Results
2006-15-18: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 737-300, -400, -500, -600, -700, -700C, -800, and -900 series airplanes. This AD requires modifying the wiring for the master dim and test system. For certain airplanes, this AD also requires related concurrent actions as necessary. This AD results from a report that the master dim and test system circuit does not have wiring separation of the test ground signal for redundant equipment in the flight compartment. We are issuing this AD to prevent a single fault failure in flight from simulating a test condition and showing test patterns instead of the selected radio frequencies on the communications panels, which could inhibit communication between the flightcrew and the control tower, affecting the continued safe flight of the airplane.
2018-07-04: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all The Boeing Company Model DC-9-81 (MD-81), DC-9-82 (MD-82), DC-9-83 (MD-83), and DC-9-87 (MD-87) airplanes, Model MD-88 airplanes, and Model MD-90- 30 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report of loss of airspeed indication due to icing. This AD requires modifying the air data heat (ADH) system. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
66-13-04: 66-13-04 LEARJET: Amdt. 39-237 Part 39 Federal Register May 17, 1966. Applies to Models 23 and 24 Airplanes. Compliance required before further flight, unless already accomplished, except that the airplane may be flown to a base where the repair can be performed, provided the following restrictions are contained on a placard in clear view of the pilot: "(a) No passengers may be carried. "(b) Monitor the cabin pressure indicator for proper pressurization control. If automatic and/or manual control of the cabin pressure is not properly effective: "(1) Turn air bleed off to shutoff bleed air. "(2) Reduce power to reduce bleed air pressure as necessary. "(3) Don oxygen masks. "(4) Expedite descent to a safe altitude." Modify the pressure control static air system in accordance with Lear Service Kit SK23/24-230 or an equivalent approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Central Region. This directive effective upon publication in the Federal Register for all persons except those to whom it was made effective immediately by telegram dated May 10, 1966.
2006-15-15: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas airplane models, that requires a one-time inspection for chafing or signs of arcing of the wire bundle for the auxiliary hydraulic pump, and other specified and corrective actions, as applicable. This AD also requires that, for certain airplanes, installation of additional protective sleeving on the upper portion of the auxiliary hydraulic pump wire assembly. This AD results from reports of shorted wires and evidence of arcing on the power cables of the auxiliary hydraulic pump, as well a fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer. We are issuing this AD to prevent shorted wires or arcing at the auxiliary hydraulic pump, which could result in loss of auxiliary hydraulic power, or a fire in the wheel well of the airplane. The actions specified by this AD are also intended to reduce the potential of an ignition source adjacent to the fuel tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.
72-15-03: 72-15-03 LEARJET: Amendment 39-1489 amended by Amendment 39-1597 is further amended by Amendment 39-1959. Applies to Model 24 (Serial Numbers 24-178 thru 24-268) and Model 25 (Serial Numbers 25-020 thru 25-114) airplanes. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent failure of spoiler actuator attachment bolts, accomplish the following: A) On aircraft with 500 or more hours' time in service, within 25 hours' time in service after the effectiveness of this AD, replace the spoiler actuator pivot bolts (P/N NAS 464P4-32), nuts (P/N AN320-4), and cotter pins (P/N MS24665-7), in accordance with procedures in Gates Lear Jet Service Bulletin SB No. 24/25-237 dated July 7, 1972. B) On aircraft with less than 500 hours' time in service upon the effectiveness of this AD, the spoiler actuator pivot bolts, nuts and cotter pins identified in Paragraph A must be replaced in accordance with the Gates Lear Jet Service Bulletin identified above, upon the accumulation of 500 hours' time in service. (If the aircraft has between 475 and 500 hours' time in service upon effectiveness of this AD you must replace the specified parts within the next 25 hours' time in service.) C) The spoiler actuator pivot bolts, nuts and cotter pins identified in Paragraph A of this AD must be replaced upon accumulation of each 500 hours' time in service thereafter. D) When the spoiler actuator installation is modified per Gates Learjet Aircraft Modification Kit AMK 73-1 and Service Bulletin 24/25-237B dated January 15, 1973, further compliance with this AD is no longer required. Any equivalent modification must be approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Central Region. Amendment 39-1489 became effective July 28, 1972, to all persons except those to whom it was made effective earlier by telegram or letter issued July 11, 1972. Amendment 39-1597 became effective March 2, 1973. This Amendment 39-1959 becomes effective September 19, 1974.
2006-15-10: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus Model A300 B4-600, B4-600R, and F4-600R series airplanes, and Model C4-605R Variant F airplanes (collectively called A300-600 series airplanes); and Model A310-200 and -300 series airplanes. This AD requires a one-time inspection of the trimmable horizontal stabilizer actuator (THSA), corrective actions if necessary, and follow-on repetitive tasks. This AD results from reports of THSAs that have reached their design operational life. We are issuing this AD to extend the operational life of the THSA to prevent a possible failure of high- time THSAs, which could result in reduced controllability of the airplane.
2018-16-07: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain General Electric Company (GE) GEnx-1B54, -1B58, -1B64, -1B67, -1B70, - 1B54/P1, -1B58/P1, -1B64/P1, -1B67/ [[Page 36725]] P1, -1B70/P1, -1B54/P2, -1B58/P2, -1B64/P2, -1B67/P2, -1B70/P2, -1B70C/ P1, -1B70/72/P1, -1B70/75/P1, -1B74/75/P1, -1B75/P1, -1B70C/P2, -1B70/ 72/P2, -1B70/75/P2, -1B74/75/P2, -1B75/P2, -1B76/P2, -1B76A/P2, -1B78/ P2, -2B67, -2B67B, and -2B67/P turbofan engines. This AD requires removal of affected high-pressure turbine (HPT) stator cases (HPT cases) from service and their replacement with a part eligible for installation. This AD was prompted by the discovery of a quality escape at a manufacturing facility. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
70-04-04: 70-04-04 AIRESEARCH: Amendment 39-944. Applies to Model TPE331-1 and -2 S/N engines: 90005, 90009, 90010, 90011, 90014, 90016, 90017, 90018, 90019, 90022, 90023, 90024, 90027, 90028, 90029, 90030, 91003, 91004, 91005, 91006, 91009, 91011, 91013 thru 91021, 91023, 91024, 91025, 91027, 92001, 92002, 92003, 92004, 92005, 92007, 92010, 92012, 92013, 92014, 92016, thru 92027, 93007, 93008, 93009, 93010; installed in but not limited to Mooney MU-2, Merlin 2B, Volpar Turboliner and Short Skyvan aircraft is effective upon receipt of this telegram. This directive necessary because of a serious engine failure caused by backing off of the high speed pinion retaining nut. To detect and prevent engine failure from this cause, the following is required: (A) Within 10 hours time in service unless previously accomplished within the last 15 hours time in service, and at intervals not to exceed 25 hours time in service thereafter, remove the engine oil filter and inspect the filter for metal particles. If an abnormal quantity of metal particles is found, accomplish Item (C) before further operation of the engine. At each inspection a replacement filter must be installed and the filter which was removed shall be returned for laboratory examination to AiResearch or to a facility approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, Western Region. Any finding of unacceptable metal contamination by AiResearch or other approved facility will be communicated to the owner or operator and the FAA. Upon receipt of such notice the engine shall then not be operated until Item (C) is accomplished. 25 hours oil filter special inspections may be discontinued upon completion of Item (C). (B) Within 10 hours time in service, install a placard in full view of the pilot to read: 'If abrupt and complete loss of torque indication occurs, shut down the engine and determine the cause.' This placard may be removed when Item (C) is accomplished. (C) Within 150 hours time in service unless previously accomplished, rework or replace the high speed pinion gear shaft assembly, P/N 869337-2, -3, or -4, in accordance with AiResearch Service Bulletin No. 587, dated 5 February 1970, or later FAA approved revisions. This amendment is effective upon publication in the Federal Register for all person except those to whom it was made effective immediately by telegram dated February 5, 1970.
2006-15-09: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus Model A300 airplanes and Model A310 airplanes, and for certain Airbus Model A300-600 series airplanes. This AD requires an inspection of the wing and center fuel tanks to determine if certain P-clips are installed and corrective action if necessary. This AD also requires an inspection of electrical bonding points of certain equipment in the center fuel tank for the presence of a blue coat and related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. This AD also requires installation of new bonding leads and electrical bonding points on certain equipment in the wing, center, and trim fuel tanks, as necessary. This AD results from fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer. We are issuing this AD to ensure continuous electrical bonding protection of equipment in the wing, center, and trim fuel tanks and to prevent damage to wiring in the wing and center fuel tanks, due to failed P-clips used for retaining the wiring and pipes, which could result in a possible fuel ignition source in the fuel tanks.
59-04-02: 59-04-02 CONVAIR: Applies to All Model 240/340/440 Series Aircraft Through Serial Number 485. Compliance required as indicated. Several instances have been reported wherein the pilot's direct-vision window has swung inward beyond the normal stop and has interfered with the movement of the control column. One such instance resulted in a crash landing and a fire which destroyed the aircraft. (1) Within the next 50 hours of operation inspect the DV window and ascertain that the stop is secure. Also,install a placard in the vicinity of the DV window cautioning the pilots against deliberately opening the window past the stop as an interim measure pending compliance with item (2). (2) Not later than September 1, 1959, the following must be accomplished to provide a positive stop for restricting the amount of travel of the DV window to eliminate possible interference between the window and the control column. For model 240 aircraft install a secondary DV window stop such as the safety chain described in Convair Service Engineering Report No. 26/440-28 dated 16 January 1959 or equivalent. For models 340 and 440 aircraft, install either the redesigned positive stop P/N 340-3110303-65 and -66 described in Convair Service Newsletter No. 411 or the secondary DV window stop safety chain described in Convair Service Engineering Report No. 26/440-28 dated 16 January 1959 or equivalent.
2006-15-11: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain CASA Model C-212-CC airplanes. This AD restricts the operation of the airplane to carrying either passengers or cargo (but not both) in the same compartment, unless the airplane is modified to include an approved protective liner between the passengers and the cargo. This AD results from our determination that affected airplanes, when carrying both cargo and passengers in the same compartment, cannot achieve the required level of performance. We are issuing this AD to prevent a hazardous quantity of smoke, flames, and/or fire extinguishing agent from the cargo compartment from entering a compartment occupied by passengers or crew.
2021-02-10: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus SAS Model A350-941 and -1041 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report that certain retaining rings could cause damage to frame forks, brackets and edge frames, and their surface protection; subsequent investigation showed that the depth of the frame fork spotfacing on structural parts is inadequate to accommodate the retaining ring. This AD requires repetitive inspections of certain areas of each cargo door for damage and corrective action. This AD also provides an optional terminating modification, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2006-15-07: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. (MHI) MU-2B series airplanes. This AD requires you to incorporate text from the service information into the Limitations Section of the FAA-approved Airplane Flight Manual (AFM). This AD results from a recent safety evaluation that used a data-driven approach to analyze the design, operation, and maintenance of the MU-2B series airplanes in order to determine their safety and define what steps, if any, are necessary for their safe operation. Part of that evaluation was the identification of unsafe conditions that exist or could develop on the affected type design airplanes. Field reports indicate an unsafe condition of improper rigging and/or adjustment of the propeller feathering linkage. Service centers found the unsafe condition during inspections. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct improper rigging of the propeller feathering linkage. The above issue, if uncorrected,could result in degraded performance and poor handling qualities with consequent loss of control of the airplane.
54-09-01: 54-09-01 RANGER: Applies to All 6-440-C Series Engine Models. To be accomplished as indicated. To preclude the failure of carburetor hotspot heater assembly P/N 7683, 7697, 7699 or 7708, due to corrosion from accumulations of exhaust products which in some instances have been found to completely close the inner passages, the following inspection should be accomplished by July 31, 1954, and additionally, as indicated below: 1. Remove the manifold pipes and inspect the hotspot casting for cracks on both the outside surfaces and the inside carburetor air passages, particularly at the bottom. 2. If no cracks are evident, the hotspot may be replaced with the hot air supply blocked off, per Ranger Engine Service Bulletin No. 91. Since no appreciable benefit in icing protection is provided by the use of the hotspot, it will be permissible to operate the engine with the hotspot blocked off. If the hotspot is blocked off, it is suggested that hot lubricating oil be applied to coatthoroughly the internal passage walls formerly used for exhaust gas circulation through the hotspot; this will tend to retard further corrosion. 3. If it is desired to continue to use a heated hotspot, it should be checked initially, and at 400-hour intervals to ascertain that the hot air passages are unobstructed with carbon or other exhaust gas products. This can most easily be accomplished by blocking off one hot air boss with a plate and pouring into the other hot air passage, 120 cc's of oil or gasoline. If this will not all be contained in the hotspot casting, a new hotspot casting should be utilized since no satisfactory method is known whereby all of the deposits can be removed. 4. If the hotspot has been used unheated since the last overhaul, only the initial inspection in 1. need be performed before normal overhaul.
2021-02-06: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2019-02- 03, which applied to all The Boeing Company Model 787-8, 787-9, and 787-10 airplanes. AD 2019-02-03 required revising the existing maintenance or inspection program, as applicable, to incorporate new or more restrictive airworthiness limitations. This AD retains the requirements of AD 2019-02-03 and requires incorporation of an airworthiness limitation that applies only to certain airplanes. This AD also requires replacing or modifying certain engine fire control panels, which terminates the revised airworthiness limitation added in this final rule when a certain condition is met. Since the FAA issued AD 2019-02-03, the manufacturer has developed a new fire handle design that will eliminate the need for the airworthiness limitations required by AD 2019-02-03. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2018-14-12: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all General Electric Company (GE) GEnx-1B engines. This AD was prompted by a report of a center vent tube (CVT) failure leading to a loss of oil pressure and subsequent in-flight engine shutdown. This AD requires removal of an affected extension duct and replacing it with a part eligible for installation. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2006-15-06: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD), which applies to certain Airbus Model A300 series airplanes and all Model A300-600 and A310 series airplanes. That AD currently requires repetitive inspections of the pitch trim system to detect continuity defects in the autotrim function, and follow-on corrective actions if necessary. For certain airplanes, this new AD requires replacing the flight augmentation computers (FACs) with new improved FACs. This AD also revises the applicability of the existing AD. This AD results from the development of a final action intended to address the unsafe condition. We are issuing this AD to prevent a sudden change in pitch due to an out-of-trim condition combined with an autopilot disconnect, which could result in reduced controllability of the airplane.
57-16-02: 57-16-02 DOUGLAS: Applies to All DC-7 Series Aircraft Prior to Fuselage No. 697. \n\n\tCompliance required as indicated. \n\n\tAn operator recently experienced a failure in the threaded area of the forward end of the rudder tab push-pull tube P/N 3483231, which resulted in a declared emergency and unscheduled landing due to loss of rudder control. Investigation reveals that tubes reamed to accommodate the end fittings are unsatisfactory. Also, it has been determined that many rudder tab push tube assemblies, P/N's 3593396, 3593396-501, as well as 3483231, have been reamed in order to accommodate the end fittings. \n\n\tOn all aircraft on which the above-mentioned assemblies have 5,000 hours of operation or more an inspection must be conducted within the next 300-hour operation, unless already accomplished, to determine whether the rods have been reamed and for signs of failure of the tube and end fittings. All assemblies found cracked and those reamed in excess of the limits outlined in Douglas Service Bulletin DC-7 No. 181 reissued February 8, 1957, must be replaced. Unless disassembled, x-ray is believed to be the only reliable means of verifying whether the tubes have been reamed in excess of the limits specified by Douglas. \n\n\tAll assemblies not cracked and are not reamed in excess of the limits specified in the Douglas Service Bulletin must be visually reinspected at periods not to exceed 300 hours of operation until they are replaced with new push-pull tube assembly, P/N 3593396, which have been manufactured without resorting to reaming. \n\n\t(Douglas Service Bulletin DC-7 No. 68, reissued February 8, 1957, describes the modifications required to install P/N 3593396 on those aircraft that presently incorporate P/N 3483231.) \n\n\tThis supersedes AD 56-24-3.
66-27-06: 66-27-06 GRUMMAN: Amdt. 39-296 is further amended by Amendment 39-2452. Applies to Models G-164 and G-164A Airplanes that have elevators with Serial Number 461 and Below. Compliance required as indicated. To prevent failure of the elevator torque tube due to cracks, accomplish the following: (a) For airplanes with 1,000 or more hours' time in service on April 22, 1966, comply with (d) within the next 25 hours' time in service after April 22, 1966, and at intervals not to exceed 100 hours' time in service from the last inspection until modified in accordance with (f). (b) For airplanes with 500 or more but less than 1,000 hours' time in service on April 22, 1966, comply with (d) within the next 100 hours' time in service after April 22, 1966, or before the accumulation of 1,025 hours' time in service whichever occurs first, and at intervals not to exceed 100 hours' time in service from the last inspection until modified in accordance with (f). (c) For airplanes with less than 500 hours' time in service on April 22, 1966, comply with (d) before the accumulation of 600 hours' time in service and at intervals not to exceed 100 hours' time in service from the last inspection until modified in accordance with (f). (d) Remove two inboard blind rivets that attach the elevator leading edge skin cover, to the right-hand elevator torque tube. Visually inspect the torque tube for cracks where inboard elevator rib, is welded to the torque tube and between the two inboard blind rivets. If no cracks are found, install new rivets before further flight. If cracks are found, comply with (f) before further flight. (e) Within the next 25 hours in service after the effective date of the amendment, unless already accomplished within the last 75 hours in service, visually inspect the lefthand elevator torque tube for cracks where the inboard rib is welded to the torque tube. This inspection must be repeated at intervals of 100 hours until the aircraft is altered in accordance with paragraph (f). (f) Modify torque tube in accordance with Grumman Model G-164 Alert Service Bulletin No. 33, dated March 8, 1966, or later FAA-approved revision, or an equivalent approved by an FAA Aircraft Engineering Division or Engineering and Manufacturing Branch. This supersedes AD 66-11-01. Amendment 39-296 was effective October 29, 1966. This amendment, 39-2452 is effective December 16, 1975.
2000-06-11: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to Turbomeca Makila 1 series turboshaft engines, that requires a one-time visual inspection of the scavenge and lubrication systems for obstruction due to coke deposits, then reconditioning of the engine oil system prior to return to service. This amendment is prompted by a report of an in-flight engine shutdown due to roller bearings contaminated by certain types of detergent oil. The actions specified by the proposed AD are intended to prevent in-flight engine shutdown due to roller bearing failure following oil contamination.
59-09-03: 59-09-03 HARTZELL: Applies to All Propeller-Engine Combinations Consisting of HC- 82-XG Series Propellers Installed On Lycoming 0-320 Series Engines and On Some 0-340 Series Engines (as noted below). Compliance required as indicated. There are six 3/8-inch diameter bolts used to hold the HC-82XG Series propellers on the 0-320 and some 0-340 engines (if a Hartzell HC-82XL Series propeller is installed on a Lycoming 0-340 Series engine, the bolts are already 7/16-inch in diameter). A number of these bolts have broken and, in several cases, the failures progressed, allowing the propeller to separate from the engine. In order to minimize the possibility of this type of failure, inspect and take action as follows: (1) If the mounting bolts have not been checked for the proper torque within the last 100 hours, check these bolts for the proper 30 foot-pounds torque before completing the next 25 hours' operating time and at or before completing each 100-hour operating period thereafter until item (2) is complied with. (2) At next engine or propeller overhaul but not later than January 1, 1961, change mounting bolts from 3/8-inch to 7/16-inch. Use bolts specified in Hartzell Bulletin No. 68. Change marking on propeller from HC-82XG-( ) to HC-82XL-( ). Change markings on 0-320 Series engines as instructed in Lycoming Service Bulletin No. 253A. The model designation of Lycoming 0-340 Series engines will not change since, when this AD is complied with, all 0-340 engines will incorporate 7/16-inch bolts. (Hartzell Bulletins Nos. 41 and 68 and Lycoming Service Bulletin No. 253A cover this same subject.)
2006-15-02: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) that supersedes AD 2003-09-01, which applies to certain Pilatus Aircraft Ltd (Pilatus) Model PC-6 airplanes. AD 2003-09-01 currently requires you to inspect and correct, as necessary, the aileron control bellcrank assemblies at the wing and fuselage locations. Since we issued AD 2003- 09-01, the FAA determined the action should also apply to all the models of the PC-6 airplanes listed in the type certificate data sheet of Type Certificate (TC) No. 7A15 that were produced in the United States through a licensing agreement between Pilatus and Fairchild Republic Company (also identified as Fairchild Industries, Fairchild Heli Porter, or Fairchild-Hiller Corporation). In addition, the intent of the applicability of AD 2003-09-01 was to apply to all the affected serial numbers of the airplane models listed in TC No. 7A15. This AD retains all the actions of AD 2003-09-01, adds those Fairchild Republic Company airplanes to the applicability of this AD, and lists the individual specific airplane models. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct increased friction in the aileron control bellcrank assemblies, which could result in failure of the aileron flight-control system. Such failure could lead to problems in controlling flight. DATES: This AD becomes effective on August 23, 2006. As of June 17, 2003 (68 FR 22582, April 29, 2003), the Director of the Federal Register previously approved the incorporation by reference of Pilatus Service Bulletin No. 27-001, dated June 5, 2002, in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
2000-06-13: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 737-200, -200C, -300, and -400 series airplanes, that currently requires repetitive visual inspections to detect cracking of the corners of the door frame and the cross beams of the aft cargo door, and corrective actions, if necessary. That AD also provides an optional terminating action for certain repetitive inspections. This amendment requires repetitive high frequency eddy current (HFEC) inspections, and corrective actions, if necessary. This amendment also mandates accomplishment of the previously optional terminating action. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent fatigue cracking of the corners of the door frame and the cross beams of the aft cargo door, which could result in rapid depressurization of the airplane.
2018-13-07: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Rolls-Royce plc (RR) Trent 1000-A, Trent 1000-C, Trent 1000-D, Trent 1000-E, Trent 1000-G, and Trent 1000-H turbofan engine models. This AD requires inspecting the intermediate-pressure compressor (IPC) stage 1 rotor blades, IPC stage 2 rotor blades, and IPC stage 2 dovetail posts, and removing any cracked parts from service. This AD was prompted by crack findings on the IPC rotor blades, which could lead to separations resulting in engine failures. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
66-08-02: 66-08-02\tBOEING: Amdt. 39-216 Part 39 Federal Register March 23, 1966. Applies to Model 727 Airplanes Delivered July 2, 1965, through January 20, 1966, and Airplanes that Have Had Flap Drive Coupling Sleeve, P/N 33513-1, Replaced. \n\n\tCompliance required as indicated, unless already accomplished.\n \n\tTo prevent disengagement of the flap drive and the outboard aileron lockout, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tWithin the next 125 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, visually inspect flap drive coupling sleeve, P/N 69-33513-1, to ensure that the end of the coupling sleeve, opposite the flange end, is rolled 180 degrees, forming a lip. \n\n\t(b)\tReplace sleeves having ends not rolled 180 degrees before further flight. \n\n\t(Boeing telegram to Boeing operators, dated January 20, 1966, pertains to this subject.)\n \n\tThis directive effective March 23, 1966.