Results
59-05-06: 59-05-06 SUD AVIATION: Applies to All Alouette II SE 3130 Helicopters Prior To Serial Number 1160 Except Serial Number 1085. Compliance required as soon as possible but not later than May 1, 1959. In order to preclude binding between the uniball bearing and oilite bearings at the main rotor swash plate, replace oilite bearings Sud Aviation P/N 68.10.009 and spacer P/N 68.10.010 with new oilite bearings P/N 68.10.014, spacer P/N 68.10.012, shim P/N 68.10.013, spacer P/N 68.10.012, shim P/N 68.10.013, spacer P/N 68.10.011. (Note: This assembly must also be lubricated every five hours with Mil. L.644A oil in accordance with Sud Aviation Maintenance Manual.) The French SGACC considers this mandatory. The FAA concurs with this action and considers compliance therewith mandatory. (Sud Aviation Service Bulletin AL.68.11.159 and modification proposal V-49 cover this same subject.) In addition, modifications stated in Republic Aviation Service Bulletins 3.45-1, safetying lateral trim cylinder cap nut and 8.10-3 on rework of emergency fuel shutoff lever must be accomplished immediately unless already completed. This supersedes AD 59-02-03.
70-01-04: 70-01-04 GENERAL DYNAMICS: Amendment 39-917 is amended by Amendment 39- 943. Applies to Model 30 and 30A airplanes. Compliance required as indicated. To detect fatigue cracks and prevent possible failure of the main landing gear support beams: a) Within the next 50 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, or before the accumulation of 17,000 hours time in service, whichever occurs later, visually inspect the exposed surface of the upper beam cap from wing station 69 to 163 for cracks. 1) If no cracks are found, comply with either paragraph (b) or (c)(1) below. 2) If cracks are found in the exposed beam cap surface, remove the fasteners and conduct the inspection of the upper beam cap and tangs as described in paragraph (b), below. Prior to further flight, accomplish (c)(1) or (c)(2), as appropriate. b) If no cracks are found as a result of the inspections specified in paragraph (a), within the next 250 hours time in service, remove the fasteners attaching the lower honeycomb wing panels to beam lower aft tang to permit internal access to the area from wing station 69 to 163, and inspect upper beam cap and tangs by means by dye penetrant or eddy current inspection procedure. 1) If no cracks are found, comply with one of the following alternatives: i) Repeat the inspection described in paragraph (b) at intervals not to exceed 250 hours time in service, or; ii) Install the beam cap reinforcement specified in paragraph (c)(1). 2) If cracks are found which are confined to the beam tang: i) Within the next 50 hours' time in service, remove any steel tang reinforcement previously installed per General Dynamics Service Bulletin 57-9 and, unless previously accomplished, remove all evidence of cracking or any stop drilling by routing with a 0.50 radius router in accordance with Detail K on Convair Drawing Number 30-17827. Verify by dye penetrant or eddy current technique that all evidence ofcracking has been removed. ii) Rework any newly detected tang cracks by routing as prescribed in (b)(2)(i). iii) At intervals not to exceed 250 hours' time in service following any rework per (i) or (ii) above reinspect such reworked areas by eddy current or dye penetrant technique to determine whether any new cracking has developed. If sufficient tang material remains, any new cracking which is detected may be routed out per (i), above. If cracking has progressed into spar cap, rework per (b)(3) below. iv) The reinspection of any spar tang which has been reworked so as to remove all indication of cracking may be discontinued when the spar cap is reinforced per (c)(1) below. 3) If cracks are found in the beam cap and any such crack does not exceed a total area of 0.50 square inches or does not extend chordwise along the upper surface of the beam cap for more than 0.75 inches: i) Remove all evidence of cracking by routing with a router having a minimumradius of 0.50 inches. The cross sectional area removed by routing must not exceed 0.50 square inches. Break all sharp corners and polish all routed surfaces and confirm by eddy current or dye penetrant technique that no evidence of cracking remains. ii) At intervals not to exceed 50 hours' time in service, reinspect all beam caps which have been reworked per (b)(3)(i), above, using dye penetrant or eddy current technique to determine that no new cracking has developed. iii) The reinspection program required by paragraphs (b)(3)(ii) may be discontinued when the beam cap reinforcement is installed per (c)(1) below: 4) If cracks are found in the beam cap extending beyond the limitations specified in (b)(3) above, the beam must be replaced with a new beam prior to further flight. c) Accomplish the following if applicable: 1) If there are no cracks, or if cracks are confined to the beam tangs or extend into the beam cap to any depth less than 0.75 inch, provided that the total cross sectional area loss due to cracking is within the limits specified in General Dynamics Service Engineering Report No. 057-0/67-990-44A, accomplish the repair and reinforcement provisions of paragraph (2)(c) of General Dynamics Service Bulletin 57-9, dated 22 September 1969, or later FAA approved revision, or an equivalent repair and reinforcement approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. The installation of machine tapered straps on the MLG beam flanges described in General Dynamics Service Bulletin No. 57-3, dated 21 September 1962, or later FAA approved revision, or an equivalent approved installation must be accomplished prior to or concurrently with the rework of S.B. 5709. The repetitive inspections outlined in paragraph (b) may be discontinued following the above repair and reinforcement. 2) If the cracks extend into the beam cap to any depth greater than 0.75 inches, or if the total cross sectional area loss due tocracking exceeds the limits specified in General Dynamics Service Engineering Report No. 057-0/67-990-44A, the beam must be replaced with a new beam before further flight. The following conditions are also applicable: i) If the rework and reinforcement outlined in paragraph (c)(1) are not accomplished on the new beam, perform inspections at the intervals specified in paragraph (b) of this AD prior to the accumulation of 17,000 hours time in service after installation of the new beam. ii) If the rework and reinforcement of paragraph (c)(1) has been accomplished on the new beam, all inspections mentioned above may be discontinued. The inspection required by this AD may be discontinued for any uncracked landing gear support beam or for any support beam which has been reworked as prescribed above when the beam is reinforced in accordance with paragraph (2)(c) of General Dynamics Service Bulletin 57- 9, dated September 22, 1969, or later FAA approved revision, or an equivalent reinforcement approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. The installation of machine tapered straps on the MLG beam flanges described in General Dynamics Service Bulletin 57-3, dated September 21, 1962, or later FAA approved revision, or an equivalent approved installation must be accomplished prior to or concurrently with the rework of Service Bulletin 57-9. A further amendment of this AD will be accomplished at such time as new service bulletin information is issued by the manufacturer or any additional requirements or clarifications are found necessary. Amendment 39-917 effective January 29, 1970. This amendment is effective February 26, 1970, and was effective upon receipt for all recipients of the telegram dated January 30, 1970, which contained this amendment.
2004-10-07: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for Bell Helicopter Textron Canada (BHTC) Model 407 helicopters which requires a one-time replacement of certain oil cooler blower bearings. Also, the existing AD requires adding a limitation and caution to the rotorcraft flight manual (RFM) and inspecting, replacing, and lubricating certain bearings at specified intervals. This amendment adds certain segmented drive shaft bearings to the applicability and requires modifying the oil cooler blower inlet ducts and airflow shields and replacing certain bearings. Thereafter, this amendment requires removing the current temporary limitations and inserting revised limitations into the RFM. This amendment also requires revising the inspection and lubrication requirements. This amendment is prompted by several cases of bearing failure. The addition of certain segmented drive shaft bearings is due to two recent failures. The actions specified by this AD are intended toprevent failure of a bearing, loss of tail rotor drive, and a subsequent loss of directional control of the helicopter.
2012-06-19: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus Model A330-201, -202, -203, -223, -243, -301, -302, -303, -321, -322, -323, -341, -342, and -343 airplanes; and Model A340-200 and -300 series airplanes. This AD requires repetitive inspections of the main fitting and sliding tube of the nose landing gear (NLG) for defects, damage, and cracks, and corrective actions if necessary. This AD was prompted by reports of a cracked main fitting and sliding tube during overhaul of NLGs. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct cracks, defects, or damage of the main fitting and sliding tube of the NLG, which could result in failure of the main fitting or sliding tube, and consequent NLG collapse.
2012-06-25: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for Goodrich Evacuation Systems approved under TSO TSO-C69b and installed on Model A330-200 and -300 series airplanes, Model A340-200 and -300 series airplanes, and Model A340-500 and -600 series airplanes. That AD currently requires inspecting to determine the part number of the pressure relief valves on the affected Goodrich evacuation systems, and corrective action if necessary. This new AD requires inspecting to determine the part number of the pressure relief valves on the affected Goodrich evacuation systems and replacing certain pressure relief valves, and adds airplanes to the applicability. This AD was prompted by reports that during workshop testing, certain pressure relief valves, which were required by the existing AD, did not seal and allowed the pressure in certain slides/ rafts to fall below the minimum raft mode pressure for the unit. We are issuing this AD to prevent loss of pressure in the escape slides/rafts after an emergency evacuation, which could result in inadequate buoyancy to support the raft's passenger capacity during ditching and increase the chance for injury to raft passengers.
2021-22-24: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain MHI RJ Aviation ULC Model CL-600-2C10 (Regional Jet Series 700, 701 & 702), CL-600-2C11 (Regional Jet Series 550), CL-600-2D15 (Regional Jet Series 705), CL-600-2D24 (Regional Jet Series 900), and CL-600-2E25 (Regional Jet Series 1000) airplanes. This AD was prompted by a determination that new or more restrictive airworthiness limitations for structural inspections and safe life components are necessary. This AD requires revising the existing maintenance or inspection program, as applicable, to incorporate new or more restrictive airworthiness limitations. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2021-22-23: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all The Boeing Company Model 757-200, -200PF, -200CB, and -300 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by crack indications found in the lower aft wing skin bolt holes where the flap tracks attach to the track support fitting; this finding was on a Model 737-300 series airplane, which has a design similar to the Model 757 airplanes. This AD requires repetitive high frequency eddy current (HFEC) inspections for cracking of the lower aft wing skin aft edge at certain flap tracks, and repair if necessary. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2004-10-10: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 737-600, -700, -700C, -800, and -900 series airplanes equipped with certain Honeywell start converter units (SCU). This amendment requires replacement of the SCU of the auxiliary power unit (APU) located in the electrical and electronics (E/E) compartment with a new or modified SCU. This action is necessary to prevent overheating of the electrical connector of the SCU, which could create an ignition source and possible fire in the E/E compartment and cause damage to certain electrical wire bundles on the E2-2 shelf. Such damage could result in loss of power from the APU generator, failure of electrically powered airplane systems, and consequent reduction in the ability of the flight crew to control the airplane in certain adverse operating conditions. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
58-26-03: 58-26-03 FAIRCHILD: Applies to all F-27 aircraft. Compliance required as indicated. A number of failures of the Westinghouse P/N 903J826, 903J826-2, 903J826-3 a.c. deicing generators have occurred in service. These generators have been replaced by an improved generator, J/N 903J826-4. Inspect Westinghouse P/N 903J826-4 at the first removal or by 500 hours, whichever comes first, to determine that the bearing support in the mounting bracket is secure with no evidence of looseness or failed rivets. (Fairchild Service Bulletin 24-1 cover this same subject.)
2012-03-01: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Eurocopter Deutschland (ECD) Model EC135 helicopters. This AD results from a mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) AD issued by the aviation authority of the Federal Republic of Germany, with which we have a bilateral agreement, to identify and correct an unsafe condition. The MCAI AD states that in the past, the FADEC FAIL caution light illuminated on a few EC135 T1 helicopters. It states that this was caused by a discrepancy in the parameters that was generated within the fuel main metering unit and transmitted to the FADEC. This discrepancy led to the display of the FADEC FAIL caution light and ``freezing'' of the fuel main metering valve at its position, resulting in loss of the automatic engine control in the affected system. With the MCAI AD, a synchronization procedure for pilots, which was already used in the past, is being reintroduced, which prevents the parameter discrepancy arising and thus sustains the automatic engine control. The AD actions are intended to prevent failure of the FADEC to automatically meter fuel, indicated by a FADEC FAIL cockpit caution light, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
96-12-03: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain Aviat Aircraft, Inc. (Aviat) Models S-1S, S-1T, S-2, S-2A, S-2S, and S-2B airplanes that are equipped with aft lower fuselage wing attach fittings incorporating either part number (P/N) 76090, 2-2107-1, or 1-210-102. This action requires repetitively inspecting the aft lower fuselage wing attach fitting on both wings for cracks and modifying any cracked aft lower fuselage wing attach fitting. Modifying the aft lower fuselage wing attach fitting on both wings eliminates the repetitive inspection requirement of the AD. Several reports of cracked fuselage wing attach fittings on the affected airplanes prompted this action. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent possible in-flight separation of the wing from the airplane caused by a cracked fuselage wing attach fitting.
2004-10-05: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing transport category airplane models, as listed above. This amendment requires a modification of the air data computer (ADC) system, which involves installing certain new circuit breakers, relays, and related components, and making various wiring changes in and between the flight deck and main equipment center. For certain airplanes, this amendment also requires accomplishment of various other actions prior to or concurrently with the modification of the ADC system. For certain airplanes, this amendment also contains an option that will extend the compliance time to accomplish the modification of the ADC system. This action is necessary to ensure that the flightcrew is able to silence an erroneous overspeed or stall aural warning. A persistent erroneous warning could confuse and distract the flightcrew and lead to an increase in the flightcrew's workload. Such a situation could lead the flightcrew to act on hazardously misleading information, which could result in loss of control of the airplane. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
98-20-06: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Aerospatiale Model ATR42 series airplanes, that requires modification of the electrical power supply for the standby horizon indicator. This amendment is prompted by issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent loss of the standby horizon indicator in the event of failure of emergency direct current (DC) power, which could result in reduced controllability of the airplane during instrument flight rules conditions.
2021-20-09: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2021-03- 03, which applied to certain ATR-GIE Avions de Transport R[eacute]gional Model ATR72 airplanes. AD 2021-03-03 required revising the existing maintenance or inspection program, as applicable, to incorporate new or more restrictive airworthiness limitations. Since the FAA issued AD 2021-03-03, the FAA has determined that new or more restrictive airworthiness limitations are necessary. This AD requires revising the existing maintenance or inspection program, as applicable, to incorporate new or more restrictive airworthiness limitations, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2021-22-04: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2019-21- 10, which applied to all Airbus SAS Model A321-111, -112, -131, -211, - 212, -213, -231, and -232 airplanes. AD 2019-21-10 required a one-time eddy current conductivity measurement of certain structural parts of the outer flaps to determine if the incorrect alloy was used, and replacement if necessary. This AD continues to require a one-time eddy current conductivity measurement of certain structural parts of the outer flaps to determine if the incorrect alloy was used, and replacement if necessary; and also requires a new one-time eddy current conductivity measurement of certain other structural parts of the outer flaps to determine if the parts were properly heat treated, and replacement if necessary; and includes additional affected airplanes; as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. This AD was prompted by a quality control review, which determined that the wrong aluminum alloy was used to manufacture several structural parts and by the issuance of an updated list of suspected parts, including those that may have been improperly heat treated. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
96-11-14: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain Saab Model SAAB 2000 series airplanes. This action requires inspections to detect cracking of the lower rib of the rudder, and repair, if necessary. This action also provides for an optional terminating action, which, if accomplished, terminates the repetitive inspection requirement. This amendment is prompted by reports of fatigue cracking of the lower rib of the rudder. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent such fatigue cracking and subsequent failure of the primary structure of the rudder, which could result in reduced controllability of the airplane.
2012-06-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Bombardier, Inc. Model BD-100-1A10 (Challenger 300) airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports that the horizontal stabilizer trim actuator (HSTA) no-back and the number 1 motor brake assembly (MBA) can both fail dormant. This AD requires revising the airplane maintenance schedule to include new functional tests of the HSTA no-back and HSTA brake system. We are issuing this AD to prevent dormant failure of the HSTA no-back and the number 1 MBA, which along with additional component failure could result in an uncontrollable horizontal stabilizer surface runaway without the ability to retrim, and consequent loss of the airplane.
56-14-02: 56-14-02 DOUGLAS: Applies to All DC3 Series Aircraft Operated at Weights in Excess of 25,200 Pounds. \n\n\tCompliance required as indicated. \n\n\tIt has come to our attention that there are numerous instances wherein DC3 Series Aircraft have been approved for operation at landing and takeoff weights in excess of 25,200 pounds, in accordance with pertinent notes of Aircraft Specifications A-618 or A-669, that have main landing gear axle assemblies installed which are structurally unsatisfactory for the higher weights. The two axle assemblies involved are DACO P/N 5007396, and P/N 5007162 with P/N 5007390 torque collar. \n\n\tTherefore, all DC3 Series Aircraft in which either of these assemblies is installed must be operated at weights not to exceed 25,200 pounds for landing or takeoff (25,346 lbs. if deicers are installed) until satisfactory axle assemblies are installed. Note 9 of DC3 Aircraft Specification A-618 and Note 10 of DC3A Aircraft Specification A-669 contain a list of axle assemblies and the maximum weights for which each is structurally satisfactory.
2021-22-06: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 747-400F series airplanes. This AD was prompted by the determination that more restrictive tasks and limitations are necessary. This AD requires revising the existing maintenance or inspection program, as applicable, to incorporate more restrictive tasks and limitations, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
73-15-01: 73-15-01 SIKORSKY AIRCRAFT: Amdt. 39-1686. Applies to all S-61A, S-61D, S- 61E, S-61V and S-61L Helicopters certificated in all categories. Compliance required as indicated. To prevent fatigue failures of the rear fuselage and pylon hinge fitting assemblies, accomplish the following: (a) For aft fuselage upper and lower hinge fitting assemblies S6120-65118-3, S6120-65118-4, S6120-65118-34, S6120-65121-0, S6120-75702-1 and S6120-75702-2: (1) Within the next 15 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, inspect the hinge fittings in accordance with Section 2A of Sikorsky Service Bulletin No. 61B20-6A dated June 18, 1973 or later approved revisions or an equivalent method approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Federal Aviation Administration, New England Region; (2) Thereafter, on a daily basis inspect the hinge fitting assemblies in accordance with Section 2C of said Bulletin or later approved revisions or an equivalent method approved as above; and (3) At each 150 hours time in service after the initial inspection described in (a)(1) or approved equivalent period inspection, inspect the hinge fitting assemblies in accordance with Section 2G or said bulletin or later approved revisions or an equivalent method approved as above. (b) For aft fuselage upper and lower hinge fitting assemblies and upper and lower pylon hinge fitting assemblies S6120-65118-3, S6120-65118-4, S6120-65118-34, S6120-65121- 0, S6120-75702-1, S6120-75702-2, S6120-66117-0, S6120-66117-2, S6120-66120-0, S6120- 66120-2; (1) Within the next 15 days after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, inspect the aft fuselage hinge fitting lugs and the pylon hinge fitting lugs in accordance with Section 2B of Sikorsky Service Bulletin No. 61B20-6A dated June 18, 1973 or later approved revisions or an equivalent inspection method approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch,Federal Aviation Administration, New England Region. (2) Thereafter, at intervals not to exceed 50 hours time in service from the last inspection, inspect the aft fuselage hinge fitting lugs and the pylon hinge fitting lugs in accordance with Section 2D of said Bulletin, or later approved revisions, or an equivalent inspection method approved as above; and (3) At each 150 hours time in service after the initial inspection described in (b) (1) or approved equivalent period inspection, inspect the aft fuselage hinge fitting lugs and the pylon hinge fitting lugs in accordance with Section 2F of said Bulletin, or later approved revisions or an equivalent inspection method as approved above. (c) If a crack is found, remove and replace the hinge fitting prior to further flight. (d) These inspections are not required on the steel upper hinge fitting assemblies or on any hinge fitting assemblies in the T73 condition. (This supersedes AD 71-11-7) This amendment becomes effective July 27, 1973.
2012-02-13: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Eurocopter France EC130B4 helicopters that have not had Eurocopter Modification 073880 incorporated. This AD is prompted by several reports of cracks in the tailboom/Fenestron junction frame, which could result in structural failure of the tail boom, resulting in detachment of the Fenestron (tail rotor) and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter. We are issuing this AD to correct the unsafe condition on these helicopters.
84-20-04: 84-20-04 BRITISH AEROSPACE, INC.: Amendment 39-4924. Applies to Model DH-114 Heron series 2A, 2DA, and 2X airplanes certificated in all categories. Compliance is required as indicated. To prevent fatigue failure of the tailplane upper pick-up eyebolts, accomplish the following within 90 days after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished: A. Remove the eyebolts, modify the eyebolt holes, and install new eyebolts in accordance with paragraphs 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3, respectively, of British Aerospace Aircraft Group Technical News Sheet No. F.21, Issue 1, dated January 8, 1979. B. Alternate means of compliance which provide an equivalent level of safety maybe used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. C. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of inspections and/or modifications required by this AD.This amendment becomes effective November 5, 1984.
2012-07-03: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for all 328 Support Services GmbH (Type Certificate previously held by AvCraft Aerospace GmbH; Fairchild Dornier GmbH; Dornier Luftfahrt GmbH) Model 328-100 and -300 airplanes. That AD currently requires performing a detailed visual inspection of the cockpit door locking device and the surrounding area for proper installation, and corrective action if necessary. This new AD requires removing or replacing the locking device of the cockpit door; performing operational tests, and repair if necessary; and, for certain airplanes, installing gap filler parts. This AD was prompted by a report that a right-hand power lever jammed in flight-idle position during the landing roll-out, and the airplane was stopped by excessive braking. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct interference with the engine and flight control cables, which could result in reduced controllability of the airplane.
2004-10-02: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Airbus Model A300-600, A310, A319, A320, A321, A330, and A340-200 and -300 series airplanes, that requires a one-time inspection to determine if certain Thales pitot probes are installed, a check for certain part numbers and serial numbers of the affected pitot probes, and cleaning of the drain hole of any affected pitot probes if obstructed. This action is necessary to prevent obstruction of the air intake of the pitot probes, which could result in misleading information being provided to the flightcrew. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
88-25-05: 88-25-05 BELL HELICOPTER TEXTRON, INC. (BHTI); CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF FORESTRY; GARLICK HELICOPTERS; HAWKINS AND POWERS AVIATION, INC.; INTERNATIONAL HELICOPTERS, INC.; PILOT PERSONNEL INTERNATIONAL, INC.; SMITH HELICOPTERS; SOUTHERN AERO CORPORATION; OREGON HELICOPTERS; WEST COAST FABRICATIONS; and HERCULES: Amendment 39-6079. Applies to Model 204B, 205A, and 205A-1 helicopters certificated in any category and Model UH-1B, UH-1E, UH-1F, UH-1L, and TH-1L helicopters certificated in the restricted category that have tail rotor grip assembly P/N 204-011-728-1, -13, or -19 installed. Compliance is required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent failure of the tail rotor (T/R) grip assembly, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 50 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, remove the T/R grip assembly, P/N 204-011-728-1, -13, or -19 with 250 or more hours' time in service and replace with a serviceable part. (b) For those T/R grip assemblies, P/N 204-011-728-1, -13 or -19, with less than 250 hours' time in service on the effective date of this AD, a retirement life of 300 hours is established. (c) Any alternate method of compliance which provides an equivalent level of safety with this AD may be used when approved by the Manager, Helicopter Certification Branch, Federal Aviation Administration, Fort Worth, Texas 76193-0170. This amendment (39-6079, AD 88-25-05) becomes effective December 13, 1988.