the rollpin hole before removing the valve stem P/N 7553S-1 from the bonnet P/N 7553-5). Replace the "O" ring stem seal with a new Rego "O" ring P/N 1421.7. Lubricate the new "O" ring with Orange Solid Oil (Rego P/N 5555GS) or unmedicated Vaseline lubricant before reassembly. Other lubricants may cause shrinkage of the "O" ring. b. Check the torque of the valve seat retaining screw to 8 to 10 in-lbs in the counter-clockwise (loosening) direction. If it turns, the screw must be removed, cleaned of lubricant and reinstalled using MIL-S 22473 high strength thread locking compound, or equivalent. Recheck torque after thread locking compound has cured. CAUTION: Do not permit the thread locking compound to adhere to the rubber seating surface. c. Reinstall valve actuating lever on the valve body with rollpin, P/N 7553S-8. Install a number three machine screw and stop nut or a 3/32 inch stainless steel cotter pin or .040 inch diameter safety wire through the hole in the rollpin, holding the actuating handle to the valve body and secure. d. Appropriate maintenance records must be kept in accordance with FAR 91.173. This amendment becomes effective on September 17, 1975.
79-20-06: 79-20-06 BOEING: Amendment 39-3581. Applies to Model 727 series airplanes, certificated in all categories, line numbers 1 through 1361 inclusive.\n \n\tCompliance required within 60 days from the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. \n\tTo protect the aircraft structure in the event of an excessively hard landing by providing the desired separation characteristics of the main landing side strut, accomplish the inspection of the side strut assemblies (2 per airplane) for correct installation in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin No. 727-32-268, Revision 1, or in an equivalent manner approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Northwest Region. If incorrect parts are found installed, remove the affected part and install a correct part prior to further flight. \n\tReport findings of incorrect installation to the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Northwest Region. (Reporting approved by the Bureau of Budget under BOB No. 04-R0174.) \n\tThe manufacturer's specifications and procedures identified and described in this directive are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). \n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer, may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. These documents may also be examined at FAA Northwest Region, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington 98108. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective October 11, 1979.
2011-25-12: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-15AG, -27, -28, -34, -34AG, -34B, and -36 series turboprop engines. This AD requires the removal of certain affected part manufacturer approval (PMA) replacement Timken Alcor Aerospace Technologies, Inc. (TAATI) first stage reduction sun gears and/or the interacting planetary gear sets from the propeller reduction gearbox assembly. This AD was prompted by a failure report of a certain TAATI PMA sun gear, installed since December 22, 2008. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of the sun gear, which will result in an engine in- flight shut down, possible uncontained engine failure, aircraft damage, and serious injuries.
76-15-09: 76-15-09 ROLLS-ROYCE (1971) LIMITED: Amendment 39-2682. Applies to Rolls-Royce RB211-22 series engines that do not incorporate Rolls-Royce Modifications 3310, and 3738. Compliance is required as indicated. To prevent inflight engine shutdown that could result from cracks in the engine intermediate casing, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 50 hours engine time in service after the effective date of this AD, or before the accumulation of the lesser of 400 hours total engine time in service or 280 cycles, whichever occurs later, unless already accomplished in accordance with Revision 5 of Rolls-Royce Service Bulletin RB211-72-A3077, dated July 5, 1976, comply with paragraph (b) of this AD. (b) Inspect the outside of the intermediate compressor casing for axial cracks in the outer main casing wall, using the dye penetrant method - (1) In the vicinity of the internal wheel case oil scavenge boss and the borescope access port at the 5 o'clock location when viewed from the rear; and (2) In the vicinity of the internal gearbox oil vent and pressure tube connections (ground handling point) at the 9 o'clock location when viewed from the rear. (c) If a crack is found during any inspection required by this AD, and that crack, either (1) Has reached either the oil scavenge boss which is located at the 5 o'clock location or the ground handling point which is located at the 9 o'clock location; (2) Has progressed through either the oil scavenge boss which is located at the 5 o'clock location or the ground handling point which is located at the 9 o'clock location; or (3) Is in close proximity to and appears to be approaching either the oil scavenge boss which is located at the 5 o'clock location or the ground handling point which is located at the 9 o'clock location; before further flight, except that the engine may be operated on an aircraft which is flown in accordance with FARs 21.197 and 21.199 to a base wherereplacement can be accomplished, replace the cracked casing with a serviceable casing of either steel, Silcosetcoated aluminum or aluminum. If replacement is accomplished with other than a Silcoset-coated aluminum casing or steel casing continue to inspect the replacement casing for cracks in accordance with paragraph (b) of this AD at intervals established in paragraph (e) of this AD. (d) If a crack is found during any inspection required by this AD which does not conform to any of the criteria of paragraph (c) of this AD and which has progressed from a point forward to a point aft of the oil scavenge boss which is located at the 5 o'clock location, or from a point forward to a point aft of the ground handling point which is located at the 9 o'clock location, replace the cracked casing with a serviceable casing of either steel, Silcoset-coated aluminum or aluminum, before further flight, except that the engine may be operated on an aircraft which is flown, either - (1) Inaccordance with FARs 21.197 and 21.199 to a base where replacement can be accomplished; or (2) For 7 or less additional cycles, provided that - (i) There is no visible loss of oil; (ii) Engine oil consumption remains within the limits established for the engine; and (iii) All other engines on the aircraft are inspected in accordance with the provisions of this AD at the same time as the affected engine and are found free of any of the cracks specified in paragraphs (c) and (d) of this AD. If a cracked casing is replaced with a serviceable aluminum casing other than a Silcoset-coated aluminum casing, continue to inspect the replacement casing for cracks in accordance with paragraph (b) of this AD at intervals established in paragraph (e) of this AD. (e) Repeat the inspection specified in paragraph (b) of this AD at intervals not to exceed - (1) 300 cycles from the last inspection for engines incorporating either Rolls-Royce Service Bulletin 72-3650, dated January 20, 1975, or Rolls-Royce Service Bulletin 72-3720, Revision 2, dated March 21, 1975, or an FAA-approved equivalent of either; (2) 300 cycles from the last inspection for engines incorporating Rolls-Royce Service Bulletin 72- 3681, dated October 7, 1974, or an FAA-approved equivalent, until modified in accordance with paragraph (f) of this AD; or (3) 150 cycles from the last inspection for engines which have not incorporated any of the modifications specified in paragraph (e)(1) or (e)(2) of this AD, until modified in accordance with paragraph (f) of this AD. (f) For engines with aluminum compressor casings other than Silcoset-coated aluminum casings on which no oil passageway sleeves have been incorporated or which have been modified in accordance with Rolls- Royce Service Bulletin 72-3681, dated October 7, 1974, within the next 500 hours engine time in service after the effective date of this AD, install a sleeve at the 5 o'clock location, viewed from the rear, into the intermediate case internal wheel case oil return passageway in accordance with either Rolls-Royce Service Bulletin 72-3650, dated January 20, 1975, or Rolls-Royce Service Bulletin 72-3720, Revision 2, dated March 21, 1975, or an equivalent of either, approved by the Chief, Aircraft Certification Staff, Europe, Africa and Middle East Region, Federal Aviation Administration, c/o American Embassy, APO New York, N.Y. 09667 and thereafter inspect the casing for axial cracks in accordance with paragraph (b) of this AD at intervals not to exceed 300 cycles from the last inspection. (g) For the purpose of this AD, the number of cycles equals the number of flights that involve an engine operating sequence consisting of engine starting, takeoff, operation, landing, and engine shutdown. This supersedes Amendment 39-2170 (40 FR 16190), AD 75-08-18. This amendment becomes effective July 22, 1976.
2011-25-06: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model MD-11 and MD-11F airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report that the rub strips attached to the horizontal stabilizer front spar access door location were manufactured improperly using anodized aluminum. This AD requires replacing the anodized rub strips with new alodined rub strips to prevent inadequate electrical bonding between the rub strips and the fuel access door, which can contribute to possible ignition of flammable fuel vapor in the tail fuel tank as a result of a lightning strike. We are issuing this AD to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
97-10-13: This amendment supersedes Airworthiness Directive (AD) 96-21-05, which currently requires the following on certain Fairchild Aircraft, Inc. (Fairchild) SA226 and SA227 series airplanes that do not have a certain elevator torque tube installed: drilling inspection access holes in the elevator torque tube arm, inspecting the elevator torque tube for corrosion, replacing any corroded elevator torque tube, and applying a corrosion preventive compound. AD 96-21-05 resulted from several reports of corrosion found in the elevator torque tube area on the affected airplanes. This AD retains the actions required by AD 96-21-05, and adds certain Fairchild Model SA227-BC airplanes to the Applicability section of that AD. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of the flight control system caused by a corroded elevator torque tube, which could result in loss of control of the airplane.
93-17-03: 93-17-03 BOEING: Amendment 39-8673. Docket 93-NM-27-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model 737-200, -300, -400, and -500 series airplanes equipped with BFGoodrich evacuation slides, as listed in BFGoodrich Service Bulletin 101658/659/660-25-257, dated November 20, 1992; certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. \n\n\tTo prevent passengers from being unable to exit the airplane in the event of an emergency evacuation, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tWithin 3 years after the effective date of this AD, modify the evacuation slide valise in accordance with BFGoodrich Service Bulletin 101658/659/660-25-257, dated November 20, 1992. \n\n\t(b)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Los Angeles ACO. \n\n\tNOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Los Angeles ACO. \n\n\t(c)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. \n\n\t(d)\tThe modification shall be done in accordance with BFGoodrich Service Bulletin 101658/659/660-25-257, dated November 20, 1992. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from BFGoodrich Aircraft Evacuation Systems, 3414 South 5th Street, Phoenix, Arizona 85040. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the FAA, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3229 East Spring Street, Long Beach, California; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC. \n\n\t(e)\tThis amendment becomes effective on October 7, 1993.
2011-25-04: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Quest Aircraft Design, LLC (Quest) Model Kodiak 100 airplanes. This AD requires you to inspect the torque of the inertial particle separator (IPS) bolts; correct the torque, if necessary; replace the IPS bolts with new IPS bolts within a certain time; and install safety wire around the new IPS bolts. This AD was prompted by five instances where a loose IPS bolt was found on the right-hand side of the engine bypass door attachment. This condition, if not corrected, could lead to an inoperable bypass door, which could result in engine inlet icing with consequent loss of engine power and forced landing. We are issuing this AD to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
97-10-11: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to all Boeing Model 777 series airplanes. This action requires repetitive testing of the engine fire shutoff switch (EFSS) to determine that the override mechanism and the switch handle are operational, and replacement of the EFSS, if necessary. This action also requires, for certain airplanes, installation of a collar on a specific circuit breaker of the standby power management panel, and installation of placards to advise the flightcrew that the override mechanism must be pushed in order to pull the fire switch. This amendment is prompted by a report indicating that a solenoid and an override mechanism of the EFSS were not operational due to overheating of the solenoid. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent damage to the EFSS solenoid and to the override mechanism, and consequent failure of the EFSS due to overheating of the solenoid; such failure of the EFSS could result in the inability of the flightcrew to discharge the fire extinguishing agent in the event of an engine fire.
93-05-20: 93-05-20 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-8524. Docket 92-NM-169-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model MD-11 series airplanes equipped with Pratt & Whitney Model PW4460 engines; having airplane serial numbers 48407 through 48410 inclusive, 48443 through 48448 inclusive, 48452 through 48457 inclusive, 48461, 48472 through 48475 inclusive, 48484, 48485, 48495, and 48496; certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. \n\n\tTo prevent loss of a hydraulic system, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tWithin 60 days after the effective date of this AD, modify the wiring to the engine-driven hydraulic pump overtemperature switches, in accordance with McDonnell Douglas MD-11 Service Bulletin 29-16, dated August 6, 1992. \n\n\t(b)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, TransportAirplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Los Angeles ACO. \n\n\tNOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Los Angeles ACO. \n\n\t(c)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. \n\n\t(d)\tThe modification shall be done in accordance with McDonnell Douglas MD-11 Service Bulletin 29-16, dated August 6, 1992. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from McDonnell Douglas Corporation, P.O. Box 1771, Long Beach, California 90846-1771, Attention: Business Unit Manager, Technical Publications - Technical Administrative Support, C1-L5B. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), 3229 East Spring Street, Long Beach, California; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC. \n\n\t(e)\tThis amendment becomes effective on April 30, 1993.
92-14-02: 92-14-02 BOEING: Amendment 39-8284. Docket No. 91-NM-226-AD.\n\n\tApplicability: Model 747 series airplanes operated as freighters, certificated in any category.\n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously.\n\n\tTo prevent damaged or unusable life rafts due to improper mooring line and inflation length on life rafts, accomplish the following:\n\n\t(a)\tWithin 12 months after the effective date of this AD, inspect the life raft mooring line and inflation length. The mooring line length is measured from attachment fitting on the end of the mooring line to the connecting point on the raft. The mooring line must be no less than 39 feet long and no more than 44 feet long. The inflation length is the distance the life raft must be from its mooring line attachment point for inflation of the life raft to be initiated. Inflation should begin at not less than 33 feet and not more than 38 feet, as defined by the mooring line length.\n\n\t\t(1)\tFor life rafts with mooring line length and inflation length that meet the measurements specified in paragraph (a) of this AD, no additional action is required.\n\n\t\t(2)\tFor life rafts with mooring line length and inflation length that do not meet the measurements specified in paragraph (a) of this AD, accomplish the following prior to further flight:\n\n\t\t\t(i)\tFor life rafts listed in Air Cruisers Service Bulletin 35-25-3, dated October 22, 1990: Modify the life raft in accordance with that service bulletin.\n\n\t\t\t(ii)\tFor life rafts listed in Air Cruisers Service Bulletin 35-25-2, dated October 30, 1990: Modify the life raft in accordance with that service bulletin.\n\n\t\t\t(iii)\tFor all other life rafts: Modify the life raft in accordance with BFGoodrich Alert Service Bulletin No. 100102-25A-244, dated December 13, 1991, or Eastern Aero Marine Service Bulletin T9-25-1, dated January 31, 1992, as applicable; or in accordance with a method approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate.\n\n\t(b)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Seattle ACO. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Seattle ACO.\n\n\tNOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Seattle ACO.\n\n\t(c)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.\n\n\t(d)\tThe modifications shall be done in accordance with Air Cruisers Service Bulletin 35-25-3, dated October 22, 1990; Air Cruisers Service Bulletin 35-25-2, dated October 30, 1990; BFGoodrich Alert Service Bulletin No. 100102-25A-244, dated December 13, 1991; or Eastern Aero Marine Service Bulletin T9-25-1, dated January 31, 1992; as applicable. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124; Air Cruisers Company P.O. Box 180, Belmar, New Jersey 07719-0180; or BFGoodrich Aerospace, Aircraft Evaluations Systems, 3414 South 5th Street, Phoenix, Arizona 85040; or Eastern Aero Marine, P.O. Box 593513, Miami, Florida 33159. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L Street NW., Room 8401, Washington, DC.\n\n\t(e)\tThis amendment becomes effective on August 18, 1992.
79-24-01 R3: 79-24-01 R3 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-3618 as amended by Amendment 39-3741 and 39-3841 is further amended by Amendment 39-4191. Applies to McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9 series airplanes, certificated in all categories, equipped with the non-ventral door aft pressure bulkhead P/N 5910163, and with more than 10,000 landings. \n\n\tCompliance required as indicated. \n\n\tTo detect fatigue cracks and prevent failure of the aft pressure bulkhead, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tFor aircraft not previously modified or repaired in accordance with McDonnell Douglas DC-9 Service Bulletin 53-127 dated May 25, 1976, accomplish the following: \n\n\t\t(1)\tWithin 10 landings after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished in accordance with telegraphic AD T79WE13 dated September 18, 1979 or telegraphic AD T79WE15 dated September 28, 1979, conduct an initial visual inspection per Step 1, Figure 1, of McDonnell Douglas DC-9 Alert Service Bulletin A53-127, Revision 1, dated September 26, 1979. The visual inspection shall encompass the entire periphery of the emergency exit doorjamb structure. \n\n\t\t(2)\tWithin 100 landings after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished in accordance with telegraphic AD T79WE15 dated September 28, 1979, conduct both visual and X-ray inspections per Steps 3 through 10, Figure 1, of McDonnell Douglas DC-9 Alert Service Bulletin A53-127, Revision 1, dated September 26, 1979. The visual portion of the inspection shall encompass the entire periphery of the doorjamb structure. \n\n\t\t(3)\tWithin 250 landings of the inspection required by paragraph (a)(2) of this AD and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 250 landings, conduct a visual inspection per Step 1, Figure 1, of McDonnell Douglas DC-9 Alert Service Bulletin A53-127, Revision 1, dated September 26, 1979. The visual inspection shall encompass the entire periphery of the emergency exit doorjamb structure. \n\n\t\t(4)\tWithin 1,000 landings from the inspection required by paragraph (a)(2) and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 1,000 landings, conduct X-ray inspections per Steps 8 through 10 and a visual inspection per Step 1, Figure 1, of McDonnell Douglas DC-9 Alert Service Bulletin A53-127, Revision 1, dated September 26, 1979. The visual inspection shall encompass the entire periphery of the emergency exit doorjamb structure. \n\n\t(b)\tFor aircraft previously modified or repaired per McDonnell Douglas DC-9 Service Bulletin 53-127 dated May 25, 1976, accomplish the following: \n\n\t\t(1)\tWithin 100 landings after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished subsequent to September 25, 1979, conduct X-ray inspections per Steps 8 through 10, Figure 1, of McDonnell Douglas DC-9 Alert Service Bulletin A53-127, Revision 1, dated September 26, 1979, and a visual inspection of the entire periphery of the emergency exit doorjamb structure. \n\n\t\t(2)\tWithin 2,000 landings after inspection per paragraph (b)(1) of this AD and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 2,000 landings, conduct X-ray inspections of the jamb structure per Steps 8 through 10, Figure 1, of McDonnell Douglas DC-9 Alert Service Bulletin A53-127, Revision 1, dated September 26, 1979, and a visual inspection of the entire periphery of the emergency exit doorjamb structure. \n\n\t(c)\tIf cracks are found during any of the inspections required by this AD, repair before further flight in accordance with the following: \n\n\t\t(1)\tFor cracks which are limited to the emergency exit doorjamb, repair as shown for Condition 2, Figure 2, of McDonnell Douglas DC-9 Alert Service Bulletin A53-127, Revision 1, dated September 26, 1979. \n\n\t\t(2)\tFor cracks which extend through the emergency exit doorjamb and into the pressure bulkhead web, repair as shown for Condition 3, Figure 3, of McDonnell Douglas DC-9 Alert Service Bulletin A53-127, Revision 1, dated September 26, 1979. \n\n\t\t(3)\tFor cracks for which no repair is prescribed in McDonnell Douglas DC-9 Alert Service Bulletin A53-127, Revision 1, dated September 26, 1979, repair in accordance with data approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. \n\n\t(d)\tWithin 24 hours after the initial inspections per paragraph (a)(2) and paragraph (b)(1), report the results of the initial inspections by Telex to the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. Include in the reporting information the date and condition of modification or repair per DC-9 Service Bulletin 53-127 or A53-127, McDonnell Douglas fuselage number, factory serial number, and registration number. \n\n\t(e)\tWithin the next 500 landings after April 14, 1980 or at the next inspection required by paragraph (a)(4) or (b)(2), whichever occurs first, visually inspect the auxiliary emergency exit door jamb for repairs in accordance with paragraph (2)(C) of McDonnell Douglas DC-9 Alert Service Bulletin A53-146, dated March 14, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as SB A53-146). Repairs not in accordance withSB A53-146 are to be modified as follows: \n\n\t\t(1)\tFor repairs to cracks which extend radially outboard, prior to further flight the repair must conform to the configuration defined by paragraph (2)(C) Condition III Type 3 of SB A53-146. \n\n\t\t(2)\tFor repairs to cracks which extend radially inboard, within the next 500 landings the repair must conform to the configuration defined by paragraph (2)(C) Condition III Type 2 of SB A53-146. \n\n\t\t(3)\tFor repairs to circumferentially oriented cracks, within the next 1,000 landings, the repair must conform to the configuration defined by paragraph (2)(C) Condition III Type 1 of SB A53-146. \n\n\t(f)\tIf a new replacement door jamb, P/N 5910163-9 or -255 is installed, within 10,000 landings after installation of the new door jamb, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 2,000 landings, inspect the door jamb in accordance with paragraph (b)(2). \n\n\t(g)\tAlternative inspections, modifications or other actions which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. \n\n\t(h)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplanes unpressurized to a base where the inspections or crack repair can be performed. \n\n\t(i)\tFor the purposes of complying with this AD, subject to acceptance by the assigned FAA maintenance inspector, the number of landings may be determined by dividing each airplane's hours' time in service by the operator's fleet average time from takeoff to landing for the DC-9 airplane. \n\n\t(j)\tThe inspections and modifications required by this AD need not be accomplished if, after the effective date of this AD, the aircraft is operated without cabin pressurization and a placard is installed in the cockpit, in full view of the pilots, stating: \n\n\t\t"Operation with Cabin Pressurization is Prohibited." \n\n\t(k)\tThe installation of a J060116-11 Jamb Assembly in accordance with McDonnell DouglasDC-9 Service Bulletin 53-145, Revision No. 1, dated January 29, 1981, or later revisions approved by the Chief, Los Angeles Area Aircraft Certification Office, Northwest Region, constitutes terminating action for the repetitive inspections required by paragraphs (a)(3), (a)(4) and (b)(2) of this AD. \n\n\tThe manufacturer's specifications and procedures identified and described in this directive are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Director, Publications and Training, C1-750 (54-60). \n\n\tThese documents also may be examined at FAA Northwest Region, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington 98108 or Los Angeles Area Aircraft Certification Office, 4344 Donald Douglas Drive, Long Beach, California 90808. \n\n\tAmendment 39-3618 became effective December 24, 1979 and was effective upon receipt for all recipients of telegraphic AD T79WE13 dated September 18, 1979 and telegraphic AD T79WE15 dated September 28, 1979. \n\n\tAmendment 39-3741 became effective April 14, 1980. \n\n\tAmendment 39-3841 became effective July 17, 1980. \n\n\tThis Amendment 39-4191 becomes effective August 27, 1981.
91-09-06: 91-09-06 BOEING: Amendment 39-6977. Docket No. 90-NM-216-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model 727 series airplanes equipped with forward and/or aft auxiliary fuel tank listed in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 727-28A0067, Revision 1, dated July 5, 1990, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo eliminate the potential for a fire due to rupture of the auxiliary fuel tanks, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tWithin the next 18 months after the effective date of this AD, accomplish either subparagraph A.1. or A.2., below: \n\n\t\t1.\tInstall a check valve and a pressure actuated shutoff valve in the center wing tank in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 727-28A0067, Revision 1, dated July 5, 1990. \n\n\t\t2.\tDeactivate the auxiliary fuel system and insert a placard in the cockpit to indicate that the auxiliary fuel tank is inoperative, in accordance with Boeing Service Alert Bulletin727-28A0067, Revision 1, dated July 5, 1990. \n\n\tB.\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate.\n \n\tNOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Seattle ACO. \n\n\tC.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6977, 91-09-06) becomes effective on May 28, 1991.
90-03-18: 90-03-18 BOEING: Amendment 39-6498. Docket No. 88-NM-158-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model 727 and 737 series airplanes, not equipped with a system incorporating Engine Pressure Ratio (EPR) logic for activation of the takeoff warning system, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required within the next 30 months following the effective date of this AD, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent the occurrence of takeoff configuration nuisance warnings when taxi operations are conducted with the flaps intentionally retracted, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA. For Boeing Model 727 series airplanes with Auto-Speedbrakes operative: Modify the logic which enables the Takeoff Configuration Warning Systems (TOCWS) in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 727- 31-29, January 26, 1979; 727-31-33, dated November 26, 1980; 727-31-35, dated January 26, 1979; or 727-31- 36, dated January 26, 1979, as appropriate. \n\n\tB. For Boeing Model 727 series airplanes not equipped with Auto-Speedbrakes or with the Auto-Speedbrakes deactivated: \n\n\t1. Modify the logic which enables the Takeoff Configuration Warning Systems (TOCWS) in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 727-31-29, January 26, 1979; 727-31-33, dated November 26, 1980; 727- 31-35, dated January 26, 1979; or 727-31-36, dated January 26, 1979, as appropriate; or \n\n\t2. Adjust the takeoff warning thrust lever actuated switches to operate at 19.5 degrees from the idle stop for takeoff configuration warning system arming in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 727-31-30, dated November 11, 1977. Install a circuit breaker guard (cover) on the TOCWS circuit breaker, and safety wire the guard. Operation of the airplane must be in accordance with the Limitations of the Takeoff Configuration Warning System specified in Appendix 39 or 51 (as appropriate) of the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM). \n\n\tC. For Boeing Model 737 series airplanes: Modify the logic which enables the TOCWS in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 737-31-1033, Revision 1, dated January 14, 1983. \n\n\tD. An alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. NOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), who will either concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office. \n\n\tE. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6498, AD 90-03-18) becomes effective on March 7, 1990.
69-12-06: 69-12-06\tBOEING: Amdt. 39-780 applies to Boeing Model 737-100, 737-200, and 737- 200C Series Airplanes. \n\tCompliance required as indicated, unless already accomplished. \n\tTo detect cracking in the lugs of the aileron tab mast fittings and flanges of the aileron tab hinge fittings of Boeing Model 737 Series airplanes, and provide for the installation of parts to correct this condition, accomplish the following, or an equivalent inspection procedure and parts installation approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. \n\t(a)\tWithin 25 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, visually inspect the aileron tab mast fittings for cracks in the lugs and for an excessive gap between the fitting lugs and the tab control rod ends in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin No. 57-1040, dated May 26, 1969, (hereinafter referred to as Boeing ASB 57-1040) or later FAA approved revisions. \n\tNOTE: Designated 737 Series aircraft listed in Group II, Boeing ASB 57-1040, delivered after April 15, 1969, have had the gaps shimmed and nuts torqued by the manufacturer and may therefore be inspected within the time intervals listed in Step (4). \n\t\t(1)\tIf cracks are found, replace the mast fitting with a new part in accordance with Boeing ASB 57-1040 (or later FAA approved revision) before further flight. \n\t\t(2)\tIf no cracks are found, measure gap between mast fitting lugs and tab control rod end fitting, shim, and torque nut in accordance with instructions and limits specified in Boeing ASB 57-1040, or later FAA approved revisions. \n\t\t(3)\tIf gaps between the fitting lugs and the tab control rod ends exceed those limits specified in Boeing ASB No. 57-1040, or later FAA approved revision, perform either (A) or (B) as follows: \n\t\t\t(A)\tShim the gaps and torque the nuts to the limits specified in the Alert Service Bulletin. \n\t\t\t(B)\tRepeat the visual inspection for cracks at intervals not to exceed 25 hours' time in service, per (a)(1)and (a)(2), above. \n\t\t(4)\tAfter the mast fittings have been properly gapped, shimmed and nuts torqued, per (a)(2) and (a)(3) above, inspect for cracks at intervals not to exceed 160 hours time in service until at least two inspections have been accomplished, or the part has accumulated an additional 280 hours' time in service, whichever occurs later, and, thereafter, at intervals not to exceed 600 hours' time in service. \n\t\t(5)\tInspection requirements under (a) of this AD may be terminated when: (A) the magnesium mast fittings are replaced with aluminum mast fittings per Boeing ASB No. 57-1040, (FAA approved revision to be issued); and (B) the tab control rods are replaced with adjustable tab control rods, Boeing P/N 69-60081-1, installed per instructions in Boeing Service Bulletin 27- 1025, dated April 30, 1969, or later FAA approved revisions. \n\t(b)\tWithin 160 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, visually inspect the aileron tab hinge fitting flanges for cracks. \n\t\t(1)\tIf cracks are found, replace hinge fitting with a new Boeing P/N 6937805-6 before further flight. \n\t\t(2)\tIf no cracks are found, repeat inspection for cracks at intervals not to exceed 600 hours' time in service. \n\t\tNOTE: Designated 737 Series Aircraft listed in Group II, Boeing ASB 57-1040, delivered after April 15, 1969, have had the inspection of (b) performed by the manufacturer and may therefore be inspected at intervals not exceeding 600 hours' time in service. \n\t\t(3)\tInspection requirements under (b) of this AD may be terminated when magnesium tab hinge fittings are replaced with an aluminum tab hinge fitting per Boeing ASB 57-1040, (FAA approved revision to be issued). \n\t(c)\tUpon request of the operator, an FAA maintenance inspector, subject to prior approval of the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region, may adjust the repetitive inspection period of the operator if the request contains substantiating data to justify the increase for thatoperator. \n\t(d)\tAirplanes having cracked parts which require replacing under this AD may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 with the concurrence of the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region, to a base where the replacement of parts can be accomplished. \n\tThis amendment becomes effective on 18 June 1969.