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72-06-04: 72-06-04 HAWKER SIDDELEY: Amdt. 39-1405. Applies to Hawker Siddeley Model DH-114, Series 2, "Heron" airplanes which do not incorporate Heron Modification 1592, Part A. Compliance is required as indicated. To prevent failure of the main undercarriage down lock operating lever assembly, accomplish the following: (a) For airplanes with main undercarriage down lock operating lever assembly, P/N 14-2U.181A (pre Modification 608), within the next 150 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD unless accomplished within the last 150 hours' time in service, remove the lever assembly from the airplane, remove the protective coating and paint from the assembly and inspect for cracks, using a dye penetrant method, in accordance with Hawker Siddeley Technical News Sheet Series: Heron (114) No. U.12, Issue 1, dated April 13, 1970, or later ARB-approved issue or FAA-approved equivalent. If no cracks are found visually inspect the lever assembly for corrosion. (b) If cracks, or corrosion that cannot be removed by cleaning are found during the inspection required by paragraph (a), before further flight replace the affected part with a serviceable part of the same part number or replace the lever assembly with a new lever assembly, P/N 14-2U.181A/2, in accordance with Hawker Siddeley "Heron" Modification 1592. (c) For airplanes with main undercarriage down lock operating lever assembly, P/N 14-2U.181A/1 (post Modification 608), within the next 150 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, or within 300 hours' time in service from the last inspection, whichever occurs later, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 300 hours' time in service from the last inspection, remove the lever assembly from the airplane, remove the protective coating and paint from the assembly and inspect for cracks, using a dye penetrant method, in accordance with Hawker Siddeley Technical News Sheet Series: Heron (114) No. U.12, Issue 1, dated April 13, 1970, or later ARB-approved issue or FAA-approved equivalent. (d) If cracks are found during an inspection required by paragraph (c), before further flight replace the lever assembly with a new lever assembly, P/N 14-2U.181A/2 in accordance with Hawker Siddeley "Heron" Modification 1592. (e) The repetitive inspections required by paragraph (c) may be discontinued after lever assembly, P/N 14-2U.181A/2, has been installed in accordance with Hawker Siddeley "Heron" Modification 1592. (f) Replacement parts and serviceable parts that are reinstalled must be protected with a coat of lanolin, or FAA-approved equivalent prior to their installation in the airplane. This amendment becomes effective April 6, 1972.
2006-06-02: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that currently applies to Eurocopter France (ECF) Model SA 365N, N1, and AS 365N2 helicopters. That AD currently requires inspecting the main gearbox (MGB) suspension diagonal cross-member (diagonal cross-member) for cracks and replacing it with an airworthy part if any crack is found. This amendment requires more frequent inspections of the diagonal cross-member and adding the Model SA-366G1 helicopters to the applicability. This amendment is prompted by several reports of cracks in the diagonal cross-member. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of the diagonal cross-member, pivoting of the MGB, severe vibrations, and a subsequent forced landing.
89-08-01: 89-08-01 McDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-6178. \n\n\tApplicability: Model DC-8 series airplanes, equipped with control columns, P/N 5614272-1 and/or -2, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent the loss of airplane control in critical flight regimes due to fatigue failure of the control column, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tWithin the next 1,250 hours time-in-service after September 25, 1974 (the effective date of Amendment 39-1967), unless already accomplished within the last 1,250 hours time-in-service, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 2,500 hours time-in-service, except as provided below, conduct a dye penetrant or eddy current inspection of the control columns in accordance with the instructions in McDonnell Douglas All Operators Letter 8-632, issued October 11, 1972, or equivalent inspection technique approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\t\t1.\tIf surface indications of cracking exist, consisting of small specks not yet joined to form a linear crack of at least 1/8-inch in length, no rework is required, but the inspection interval is thereafter reduced to 2,000 hours time-in-service. \n\n\t\t2.\tIf linear cracks of 1/8-inch or more exist, blendout may be accomplished, in lieu of replacement, subject to the following qualifications: Blendout shall not exceed .030-inch in depth from the original surface and shall be blended over an area 10 times the depth. The defect shall not exceed an initial length of 1/4-inch. No more than two defects can occur in the same horizontal plane, and the defects shall be separated by at least 2-inch center-to-center spacing. Additional defects may be blended if the vertical distance between horizontal planes is at least 1/4-inch and the 2-inch center-to-center spacing requirement in the same horizontal plane is observed. After this rework, inspect at intervals not to exceed 2,500 hours time-in-service. \n\n\t\t3.\tIf cracks which exceed the limits described in paragraph A.2 of this AD are discovered as a result of any inspection, remove and replace the control columns, P/N's 5614272-1 and/or -2, in accordance with paragraph C. of this AD, or rework in accordance with a method approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tB.\tWithin the next 1,250 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the last 1,250 hours time-in-service, conduct a dye penetrant or eddy current inspection of the control columns, in accordance with the instructions in McDonnell Douglas DC-8 Alert Service Bulletin A27-267, dated February 18, 1987, Revision 1, dated May 22, 1987, or Revision 2, dated February 14, 1989, or equivalent inspection technique approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\t\t1.\tIf no cracks are found, accomplish repetitive inspections at intervals not to exceed 2,500 hours time-in-service. \n\n\t\t2.\tIf cracks are found, prior to further flight, remove and replace the control column in accordance with paragraph C. of this AD. \n\n\tAccomplishment of the provisions of paragraph B., constitutes terminating action for the inspection requirements of paragraph A. of this AD. However, for areas specified in the McDonnell Douglas All Operators Letter 8-632, dated October 11, 1972, allowable limits and blendout criteria established in accordance with paragraph A. of this AD still apply. \n\n\tC.\tReplacement of both pilot's and copilot's control columns, P/N's 5614272-1 or 5614272-2, respectively, with new control columns, SB 09270288-3, 5614272-501, or -503 (pilot's), and SB 09270288-4, 5614272-502, or -504 (co-pilot's), in accordance with McDonnell Douglas DC-8 Service Bulletin 27-267, issued January 20, 1988, or Revision 1, dated February 17, 1989, constitutes terminating action for the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tD.\tAn alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), who may add any comments and then send it to the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office. \n\n\tE.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Director of Publications, C1-LOO (54-60). These documents may be examined at the FAA, NorthwestMountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or at 3229 E. Spring Street, Long Beach, California. \n\n\tThis amendment supersedes AD 73-07-09, (Amendment 39-1967) which was effective on September 25, 1974. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6178, AD 89-08-01) becomes effective May 2, 1989.
2018-24-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Dassault Aviation Model Falcon 10 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a determination that new and more restrictive maintenance requirements and airworthiness limitations are necessary. This AD requires revising the existing maintenance or inspection program, as applicable, to incorporate new or more restrictive maintenance requirements and airworthiness limitations. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2000-05-30: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 747 series airplanes, that requires repetitive inspections to detect discrepancies of the cables, fittings, and pulleys of the engine thrust control cable installation, and replacement, if necessary. This AD also requires certain preventative actions on the engine thrust control cable installation for certain airplanes. This amendment is prompted by reports of failure of engine thrust control cables. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent such failures, which could result in a severe asymmetric thrust condition during landing, and consequent reduced controllability of the airplane.
86-19-01: 86-19-01 BOEING: Amendment 39-5394. Applies to Model 747-100SR series airplanes listed in Section 3.0 of Boeing Document No. D6-35655 "Supplemental Structural Inspection Document" (SSID), approved March 22, 1986, certificated in any category. Compliance is required as indicated in the body of the AD.\n\n\tTo ensure the continuing structural integrity of these airplanes, accomplish the following, unless already accomplished:\n\n\tA. Within one year after the effective date of the AD, incorporate a revision into the FAA-approved maintenance inspection program which provides no less than the required damage tolerance rating (DTR) for each Structural Significant Item (SSI) listed in Boeing Document D6-35655, approved March 22, 1986, or later FAA-approved revisions. The required DTR value for each SSI is listed in the document. The revision to the maintenance program must include and be implemented in accordance with the procedures in Sections 5.0 and 6.0 of the SSID.\n\n\tB. Cracked structure must be repaired before further flight in accordance with an FAA-approved method.\n\n\tC. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of inspections and/or modifications required by this AD.\n\n\tD. An alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region.\n\n\tE. Operators who have acceptably incorporated Boeing Document No. D6-35655, approved March 22, 1986, or later FAA-approved revisions, into their approved maintenance program are exempt from the requirements of this AD.\n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to the Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207.These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington.\n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective September 22, 1986.
99-06-11: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to all British Aerospace HP137 Mk1, Jetstream series 200, and Jetstream Models 3101 and 3201 airplanes. This AD requires inspecting the elevator bias spring assembly for correct installation and to assure that the correctly manufactured bias spring is installed. This AD also requires replacing any incorrectly manufactured bias spring, reworking any incorrectly installed bias spring assembly, inspecting the link assembly for distortion or damage, and replacing any distorted and/or damaged parts. This AD is the result of mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the airworthiness authority for the United Kingdom. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of the bearings in the elevator down bias spring assembly caused by the installation of an incorrectly manufactured bias spring or damage or distortion to the assembly, which could result in reduced or loss ofcontrol of the airplane.
2018-20-01: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all CFM International S.A. (CFM) LEAP-1B21, LEAP-1B23, LEAP-1B25, LEAP-1B27, LEAP-1B28, LEAP-1B28B1, LEAP-1B28B2, LEAP-1B28B2C, LEAP-1B28B3, LEAP- 1B28BBJ1, and LEAP-1B28BBJ2 turbofan engines with a certain high- pressure turbine (HPT) stator case (HPT cases) installed. This AD requires removal of affected HPT cases from service and their replacement with a part eligible for installation. This AD was prompted by the discovery of a quality escape at a manufacturing facility involving unapproved welds on HPT cases. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
86-17-05 R1: 86-17-05 R1 BOEING: Amendment 39-5391 as amended by Amendment 39-5714. Applies to Boeing Model 727-200 series airplanes equipped with the Number 3 cargo door, certificated in any category, listed in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 727-53A0169, Revision 2, dated May 23, 1986. \n\n\tTo detect cracks in the forward frame of the Number 3 cargo door cutout, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tWithin the next 300 landings after the effective date of this AD or prior to accumulating 29,000 landings, whichever occurs later, unless accomplished within the last 1900 landings, visually inspect the forward frame of the Number 3 cargo door cutout for cracks in accordance with paragraph C. of the Accomplishment Instructions in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin Number 727-53A0169, Revision 2, dated May 23, 1986, or later FAA-approved revisions. If any cracks are detected, repair in accordance with paragraph C. of this AD. Repeat the inspections at intervals not to exceed 2,200 landings. \n\n\tB.\tWithinthe next 300 landings after the effective date of this AD or prior to accumulating 35,000 landings, whichever occurs later, unless accomplished within the last 1900 landings, visually inspect the forward frame of the Number 3 cargo door cutout for cracks in accordance with paragraphs D. and E. of the Accomplishment Instructions in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin Number 727-53A0169, Revision 2, dated May 23, 1986, or later FAA-approved revisions. If any cracks are detected, repair in accordance with paragraph C. of this AD. Repeat the inspections at intervals not to exceed 2,200 landings. \n\n\tC.\tRepair, prior to further flight, any cracks detected in the forward frame of the Number 3 cargo door cutout, in accordance with paragraph G. of the Accomplishment Instructions in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 727-53A0169, Revision 2, dated May 23, 1986, or later FAA-approved revisions. Reinspect, at intervals not to exceed 2,200 landings, all areas of the forward frame not covered by the repair, in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of paragraphs C., D., and E. of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 727-53A0169, Revision 2, dated May 23, 1986, or later FAA-approved revisions. \n\n\tD.\tModification of uncracked frames in accordance with Figure 2 of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 727-53A0169, Revision 2, dated May 23, 1986, or later FAA-approved revisions constitutes terminating action for repetitive inspections required by this AD. \n\n\tE.\tAlternate means of compliance or adjustment of compliance time, which provide an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tF.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of inspections and/or modifications required by this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to the Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. \n\n\tAmendment 39-5391 became effective September 5, 1986, and superseded AD 84-21-04, Amendment 39-4938. \n\tThis Amendment 39-5714 becomes effective September 3, 1987.
2006-05-03: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Rolls-Royce plc (RR) models RB211 Trent 768-60, Trent 772-60, and Trent 772B-60 turbofan engines. This AD requires initial and repetitive borescope inspections of the high pressure-intermediate pressure (HP- IP) turbine bearing internal oil vent tube, scavenge tube, and tube heat shields for wear and cracking, and removing tubes from service if found with any cracks beyond serviceable limits. This AD also requires installation of a new or modified HP-IP turbine bearings support as terminating action for the repetitive borescope inspections. This AD results from two reports of RR RB211 Trent 700 series engines found with the HP-IP internal oil vent tube and scavenge tube fretted by damaged heat shields on the tubes. We are issuing this AD to prevent oil ejecting from the HP-IP turbine bearings chamber and igniting. Burning oil can cause the intermediate pressure (IP) shaft to fracture, the IP turbine to overspeed, and possible uncontained failure of the engine.