Results
2007-07-11: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Due to quality escape during serial production, the jumpers at the Right Fuel Standby Pump Connector 4Q1 were manufactured from 14 AWG electrical wiring instead of 12 AWG wires as required per approved drawing. The possible overheating of the 14 AWG jumpers routed in vicinity of the fuel tank may present the unsafe flight condition. This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
2007-06-01: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) that supersedes AD 62-24-01, which applies to all Raytheon Aircraft Company (RAC) Beech Models 45 (YT-34), A45 (T-34A, B45), and D45 (T-34B) airplanes. AD 62-24-01 currently requires you to repetitively inspect, using the dye penetrant method, the front and rear horizontal stabilizer spars for cracks and replace any cracked stabilizer. Since we issued AD 62-24-01, we determined that using the dye penetrant inspection method may not detect cracks before the crack grows to a critical length and causes failure of the horizontal stabilizer spars. Therefore, we are requiring the surface eddy current inspection method to detect cracks in the horizontal stabilizer spars. Consequently, this AD retains the actions required in AD 62-24-01 and changes the required inspection method from dye penetrant to surface eddy current. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of the front and/or rear horizontal stabilizer spars caused by fatigue cracks. This failure could result in stabilizer separation and loss of control of the airplane.
95-25-09: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Airbus Model A310 and A300-600 series airplanes, that requires that certain flight control computers be modified so that the autopilot will disengage when the airplane is in the "go-around" mode under certain conditions. This amendment is prompted by an accident in which the flight crew may have initiated an inadvertent go-around which, following several subsequent actions by the crew and automated system, placed the airplane in a severe out-of-trim condition. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent an out-of-trim condition between the trimmable horizontal stabilizer and the elevator, which may severely reduce controllability of the airplane.
2007-06-11: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Cracks on a vertical stabilizer attachment fitting due to corrosion, have been found on an aircraft in service. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
89-20-10: 89-20-10 BRITISH AEROSPACE: Amendment 39-6332. (Docket No. 89-NM-35-AD) Applicability: British Aerospace Model BAe 146 series airplanes, certificated in any category. Compliance Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. To prevent loss of control of the airplane on the ground, accomplish the following: A. Within 100 landings after the effective date of this AD, or within 100 landings after the last inspection accomplished in accordance with AD 88-22-05, Amendment 39-6047, whichever occurs later, check the torque on and mark the nose wheel steering cuff ring nut, in accordance with the procedures in paragraph 2.A. of British Aerospace Service Bulletin 32-A95, Revision 1, dated December 2, 1988. 1. If the ring nut torque loading is found to be incorrect, prior to further flight, re-torque in accordance with paragraph 2.A.(2) of the service bulletin, and reinspect in accordance with paragraph 2.B. of the service bulletin within 30 days andthereafter at intervals not to exceed 300 landings. 2. If the ring nut torque loading is found to be within the limits specified in the service bulletin, repeat the inspections in accordance with paragraph 2.B. of British Aerospace Service Bulletin 32-A95, Revision 1, dated December 2, 1988, at intervals not to exceed 300 landings. NOTE: Paragraph 2.A. of British Aerospace Service Bulletin 32-A95 refers to British Aerospace Service Bulletin 32-29 for checking the steering friction damper torque. B. Within 2,800 landings after the effective date of this AD, modify the nose wheel steering ring nut locking means in accordance with British Aerospace Modification Service Bulletin 32-95-70409A, dated December 12, 1988. Installation of this modification constitutes terminating action for the inspection requirements of this AD. C. An alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. NOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), who will either concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113. D. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to British Aerospace PLC, Librarian for Service Bulletins, P.O. Box 17414, Dulles International Airport, Washington, D.C. 20041. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Standardization Branch, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. This AD supersedes AD 88-22-05, Amendment 39-6047, which became effective on November 8, 1988. This amendment (39-6332, AD 89-20-10) becomes effective on October 30, 1989.
76-24-04: 76-24-04 MORANE SAULNIER (SOCATA): Amendment 39-2780. Applies to Models MS 892A-150, MS 892E-150, and MS 893A airplanes, all serial numbers, and Model MS 893E airplanes, serial numbers 12674 and below, certificated in all categories. Compliance is required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To detect rocker oil return pipe wear and prevent possible engine failure, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 10 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, inspect the rocker oil return pipes for wear in accordance with Socata Service Bulletin No. 124, GR 79-09, dated January 1976, or an FAA-approved equivalent. (b) If, during the inspection required by paragraph (a) of this AD, rocker oil return pipe wear is found to exceed 10% of pipe wall thickness, before further flight, replace the part with a new part of the same part number. (c) Within the next 25 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, rework the cylinder cooling deflector spring in accordance with Socata Service Bulletin No. 124, GR 79-09, dated January 1976, or an FAA-approved equivalent. This amendment becomes effective on December 14, 1976.
2007-06-05: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: * * * * ** * * updates [to the airplane maintenance manual (AMM), engine service manual (ESM), and quick engine change kit instruction manual (QECKIM)] have inadvertently introduced torque value errors for the bolts that attach the forward engine mount to the engine. * * * * * * * * Application of the incorrect torque to the forward engine mount bolts during maintenance could result in failure of the forward engine mount and possible separation of the engine from the airplane and damage to the wing or loss of control of the airplane. This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
2007-06-02: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD), which applies to all Airbus Model A318-100 and A319-100 series airplanes, Model A320-111 airplanes, and Model A320-200, A321-100, and A321-200 series airplanes. That AD currently requires repetitive inspections of the upper and lower attachments of the trimmable horizontal stabilizer actuator (THSA) to measure for proper clearance and to detect cracks, damage, and metallic particles. The existing AD also requires corrective actions, if necessary, and reports of inspection findings. This new AD shortens the repetitive interval for inspecting the upper THSA attachment. This AD results from new test results on the secondary load path, which indicated the need to shorten the repetitive interval for inspecting the upper THSA attachment. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct failure of the THSA's primary load path, which could result in latent (undetected) loading and eventual failure of the THSA's secondary load path and consequent uncontrolled movement of the horizontal stabilizer and loss of control of the airplane. DATES: This AD becomes effective April 19, 2007. The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of Airbus Service Bulletin A320-27-1164, Revision 04, including Appendix 01, dated July 17, 2006, as of April 19, 2007. On May 5, 2006 (71 FR 16203, March 31, 2006), the Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of Airbus Service Bulletin A320-27-1164, Revision 03, including Appendix 01, dated August 24, 2005.
93-10-04: 93-10-04 GULFSTREAM AEROSPACE CORPORATION: Amendment 39-8582. Docket 92-NM-222-AD. Supersedes AD 89-05-05, Amendment 39-6198. Applicability: All Model G1159 (G-II), G1159A (G-III), G1159B (G-IIB), and G-IV series airplanes, certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. To prevent fire bottles being discharged into the wrong nacelle, accomplish the following: (a) Within 3 days or 10 hours time-in-service after May 8, 1989 (the effective date of AD 89-05-05, Amendment 39-6198), whichever occurs later, perform an inspection to determine proper configuration of electrical power leads to the engine fire extinguishing system, in accordance with the following Gulfstream Alert Customer Bulletins, dated February 2, 1989: G-II Bulletin No. 20 (for Model G1159/G1159B series airplanes); G-III Bulletin No. 4 (for Model G1159A series airplanes); or G-IV Bulletin No. 5 (for Model G-IV series airplanes); as applicable. If the configuration is not correct, prior to further flight, correct the installation in accordance with the applicable alert customer bulletin. (b) Immediately following any maintenance performed on the engine fire extinguishing system, perform the inspection procedures required by paragraph (a) of this AD in accordance with the applicable alert customer bulletin to ensure that the system is functioning properly. (c) Within 2 years after the effective date of this AD, modify the electrical leads and plumbing connections to the fire extinguishers in accordance with the following Gulfstream Aircraft Service Changes: Gulfstream II/IIB Change No. 401, dated December 6, 1991 (for Model G1159/G1159B series airplanes); Gulfstream III Change No. 195, dated December 6, 1991 (for Model G1159A series airplanes); or Gulfstream Change No. 146, dated September 5, 1991 (for Model G-IV series airplanes); as applicable. Accomplishment of this modification constitutes terminating action for theinspection procedures required by paragraph (b) of this AD. (d) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Small Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Atlanta ACO. NOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Atlanta ACO. (e) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. (f) The inspections shall be done in accordance with Gulfstream G-II Alert Customer Bulletin No. 20, dated February 2, 1989 (for Model G1159/G1159B series airplanes); Gulfstream G-III AlertCustomer Bulletin No. 4, dated February 2, 1989 (for Model G1159A series airplanes); or Gulfstream G-IV Alert Customer Bulletin No. 5, dated February 2, 1989 (for Model G-IV series airplanes); as applicable. The modification shall be done in accordance with Gulfstream II/IIB Aircraft Service Change No. 401, dated December 6, 1991 (for Model G1159/G1159B series airplanes); Gulfstream III Aircraft Service Change No. 195, dated December 6, 1991 (for Model G1159A series airplanes); or Gulfstream IV Aircraft Service Change No. 146, dated September 5, 1991 (for Model G-IV series airplanes); as applicable. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation, Technical Operations Department, P.O. Box 2206, Savannah, Georgia 31402-9980. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington;or at the FAA, Small Airplane Directorate, Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office, Suite 210C, 1669 Phoenix Parkway, Atlanta, Georgia; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC. (g) This amendment becomes effective on July 1, 1993.
95-21-20: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Fokker Model F28 Mark 0100 series airplanes, that requires a visual inspection to detect damage to the flexible fuel drain line of the auxiliary power unit (APU), and replacement of the drain line, if necessary. This amendment also requires installation of two additional clamps to secure the flexible fuel drain line to the fuel supply line of the APU. This amendment is prompted by reports of electrical arcing between the flexible fuel drain line and the APU starter motor. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent such electrical arcing, which could result in a fire in the APU.
2007-05-12: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus Model A330 airplanes and Model A340-200 and -300 series airplanes. This AD requires inspecting to determine the part number of certain S4- and MZ-type spoiler servo controls (SSCs). For certain other airplanes, this AD requires inspecting to determine the part number of all SSCs. This AD also requires replacing any affected SSC with a new SSC. This AD results from a new load duty cycle defined by the manufacturer. Additional fatigue tests and calculations done on this basis indicated that the spoiler valve manifold of the S4-type SSCs, and, on certain airplanes, the maintenance cover of the MZ-type SSCs, may crack during its service life due to pressure impulse fatigue. We are issuing this AD to prevent fatigue cracking of certain SSCs, which could result in hydraulic leakage and consequent loss of SSC function and loss of the associated hydraulic system. These conditions could affect all three hydraulicsystems, which could result in reduced controllability of the airplane.
95-23-01: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Airbus Model A330 and A340 series airplanes. This action requires inspections to detect cracking, corrosion, and freeplay in the spherical washers located in certain assemblies where the aft flap track attaches to the wing trailing edge, and replacement of the washers, if necessary. This amendment is prompted by reports indicating that these washers can break under load. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent breakage of these washers, which could result in structural damage to the attachment assembly and eventually lead to separation of the flap from the airplane.
2007-05-05: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Following Safety Alert No. SA-006, issued by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) on aircraft icing, it was impossible to demonstrate that the aircraft can safely takeoff when contaminated by frost, ice, snow, or slush, and fly into icing conditions. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
47-12-01: 47-12-01 DOUGLAS: (Was Mandatory Note 14 of AD-762-7.) Applies to All C-54 and R5D Series Airplanes, and the Following DC-4 Airplanes: 42904 to 42943, Inclusive; 42948 to 42952, Inclusive; 42982 to 42996, Inclusive; 43065 to 43069, Inclusive; 43071; 43072; and 43102. DC-4 Production Airplanes Nos. 43070, 43090, and Subsequent Except 43102, as Noted Above, Will be Modified Prior to Delivery. \n\n\tTo be accomplished not later than January 1, 1948. \n\n\tIf the clear-view panel in the windshield is opened in flight when the landing gear and flaps are extended, exhaust fumes enter the cabin. This causes considerable discomfort to passengers and may create a hazard which would affect the safe operation of the airplane. In order to prevent the exhaust fumes from entering the cabin under these conditions, all openings around the control cables and flap buss system at the side of the fuselage must be sealed and additional means for exhausting main cabin and cockpit ventilating air provided, unless tests made by the operator of the individual airplane show no unsatisfactory condition of carbon monoxide entering cabin with open windows when landing gear down and flaps extended. \n\n\t(Douglas Service Bulletin No. DC-4, No. 32, covers this same subject.)
2007-04-24: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Bombardier Model CL-600-2B19 (Regional Jet Series 100 & 440) airplanes. This AD requires repetitive inspections of the bolts that attach the exhaust nozzle to the aft engine flange to determine if any bolts are missing or fractured, and replacement of the existing bolts with new, improved bolts. This AD results from reports of the engine exhaust nozzle and fairing departing from the airplane in flight due to missing attachment bolts. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct missing or fractured attachment bolts, which could lead to the loss of an engine exhaust nozzle during flight and consequent structural damage to the airplane and hazard to people or property on the ground. Damage to the airplane could cause the airplane to yaw and result in reduced controllability of the airplane.
69-15-05: 69-15-05\tBOEING: Amdt. 39-804. Applies to Model 727 Series airplanes. \n\n\tCompliance required as indicated. \n\n\tTo prevent a slow discharge or no discharge of the engine fire extinguisher container, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tWithin the next 1000 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD unless already accomplished, and after each discharge regardless of time in service, inspect the Accessory Products Company (APCO) fire extinguisher outlet body P/N 805516 to determine that the gas port diameter has not been reduced below the allowable limit as set out in APCO Service Bulletin No. 26-04, dated March 31, 1969, or later FAA approved revision or an equivalent method approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. \n\n\t(b)\tIf an outlet body is found which is below the allowable limit, replace it, or modify it in accordance with APCO Service Bulletin No. 26-04 or later FAA approved revision or an equivalent method approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. \n\n\t(c)\tWithin the next 3000 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD unless already accomplished, modify the APCO fire extinguisher outlet body P/N 805516 in accordance with APCO Service Bulletin NO. 26-04 or later FAA approved revision or an equivalent method approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. \n\n\t(d)\tUpon completion of the modification described in (b) or (c), the inspection \nrequirement of (a) is no longer applicable. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective on July 25, 1969.
2007-04-12: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Inspection of a high time aircraft has revealed cracks in the Horizontal Stabiliser rear spar splice plate and inboard main ribs around the area of the Horizontal Stabiliser rear pivot attachment. Additionally, failure of some attach bolts in service may be due to improper assembly. This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
69-20-02: 69-20-02 MAULE AIRCRAFT CORPORATION: Amdt. 39-846. Applies to the following models: M-4, M-4T, M-4C, M-4S, M-4-210, M-4-210C, M-4-220C. The following are affected serial numbers: M-4, Serial Nos. 3 through 94 M-4T, Serial Nos. 1T through 3T M-4C, Serial Nos. 1C through 11C M-4S, Serial Nos. 1S through 3S M-4-210, Serial Nos. 1001 through 1045 M-4-210C, Serial Nos. 1001C through 1075C, 1079C, 1080C M-4-220C, Serial Nos. 2001C through 2029C, 2032C Compliance required within the next 25 hours' time in service after the effective date of this airworthiness directive unless already accomplished. To prevent the most forward aileron control system pulley, mounted on the lower portion of the control column, from separating from its bearing, accomplish the following: Remove the bolt attaching the most forward aileron control system pulley to the control column. Replace pulley assembly with the addition of washers AN 970-5 and AN 960-516 and an AN 5-27 bolt instead of the original bolt in the following order from front to rear: 1. AN 5-27 bolt, head forward. 2. AN 970-5 washer. 3. AN 960-516 washer. 4. Original pulley. 5. Control column. 6. AN 960-516 washer. 7. AN 365-524 nut or equivalent approved by Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Southern Region. Maule Service Letter No. 19, dated September 4, 1969, covers this same subject. This amendment becomes effective September 30, 1969.
2005-17-17R1: The FAA is revising an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for Turbomeca S.A. Arrius 2F turboshaft engines. That AD currently requires replacing certain O-rings on the check valve piston in the lubrication unit, at repetitive intervals. This AD requires the same actions except it reduces the applicability from all Turbomeca S.A. Arrius 2F turboshaft engines, to Turbomeca S.A. Arrius 2F turboshaft engines that have not incorporated modification Tf75. This AD results from Turbomeca S.A. introducing a check valve piston design requiring no O-ring. We are issuing this AD to prevent an uncommanded in-flight shutdown of the engine, which could result in a forced autorotation landing and damage to the helicopter.
66-11-02: 66-11-02 LOCKHEED: Amdt. 39-213 Part 39 Federal Register March 17, 1966. Applies to Model 188A and 188C Series Airplanes Except Those Modified in Accordance with Lockheed Drawing 841318A (including Notes 10 and 11), Lockheed Drawing 841318B (including Notes 11, 13, and 19), or an Equivalent Approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. Compliance required as indicated. To detect spanwise cracks in the wing lower surface aft of the main gear fulcrum fitting and chordwise cracks in the wing lower surface plank, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 700 landings after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the last 700 landings before the effective date of this AD, and at intervals not to exceed 1,400 landings from the last inspection until repaired or modified in accordance with (b), accomplish the following or an equivalent approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region: (1) Inspect for cracks in accordance with (i) or (ii) the wing plank riser radius (Item 7, Lockheed Service Bulletin 88/SB-620D, Figure 3) of riser number 29, plank 5 and riser number 36, plank 6 between Wing Stations 162 and 172 and between Wing Stations 204 and 214, of airplanes not modified in accordance with Lockheed Drawing 841318. (i) Inspect externally, by the ultrasonic technique described in Lockheed Service Bulletin 88/SB-620D, Section 2.B.(5)(c), pages 25 through 31, or later FAA- approved revision. Test block design must be in accordance with Lockheed Service Bulletin 88/SB- 625B, Figure 2, or later FAA-approved revision. If indication of a crack is found, inspect before further flight in accordance with (ii). (ii) Inspect internally, by dye penetrant method, as described in Lockheed Service Bulletin 88/SB-625B, Sections 2(A) through 2(F), or later FAA-approved revision. (2) Inspect for cracks the internal plank area surrounding the bulkhead angle (P/N810970) at the Wing Station 211 attachment hole or holes, as applicable, located between the lower number 6 plank risers 37 and 38, by dye penetrant method, in accordance with Lockheed Service Bulletin 88 SB-625C, Section 2G, or later FAA-approved revision. (b) Repair cracks found during the inspections required by this AD before further flight in accordance with Lockheed Drawing 841318A (including Notes 10 and 11) or Lockheed Drawing 841318B (including Notes 11, 13, and 19), as applicable, and the accomplishment instructions of Lockheed Service Bulletin 88/SB-625C or later FAA-approved revision, or an equivalent approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. The airplane may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a base where the repair is to be performed. Seal all splice areas to be covered with repairs in accordance with Lockheed Service Bulletin 88/SB-620D or later FAA-approved revision. NOTE: Regional approval required by (b) may be facilitated by obtaining prior approval of a Structural DER. (c) The repetitive inspections required by (a)(2) may be discontinued if, during the inspections required by (a), no cracks are found, and before further flight the airplane is modified in accordance with Note 10 of Lockheed Drawing No. 841318A or Notes 13 and 19 of Lockheed Drawing No. 841318B, as applicable. (d) For the purpose of complying with this AD, subject to acceptance by the assigned FAA maintenance inspector, the number of landings may be determined by dividing each airplane's hours' time in service by the operator's fleet average time from takeoff to landing for the airplane type. (e) Upon request of the operator, an FAA maintenance inspector, subject to prior approval of the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region, may adjust the repetitive inspection intervals specified in this AD to permit compliance at an established inspection period of the operator if the request contains substantiating data to justify the increase for that operator. This directive effective April 16, 1966. Revised April 15, 1966. Revised September 23, 1966.
2006-25-06: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Fokker Model F27 Mark 500 airplanes. This AD requires an inspection to determine whether certain main landing gear (MLG) drag stay units (DSUs) are installed. This AD also requires an ultrasonic inspection to determine if certain tubes are installed in the affected DSUs of the MLG, and related investigative/corrective actions if necessary. This AD results from a report that, due to fatigue cracking from an improperly machined radius of the inner tube, a drag stay broke, and, consequently, led to the collapse of the MLG during landing. We are issuing this AD to prevent such fatigue cracking, which could result in reduced structural integrity or collapse of the MLG.
66-27-01: 66-27-01\tBOEING: Amdt. 39-297 Part 39 Federal Register November 2, 1966. Applies to Models 707-300B and -300C Series Airplanes, Serial Numbers 18922, 18926, 18937, 18953, 18960, 18964, 18975, 18976, 18977, and 18991.\n \n\tCompliance required within the next 300 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. \n\n\tVisually inspect the inboard aileron center hinge clevis for cracks or evidence of hammer-peening using a glass of at least 5-power in accordance with Section 3 of Boeing Service Bulletin No. 2377 or later FAA-approved revision or an equivalent approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division: FAA Western Region. Replace cracked parts and parts showing evidence of hammer-peening before further flight with a new part of the same part number or a part inspected in accordance with this AD and found free of cracks and evidence of hammer-peening.\n \n\tThis directive effective November 2, 1966.
2007-03-19: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD), which applies to certain Bombardier Model CL-600-2B19 (Regional Jet Series 100 & 440) airplanes. That AD currently requires repetitive detailed and eddy current inspections of the main fittings of the main landing gears (MLG) to detect discrepancies, and related investigative/ corrective actions if necessary. The AD also currently requires servicing the shock strut of the MLGs; inspecting the shock strut of the MLGs for nitrogen pressure, visible chrome dimension, and oil leakage; and servicing any discrepant strut. This new AD requires installing a new, improved MLG main fitting, which terminates the repetitive inspection and servicing requirements of the existing AD. This AD results from stress analyses that showed certain main fittings of the MLGs are susceptible to premature cracking, starting in the radius of the upper lug. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct premature cracking of the main fittingsof the MLGs, which could result in failure of the fittings and consequent collapse of the MLGs during landing. DATES: This AD becomes effective March 15, 2007. The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the AD as of March 15, 2007. On August 13, 2004 (69 FR 41421, July 9, 2004), the Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of Bombardier Alert Service Bulletin A601R-32-088, including Appendices A, B, and C, dated February 20, 2003.
2007-03-09: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all of the airplanes identified above, that requires revising the FAA-approved maintenance program to include a new airplane maintenance manual task that specifies a detailed inspection after each ram air turbine (RAT) retraction. This AD also requires, for certain airplanes, a one-time inspection to detect breaks in the bottom flange fitting of the RAT and corrective actions, if necessary; for certain airplanes, an adjustment of the ejection jack; and, for certain other airplanes, replacement of the aluminum part with an improved steel part. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of the RAT yoke fitting, which could result in the loss of RAT function and possible loss of critical flight control in the event of certain emergency situations. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
59-06-02: 59-06-02 DOUGLAS: Applies to All Model DC-7 Series Aircraft. \n\n\tCompliance required by first block overhaul after receipt of parts but not later than December 1, 1959. \n\n\tSeveral instances have occurred wherein the green indicator light for one of the main landing gear failed to go on when the landing gears were extended. In one case, after landing, it was noted that the left gear downlatch was not fully engaged and the ground lock safety pin could not be installed. Subsequent investigation and laboratory tests revealed that the orifice check valve could malfunction due to contaminants in the hydraulic fluid of sufficient quantity and size (approximately 0.003-inch diameter) and thereby prevent full extension of the gear. \n\n\tTo overcome this difficulty, remove existing orifice check valve assembly, P/N 4498423-503 (Mineral Oil Aircraft), or P/N 4498423-5503 (Skydrol Aircraft), from each main landing gear actuating cylinder and replace with new orifice check valve assembly, P/N 2230565-5-093 (Mineral Oil Aircraft), or P/N 4481262-5-093 (Skydrol Aircraft). (Douglas Service Bulletin DC-7 No. 353 dated January 30, 1959, covers this same subject.)