Results
2009-23-09: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Two cases have been reported in which the ADG [air driven generator] has failed to power the essential bus following in-flight deployment as part of its periodic operational check. Subsequent inspection revealed that the ADG power feeder harness wire (* * * [aromatic polyimide]) had chafed on the backshell of its own connector (P1XC), resulting in a short circuit, wire damage and disconnection of the wire from the ADG. Coupled with a dual generator failure, such a disconnection would result in the loss of emergency power to critical systems, with a consequent adverse effect on the controllability of the aircraft. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
80-10-01: 80-10-01 CESSNA: Amendment 39-3762. Applies to Cessna Models 180 through 180J, 185 through 185E, A185E, and A185F airplanes equipped with Airglas Engineering Company, Inc., LW3600-180 or LW3600-180A ski installations in accordance with STC SA213AL. Compliance required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To preclude the possibility of a ski rotating tip-down in flight, with resulting adverse flight and landing characteristics, accomplish the following: (a) Operation of airplanes equipped with Airglas Engineering Company, Inc., LW3600-180 or LW3600-180A ski installations, in excess of 160 KT IAS is prohibited. (b) Prior to further flight, on airplanes equipped with Airglas Engineering Company, Inc., LW3600-180 or LW3600-180A ski installation, install a placard on the instrument panel immediately adjacent to the airspeed indicator and in plain view of the pilot to read as follows: DO NOT EXCEED 160 KTS IAS WITH AIRGLAS LW3600-180 SKIS INSTALLED or DO NOTEXCEED 160 KTS IAS WITH AIRGLAS LW3600-180A SKIS INSTALLED whichever is appropriate. (c) Within the next 50 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, and thereafter at any time the skis are installed, rig and modify the LW3600-180 or LW3600-180A ski check, safety, and bungee cables in accordance with Airglas Engineering Company, Inc. Service Bulletin No. LW3600-3, dated September 21, 1979, or an FAA-approved equivalent. This amendment supersedes Amendment 39-1218 (36 FR 9860) AD 71-11-06. This amendment becomes effective May 12, 1980.
75-16-20: 75-16-20\tMITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES, LIMITED: Amendment 39-2294. Applies to Mitsubishi Model MU-2B, MU-2B-10, MU-2B-15, MU-2B-20, MU-2B-25, MU-2B- 26, MU-2B-30, MU-2B-35, and MU-2B-36 airplanes certificated in all categories. \n\tCompliance is required within the next 25 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the last 75 hours time in service, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 100 hours time in service from the last inspection. \n\tTo prevent possible separation of the control lever on the engine propeller pitch control unit, inspect the propeller pitch control lever, Mitsubishi P/N 022A-43111, P/N 022A-43111-3, or P/N 867304-1 in accordance with paragraph (a) or (b) of this AD, as applicable. \n\t(a)\tFor airplanes with AN3H5A bolt or MS24673-3 bolt installed in a threaded propeller pitch control lever, accomplish the following: \n\t\t(1)\tRemove safety wire and loosen bolt. \n\t\t(2)\tEnsure that the propeller pitch control leveris mounted securely on the shaft. \n\t\t(3)\tRetorque the AN 3H5A bolt to 20-25 inch pounds or the MS24673-3 bolt to 25-30 inch pounds, as applicable, and install safety wire. \n\t\t(4)\tEnsure that the power management system is properly rigged in accordance with Section VI of the Garrett-Airesearch Turboprop Engine Series 331 Maintenance Manual or an FAA-approved equivalent. \n\t(b)\tFor airplanes with AN3-6A bolt and NAS679C3W nut installed in an unthreaded propeller pitch control lever, accomplish the following: \n\t\t(1)\tLoosen the AN3-6A bolt. \n\t\t(2)\tEnsure that the propeller pitch control lever is mounted securely on the shaft. \n\t\t(3)\tRetorque the AN3-6A bolt to 20-25 inch pounds. \n\t\t(4)\tEnsure that the power management system is properly rigged in accordance with Section VI of the Garrett-Airesearch Turboprop Engine Series 331 Maintenance Manual or an FAA-approved equivalent. \n\t(Mitsubishi MU-2 Service Bulletin No. 168, dated April 18, 1975, refers to this same subject). \n\tThis amendment becomes effective August 12, 1975.
2007-02-06: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Pratt & Whitney PW2000 series turbofan engines. This AD requires a onetime focused visual and fluorescent penetrant inspection (FPI) of 21 suspect PW2000 8th stage high pressure compressor (HPC) drum rotor disk assemblies. This AD results from a PW2037 8th stage HPC drum rotor disk assembly failure event caused by tooling damage that occurred during disk assembly manufacture. We are issuing this AD to prevent 8th stage HPC drum rotor disk assembly failure that could result in an uncontained engine failure and damage to the airplane.
2007-02-09: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as cracking in the wing main landing gear (MLG) rib 5 forward attachment lug, which could affect the structural integrity of the MLG attachment. This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
2018-21-10: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all International Aero Engines (IAE) PW1133G-JM, PW1133GA-JM, PW1130G-JM, PW1127G-JM, PW1127GA-JM, PW1127G1-JM, PW1124G-JM, PW1124G1-JM, and PW1122G-JM turbofan engines. This AD was prompted by reports of in- flight engine shutdowns and aborted take-offs as the result of certain parts affecting the durability of the rear high-pressure compressor (HPC) rotor hub knife edge seal. This AD requires replacing the diffuser case air seal assembly, the high-pressure turbine (HPT) 2nd- stage vane assembly, and the HPT 2nd-stage borescope stator vane assembly with parts eligible for installation. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2007-02-05: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for Rolls-Royce plc (RR) RB211 Trent 700 series turbofan engines. That AD currently requires initial and repetitive borescope inspections of the high pressure-and-intermediate pressure (HP-IP) turbine internal and external oil vent tubes for coking and carbon buildup, and cleaning or replacing the vent tubes if necessary. This AD requires the same actions but uses more stringent tube replacement criteria than the previous AD. This AD results from a recent incident where an RB211 Trent 700 series turbofan engine had an oil vent tube rupture as a result of blockage, leading to significant loss of engine oil. The incident indicates that further measures are necessary to control carbon buildup in the oil vent tubes. We are issuing this AD to prevent internal oil fires due to coking and carbon buildup, that could cause uncontained engine failure and damage to the airplane.
75-04-11: 75-04-11 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-2094. Applies to Douglas DC-10 Series -10, -10F, -30, and -30F airplanes, certificated in all categories. \n\n\tTo prevent possible damage to the No. 2 engine due to ingestion of ice and snow, accomplish the following. \n\n\t(a)\tAfter the effective date of this airworthiness directive, when airplanes have been parked during icing conditions (freezing rain, snow, sleet) for any period of time which will enable ice or snow to accumulate on the airplane in the area of the No. 2 engine, inspect the top of the fuselage and the No. 2 engine inlet for the presence of ice and snow accumulation prior to starting engines. If found to exist, remove accumulated ice and snow prior to further flight.\n\n\tNOTE: Guidelines for inspection and safeguarding the aircraft are contained in these documents:\n\n\tDouglas AOL 10-546, dated January 11, 1974\n\n\tDouglas AOL 10-673, dated August 7, 1974\n\n\tDC-10 Maintenance Manual, Chapter 12-31-01 (b) Make appropriatemaintenance record entries to show compliance with this AD.\n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective February 21, 1975.
2000-16-01: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model MD-90-30 series airplanes, that requires replacement of certain ground block screws with new screws; and retermination of the circuit ground wires of the electrical power control unit (EPCU) to separate grounding points. This amendment is prompted by reports of complete loss of the primary electrical power on an airplane during flight. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent a loose electrical ground block of the circuit ground wires of the EPCU, which could result in complete loss of the primary electrical power of an airplane during flight.
2018-22-01: We are superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 88-12-10 for certain Honeywell International Inc. (Honeywell) TPE331 turboprop engines. AD 88-12-10 required reducing the life limit for certain second stage turbine rotors. This AD requires removing certain second stage turbine rotors from service at a reduced life limit. This AD was prompted by report that a TPE331-11U engine experienced an uncontained rotor separation. In addition, cracks were discovered through eddy current inspection (ECI) in the bore of the second stage turbine rotor assembly after publication of AD 88-12-10. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.