Results
99-26-04: This document publishes in the Federal Register an amendment adopting Emergency Priority Letter Airworthiness Directive (AD) 99-26-04, which was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of Kaman Aerospace Corporation (Kaman) Model K1200 helicopters by individual letters. This AD requires, before the first flight of each day, inspecting for clutch assembly integrity. Replacing any unairworthy clutch assembly with an airworthy clutch assembly is required before further flight. This amendment is prompted by two incidents of engine adapter flange failure and loss of power to the main rotors. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of the engine adapter flange, loss of power to the main rotors, and a subsequent forced landing.
2006-20-51: This document publishes in the Federal Register an amendment adopting airworthiness directive (AD) 2006-20-51 that was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of certain Boeing Model 777-200LR and -300ER series airplanes by individual notices. This AD requires revising the Airplane Flight Manual to prohibit takeoffs at less than full-rated thrust. This AD is prompted by a report of two occurrences of engine thrust rollback (reduction) during takeoff. We are issuing this AD to prevent dual-engine thrust rollback, which could result in the airplane failing to lift off before reaching the end of the runway or failing to clear obstacles below the takeoff flight path.
2021-10-10: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus Helicopters Model SA330J helicopters. This AD was prompted by the failure of a second stage planet gear installed in the main gearbox (MGB). This AD requires repetitively inspecting the MGB particle detector and the MGB bottom housing (oil sump) for metal particles, analyzing any metal particles that are found, and replacement of the MGB if necessary, as specified in a European Aviation Safety Agency (now European Union Aviation Safety Agency) (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2018-19-10: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Airbus Helicopters Model AS355E, AS355F, AS355F1, AS355F2, and AS355N helicopters. This AD requires measuring a vibration level in the tail rotor (T/R) drive. This AD was prompted by reports of bearing degradation. The actions of this AD are intended to prevent an unsafe condition on these helicopters.
2006-21-02: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Raytheon (Beech) Model 400, 400A, and 400T series airplanes; and Raytheon (Mitsubishi) Model MU-300 airplanes. This AD requires revising the airplane flight manual to modify the Operating Limitations, Abnormal Procedures, and Normal Procedures, as applicable, for flight in icing conditions. This AD results from multiple reports of high- altitude, dual-engine flameouts on airplanes operating in certain meteorological conditions. We are issuing this AD to advise the flightcrew that the buildup of ice on certain internal areas of the engine could result in a dual-engine flameout and what action they must take to avoid this hazard.
2006-21-01: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Boeing Model 737 airplanes. This AD requires repetitive measurement of the freeplay of both aileron balance tabs; repetitive lubrication of the aileron balance tab hinge bearings and rod end bearings; and related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. This AD results from reports of freeplay-induced vibration of the aileron balance tab. The potential for vibration of the control surface should be avoided because the point of transition from vibration to divergent flutter is unknown. We are issuing this AD to prevent excessive vibration of the airframe during flight, which could result in loss of control of the airplane.
2018-19-11: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Viking Air Limited Models DHC-2 Mk. I, DHC-2 Mk. II, and DHC-2 Mk. III airplanes. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as cracking found in the wing rear spar web at the wing station where the flap outboard hinge is attached. We are issuing this AD to require actions to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2018-19-05: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Dassault Aviation Model MYSTERE-FALCON 900 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a determination that more restrictive maintenance requirements and airworthiness limitations are necessary. This AD requires revising the maintenance or inspection program, as applicable, to incorporate new and more restrictive maintenance requirements and airworthiness limitations. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
84-15-01: 84-15-01 AVIAN BALLOON: Amendment 39-4954. Applies to Avian Balloon Models Sparrow, Falcon II, and Skyhawk, serial numbers 1 through 120, 413, and 810. Compliance required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. To prevent possible separation of the basket from the envelope, accomplish the following: A. Before further flight, install a placard using white lettering at least 2/10 inches high on a red background in full view of the pilot stating that "TETHERED FLIGHT IS PROHIBITED," and B. Before further flight, to ensure the structural integrity of the basket suspension cables on balloons which have been used for tethered flight, accomplish the following: 1. For early production series baskets, which may be identified by the presence of a nico-press sleeve on each cable where it enters the top of the basket handrail, replace the two basket suspension cables with new 5/32-inch diameter stainless steel cables meeting the Mil-W-83402B specification in accordancewith Advisory Circular (AC) 43.13-1A, paragraph 196(b). 2. For later production baskets, which may be identified by a cable load plate on the bottom of the basket, inspect each of the four basket suspension cables from two inches above the top of the basket handrail to two inches below the handrail for broken strands, deformation and kinking. Any damaged or kinked cables must be replaced with new 5/32-inch diameter stainless steel cables meeting Mil-W-83402B specification in accordance with AC 43.13-1A paragraph 196(b). C. No later than August 30, 1984, accomplish the following modification in accordance with Avian Service Bulletin No. 5, dated June 26, 1984: 1. Modify early production series baskets by replacing and relocating the basket suspension cables, replacing the basket skid plates, and adding the steel load plate. 2. Modify later production baskets by replacing and relocating the basket suspension cables. D. Accomplishment of paragraph C., above,eliminates the need to accomplish Paragraphs A. and B., allows the removal of the required placard, and permits tethered flight. E. Alternate means of compliance which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service bulletins from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to the Avian Balloon Company, South 3722 Ridgeview Drive, Spokane, Washington 99026. These documents also may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. This amendment becomes effective November 26, 1984, and was effective earlier to those recipients of priority letter AD 84-15-01 dated July 31, 1984.
47-42-13: 47-42-13 DOUGLAS: (Was Mandatory Note 10 of AD-781-1.) Applies to DC-6 Serial Numbers 42854 to 42896, Inclusive; 43000 to 43018, Inclusive; 43035 to 43042, Inclusive; 43055 to 43057, Inclusive; 43062 to 43064, Inclusive; and 43105. \n\nTo be accomplished not later than April 1, 1948. \n\nTo prevent the possibility of the gust lock control becoming engaged during flight or in taxiing, a latch control assembly, P/N 4356957, is to be installed to safety the control handle in the gust lock "Off" position. The gust lock link assembly, P/N 4248396, must also be reworked by removing and replacing spring, P/N 2356732, (or 1248420) and plunger, P/N 1248421, with new bolt P/N 1356885. \n\nIn addition to the above, the elevator and rudder gust lock in the tail section and the aileron gust lock in the fuselage center section must be reworked by removing shaft, P/N 1165869, and replacing with new piston, P/N 2356840. After completing the rework, care must be exercised in properly rigging thegust lock control system. (Douglas Service Bulletin DC-6 No. 75 covers this same subject.)