Results
2023-02-10: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 99-25-11 for certain BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Model BAe 146 and Avro 146-RJ series airplanes. AD 99-25-11 required repetitive inspections for cracks along the face of the retraction attachment boss in the nose landing gear (NLG) sidewall; and corrective action, if necessary. This AD was prompted by a report of a crack found on the left-hand sidewall well on the NLG, and by the determination that additional airplanes are subject to the identified unsafe condition. This AD continues to require the actions in AD 99-25-11, and expands the applicability. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2014-04-02: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for DORNIER LUFTFAHRT GmbH Model 228-212 airplanes. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as main landing gear axle failure caused by initial fatigue cracking and small pre-damage by corrosion. We are issuing this AD to require actions to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2008-17-05: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD), which applies to certain EMBRAER Model EMB-135 airplanes and Model EMB-145, -145ER, -145MR, -145LR, -145XR, -145MP, and -145EP airplanes. That AD currently requires replacing the metallic tubes enclosing the vent and pilot valve wires in the left- and right-hand wing fuel tanks with non-conductive hoses. This new AD adds airplanes to the applicability of the existing AD. This AD results from fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer. We are issuing this AD to prevent an ignition source inside the fuel tank that could ignite fuel vapor and cause a fuel tank explosion and loss of the airplane. DATES: This AD becomes effective September 23, 2008. The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of a certain publication listed in the AD as of September 23, 2008. On July 19, 2007 (72 FR 32780, June 14, 2007), the Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain other documents.
96-07-08: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Airbus Model A320-111 series airplanes. This action requires modification of the splicing cap at nose forward Frame 8 by cold expansion of the fastener holes and installation of new oversize fasteners. This amendment is prompted by results of a full-scale fatigue test which revealed that fatigue cracking can initiate from these fastener holes. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent such fatigue cracking which, if not detected and corrected in a timely manner, could compromise the structural integrity of the fuselage and lead to rapid depressurization of the airplane.
89-08-10 R1: 89-08-10 McDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-6185 as amended by Amendment 39-6236. \n\n\tApplicability: Model DC-9 and C-9 (Military) series airplanes, including Model DC-9-80 series airplanes and Model MD-88 airplanes, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent structural failure of the empennage section, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tFor airplanes equipped with dorsal fin two-piece attach angles, part numbers 5912188-27, -28, -29, and -30, accomplish the following: \n\n\t\t1.\tWithin 100 landings after May 17, 1982 (the effective date of Telegraphic AD T82-10-51-R1, later issued as Amendment 39-4481), visually inspect, from inside the airplane, the upper fuselage skin between longerons 4L through 4R for cracks in the area adjacent to the following fuselage stations appropriate to the model being inspected: \n\t\t\n\nSeries -10 and -20:\t\nFuselage Stations (FS) 901.400; \nSeries -30 and C9:\t \nFS 1080.400;\nSeries -40:\t\nFS 1156.400; \nSeries -50:\t\nFS 1251.400; and \nSeries -80:\t\nFS 1422.400. \n\t\n\t\t2.\tIf no cracks are found, accomplish the interim modification in accordance with McDonnell Douglas Service Sketch 3414, Revision D, dated May 11, 1982 (hereinafter referred to as 3414D), prior to the accumulation of 50 landings after June 7, 1982, for DC-9 and C-9 series aircraft, fuselage numbers 1 through 950; and prior to the accumulation of 400 landings from May 17, 1982, for all other affected airplanes. Verification that no cracks exist must be repeated immediately prior to accomplishment of the interim modification. The visual inspection required by paragraph A.1., above, must be repeated at intervals not to exceed 2,000 landings after the accomplishment of the interim modification. Prior to accumulating 4,000 landings from May 17, 1982, accomplish the modification specified in paragraph D.1., below. \n\n\t\t3.\tIf cracks are found, before further flight, accomplish the interim modification described in McDonnell Douglas Service Sketches 3413, Revision J, dated March 25, 1983 (hereinafter referred to as 3413J) and 3414D, and repeat the visual inspection required by paragraph A.1., above, thereafter at intervals not to exceed 2,000 landings. Prior to accumulating 4,000 landings from May 17, 1982, accomplish the modification specified in paragraph D.1., below. \n\n\tB.\tFor airplanes with dorsal fin one-piece attach angle, part number 5912188-5 or -6 accomplish the following: \n\n\t\t1.\tWithin 500 landings from May 17, 1982, for airplanes with less than 22,500 landings; and within 100 landings from May 17, 1982, for airplanes with 22,500 or more landings; conduct the visual inspections, from inside the airplane, in accordance with paragraph A.1., above. In addition, conduct a visual inspection of the dorsal fin attach angle, from the outside of the airplane, for cracks. \n\n\t\t2.\tIf no angle cracks are found, conduct an eddy current inspection of the angle in accordance with McDonnell Douglas DC-9 Alert Service Bulletin A53-154, Revision 4, dated August 24, 1982; or conduct a dye penetrant inspection of the angle, within 1,000 additional landings, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 3,000 landings, until the modification specified in paragraph D.1., below, is accomplished. \n\n\t\t3.\tIf skin cracks are found, before further flight, accomplish the modification described in McDonnell Douglas Service Sketch 3413J, and conduct eddy current inspections of the angle in accordance with paragraph B.2., above, thereafter at intervals not to exceed 3,000 landings, until the modification specified in paragraph D.1., below, is accomplished. \n\n\t\t4.\tIf dorsal fin attach angle cracks are found, accomplish the repair described in DC-9 Structural Repair Manual, Chapter 53-05, Figure 19, prior to the accumulation of 50 landings from June 7, 1982, for Model DC-9 and C-9 series airplanes, fuselage numbers 1 through 896; and prior to the accumulation of 400 landingsfrom May 17, 1982, for all other affected airplanes. Verification that no skin cracks exist must be repeated immediately prior to accomplishment of the repair. \n\n\t\t5.\tA dye penetrant or eddy current inspection of the angle in accordance with paragraph B.2., above, must be repeated at intervals not to exceed 3,000 landings after the accomplishment of the repair until the modification specified in paragraph D.1., below is accomplished. As an alternative to this procedure, accomplish the interim modification described in McDonnell Douglas Service Sketch 3414D, in accordance with the compliance schedule specified in paragraph B.4., above. The visual inspection required by paragraph B.1., above, must be repeated at intervals not to exceed 2,000 landings after the accomplishment of the interim modification. Prior to the accumulation of 4,000 landings from May 17, 1982, accomplish the modification specified in paragraph D.1., below. \n\n\tC.\tFor airplanes equipped with dorsal fin attach angle part number 5939711-1, -2, -501, -502, accomplish the following: \n\n\t\t1.\tPrior to the accumulation of 7,500 landings since installation of the above attach angle, or within 100 landings after August 19, 1988 (the effective date of telegraphic AD 88-17-51), whichever occurs later, unless previously accomplished within the last 2,000 landings, conduct a visual inspection of both angles, RH and LH, for cracks. \n\n\t\t 2.\tIf no angle cracks are found, conduct a visual inspection of the angle in accordance with McDonnell Douglas DC-9 Alert Service Bulletin A53-223, dated November 30, 1988, (hereinafter referred to as ASB53-223), at intervals not to exceed 2,000 landings, until such time as the angles are replaced in accordance with paragraph D.1., below. \n\n\t\t3.\tIf dorsal fin attach angle cracks are found, before further flight, replace or modify cracked dorsal fin attach angle(s) in accordance with ASB53-223. \n\n\t\t4.\tIf skin cracks are found, before further flight, accomplish the modification in accordance with McDonnell Douglas Service Sketch 3413J. \n\n\tD.\tModification. \n\n\t\t1.\tReplacement or modification of the dorsal fin attach angle in accordance with ASB53-223, may be accomplished in lieu of the repetitive inspections required by paragraphs A., B., or C., above. \n\n\t\t2.\tUpon the accumulation of 30,000 landings after accomplishing the replacement or modification described in paragraph D.1., above, resume repetitive inspections in accordance with paragraph C., above, at intervals not to exceed 2,000 landings. \n\n\tE.\tAn alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office. \n\n\tF.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Director of Publications, C1-00 (54-60). These documents may be examined at FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or 3229 East Spring Street, Long Beach, California. \n\n\tThis AD supersedes two previously issued AD's: \n\n\t1.\tTelegraphic AD T82-10-51 issued May 5, 1982, as revised by Revision 1 dated May 17, 1982, Revision 2 dated June 7, 1982, and Revision 3 (Amendment 39-4481) which became effective on November 8, 1982. \n\n\t2.\tAirworthiness Directive 88-17-51 (Amendment 39-6016) which became effective on September 28, 1988, except tothose persons to whom it became immediately effective upon receipt of telegraphic AD T88-17-51 which was issued on August 19, 1988. \n\n\tAirworthiness Directive 89-08-10 (Amendment 39-6185) became effective on May 9, 1989. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6236, a correction to AD 89-08-10) becomes effective on June 14, 1989.
51-14-01: 51-14-01 BEECH: Applies to All Models 35 and A35 Aircraft Equipped With Unmodified Adel 20653 Electric Fuel Pump Installation. Compliance was required as soon as possible, but in any event, not later than April 1, 1949. To prevent the possibility of air leakage into the airplane's fuel system through a leaking shaft seal of the unmodified 20653 pump, this pump and associated installation components are to be removed from the airplane. Aircraft equipped with a modified fuel booster pump installation, which consists of a modified Adel 20653 electric-driven fuel pump (identified by either a 1/8 inch red band around the pump body, or the suffix "H" in the pump serial number, in series with a modified Thompson TF-1100 engine-driven fuel pump (identified by a "2" or "M2" stamped after the TF-1100 on the nameplate)) installed in accordance with Beech Installation Instructions, revised March 31, 1949, are not affected by this Airworthiness Directive. (Beech Letter D-49-540 dated January 7, 1949, and Installation Instructions for the Model 35 Electric-Driven Auxiliary Fuel Pump, revised March 31, 1949, covers this same subject.) This supersedes AD 49-28-02.
2004-23-16: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for McCauley Propeller Systems propeller assemblies, part numbers (P/Ns) B5JFR36C1101/114GCA-0, C5JFR36C1102/L114GCA-0, B5JFR36C1103/114HCA-0, and C5JFR36C1104/L114HCA-0, installed on BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Jetstream Model 4100 series airplanes. This AD requires a one- time eddy-current inspection of the propeller hub for cracks, and if necessary, replacing the propeller assembly. This AD results from three reports of cracked hubs. We are issuing this AD to detect cracked hubs, which could cause failure of the propeller hub and loss of control of the airplane.
2008-16-06: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Resulting from the assessment of fuel tank wiring installations required by SFAR 88 (Special Federal Aviation Regulation 88) and equivalent JAA/EASA (Joint Aviation Authorities/European Aviation Safety Agency) policy, BAE Systems identified two features in the Jetstream 4100 where the need for design changes was apparent. * * * Insufficient or defective bonding in the fuel tank area, if not corrected, could lead to ignition of fuel vapours and subsequent fuel tank explosion. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2023-02-06: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directives (ADs) 2005-15- 11, 2016-07-09, and 2018-19-24, which applied to all BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Model 4101 airplanes. AD 2005-15-11 required repetitive detailed and specialized inspections to detect fatigue damage in the fuselage, replacement of certain bolt assemblies, and corrective actions if necessary. AD 2016-07-09 required a revision of the maintenance or inspection program, as applicable. AD 2018-19-24 required a one-time detailed inspection of a certain fuselage frame and repair, if necessary, and a revision of the maintenance or inspection program, as applicable, to incorporate new or revised maintenance instructions and airworthiness limitations. This AD was prompted by a determination that new or more restrictive airworthiness limitations are necessary. This AD continues to require the actions in ADs 2016-07- 09 and 2018-19-24 and requires revising the existing maintenance or inspection program, as applicable, to incorporate new or more restrictive airworthiness limitations. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
80-04-02: 80-04-02 PRATT & WHITNEY AIRCRAFT OF CANADA, LTD.: Amendment 39-3693. Applies to Pratt & Whitney Aircraft of Canada, Ltd. (P&WACL) PT6A-6A, -6B, -6/C20 and -20 turboprop engines. Compliance required within the next 10 hours in service after the effective date of this AD unless already accomplished and every time the propeller reversing interconnect linkage is disconnected. To insure adequate engagement of push-pull control terminal P/N 3010175 into the clevis P/N 3010622 or 3012419, inspect for a maximum of three threads outside the locknut. If more than three threads are visible, re- rig the linkage in accordance with P&WACL Maintenance Manual, P/N 3015422 Part 3, Paragraph 91 and the appropriate aircraft maintenance manual or equivalent inspection or procedure. For clevises incorporating witness holes, a safety wire inserted through one hole should not be able to exit through the opposite hole. Where the safety wire passes through both holes, re-rig in accordance withP&WACL Maintenance Manual, P/N 3015422 Part 3, Paragraph 91 and the appropriate aircraft maintenance manual or equivalent inspection or procedure. Aircraft may be flown to a base for performance of maintenance required by this AD per FAR 21.197 or FAR 21.199. All equivalent inspections and procedures must be approved by the Chief, Engineering & Manufacturing Branch of the Eastern Region of the FAA. (DeHavilland Service Bulletin Nos. A6/387 and ATB/50 pertain to this subject.) This amendment is effective February 8, 1980.
2000-04-07: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all British Aerospace BAe Model ATP airplanes, that requires a one-time detailed visual inspection to detect incorrect installation or discrepancies (damage, bending, overheating, discoloration) of the circuit breaker and the cable terminations of the circuit breaker of the engine de-ice panel. This amendment is prompted by issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of the engine intake de-icing system, which could result in loss of engine intake de-icing capability, accretion of ice in the intake duct, ice ingestion, and consequent engine flameout.
2004-23-17: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) to supersede Airworthiness Directive 91-03-15, which applies to certain Mooney Airplane Company, Inc., (Mooney) Model M20M airplanes. AD 91-03- 15 currently requires you to replace the tailpipe coupling with improved tailpipe coupling. Since we issued AD 91-03-15, a fire erupted in the lower left cockpit area on one of the airplanes affected by AD 91-03-15. The V-clamp that attaches the exhaust tailpipe to the turbocharger fell off, which allowed the exhaust tailpipe to detach from the turbocharger. Hot exhaust gases from the turbocharger outlet blasted the lower left firewall. This AD requires you to replace the existing radiant heat shield with the new improved design heat shield, deflector kit; replace the existing exhaust tailpipe-to-turbocharger V- band clamp with the new design V-band clamp; and modify the hydraulic brake fluid poly line. We are issuing this AD to prevent the V-clamp from detaching from the turbocharger and to prevent exposure of the firewall to hot exhaust gases, which could result in an in-flight fire. An in-flight fire could lead to loss of control of the airplane and passenger injury.
2000-04-10: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to Hoffmann Propeller Co. HO27( ) and HO4/27 series propellers. This action requires installing improved propeller mounting bolts to a higher torque value, operating the airplane for one flight, checking the torque, and retorquing, as required, to the correct torque value. This amendment is prompted by reports of insufficient torque of propeller mounting bolts due to operating conditions, loads, and environmental conditions such as humidity and temperature. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent propeller mounting bolt failure, which could result in propeller separation and loss of control of the airplane.
2014-03-02: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus Model AS332C, AS332L, AS332L1, AS332L2, and SA330J helicopters. This AD requires inspecting the crimping of the ball joint of the upper- and lower- end-fittings of the main servo-control and, depending on findings, replacing the main servo-control or repairing the ball joint. This AD was prompted by incidents of missing crimping on the ball joints of servo-control end-fittings. The actions of this AD are intended to prevent failure of a main servo-control upper end fitting, and subsequent failure of the flight controls and loss of control of the helicopter.
2000-04-01: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain Cessna Aircraft Company (Cessna) Models 172R, 172S, 182S, 206H, and T206H airplanes. This AD requires that you accomplish the following: - inspect the oil pressure switch to determine if the oil pressure switch is part-number (P/N) 77041 or P/N 83278; and - replace any P/N 77041 oil pressure switch with a P/N 83278 switch. This AD is the result of reports of failure of the oil pressure switch diaphragm. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent loss of engine oil through the failure of the oil pressure switch diaphragm, which could result in partial or complete loss of engine power.
89-03-08: 89-03-08 EMPRESA BRASILEIRA DE AERONAUTICA, S.A. (EMBRAER): Amendment 39-6129. Applicability: Model EMB-120 series airplanes, as listed in Embraer Service Bulletin 120-024-0031, dated October 21, 1988, certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. To prevent the loss of essential navigation systems, accomplish the following: A. Within the next 25 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, accomplish the following, in accordance with Embraer Service Bulletin 120-024-0031, dated October 21, 1988: 1. Install self-locking nuts, P/N LN9161-05, to secure the No. 1 and No. 2 auxiliary generator control voltage sensor wires to the connecting bars at relays K0035 and K0036. 2. Install placard 120-47147-001 on the left-hand relay box cover. The placard shall state, "USE LN9161-05 NUTS FOR K0035 AND K0036 IN PLACE OF ORIGINAL NUTS. SEE MAINTENANCE MANUAL 24-52-00." B. An alternate means of complianceor adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Central Region. NOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), who may add any comments and then send it to the Manager, Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office. C. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service information from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to EMBRAER, 276 S.W. 34th Street, Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33315. This information may be examined at FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or FAA, Central Region, Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office, 1669 Phoenix Parkway, Suite 210C, Atlanta,Georgia. This amendment (39-6129, AD 89-03-08) becomes effective February 15, 1989.
80-01-03: 80-01-03 RAVEN INDUSTRIES, INC.: Amendment 39-3648. Applies to model S-50A, serial no. S50A-275, model S-55A, serial nos. S-55A-330 to S-55A-624, and model S-60A, serial nos. S-60A-102 to S-60A-138 hot air balloons certificated in all categories which have installed the parachute top vent. Compliance required before further flight unless already accomplished. To allow proper release of the parachute top, accomplish the following or an equivalent modification approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Rocky Mountain Region: Remove all but the middle 1 inch of the length of the "Velcro" tape "hooks" on each of the 24 4-inch long tapes found on the envelope by use of a razorblade or sharp knife. Raven Service Bulletin No. 111 dated December 19, 1979, covers this same subject. This amendment becomes effective January 7, 1980
84-09-06: 84-09-06 DeHAVILLAND: Amendment 39-4858. Applies to all Models DHC-2 MK. I (L-20A, YL-20, U-6 and U-6A), MK. II Beaver and MK. III Turbo Beaver series airplanes certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent the failure of the horizontal torque tube at the base of the control column which may cause loss of airplane control, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 5O hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, unless accomplished within the last 150 hours time-in-service, and subsequently at intervals thereafter not to exceed 200 hours time-in-service from the last inspection, visually inspect the control column lower sub-assembly, P/N C2CF843A (single control column) and C2CF1977AND (dual control column) for cracks in accordance with DeHavilland Service Bulletin No. 2/28, Revision B, dated May 13, 1983, Section ACCOMPLISHMENT INSTRUCTIONS paragraphs 1a, lb, 1c and If or an FAA approvedequivalent. (b) If no cracks are found, return the airplane to service and repeat the inspections required by paragraph (a) of this AD. (c) If cracks 0.5 inches or less in length in the weld area are found in the control column assembly P/N C2CF843A (single control column) and C2CF1977AND (dual control column), repair the above-noted assembly prior to further flight as instructed in the ACCOMPLISHMENT INSTRUCTIONS Section of Service Bulletin No. 2/28 Revision B. (d) If cracks longer than 0.5 inches are found in the control column assembly P/N C2CF843A (single control column) and C2CF1977AND (dual control column), replace the assembly prior to further flight as instructed in the ACCOMPLISHMENT INSTRUCTIONS Section of Service Bulletin No. 2/28 Revision B. (e) Aircraft maintenance record entries shall be made and a report in writing of the initial inspection findings, positive or negative, shall be made to the FAA, New York Aircraft Certification Office, New England Region, Attention: ANE-172, 181 South Franklin Avenue, Valley Stream, New York 11581. A negative finding report shall include the time-in-service of the aircraft and of the component. A positive finding report shall include the above information and state the location and length of any crack found. Reports may be submitted by letter to the New England Region, or through the Malfunction or Defect (M or D) procedure. (The paper work reporting requirement has been cleared by the Office of Management and Budget under Clearance Number 2100 0056.) (f) The airplane may be flown in accordance with Federal Aviation Regulation 21.197 to a location where this AD can be accomplished. (g) Alternate methods of compliance with this AD may be used when they provide an equivalent level of safety and are approved by the Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office, FAA New England Region, 181 South Franklin Avenue, Valley Stream, New York 11581. (h) The repetitive inspection intervalrequired by (a) may be increased by the Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office, FAA New England Region upon receipt of substantiating data submitted through an FAA Maintenance Inspector. This amendment becomes effective on May 10, 1984.
2023-02-05: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all General Electric Company (GE) CF34-8C1, CF34-8C5, CF34-8C5A1, CF34- 8C5B1, CF34-8C5A2, CF34-8C5A3, CF34-8E2, CF34-8E2A1, CF34-8E5, CF34- 8E5A1, CF34-8E5A2, CF34-8E6, and CF34-8E6A1 model turbofan engines. This AD was prompted by a predicted reduction in the cyclic life of the combustion chamber assembly aft flange. This AD requires revisions to the airworthiness limitations section (ALS) of the existing engine manual (EM) and the operator's existing approved maintenance or inspection program, as applicable, to incorporate initial and repetitive fluorescent penetrant inspections (FPIs) of the combustion chamber assembly. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
61-01-03: 61-01-03 SIKORSKY: Amdt. 238 Part 507 Federal Register December 30, 1960. Applies to All S-58 Helicopters. Compliance required as indicated. As a result of a recent failure of a salvaged S1635-20011-2 input bevel gear which caused an autorotative landing, the following must be accomplished: (a) All input bevel gears (S1635-20011-2) salvaged in accordance with instructions in Sikorsky Service Information Circular No. 1635-1127 Revisions A and E must be retired upon the accumulation of 1,200 hours' time in service since salvage unless reworked in accordance with paragraph (b). (b) Gears salvaged as outlined in (a) of this directive may be resalvaged, prior to accumulating 1,200 hours' time in service since that salvage, in accordance with (A) of Sikorsky Service Bulletin No. 58B35-3B or the following: (1) Strip the chrome plate from the gear by reverse electrolysis. (Use Unichrome 80X, manufactured by United Chrome Co., Waterbury, Conn., or equivalent solution.)(2) Measure the bearing journal diameter. If the diameter is more than 0.010 inch below the low limit of the manufacturing tolerance, reject the part. (3) Perform a magnetic inspection on the bearing area of the gear for cracks, concentrating attention on fillet area; e.g., Magnaflux in accordance with SPEC MIL-I-6868. (4) If cracks exist, reject the gear. (5) If no cracks exist, proceed as follows: (i) Machine and blend the fillet radius at the bearing journal using a radius of blending of 0.150 inch with the maximum depth of undercut equal to 0.010/0.015 inch. (ii) Again perform a magnetic inspection. (iii) Shotpeen the area to be chrome plated, in accordance with SPEC MIL-S-13165, at an intensity of 12A2 to 18A2, using S170 shot. (iv) Bake the gear for five hours at 275 degrees plus or minus 10 degrees F. (v) Anodically clean the gear so as not to embrittle any carburized areas and to prepare the gear for chrome plating. (vi) In accordance with FED. SPEC QQ-C-320, Class 2, chrome plate the bearing area to the thickness corresponding to the diameter below lower limits of manufacturing tolerance shown in the following table: Diameter Below Lower Limits of Mfg. Tolerance Chrome Plate Thickness 0.006 0.005 0.007 0.006 0.008 0.006 0.009 0.007 0.010 0.007 (vii) Bake the gear for five hours at 275 degrees plus or minus 10 degrees F. (viii) Final machine the newly chrome plated O.D. to 5.0382/5.0372 inches. After final machining, the chrome plated area shall have a minimum plate thickness of 0.002 inch. (ix) Perform magnetic inspection after final machining. (c) Gears reworked in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (b) shall be retired upon the accumulation of 2,400 hours total time in service. (d) All input bevel gears (P/N S1635-20011-2) that have been salvaged for the first time in accordance with (B) of Sikorsky Service Bulletin No. 58B35-3B shall be retired upon accumulation of 2,400 hours' time in service since salvage. (Sikorsky Service Bulletin No. 58B35-3B covers this subject.) This directive effective December 30, 1960. Revised May 22, 1965.
2004-23-14: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 767-200, -300, and -300F series airplanes. This AD requires reworking the surface of the ground stud brackets of the transformer rectifier unit (TRU) and the airplane structure mounting surface, and measuring the resistance from the bracket to the structure and the ground lug to the bracket using a bonding meter. This AD is prompted by a report of loss of all direct current (DC) power generation during a flight, due to inadequate electrical ground path between the ground bracket of the TRU and the structure. We are issuing this AD to prevent depletion of the main battery and consequent loss of all DC power, which could cause the loss of flight critical systems.
2000-03-15: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 and MD-11F series airplanes, that requires replacement of the existing terminal strips and supports above the main cabin area; and installation of spacers between terminal strips and mounting brackets in the avionics compartment; as applicable. This amendment is prompted by a report indicating that, during flight, an incident of electrical arcing occurred at a terminal strip located overhead in the main cabin. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent electrical arcing caused by power feeder cable terminal lugs grounding against terminal strip support brackets, which could result in smoke and fire in the main cabin or avionics compartment.
2023-01-13: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model DC-9-81 (MD-81), DC-9-82 (MD-82), DC- 9-83 (MD-83), and DC-9-87 (MD-87) airplanes; and Model MD-88 airplanes. This AD was prompted by an evaluation by the design approval holder (DAH) indicating that certain center wing lower stringers are subject to widespread fatigue damage (WFD). WFD analysis found that fatigue cracks could grow to a critical length after the structural modification point (SMP) for these center wing lower stringers. This AD requires replacing certain left and right side center wing lower stringers. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
79-03-06: 79-03-06 GULFSTREAM AMERICAN CORPORATION (GAC) (Formerly Grumman American Aviation Corporation): Amendment 39-3408. Applies to GAC Model GA-7 serial numbers GA7-0002 through GA7-0038, GA7-0040, and GA7-0042 through GA7-0087, airplanes certificated in all categories. Compliance is required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent partial loss of rudder control, accomplish the following within 10 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD: 1. Inspect and modify the rudder assembly as appropriate in accordance with GAC Service Bulletin ME-16 dated January 31, 1979, or later revision approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Southern Region. (a) If freeplay exceeds the maximum allowed in Service Bulletin ME-16 (.040 inches or 1 degree), modify the rudder assembly in accordance with this bulletin before further flight; however, if the freeplay does not exceed .080 inches or 2 degrees, the aircraft may be flown toa base for repairs in accordance with FAR 21.197. (b) If the freeplay is .040 inches (1 degree) or less, modify the rudder system in accordance with Service Bulletin ME-16 within 100 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD. 2. An equivalent method of compliance may be used if approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Southern Region. This amendment is effective February 15, 1979.
2023-03-01: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Airbus Helicopters Deutschland GmbH (AHD) Model BO-105A, BO-105C, BO- 105S, BO-105LS A-1, BO-105LS A-3, MBB-BK 117 A-1, MBB-BK 117 A-3, MBB- BK 117 A-4, MBB-BK 117 B-1, MBB-BK 117 B-2, MBB-BK 117 C-1, MBB-BK 117 C-2, and MBB-BK 117 D-2 helicopters. This AD was prompted by a report of a missing main rotor swashplate (swashplate) inner ring (inner ring). This AD requires inspecting for the presence of the inner ring and, depending on the results, accomplishing additional actions. This AD also prohibits installing an affected swashplate unless it is determined that the inner ring is installed, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.