Results
89-04-07: 89-04-07 CANADAIR: Amendment 39-6141. Applicability: Model CL-44D4 and CL-44J series airplanes, certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. To prevent wing failure due to exfoliation corrosion on the wing upper skin, accomplish the following: A. Within 225 hours time-in-service or 30 days after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs first, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 12 months, perform a visual inspection of the upper wing skin area between the front and rear spars over the total wing span for corrosion, including raised blistering or bulging, in accordance with Canadair Alert Wire 44T-1340/2431, dated October 28, 1988. 1. If the extent of such corrosion exceeds 20 sq.in. in any one skin panel, between chordwise joints, prior to further flight conduct a non-destructive testing (NDT) inspection, using ultrasonic or eddy current inspection techniques, to determine the skin thickness,in accordance with the Alert Wire. Repair the corrosion area prior to further flight, in accordance with a method approved by the Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, New England Region. 2. If the extent of such corrosion exists within an area equal to or less than 20 sq.in. in any one skin panel, between chordwise joints, repair corrosion area within 900 hours time-in-service or 6 months after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs first. Repair must be accomplished in accordance with a method approved by the Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, New England Region. B. Within 48 hours after performing the inspections required by paragraph A., above, submit a report of results to Canadair, in accordance with Canadair Alert Wire 44T- 1340/2431, dated October 28, 1988. The report must include information as to the extent and location of the corrosion, and the inspection method used. C. An alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, New England Region. NOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), who may add any comments and then send it to the Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office. D. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service information from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Bombardier, Inc., Canadair Aerospace Group, P.O. Box 6087, Station A, Montreal, Quebec H3C 3G9, Canada. This information may be examined at FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or FAA, New England Region, New York Aircraft Certification Office, 181 South Franklin Avenue, Room 202, Valley Stream, New York. This amendment (39-6141, AD 89-04-07) becomes effective March 7, 1989.
87-18-07: 87-18-07 ROLLS-ROYCE plc (formerly Rolls-Royce Limited): Amendment 39-5689. Applies to Rolls- Royce (R-R) Spey 506-14, 506-14A, 506-14D, 511-5W, 511-14, 511-14W, 511-8, 511-8/Mod. 2970, 512-14E, 512-14DW, 512-5, 512-5W, 555-15, 555-15H, 555-15N, and 555-15P turbofan engines. Compliance is required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent failure of the primary airscoop and subsequent burnthrough of the engine case, inspect for cracks, and repair or replace as necessary, the primary airscoops in accordance with R-R Service Bulletin (SB) Number SP72-997, dated October 1985, at the next engine shop visit after the effective date of this AD. NOTE: For the purpose of this AD, engine shop visit is defined as the input of an engine to a repair shop where combustion section system overhaul facilities exist and the subsequent engine maintenance entails the separation of front and rear. Aircraft may be ferried in accordance with the provisions of FAR 21.197and 21.199 to a base where the AD can be accomplished. Upon request, an equivalent means of compliance with the requirements of this AD may be approved by the Manager, Engine Certification Office, Federal Aviation Administration, New England Region, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts 01803. Upon submission of substantiating data by an owner or operator through an FAA maintenance inspector, the Manager, Engine Certification Office, New England Region, may adjust the compliance time specified in this AD. R-R SB Number SP72-997, dated October 1985, identified and described in part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). All persons affected by this directive who have not already received this document from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Service Manager, Spey Engine, Rolls-Royce plc, East Kilbride, Glasgow G74 4PY, Scotland. This document may also be examined at the Office of the Regional Counsel, Federal Aviation Administration, New England Region, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts 01803, Rules Docket Number 86-ANE-24, Room 311, between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 4:30 p.m., Monday through Friday, except federal holidays. This amendment becomes effective on September 28, 1987.
89-12-09: 89-12-09 AEROSPATIALE: Amendment 39-6231. Applicability: All Model ATR42 series airplanes, certificated in any category. Compliance: Required within 30 days after the effective date of this AD, unless previously accomplished. To prevent a fire in a cargo compartment remaining undetected, accomplish the following: A. Modify the forward and aft smoke detector test systems, in accordance with Aerospatiale Service Bulletin ATR42-26-0010, Revision 1, dated March 28, 1989. B. An alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. NOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), who will either concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113. C. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service information from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Aerospatiale, 216 Route de Bayonne, 31060 Toulouse, Cedex 03, France. This information may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. This amendment (39-6231, AD 89-12-09) becomes effective on June 20, 1989.
88-17-02 R2: 88-17-02 R2 FOKKER: Amendment 39-6035 as revised by Amendment 39-6127 is further revised by Amendment 39-6331. Docket No. 89-NM-82-AD. Applicability: Model F-27 series airplanes, serial numbers 10346 to 10684, inclusive; and serial numbers 10105 to 10345, inclusive, if retrofitted with outerwing serial number 246 or higher; certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated unless previously accomplished. To prevent reduced structural capability of the wing, accomplish the following: A. Within 24 hours after February 15, 1989 (the effective date of Amendment 39- 6127), incorporate the following into the Limitations Section of the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM). This may be accomplished by inserting a copy of this AD into the AFM. "For airplanes operating at weights over 32,000 lbs.: Speed Limitation VB: 165 KIAS (168 KTS CAS)" B. Within 24 hours after February 15, 1989 (the effective date of Amendment 39- 6127), install a placard near each airspeed indicator, stating the following: FOR AIRPLANES OPERATING AT WEIGHTS OVER 32,000 LBS.: SPEED LIMITATION VB: 165 KIAS (168 KTS CAS) C. Within six months after the effective date of this amendment, perform a one-time inspection of the splice parts at Wing Station 7915, in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions, Part 1, Fokker Service Bulletin F27/57-63, Revision 1, dated January 25, 1989. 1. If no defective splice parts are found, and if the structural strength of the wing splice is determined to be satisfactory in accordance with the limits specified in the service bulletin, no further action is required. The airspeed restriction required by paragraphs A. and B., above, is no longer required, and the AFM limitation and placard may be removed. 2. If defective splice parts are found or if the structural strength of the wing splice is determined to be unsatisfactory in accordance with the limits specified in the service bulletin, within one year after the effective date of this amendment reinforce all unsatisfactory splice parts at Wing Station 7915 in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions, Part 2, of Fokker Service Bulletin F27/57-63, Revision 1, dated January 25, 1989. Following this modification and a determination that the wing splice strength is satisfactory, the airspeed restriction required by paragraphs A. and B., above, is no longer required, and the AFM limitation and placard may be removed. D. An alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. NOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), who will either concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. E. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Fokker Aircraft USA, Inc., 1199 N. Fairfax Street, Alexandria, Virginia 22314. These documents may be examined at FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. Priority Letter AD 88-17-02, issued on August 15, 1988, became effective immediately upon receipt. Amendment 39-6035, the Final Rule of AD 88-17-02, became effective on October 14, 1988, and was revised by Amendment 39-6127, AD 88-17-02 R1, which became effective on February 15, 1989. This Amendment (39-6331, AD 88-17-02 R2) revises AD 88-17-01 R1 and becomes effective onOctober 30, 1989.
84-13-51 R1: 84-13-51 R1 LOCKHEED-CALIFORNIA COMPANY: Amendment 39-4947. Applies to Lockheed Models L-1011 series airplanes, certificated in all categories. Compliance required as indicated unless previously accomplished. A. Unless the inspection requirements of paragraph B., below, have been accomplished within the previous 2,000 flight hours or 1,000 landings, whichever came first, revise the Lockheed L-1011 FAA approved airplane flight manual (AFM) LR-25925 within 5 calendar days after receipt of this airworthiness directive (AD), to add the following and provide to flight crews: SECTION 1 - LIMITATIONS Fuel System 1. In addition to normal fuel reserve requirements, flight planning must be predicated on the following: A) A fuel fitting failure, occurs to engine No. 1 or 3 at any time during the flight; B) 10,000 pounds of fuel will be lost overboard while the flight crew recognizes and reacts to a fuel line failure; C) At the time of fuel line failure, the respective No. 1 or 3 engine is considered to become inoperative; and D) At the time of failure, the flight can be continued to a suitable airport. 2. Cockpit fuel totalizer and fuel quantity indicating systems for tanks 1 and 3 must be operational prior to takeoff. Aircraft equipped with tanks 1A and 3A, when fueled, must have the respective cockpit fuel quantity indicating systems operational prior to takeoff. 3. The fuel quantity must be closely monitored and compared with total fuel used at 5 minute maximum intervals during flight. SECTION 2 - EMERGENCIES Rapidly Decreasing Fuel Quantity Indication Reference. If fuel quantity indication decreases at an abnormally high rate, assume a leak in the fuel line to engine No. 1 or 3 and proceed as follows: 1. All fuel crossfeed valves close 2. All fuel quantity indicators monitor 3A. If fuel quantity indication in tanks 1 and 3 decrease at a normal rate, resume normal operation. 3B. If fuel quantity indication continues to decrease abnormally in tanks 1 or 3: 1.) Fuel tank pumps (in affected tank) off 2.) Affected engine shut down 3.) Affected tank valve close 4.) Fuel quantity indicators (Tank 1 and 3) monitor 5.) Aircraft range check 6.) With tank valve closed, remaining fuel in affected tank is available to the other engines by use of crossfeed procedures. B. Within 1,000 hours time in service, or ninety (90) days after the effective date of this amendment, whichever occurs first, inspect and replace, if necessary, P/N 741266-101 fuel line fittings as specified in Paragraph 2, Accomplishment Instructions of Lockheed L-1011 Service Bulletin 093-28-072, dated July 23, 1984; or later revisions approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. Repetitive inspections of P/N 741266-101 fuel line fittings are required at 1000 landing intervals using visual inspections, or 1500 landing intervals using eddy current inspections, until P/N 741266-105 fuel line fittings are installed. NOTE: Installation of P/N 741266-105 fuel line fittings is terminating action for this AD. C. A copy of this AD inserted in the FAA approved AFM may be considered as an acceptable means of compliance with required AFM revisions. D. Alternate means of compliance which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. E. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the repair requirements of this AD. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Lockheed-California Company, P.O. Box 551, Burbank, California 91520, Attention: Commercial Support Contracts, Dept. 63-11, U-33, B-1. These documents also may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 4344 Donald Douglas Drive, Long Beach, California. This amendment becomes effective November 14, 1984, and was effective earlier to those recipients of telegraphic AD T84-13-51, dated June 21, 1984.
89-03-04: 89-03-04 PIPER (AEROSTAR): Amendment 39-6119. Applicability: PA-60 series (all serial numbers) airplanes certificated in any category. Compliance: Required within the next 100 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To prevent the upper cabin door from opening in flight, accomplish the following: (a) Inspect the cabin door for proper rigging in accordance with Piper Maintenance Manual (Part Number 761 732), Revision IR860920, dated September 20, 1986. Prior to further flight, repair any discrepancies. (b) Install cabin door placards in accordance with Piper Service Bulletin 600-74, dated July 3, 1978. (c) Modify the cabin door latching system by the installation of a door ajar warning kit as prescribed in the information listed in either paragraph (c)(1) or (c)(2), as follows: (1) Piper Service Letter 980, dated February 7, 1985, or (2) Supplemental Type Certificate SA1327G1 issued toAir Continental, Inc., which specifies Kit No. 10001, no revision, dated June 6, 1988 (for Model PA-60 600/601 airplanes). (d) Airplanes may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a location where this AD may be accomplished. (e) An equivalent method of compliance with this AD, if used, must be approved by the Manager, Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office, ACE-115A, 1669 Phoenix Parkway, Suite 210C, Atlanta, GA 30349. All persons affected by this directive may obtain copies of the documents referred to herein upon request to the Piper Aircraft Corporation, 2926 Piper Drive, Vero Beach, Florida 32960, telephone (407) 567-4361; or Air Continental, Inc., One Continental Drive, Norwalk, Ohio 44857, telephone 1-800-321-4409/668-3088; or may examine these documents at the FAA, Office of the Assistant Counsel, Room 1558, 601 East 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri 64106. This amendment (39-6119, AD 89-03-04) becomes effective February 24, 1989.
2010-23-01: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Some cases of corrosion were detected in the interface between the elevator hinges fittings (metallic) and the horizontal stabilizer (carbon fibre); investigation identified the cause in galvanic corrosion between dissimilar materials. If left uncorrected, this situation could lead to a structural failure of the elevator, which could result in possible loss of control of the aeroplane. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
87-04-19: 87-04-19 EON CORPORATION: Amendment 39-5552. Applies to EON Corporation TSO C22 safety belt assemblies incorporating E6000 buckle assemblies. \n\n\tCompliance is required within 30 days after the effective date of this AD, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent inadvertent opening of safety belt assemblies, accomplish the following: \n\n\t\tA.\tInspect all EON Corporation TSO C22 safety belt assemblies to determine if they use E6000 buckle assemblies. If a safety belt assembly with E6000 buckles is installed, remove and replace it with another FAA-approved safety belt assembly. The removed belts, if not destroyed, must have the TSO approval markings either permanently obliterated or removed. \n\n\tNOTE: This type of buckle assembly has a front cover plate which is pivoted at one end and is pulled at the other end through an arc to release the latch from the buckle. The E6000 buckle assemblies can be identified by the type of catch they use. Figure 1 (following) shows theconfiguration of the catch and how it is located within the buckle assembly. \n\n\t\tB.\tAlternate means of compliance which provide an acceptable level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Western Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective March 18, 1987.
87-24-12: 87-24-12 SHORT BROTHERS PLC: Amendment 39-5784. Applies to Short Brothers PLC Model SD3-30 series airplanes, serial numbers SH3002 through SH3107, SH3109 through SH3121, and SH3123 through SH3125 inclusive; and Model SD3-60 series airplanes, serial numbers SH3601 through SH3695 inclusive; certificated in any category. Compliance required within the next 180 days after the effective date of this AD, unless previously accomplished. To prevent fire caused by grounding of certain electrical contactors, accomplish the following: A. For Model SD3-30 series airplanes, modify the ECE electrical contactors on panels 1C and 2C in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Shorts Service Bulletin SD330-24-21, Revision 1, dated October 1986. B. For Model SD3-60 series airplanes, modify the ECE electrical contactors on panels 1C and 2C in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Shorts Service Bulletin SD360-24-06, dated August 1986. C. An alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety and which has the concurrence of an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, may be used when approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. D. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of the modifications required by this AD. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service document from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Short Brothers, 2011 Crystal Drive, Suite 713, Arlington, Virginia 22202-3702. This document may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. This amendment becomes effective January 14, 1988.
2010-20-23: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for certain serial numbers (S/Ns) of Bombardier-Rotax GmbH type 912 F and 914 F series reciprocating engines. That AD currently requires initial and repetitive visual inspections of the engine crankcase for cracks. This AD requires those same inspections, adds the 912 S series to the affected population, adds a test procedure to determine the engine suitability for a special flight permit, and changes applicability from engine S/N to crankcase S/N. This AD results from an increase in the affected crankcase population. We are issuing this AD to prevent oil loss caused by cracks in the engine crankcase, which could lead to in-flight failure of the engine and forced landing.
2010-22-06: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: An A330 experienced an uncommanded engine 1 in flight spool down, which occurred while applying fuel gravity feed procedure, in response to low pressure indications from all fuel boost pumps, in both left and right wings. The investigations revealed that the wing tank pressure switches P/N (part number) HTE69000-1 had frozen due to water accumulated in their external part, causing spurious low pressure indications. As per procedure, the main pumps are then switched off, increasing the level of unavailable fuel. This, in combination with very low fuel quantities or another independent trapped fuel failure scenarios, can lead to fuel starvation on the affected engine(s). * * * * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
89-10-01: 89-10-01 BOEING: Amendment 39-6200. \n\n\tApplicability: Model 737-300 series airplanes, listed in Being Alert Service Bulletin 737-28A1077, dated October 6, 1988, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required within three months after the effective date of this AD, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent a fire hazard associated with a fuel leak, due to the fuel feed tube assembly chafing against the thermal anti-ice duct, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tInspect and, if necessary, adjust fuel feed tube assembly clearance, in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-28A1077, dated October 6, 1988. Replace chafed tubes, before further flight, with a serviceable tube. \n\n\tB.\tAccomplishment of the procedures specified in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-28A1062 Revision 2, dated September 29, 1988, or Boeing Service Bulletin 737-28-1055 Revision 1, dated October 27, 1988, is an approved alternate means of compliance for the requirements of paragraph A., above. \n\n\tC.\tAn alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which proves an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tNote: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), who may add any comments and then send it to the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office. \n\n\tD.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6200, AD 89-10-01) becomes effective on May 30, 1989.
2010-22-05: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: When preparing for landing, the flight crew of a F28 Mark 0100 (Fokker 100) aeroplane observed a main landing gear (MLG) unsafe indication after landing gear down selection. * * * [T]he right (RH) MLG was partly extended and the left (LH) MLG door was open but without the MLG being extended. * * * Subsequent investigation revealed that the cause of the MLG extension problem was the (partially) blocked hydraulic return line from the MLG selector valve by pieces of hard plastic. These were identified as parts of the poppet seat of PBSOV [parking brake shut- off valve] Part Number (P/N) 70379. * * * This condition, if not detected and corrected, could lead to further events where the MLG fails to extend, possibly resulting in loss of control of the aeroplane during landing. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2008-23-17: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: [E]scape slide system installation [was found with] * * * tie- down straps which are used for escape slide packing [having not been removed]. The non-removal of the tie-down straps does not allow the aircraft door to reach the fully open position and the consequent deployment of the escape slide system in a * * * emergency evacuation, affecting the occupying safety. The unsafe condition is failure of an evacuation system, which could impede an emergency evacuation and increase the chance of injury to passengers and flightcrew during the evacuation. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
86-09-09: 86-09-09 BOEING: Amendment 39-5304. Applies to Boeing Model 757-200 airplanes, listed in Boeing Service Bulletin 757-25A0058, dated April 18, 1986, certificated in any category. Compliance required within 45 days after the effective date of this amendment, unless already accomplished. \n\n\tTo ensure proper door opening and escape slide deployment accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tModify slide pack release cable assemblies on Doors No. 1 and No. 2, left and right, in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 757-25A0058, dated April 18, 1986, or later FAA-approved revisions. \n\n\tB.\tAn alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tC.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of inspections and/or modifications required by this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this AD who have not already received copies of the service bulletin cited herein may obtain copies upon request from the Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. This document may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective May 30, 1986.
2010-21-01: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the specified Eurocopter model helicopters. This AD results from a mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) AD issued by the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Community. The MCAI AD states that the AD is issued following a report of a crack discovered in the area of the center cross-member at station X 2325, at the attachment point of the yaw channel ball-type control sheath stop, of a Model AS355N helicopter fitted with the collective-to-yaw control coupling. Investigations revealed that the helicopter did not have the structural doublers, which are combined with the collective-to-yaw control coupling installation. Repetitive loads on the non-modified cross- member may cause it to crack. A crack can reduce the yaw control travel. This AD requires actions that are intended to prevent reduced yaw control and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
2010-21-07: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the Eurocopter France Model AS350B3 and EC130 B4 helicopters. This amendment is prompted by a mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) AD issued by the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Community. The MCAI AD states that a dormant failure of one of the two contactors 53Ka or 53Kb can occur following certain modifications. Failure of a contactor can prevent switching from "IDLE'' mode to "FLIGHT'' mode during autorotation training making it impossible to execute a power recovery and compelling the pilot to continue the autorotation to the ground. This condition, if not corrected, can lead to an unintended touchdown to the ground during a practice autorotation at a flight-idle power setting, damage to the helicopter, and injury to the occupants.
84-15-05: 84-15-05 BELL HELICOPTER TEXTRON, INC.: Amendment 39-4891. Applies to all Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., Model 214ST helicopters certified in all categories equipped with main rotor collective lever assembly P/N 214-010-474-109 or -113. Compliance is required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent failure of the collective lever assembly, remove and replace the lever assembly prior to accumulating 1,250 hours time in service. For helicopters that have accumulated more than 1,250 hours time in service on the lever assembly, remove and replace the lever assembly within the next 50 hours time in service or by September 1, 1984, whichever comes first. This amendment becomes effective August 3, 1984.
2010-21-16: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. That AD currently requires modifying the auxiliary hydraulic power system (including doing all applicable related investigative and corrective actions). This new AD requires these same actions, using corrected service information. This AD was prompted by fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer, as well as reports of electrically shorted wires in the right wheel well and evidence of arcing on the auxiliary hydraulic pump power cables, which are routed within the tire burst area. We are issuing this AD to prevent electrically shorted wires or arcing at the auxiliary hydraulic pump power cables, which could result in a fire in the wheel well. We are also issuing this AD to reduce the potential of an ignition source adjacent to the fuel tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.
2010-21-12: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: * * * * * Recently, a brake fire was reported which was caused by a ruptured brake piston. The fire was quickly extinguished but caused damage to the paint and hydraulic/electrical harness and its components. Detailed investigation showed that a hydraulic lock must have been present close to the affected brake creating enough internal pressure to rupture the piston. The most probable scenario for the hydraulic lock is a loosened (not necessarily disconnected) brake QD [quick-disconnect] coupling. Further investigation of the service experience files at Fokker Services showed that more brake fires have occurred on aeroplanes in a pre-mod SBF100-32-127 configuration. * * * * * The unsafe condition is loss of braking capability and possible brake fires, which could reduce the ability of the flightcrew to safely land the airplane. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
87-11-02: 87-11-02 THE DEHAVILLAND AIRCRAFT COMPANY OF CANADA, A DIVISION OF BOEING OF CANADA, LTD.: Amendment 39-5625. Applies to all Model DHC-7 series airplanes, certificated in any category. Compliance is required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To assure that flames will not penetrate the rear cargo compartment liner to the fuselage primary structure, accomplish the following: A. Within the next 6 months after the effective date of this AD, modify the DHC-7 rear cargo liner in accordance with DH Modification No. 7/2499, as detailed in DeHavilland Service Bulletin No. 7-25-49, Revision A, dated July 11, 1986, or later revisions approved by the Manager, New York Certification Office, FAA, New England Region. B. Alternate means of compliance which provide an acceptable level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, New England Region. C. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to The de Havilland Aircraft Company of Canada, A Division of Boeing of Canada, Ltd., Garratt Boulevard, Downsview, Ontario M3K 1Y5, Canada. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or FAA, New England Region, New York Aircraft Certification Office, 181 South Franklin Avenue, Room 202, Valley Stream, New York. This amendment becomes effective June 21, 1987.
87-22-05: 87-22-05 BRITISH AEROSPACE: Amendment 39-5751. Applies to all Model H.S. 748 series airplanes with a large freight door, certificated in any category. Compliance required within the next 90 days after the effective date of this AD, unless previously accomplished. To prevent inadvertent opening of the freight door in flight, accomplish the following: A. Inspect the large freight door shoot bolt lever, barometric (pressure lock) lever, bellows assembly, dry air cartridge and microswitches for damage, distortion and/or wear in accordance with British Aerospace Service Bulletin 52/129, dated May 1986. If any damage, distortion and/or wear is discovered as a result of the inspection required by this paragraph, prior to further flight, adjust, repair, or replace the affected components, in accordance with British Aerospace Service Bulletin 52/129, dated May 1986. B. Install a placard to indicate that the aircraft must be depressurized before opening its large freight door, in accordance with British Aerospace Service Bulletin 11/7, dated December 1, 1986. C. An alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. D. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of inspections and/or modifications required by this AD. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service information from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to British Aerospace, Librarian for Service Bulletins, P.O. Box 17414, Dulles International Airport, Washington, D.C. 20041. This information may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or at the Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. This amendment becomes effective November 13, 1987.
2010-21-19: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD requires replacing aluminum fire extinguisher discharge tubes with new, improved tubes; checking the fire extinguisher container for certain serial numbers; replacing fire extinguisher containers that have affected serial numbers; inspecting the pressure indicator on certain fire extinguisher containers for discrepancies; and performing corrective action if necessary. This AD was prompted by a report of accidental discharge of a fire extinguisher container and damage to an aluminum discharge tube. Investigation revealed that following the discharge an inaccurate pressure indication, due to the indicator dial being incorrectly staked, showed that the container was fully charged. We are issuing this AD to prevent inaccurate pressure readings and subsequent damage to the discharge tubes during operation, which could result in failure of the fire extinguisher system and an uncontained fire inan emergency situation.
2010-21-17: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Pratt & Whitney (PW) JT8D-9, -9A, -11, -15, -17, and -17R turbofan engines. This AD requires overhauling fan blade leading edges at the first shop visit after 4,000 cycles-in-service (CIS) since the last total fan blade overhaul was performed. This AD results from reports of failed fan blades. We are issuing this AD to prevent high-cycle fatigue cracking at the blade root, which could result in uncontained failures of first stage fan blades and damage to the airplane.
92-23-01: 92-23-01 BELL HELICOPTER TEXTRON, INC. (BHTI); CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF FORESTRY; GARLICK HELICOPTERS; HAWKINS AND POWERS AVIATION, INC; INTERNATIONAL HELICOPTERS, INC.; PILOT PERSONNEL INTERNATIONAL, INC.; SOUTHERN AERO CORPORATION; AND SOUTHWEST FLORIDA AVIATION: Amendment 39-8401. Docket No. 90-ASW-42. Applicability: All BHTI Model 204B, 205A, 205A-1, 205B, and 212 helicopters, certificated in any category, and military Model UH-1B, UH-1F, and UH-1H helicopters, certificated in the restricted category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. To prevent separation of the main rotor pillow blocks from the hub assembly as a result of bolt cracking, which could result in loss of the main rotor and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 300 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD; or at the next main rotor hub retention strap change; or at the next hub assembly overhaul; whichever occurs first, remove the four bolts, part number (P/N) 204-011-171-003, joining the two pillow blocks to the main rotor yoke assembly. Reinstall the pillow blocks using new (zero time) bolts, P/N 204-011-171-003; nuts, P/N EB080 or 42FLW-820; and washers, P/N 140-007-33S28-3 as follows: (1) Coat the shank of the bolts with corrosion prevention compound, such as MIL-C-16173 Grade 1, and dry torque the bolts and nuts 65 to 79 foot-pounds. Retorque nuts within 15 to 30 hours time in service after the initial installation. If the torque has reduced below the minimum value of 65 foot-pounds, repeat the torque check at intervals of 15 to 30 hours time in service until the torque remains at or above 65-foot pounds or until the torque check has been accomplished four times. If during the fourth check the torque has reduced below 65 foot-pounds, remove and replace the bolts, washers, and nuts and repeat the torque check procedure of this paragraph. (2) After initialinstallation or retorque, apply sealant, such as BHTI P/N 299-947-107 TYIII CL7, to the four bolt heads, washers, nuts and yoke mating surfaces to prevent moisture from entering the pillow block retention area. (b) Thereafter, remove the bolts and associated hardware from the pillow block and replace with new bolts, washers, and nuts as described in paragraph (a) of this AD at each hub assembly overhaul, at each change of the main rotor hub retention strap, or whenever the bolts are removed for any reason. NOTE: Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., Alert Service Bulletins 204-90-27, Revision A; 205-90-38, Revision A; and 212-90-62, Revision A, all dated October 11, 1990, pertain to this AD. A copy of the service bulletins may be obtained from Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., P.O. Box 482, Fort Worth, Texas 76101. (c) Rework or repair of the bolts, P/N 204-011-171-003; nuts, P/N EB080 or 42FLW-820; and washers, P/N 140-007-33S28-3, is not authorized. (d) An alternative method ofcompliance or adjustment of the compliance times, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Rotorcraft Certification Office, ASW-170, Federal Aviation Administration, Fort Worth, Texas 76193-0170. Operators shall submit their request through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Rotorcraft Certification Office. NOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Manager, Rotorcraft Certification Office. (e) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the helicopter to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. (f) This amendment becomes effective April 23, 1993.