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79-08-01 R1: 79-08-01 R1 GATES LEAR JET: Amendment 39-3447 as amended by Amendment 39- 4361. Applies to Models 35, 35A, 36 and 36A airplanes equipped with Aeronca thrust reversers. COMPLIANCE: Required as indicated unless already accomplished. To preclude inadvertent thrust reverser deployment and possible loss of aircraft control, prior to next flight accomplish the following: A) Insert in the Aeronca Thrust Reverser Supplement to the Airplane Flight Manual the FAA-approved temporary changes shown herein as Figures I, II and III or the FAA-approved Flight Manual Supplement changes (temporary or permanent) supplied by the manufacturer and containing the same information as the above figures. B) Operate the airplane in accordance with instructions in the Flight Manual Supplement changes specified in Paragraph A) of this Airworthiness Directive. C) Airplanes may make one flight to the location where the changes to the Aeronca Thrust Reverser Supplement to the Airplane Flight Manual specified in this Airworthiness Directive are available, providing the Exterior Inspection in Figure II and Limitations in Figure I are complied with. D) The installation of Gates Learjet Thrust Reverser Blocker Door Position Indication System, per Gates Learjet Corporation Modification Kit No. AMK 81-6, constitutes terminating action for the requirements of paragraphs A), B), and C) of this AD. E) Any equivalent method of compliance with this AD must be approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Central Region. Amendment 39-3447 became effective on April 19, 1979, to all persons except those to whom it had already been made effective by an airmail letter from the FAA dated March 1, 1979. This Amendment 39-4361 becomes effective April 19, 1982. FIGURE I TEMPORARY CHANGE, SUPPLEMENT FOR AERONCA THRUST REVERSERS Aircraft Affected: All Gates Lear Jet Model 35, 36, 35A, 36A Aircraft equipped with Aeronca Thrust Reversers. Description of Change: Add Limitations to Section I of the Aeronca Thrust Reverser AFM Supplement. Filing Instructions: Insert this page adjacent to page 2 of 23 in your Thrust Reverser Supplement and retain until further notice. Amend Section I - Limitations by adding the following limitations: Section I - LIMITATIONS (Cont) 7. Thrust Reversers must not be operated prior to takeoff. 8. Thrust Reversers must not be used to control taxi speed, except after landing. 9. Thrust Reversers must not be used for touch and go landings. 10. After Thrust Reversers have been deployed, a visual check of proper door stowing must be made prior to takeoff. 11. Operational Procedures in this Thrust Reverser Supplement are mandatory. FIGURE II TEMPORARY CHANGE, SUPPLEMENT FOR AERONCA THRUST REVERSERS Aircraft Affected: All Gates Lear Jet Model 35, 36, 35A, 36A Aircraft equipped with Aeronca Thrust Reversers. Description of Change: Add Thrust ReverserOperational Changes. Filing Instructions: Insert this page adjacent to page 2 of 23 in your Thrust Reverser Supplement and retain until further notice. Add the following EXTERIOR INSPECTION to Section II - NORMAL PROCEDURES EXTERIOR INSPECTION (Power-Off) A. Inspect both thrust reversers as follows: 1. Check that thrust reverser upper and lower blocker doors are completely stowed. Change BEFORE TAKEOFF to read as follows: CAUTION: Do not operationally check thrust reversers before takeoff. 1. Thrust Reverser Circuit Breaker - In. 2. Thrust Reverser Position Indicator Lights - Extinguished. 3. Deleted. NOTE: This Temporary Change deletes Thrust Reverser Operational Check, Before Takeoff. FIGURE III TEMPORARY CHANGE, SUPPLEMENT FOR AERONCA THRUST REVERSERS Aircraft Affected: All Gates Lear Jet Model 35, 36, 35A, 36A Aircraft with Aeronca Thrust Reversers. Description of Change: Add Postflight Operational Check. Filing Instructions: Insert this page adjacent to page 4 of 23 in your Thrust Reverser Supplement and retain until further notice. Add the following POSTFLIGHT Operational Check after NORMAL PROCEDURES - After Landing: POSTFLIGHT A. Operationally check Thrust Reverser as follows: CAUTION: It is recommended that the aircraft be headed into the wind during static thrust reverser ground operational check. Keep thrust reverser deployed time to a minimum to prevent possible engine reingestion of exhaust gases. a NORM-EMER STOW Switch - NORM, EMER STOW light extinguished. b Thrust Levers - IDLE. c Thrust Reverser Levers - Pull to deploy lever stop position. UNLOCK lights will come on and then go off when DEPLOY lights come on. Check that the throttle lock releases when the DEPLOY lights illuminate. d NORM-EMER STOW Switch - EMER STOW, EMER STOW light illuminated. DEPLOY lights will go off when UNLOCK lights go on. UNLOCK lights will go off when system is stowed. eThrust Reverser Levers - Push to stow position. f NORM-EMER STOW Switch - NORM, EMER-STOW lights extinguished. g Thrust Reverser Levers - Pull to deploy position. Check for proper light sequence. h Thrust Reverser Levers - Push to stow position. Check for proper light sequence.
2017-13-14: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 777-300ER series airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report that certain galley tripod mount assemblies were not connected to the tie rods in the overhead support structure. This AD requires an inspection of certain galleys for the presence of the hardware that connects the tripod mount assembly to the tie rods in the overhead support structure, and corrective actions if necessary. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
80-02-18: 80-02-18 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-3677. Applies to McDonnell Douglas DC-10-10, -10F, -30, -30F, and -40 airplanes certificated in all categories utilizing the following passenger evacuation systems manufactured by the PICO Division of Sargent Industries: (Subsequent production serial numbers are not affected.) \n\t\n\nPART NUMBER\nSERIAL NUMBER \n5LS230100-( )\nA0001-A0091 \n5LD230300-( )\nB0001-B0093 \n5LD230500-( )\nC0001-C0086 \n5LD230600-( )\nD0001-D0081\n5LD260100-( )\n E0001-E0087 \n5WD230100-( )\nAA001-AA420 \n5WD230500-( )\t\nCC001-CC169 \n5WD230600-( )\t\nDD001-DD178 \n5WD260100-( )\nEE001-EE792 \n\t\t\n\tCompliance required within the next eighteen calendar months after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent failure of the Sargent Industries, PICO Division emergency evacuation system due to inflation hose end fitting failure accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tVisually inspect the passenger evacuation system inflation hoses in accordance with PICO Service Bulletin No. DC-10-25-78, Revision 2, dated December 5, 1979, to determine which hoses have end fittings configured as shown in Figure 2 of the PICO Service Bulletin. \n\n\t(b)\tInflation hose assemblies with end fittings configured as shown in Figure 2 of the PICO Service Bulletin, must be modified in accordance with Subpart 2, "Accomplishment Instructions," of PICO Service Bulletin No. DC-10-25-78 Revision 2, dated December 5, 1979, or each replaced with an approved production hose assembly part number (P/N) 720111-101 in accordance with appropriate maintenance manual procedures. \n\n\t(c)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of inspections required by this AD. \n\n\t(d)\tAlternative inspections, modifications or other actions which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective March 3, 1980.
64-12-05: 64-12-05 LOCKHEED: Amdt. 744 Part 507 Federal Register June 9, 1964. Applies to All Models 188A and 188C Aircraft. Compliance required as indicated. As a result of failures of the landing gear cam follower P/N NAS 562-3-7A and of worn and bent landing gear lever detent plate P/N 827127-3 or -5, accomplish the following unless already accomplished: (a) Correct Lockheed Service Information Letter 84 dated May 6, 1964, by changing in item 6 (A) the word "pilot's" to "co-pilot's" and by changing item 6 (F) to read "Perform steps 6 (A), (B) and (D) on pilot's landing gear control lever". (b) Within the next 40 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD and at periods not to exceed 4,000 hours' time in service from the last inspection, accomplish the following: (1) Accomplish items 1 through 8 of the section entitled "Description" of Lockheed Service Information Letter No. 84 dated May 6, 1964, as corrected. (2) If during accomplishment of item 6(B) of Service Information Letter 84, the force required to unseat cam follower is less than 5 pounds, before further flight replace the control lever handle return spring with a new return spring. (3) If during accomplishment of items 6(A), (C), (D), (E), and (F) of Service Information Letter 84, the cam follower is unseated from the detent, before further flight replace the cam follower P/N NAS 562-3-7A, with a new cam follower P/N NAS 562-3-7A and inspect the landing gear lever detent plate, P/N 827127-3 or -5, for deformation and for wear or cracks in the detents. If the landing gear lever detent plate exhibits wear beyond the wear limits recommended by the manufacturer or exhibits deformation or cracks, replace the detent plate, P/N 827127-3 or -5, with a new detent plate P/N 827127-3 or -5. The detent plates P/N 827127-3 or - 5 are interchangeable. (4) If any parts are replaced in accordance with (b) (1) and (b)(3), before further flight rig the system in accordance with the Electra Maintenance Manual, Section 32-1-0 and reaccomplish items 1 through 8 of the section entitled "Description" of Lockheed Service Information Letter No. 84 dated May 6, 1964. This directive effective upon publication in the Federal Register for all persons except those to whom it was made effective immediately by telegram dated May 22, 1964. Revised September 28, 1965.
2021-20-16: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2021-04- 15, which applied to all Airbus Helicopters Model AS355E, AS355F, AS355F1, AS355F2, AS355N, and AS355NP helicopters; and certain Model AS350B3 helicopters. AD 2021-04-15 required repetitive visual inspections of the right-hand side of the vertical fin spar for discrepancies (cracking), and corrective action if necessary. This AD retains the requirements of AD 2021-04-15, and requires repetitive cleaning and repetitive detailed inspections for cracking of the vertical fin spar and vertical fin upper attachments, and corrective action if necessary, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. This AD also expands the applicability to include additional Model AS350B3 helicopters. This AD was prompted by a report that, during an unscheduled post-flight inspection of the tail cone area, a crack was found in the spar of the upper part of the vertical fin and fractures were found in the two front attachment screws. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
83-18-51 R2: 83-18-51 R2 BOEING VERTOL COMPANY: Amendment 39-4862. Applies to Boeing Vertol Model 234 series helicopters certificated in all categories. Compliance is required as indicated. To prevent possible hazards in flight associated with cracking of the main rotor head pitch shafts, accomplish the following: (a) Unless already accomplished, prior to further flight on helicopters equipped with main rotor head pitch shafts Part Numbers (P/N) 114R2088-7, -14, -15, -16, conduct an eddy current inspection of the pitch shaft in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions (Part 2) of Boeing Vertol Service Bulletin No. 234-64-1006, Revision 2, dated August 25, 1983, or (Part 3) of Service Bulletin No. 234-64-1006 dated January 16, 1984. (b) After the initial inspection of paragraph (a), repeat the inspection of paragraph (a) at intervals not to exceed 15 hours time in service. (c) Remove from service pitch shafts having a crack and replace with a serviceable part prior to further flight. (d) An equivalent method of compliance with this AD may be used when approved by the Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office, 181 South Franklin Avenue, Valley Stream, New York 11581. (e) Upon submission of substantiating data by an owner or operator through an FAA Maintenance Inspector, the Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, New England Region, may adjust the compliance times specified in this AD. (f) Within the next 25 hours time in service from the effective date of this AD or prior to the accumulation of 550 hours time in service, whichever occurs later, remove from service at main rotor head pitch shafts P/N's 114R2088-14 and -16 and replace with serviceable parts. (g) Within the next 25 hours time in service from the effective date of this AD or prior to the accumulation of 700 hours time in service, whichever occurs later, remove from service forward main rotor head pitch shafts P/N's 114R2088-7 and -15 and replace with serviceable parts. This amendment becomes effective May 31, 1984, as to all persons except those persons to whom it was made immediately effective by telegraphic AD's No. T83-18-51, issued September 2, 1983, and No. T83-18-51R1, issued October 28, 1983, which contained parts of this amendment.
2003-17-03: This document supersedes Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2003-03- 14, which applies to all PIAGGIO AERO INDUSTRIES S.p.A. (PIAGGIO) Model P-180 airplanes. AD 2003-03-14 currently requires you to inspect and determine whether any firewall shutoff or crossfeed valve with a serial number in a certain range is installed and requires you to replace or modify any valve that has a serial number within this range. The modification consisted of reworked valves that were re-identified with an "A" at the end of the serial number. AD 2003-03-14 allows the pilot to check the logbook and does not require the inspection and replacement requirement if the check shows that one of these valves is definitely not installed. Since AD 2003-03-14 became effective, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has found that the valve manufacturer was not correctly incorporating the modification on reworked valves. Consequently, the installation of modified fuel valves installed per AD 2003-03-14 could allow the unsafe condition to remain on the affected airplanes. This AD would require you to replace any firewall shutoff or crossfeed valve with a serial number in a certain range even if it has been modified per AD 2003-03-14. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent a faulty firewall shutoff or crossfeed valve from developing cracks and leaking fuel. This could result in an engine fire.
2017-13-13: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 737-100, -200, -200C, -300, -400, and -500 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of frame web cracking at certain locations. This AD requires repetitive inspections in certain locations of the frame web, and corrective action if necessary. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2017-13-09: We are superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2014-16-02, which applied to certain Bombardier, Inc., Model CL-600-1A11 (CL-600) airplanes. AD 2014-16-02 required revising the airplane flight manual to prohibit thrust reverser operation, doing repetitive detailed inspections of both engine thrust reversers for cracks, and modifying the thrust reversers if necessary. The modification is also an interim (optional) terminating action for the repetitive inspections. This new AD adds a new terminating modification of the thrust reversers, which includes new inspections and repair, if necessary. This AD was prompted by a determination that it is necessary to add a requirement to repair or modify the thrust reversers, which would terminate the requirements of AD 2014-16-02. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
63-10-04: 63-10-04 MCCAULEY: Amdt. 556 Part 507 Federal Register May 9, 1963. Applies to McCauley Full Feathering and Constant Speed Propeller Model 2AF36C39 Equipped With Model 78BF Blades and Those Modified to Model 78BFM, but Excluding the Following: Original Model 78BFM Blades, Those Blades Having Serial Numbers with a "Y" Suffix, and Those Blades or Blade Assemblies Which Are Metal Stamped With Identification "P xxxx-3993" Along With a 5 Digit Serial Number Without a Suffix. (Example: P1062-3933, S/N 27236.) (NOTE: These propellers may be found on Beech Models 95-55 and 95-A55 aircraft.) Compliance required as indicated. Because of cranking in the blade threaded shank, accomplish the following: (a) Propellers with blade having accumulated the maximum time in service as listed in Table I of McCauley Service Bulletin No. 53 dated March 4, 1963, before the effective date of this AD, must be replaced prior to the accumulation of 25 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD. (b) Propellers with blades having accumulated less than the maximum time in service as listed in Table I of McCauley Service Bulletin No. 53 dated March 4, 1963, on the effective date of this AD, must be replaced prior to the accumulation of 25 hours' time after the maximum time listed in Table I of McCauley Service Bulletin No. 53 dated March 4, 1963. (c) Propellers with affected blades that are continued in service regardless of the number of hours service, shall not be operated continuously between 2,250 and 2,400 r.p.m. Aircraft with affected blades installed shall be so placarded within 5 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD. The placard may be removed when the blades are replaced. (d) Identification of propeller blade serial numbers shall be determined in accordance with McCauley Service Bulletin No. 53 dated March 4, 1963. (e) Replacement of blades shall be made in accordance with instructions in McCauley Service Bulletin No. 53 dated March 4, 1963. (f) Revise the FAA approved Flight Manual to incorporate operating limitations covering the new propeller installed. An AFM Supplement containing this material may be obtained from the airplane or propeller manufacturer. (McCauley Service Bulletin No. 53 dated March 4, 1963, including supplemental revisions, and Service Manual 601101 cover this subject.) This directive effective May 20, 1963.
2017-13-06: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all DG Flugzeugbau GmbH Models DG-400, DG-500M, DG-500MB, DG-800A, and DG-800B gliders. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as a manufacturing defect in certain textile fabric covered fuel hoses, which could cause the fuel hose to fail. We are issuing this AD to require actions to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2017-12-13: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus Model A320-212, -214, -232, and -233 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report of a crack found during an inspection of the pocket radius of the fuselage frame. This AD requires repetitive low frequency eddy current inspections or repetitive high frequency eddy current inspections of this area, and repair if necessary. The repair terminates the repetitive inspections. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
62-21-03: 62-21-03 HUGHES: Amdt. 485 Part 507 Federal Register September 20, 1962. Applies to All Model 269A Helicopters Except Those Operated Under CAR Part 8 With Limitations Which Prohibit Flight Over Densely Populated Areas, in Congested Airlanes, or in the Vicinity of Busy Airports. Compliance required as indicated. Prior to further flight, unless already accomplished, incorporate modification in accordance with Hughes Service Bulletin No. 2A7 or equivalent approved by FAA Western Region. This directive effective upon publication in the Federal Register for all persons except those to whom it was made effective immediately by telegrams dated August 17, 1962, and August 31, 1962.
2003-17-10: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for McCauley Systems, Inc. propellers that are installed on, but not limited to, BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Jetstream Model 4101 airplanes. That AD currently requires a one-time fluorescent penetrant inspection (FPI) of propeller blade retention areas for cracks. This AD requires initial and repetitive FPI or Ultrasonic Inspection (UT) of propeller blade retention areas for cracks, replacement of high time propeller blades, and a one-time inspection of propeller hubs. This AD is prompted by four reports of significant cracks found in propeller blade shanks since the issuance of AD 2003-15-01. We are issuing this AD to prevent propeller blade failure or hub failure due to cracking, which could result in failure of the propeller and loss of control of the airplane.
2017-12-14: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 757-200 and -200PF series airplanes. This AD was prompted by an evaluation by the design approval holder (DAH) indicating that certain areas of the frame webs are subject to widespread fatigue damage (WFD). This AD requires inspections of the frame webs for any crack of any open coordinating holes, tooling holes, and insulation blanket attachment holes; repair if necessary; and modification of the frame webs at all open hole locations, which would terminate the repetitive inspections. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2017-12-12: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all The Boeing Company Model 757-200, -200PF, and -200CB series airplanes. This AD was prompted by an evaluation by the design approval holder (DAH) indicating that certain fuselage circumferential splice plates are subject to widespread fatigue damage (WFD). This AD requires repetitive low frequency eddy current (LFEC) inspections for cracks of certain circumferential splice plates, and repairs if necessary. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
62-21-02: 62-21-02 GENERAL DYNAMICS/CONVAIR: Amdt. 487 Part 507 Federal Register September 25, 1962. Applies to All Models 22 and 22M Series Aircraft. Compliance required within the next 350 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. With the rudder pedals adjusted to the full forward position and the rudder fully deflected, mechanical interference can make it impossible to apply brakes on the side with the deflected rudder. To correct this interference problem, P/N's 22-41202-1 LH and 22-41202-2 RH located at fuselage Station 192 shall be reworked in accordance with General Dynamics/Convair Service Bulletin A27-53 for the Model 22 and A27-22 for the Model 22M or in accordance with an FAA engineering approved equivalent modification. (General Dynamics/Convair Alert Service Bulletin A27-53 for the Model 22 and A27-22 for the Model 22M cover this same subject.) This directive effective October 25, 1962.
79-21-02: 79-21-02 AVIONS MARCEL DASSAULT (A.M.D.): Amendment 39-3587. Applies to all models of the Fan Jet Falcon series airplanes, Serial Numbers 1 through 376, 378 through 380, 382, and 385 through 388, certificated in all categories. Compliance required as specified in the body of this AD, unless already accomplished. To prevent inadvertent opening of the passenger door due to incomplete manual engagement in closing, worn components, or poor adjustment of the latching mechanism, accomplish the following: (a) For aircraft serial numbers 371 and 386, comply only with paragraph (e) of this AD. All other aircraft must comply with paragraphs (b) through (g) of this AD. (b) Within the next 50 hours in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, inspect the passenger door outer control handle and its catch for evidence of wear or inadequate mating of the engaging surfaces in accordance with Avions Marcel Dassault (A.M.D.) Service Bulletin (SB)No. 604 dated May 17, 1978, with Revision 1 dated June 8, 1978, or equivalent approved by the Chief, Aircraft Certification Staff, FAA, AEU-100, Europe, Africa, and Middle East Region. (c) If during any inspection required by this AD, inadequate mating of the door outer control handle and its catch is found, before further flight, except that the airplane may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to a base where repairs can be made, modify the door outer control handle assembly and its catch and install new steel lock bolts in accordance with AMD - SB No. 615, dated May 17, 1978, or an equivalent approved by Chief, Aircraft Certification Staff, FAA, Europe, Africa, and Middle East Region, or if wear is localized on the door outer handle, replace it with a door outer handle of the same part number in accordance with the Falcon 20 service manuals referenced in paragraph "J" of AMD-SB No. 615 or equivalent approved by Chief, Aircraft Certification Staff, AEU-100, FAA, Europe, Africa, and Middle East Region. (d) If during any inspection required by this AD, inadequate mating of the door outer control handle and its catch is found or if a new door outer control handle has been installed in accordance with paragraph (c) of this AD, inspect the door outer control handle and its catch in accordance with the method specified in paragraph (b) of this AD at intervals not to exceed 500 hours time in service from the last inspection until the door outer control handle assembly and its catch are modified and steel lock bolts are installed in accordance with AMD - SB No. 615, dated May 17, 1978, or equivalent approved by the Chief, Aircraft Certification Staff, AEU-100, FAA, Europe, Africa, and Middle East Region. (e) Within the next 500 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, install passenger door closing instruction placards and symbols in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions, paragraph 2.k. of AMD - SB No. 616, dated May 17, 1978 or FAA-approved equivalent. (f) Within the next 1000 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, install a microswitch and associated electrical circuitry to the passenger door handle mechanism and accomplish associated modifications, in accordance with AMD - SB 616, dated May 17, 1978, or equivalent approved by the Chief, Aircraft Certification Staff, AEU-100, Federal Aviation Administration, Europe, Africa, and Middle East Region, c/o American Embassy, Brussels, Belgium. (g) Upon accomplishment of each modification specified in this AD, incorporate appropriate revisions to the Aircraft Parts, Maintenance and Repair Manuals, and Wiring Diagrams related to AMD service bulletins referenced in this AD. This amendment becomes effective November 12, 1979.
2017-12-15: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Bombardier, Inc., Model CL-600-2E25 (Regional Jet Series 1000) airplanes. This AD requires revising the airplane flight manual (AFM) to provide procedures to stabilize the airplane's airspeed and attitude. This AD was prompted by two in-service incidents of loss of all air data information in the flight deck. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2017-12-07: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 737-800, -900, and -900ER series airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of in-flight failure of the left temperature control valve and control cabin trim air modulating valve. This AD requires replacing the left temperature control valve and control cabin trim air modulating valve. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2024-16-01: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2000-18- 09, which applied to certain Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. (now Bell Textron Inc.), Model 412, 412CF, and 412EP helicopters. AD 2000-18-09 required repetitively inspecting the upper left-hand cap angle (cap angle) and adjacent structure for a crack and, depending on the results, replacing any cracked cap angle and repairing any crack in the adjacent structure. This AD was prompted by a report of a fatigue crack in a tail boom attachment cap angle. This AD retains the requirements of AD 2000-18-09, expands the applicability by adding models and an additional part-numbered cap angle, reduces the inspection intervals, and requires using updated procedures. This AD also updates the reporting requirement. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
86-24-06: 86-24-06 BRITISH AEROSPACE: Amendment 39-5472. Applies to Models HP-137 MK 1 and Jetstream 200 Series (all serial numbers), and Model Jetstream 3101 (S/N 601-633, 635-646 and 648-654 inclusive) airplanes certificated in any category. Compliance: Required within 600 hours time-in-service (TIS) after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To prevent unacceptable aileron control vibration and aileron jamming, accomplish the following: (a) Inspect the special stud BAe P/N 13705E29 and nut BAe P/N A103-JT for tightness, visible thread length and punch marks, in accordance with Section 2. "Accomplishment Instructions" in BAe Mandatory S/B No. 27-JM-5257, dated June 6, 1986. (1) If the special stud and nut are secure, and the special stud end protrudes 1-1/2 to 2 threads beyond the nut and all three punch marks are visible, no further action is necessary. (2) If the special stud and nut are loose, or the special stud end does not protrude 1-1/2 to 2 threads beyond the nut, or all three punch marks are not visible, prior to further flight, remove aileron quadrant in accordance with Section 2. "Accomplishment Instructions," Paragraph B. "Removal/Installation" in BAe Mandatory S/B No. 27-JM-5257, dated June 6, 1986, and check the security of the nut P/N A103-JT securing the special stud P/N 13705E29 to the quadrant, and determine that peening of the stud is in accordance with the above BAe Service Bulletin. (i) If security and locking are satisfactory, prior to further flight, reinstall aileron control quadrant using steps (13) to (20) inclusive of the above Service Bulletin, and no further action is required. (ii) If the securing nut P/N A103-JT or special stud P/N 13705E29 is loose or the peening of the stud is not in accordance with the above BAe Service Bulletin, prior to further flight, remove and replace nut BAe P/N A103-JT with new nut BAe P/N RMTE 9868-6, install new stud BAe P/N 13705E91 and add splitpin SP90-C7 to lock the nut on, according to the instructions in BAe Mandatory S/B 27-JM-5257, dated June 6, 1986. (b) Airplanes may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a location where this AD may be accomplished. (c) An equivalent means of compliance with this AD may be used if approved by the Manager, Aircraft Certification Staff, AEU-100, Europe, Africa and Middle East Office, FAA, c/o American Embassy, B-1000 Brussels, Belgium. All persons affected by this directive may obtain copies of the document referred to herein upon request to British Aerospace PLC., Manager, Product Support Civil Aircraft Division, Prestwick Airport, Ayrshire, KA9 2RW, Scotland; or British Aerospace, Inc., Librarian, Box 17414, Dulles International Airport, Washington, D.C. 20041; or FAA, Office of the Regional Counsel, Room 1558, 601 East 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri 64106. This amendment becomes effective on January 2, 1987.
2024-16-06: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2023-15- 07, which applied to all Air Tractor, Inc. (Air Tractor) Model AT-802 and AT-802A airplanes with Wipaire, Inc. Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) No. SA01795CH installed. AD 2023-15-07 required repetitively inspecting the left and right forward horizontal stabilizer spars for cracks, replacing any forward horizontal stabilizer spar found cracked, and reporting inspection results to the FAA. This AD requires repetitively inspecting the left and right, forward and rear, horizontal stabilizer spars for cracks at shorter intervals than those required by AD 2023-15-07, replacing any horizontal stabilizer spar found cracked or damaged, installing bathtub fittings, and reporting inspection results to the FAA. This AD was prompted by additional reports of cracks in the horizontal stabilizer spars and the need to incorporate a new finlet attach design on the horizontal stabilizer spars to reduce the cracking. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
64-06-02: 64-06-02\tBOEING: Amdt 707 Part 507 Federal Register March 17, 1964. Applies to All Model 720 Series Aircraft with Pratt and Whitney JT3C-7 and JT3C-12 Turbojet Engines Installed. \n\n\tCompliance required as indicated. \n\n\tAs the result of the failure of the second and third stage compressor rotor disc spacer assemblies, P/N's 359411 and 359412, respectively, and resultant serious engine damage together with possible aircraft damage, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tFor spacer assemblies previously inspected by the procedure described in (c), reinspect in accordance with (c) as follows: \n\n\t\t(1)\tInspect spacer assemblies having 200 or more hours' time in service since the last inspection within 50 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, and within each 250 hours' time in service thereafter. \n\n\t\t(2)\tInspect spacer assemblies having less than 200 hours' time in service since last inspection prior to the accumulation of 250 hours' time in service and within each 250 hours' time in service thereafter. \n\n\t(b)\tFor spacer assemblies not previously inspected by the procedure described in (c), inspect in accordance with (c) as follows: \n\n\t\t(1)\tInspect spacer assemblies with 950 or more hours' time in service since last overhaul within the next 50 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, and every 250 hours' time in service thereafter. \n\n\t\t(2)\tInspect spacer assemblies with less than 950 hours' time in service since last overhaul prior to the accumulation of 1,000 hours' time in service since last overhaul and every 250 hours' time in service from the last inspection. \n\n\t(c)\tIncorporate an inspection hole and plug in the compressor case and second stage vane and shroud assembly and in the compressor case and third stage vane and shroud assembly in accordance with Pratt and Whitney Aircraft letter dated November 22, 1963, and its two enclosed sketches. Using an American Systoscope Markers Incorporated Model B-175-AS-15 or FAA approved equivalent viewing instrument inserted through these holes, inspect the second and third stage compressor rotor disc spacer assemblies for possible cracks in all the visible areas of each spacer. Give particular attention to the front and rear seal edges. If any cracks are found, remove the engine before further flight and disassemble for confirmation of the cracks. Replace any cracked spacer assemblies. \n\n\t(d)\tWhen P/N's 420145 and 429175 second and third stage compressor rotor disc spacer assemblies, respectively, are incorporated, the inspections prescribed by this AD are no longer required. \n\n\t(e)\tUpon request of the operator, an FAA maintenance inspector, subject to prior approval of the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Eastern Region, may adjust the repetitive inspection intervals specified in this AD to permit compliance at an established inspection period of the operator if the request contains substantiating data to justify the increase for such operator. \n\n\t(Pratt and Whitney Aircraft telegraphic message dated November 20, 1963, to Eastern Air Lines and Pratt and Whitney Aircraft letter dated November 22, 1963, and enclosed two sketches to all operators of JT3C-7 turbojet engines cover the same subject.) \n\n\tThis supersedes AD 63-26-01. \n\n\tThis directive effective March 17, 1964.
2017-12-09: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Empresa Brasileira de Aeronautica S.A. (Embraer) Model EMB-135 airplanes and Model EMB-145, -145ER, -145MR, -145LR, -145MP, -145EP, and -145XR airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report of chafing found between the fuel pump electrical harness and the fuel pump tubing during scheduled maintenance. This AD requires a detailed inspection for chafing on the electrical harness of each electrical fuel pump in the fuel tanks, replacement of the affected electrical fuel pump with a new or serviceable pump if necessary, and installation of clamps on the fuel pump electrical harnesses. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.