Results
2007-14-06: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: It was detected by the STC holder that in earlier installations of the ACASII system there were no isolation diodes installed in the Heading and Attitude Valid lines. The absence of an isolation diode in the valid lines can prevent the valid flag to come up even if a gyro fault exists. The problem has only been detected for Heading Valid lines but could equally affect the Attitude Valid lines. With installation of the ACASII, the heading and attitude valid lines have to be connected to the TPU67A. On valid state, the signals are +28VDC. On invalid, the signals are open. This condition of direct connection (without an isolation diode installed) of the valid lines to the TPU67A, if not corrected, could cause the TPU67A to feed current into the open stated valid lines. This prevents the flag to appear even if the gyro is invalid, providing the flight crew with erroneous navigation information. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
87-10-08: 87-10-08 CASA: Amendment 39-5622. Applies to CASA Model C-212 series airplanes, serial numbers as listed in CASA Service Bulletin 212-52-16, dated October 23, 1985, certificated in any category. Compliance is required within 9 months after the effective date of this AD. To prevent inadvertent opening of the crew door, accomplish the following, unless previously accomplished: A. Install a protective cover over the crew door internal handle in accordance with CASA Service Bulletin 212-52-16, dated October 23, 1985. B. An alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. C. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of the modification required by this AD. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service document from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Construcciones Aeronauticas S.A., Getafe, Madrid, Spain. This document may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. This amendment 39-5622 becomes effective June 19, 1987.
2008-10-09: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Boeing Model 737-100, -200, -200C, -300, -400, and -500 series airplanes. This AD requires revising the FAA-approved maintenance program to incorporate new airworthiness limitations (AWLs) for fuel tank systems to satisfy Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 88 requirements. This AD also requires the initial inspection of a certain repetitive AWL inspection to phase in that inspection, and repair if necessary. This AD results from a design review of the fuel tank system. We are issuing this AD to prevent the potential for ignition sources inside fuel tanks caused by latent failures, alterations, repairs, or maintenance actions, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.
2008-10-03: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the specified Bell Helicopter Textron (Bell) model helicopters. This action requires certain checks and inspections of each tail rotor blade assembly (T/R blade) at specified intervals and repairing or replacing, as applicable, any unairworthy T/R blade. This amendment is prompted by three failures of a T/R blade occurring during flight and a recent incident of a cracked T/R blade discovered during a scheduled visual inspection. The actions specified in this AD are intended to detect damage to a T/R blade that could lead to cracking of a T/R blade and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
79-18-06: 79-18-06 BENDIX: Amendment 39-3546 as amended by Amendment 39-3606. Applies to Bendix D-2000 and D-2200 series magnetos installed on 4, 6, or 8 cylinder reciprocating engines. To preclude the loss of ignition, accomplish the following within the next ten hours after the effective date of this AD unless previously accomplished. (a) Housing Distortion For any of the following magnetos, accomplish Detailed Instructions, Part I of Bendix Service Bulletin No. 605 by means of any one of Methods, I, II or III and Information Parts I-C and I-D or FAA approved equivalent procedures. (1) Red nameplate magnetos, Serial Numbers below 25001. (2) Blue nameplate magnetos, Serial Numbers below 901001. (3) Dual Ignition Systems with broken torque seals or no torque seals on four middle cover screws. (4) Duel Ignition Systems not having the letter "K" stamped on the magneto nameplate following the serial number and without a caution decal on the magneto cover. (b) Coil Securing Kit For the following magnetos, accomplish Detailed Instructions of Part II of Bendix Service Bulletin No. 605 or FAA approved equivalent procedures. (1) Red nameplate magnetos, Serial Numbers below Serial Number 17815 not having the letter, "C", stamped approximately in the center of the magneto nameplate bottom line. (2) Blue nameplate magnetos, Serial Numbers below 806001 not having the letter, "C", stamped approximately in the center of the magneto nameplate bottom line. (Bendix Service Bulletin No. 584B incorporated by reference in Service Bulletin No. 605.) (c) Identification After accomplishing the instructions of the Airworthiness Directive, metal stamp the letter, "K", after the magneto serial number on the magneto nameplate, the letter, "C", approximately centered on the magneto nameplate bottom line, and make an engine log book entry of compliance including magneto serial number. Equivalent inspections and procedures must be approved by the Chief of the Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, AEA-210, Federal Aviation Administration, (FAA) Eastern Region. As permitted by FAR 21.197, aircraft may be flown to a base where maintenance required by this Airworthiness Directive can be accomplished. Upon request, with substantiating data submitted through an FAA Maintenance Inspector, the compliance time specified in this AD may be adjusted by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Eastern Region. Amendment 39-3546 was effective September 17, 1979. This Amendment 39-3606 is effective upon publication in the Federal Register.
2008-09-13: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Boeing Model 737-300, -400, and -500 series airplanes. This AD requires revising the FAA-approved maintenance inspection program to include inspections that will give no less than the required damage tolerance rating for each structural significant item (SSI), doing repetitive inspections to detect cracks of all SSIs, and repairing cracked structure. This AD results from a report of incidents involving fatigue cracking in transport category airplanes that are approaching or have exceeded their design service objective. We are issuing this AD to maintain the continued structural integrity of the entire fleet of Model 737-300, -400, and -500 series airplanes.
63-13-01: 63-13-01 BOEING: Amdt. 579 Part 507 Federal Register June 21, 1963. Applies to All Model 75 Series Aircraft Equipped With Pratt & Whitney R-985 or Wright R-975 Series Engines and Western Propeller Repair Model W2-1 Propellers, Including Those Certificated in the Restricted Category. Compliance required as indicated. As a result of several propeller blade failures the following inspections are required: Within 25 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the last 225 hours' time in service, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 250 hours' time in service from the last inspection, remove propeller blades from hub, clean surface as necessary and inspect by dye penetrant or equivalent method for evidence of cracks within the hub area and for at least 6 inches of shank portion of the blade outside of the hub. If no cracks are found blades may be returned to service. Any blades showing evidence of cracks are not eligible for repair and shall not be used again in certificated aircraft. The repetitive inspections required on Pratt and Whitney R-985 engines in this AD are no longer necessary when the engine crankshaft flyweight and flyweight liners have been reworked or replaced at each overhaul period as detailed in AD 65-07-02. This directive effective June 21, 1963. Revised October 13, 1965.
2008-09-05: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 747 airplanes. This AD requires inspecting the trunnion fork assembly of the wing landing gears to determine the part number and serial number and to determine the category of the trunnion fork assemblies. For certain airplanes, this AD also requires, if necessary, various inspections to detect discrepancies of the trunnion fork assemblies, related investigative/corrective actions, and a terminating action. This AD results from a report of a fractured trunnion fork assembly. We are issuing this AD to prevent a fractured trunnion fork assembly, which could result in the collapse of a wing landing gear on the ground and possible damage to hydraulic equipment and the aileron and spoiler cables. Such damage could result in reduced controllability of the airplane.
80-02-08: 80-02-08 VARGA AIRCRAFT CORPORATION (Morrisey): Amendment 39-3664. Applies to Varga Model 2150 and 2150A series airplanes certificated in all categories. Compliance required within the next ten (10) hours' time in service from the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To prevent jamming of the rudder cables on the rudder balance weight attach bolts, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tRemove the two bolts attaching the rudder balance weight to the static balance arm and reinstall these bolts head downward, as shown in Figure 1 of this AD. \n\n\n\n\n\t(b)\tAlternative inspections, modifications or other actions which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective January 21, 1980.
2008-08-20: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Wing anti ice telescopic tubes (P/N [part number] 5035-400 and 5035-500) ball joints were originally designed with high temperature polymer (Kynel\TM\) sealing rings. Temperature induced cracking of these rings associated with long term wear has been encountered in a small number of cases. This degradation may lead to binding of the ball joint and high swiveling forces which may result in improper operation of the leading edge slats and also in failure of the ball joint mounting bracket with possible friction on the aileron control rod, which could lead, if combined with a failure of the aileron emergency actuator, to an aileron jamming. The unsafe condition is a jammed aileron, which results in reduced controllability of the airplane. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2008-06-22: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the specified Eurocopter France (Eurocopter) Model EC 130 B4 helicopters, with certain twist grip assemblies installed, that requires inspecting the pilot and co-pilot collective levers for proper bonding between the twist grip drive tubes and the control pinions and if debonding is present, replacing the collective levers before further flight. This amendment is prompted by one incident in which the engine remained at idle speed although the twist grip had been turned to the flight position. The actions specified by this AD are intended to detect debonding between the twist grip drive tubes and the control pinions on the pilot and co-pilot collective levers to prevent loss of cockpit throttle control of the engine, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
82-24-04: 82-24-04 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-4500. Applies to McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9-30, -50, and -80 series airplanes including C-9B airplanes, with manufacturer's serial numbers 48002 through 48020, 48024 through 48059, 48062, 48063, 48066 through 48074, 48079, 48080, 48083, 48086, 48087, 48092 through 48151, 48154 through 48159, 49100, 49101, 49112, 49113, and 49116 through 49119. \n\n\tCompliance required within 30 days from the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. \n\n\tTo assure proper functioning of the horizontal stabilizer leading edge de-icing system, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tAccomplish the inspection, and if necessary, take the corrective action specified in the Accomplishment Instructions of McDonnell Douglas DC-9 Alert Service Bulletin A30-50, dated October 5, 1982, or later revisions approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tB.\tAffected DC-9 airplanes may be operated after 30 days following the effective date of this AD, and prior to the accomplishment of Paragraph (A), above, under the following conditions: \n\n\t\t1)\tThey are not operated into known icing conditions; and \n\n\t\t2)\tA placard is installed in full view of the pilots which reads: "Flight into known icing conditions is prohibited." \n\n\tC.\tAlternate means of compliance which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tD.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tThe manufacturer's specifications and procedures identified and described in this directive are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). All persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Director, Publications and Training, C1-750 (54-60). These documents also may be examined at FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, C-68966, Seattle, Washington 98168, or Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 4344 Donald Douglas Drive, Long Beach, California 90808. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective November 23, 1982.
2008-08-02: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Boeing Model 727 airplanes. This AD requires repetitive inspections for cracking or corrosion of the threaded end of the lower segment of the main landing gear (MLG) side strut, and corrective actions if necessary. This AD also requires prior or concurrent inspection for cracking or corrosion of the threads and thread relief area of the lower segment, corrective action if necessary, and re-assembly using corrosion inhibiting compound. This AD results from reports of the threads cracking on the MLG side strut lower segment. We are issuing this AD to \nprevent a fractured side strut, which could result in collapse of the MLG.
84-02-02: 84-02-02 AVIONS MARCEL DASSAULT - BREQUET AVIATION: Amendment 39-4796. Applies to all Falcon 10 series airplanes certificated in all categories. To prevent failure of the wing leading edge slat anti-icing system, accomplish the following within the next 50 hours time in service or 30 days after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, unless already accomplished. A. Inspect, repair, and modify the wing leading edge slat anti-icing system in accordance with Avions Marcel Dassault-Brequet Aviation Service Bulletin F10/0239, dated September 14, 1983. B. Alternate means of compliance which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. C. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of inspections and/or modifications required by this AD. This supersedes Amendment39-4423 (47 FR 32699, July 29, 1982), AD 82-16-01. This amendment becomes effective January 31, 1984.
79-25-09: 79-25-09 HAMILTON STANDARD: Amendment 39-3637. Applies to all Hamilton Standard 24PF propellers, P/N 764995-1, 764996-2, 764996-3, 767600-2, and 767600-3, incorporating P/N 738410-1 bell cranks and P/N 738405-1 pivots. Compliance required as indicated. To preclude fracture of the P/N 738410-1 bell crank and P/N 738405-1 pivot due to cyclic loading, replace the bell cranks and the pivots in accordance with the following schedule: 1. Bell cranks and pivots with less than 2,600 hours time in service as of the effective date of this AD shall be removed from service prior to the accumulation of 3,000 hours time in service. 2. Bell cranks and pivots with 2,600 hours or more time in service as of the effective date of this AD shall be removed from service prior to the accumulation of 400 additional hours time in service. This AD establishes a 3,000 hour life limit for bell crank P/N 738410-1 and pivot P/N 738405-1. NOTE: Hamilton Standard Service Bulletin HSCode 24PF, No. 13, "Propellers - Extension Dome Assembly - Replacement of Bell Crank and Bell Crank Pivots," dated August 15, 1979, pertains to this subject. Upon request of the operator, an FAA maintenance inspector, subject to prior approval of the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, New England Region, may adjust the replacement interval specified in this AD to permit compliance at an established inspection period of the operator if the request contains substantiating data to justify the increase for that operator. This amendment becomes effective December 24, 1979.
2008-06-29: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Boeing Model 737-300, -400, and -500 series airplanes. This AD requires repetitive inspections of the downstop assemblies on the main tracks of the No. 2, 3, 4, and 5 slats and the inboard track of the No. 1 and 6 slats to verify if any parts are missing, damaged, or in the wrong order. This AD also requires other specified actions, and related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. This AD results from reports of fuel leaking from a puncture in the slat track housing (referred to as the "slat can''). We are issuing this AD to detect and correct loose or missing parts from the main slat track downstop assemblies, which could puncture the slat can and result in a fuel leak and consequent fire.
64-07-04: 64-07-04 LOCKHEED: Amdt. 705 Part 507 Federal Register March 14, 1964. Applies to All Models 49, 149, 649, 649A, 749, 749A, 1049-54, 1049C, 1049D, 1049E, 1049G and 1049H Series Aircraft. Compliance required as indicated. (a) To insure that the bolts in the parallelogram linkages of the primary flight control boost systems remain secured and safetied, accomplish the following within 400 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless previously accomplished. (1) Replace the five castellated nuts in each of the four parallelogram linkages between the boost valve and boost mechanism of each of the boost systems with self-locking castellated nuts and cotter pins using MS-17825(WEP) in lieu of AN 310 nuts and MS- 17826(WEP) in lieu of AN 320 nuts or an equivalent approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Western Region. (2) All torque requirements that applied to the AN 310 and 320 castellated nuts also apply to the MS-17825(WEP) and MS-17826(WEP) self-locking castellated nuts, respectively. (b) Replace the self-locking castellated nuts with new self-locking castellated nuts prior to exceeding the reusability limits specified by the nut manufacturer. (Lockheed Service Information Letter 514, dated November 27, 1963, covers this same subject.) This directive effective April 14, 1964.
2008-06-26: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: One A320 operator has reported a disbond on the composite rudder control rod. Investigations conducted by the supplier revealed that this disbond is due to an incorrect low volume of resin in the fibre composite. The supplier and AIRBUS have confirmed that some rudder control rods installed on A330 and A340-200/-300 aircraft before delivery or delivered as spare are also affected by this defect. Rudder control rod rupture can lead, in the worst case, in combination with a yaw damper runaway to an unsafe condition. * * * * * The unsafe condition is reduced control of the airplane. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
71-02-06: 71-02-06 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amdt. 39-1148. Applies to DC-8/DC-9 series airplanes utilizing Douglas P/N 4750048-501 or -502 emergency evacuation slide girt bar latch assemblies incorporating a cadmium plated pivot pin. \n\n\tCompliance required within the next 500 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent failures in the deployment of the emergency evacuation slide, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tModify DC-8 series airplanes in accordance with Douglas Aircraft Company Service Bulletin No. 25-183, dated July 11, 1969, or later FAA approved revisions, and \n\n\t(b)\tModify DC-9 series airplanes in accordance with Douglas Aircraft Company Service Bulletin No. 25-150, Revision 1, dated October 14, 1969, or later FAA approved revisions, or \n\n\t(c)\tAn equivalent modification approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective February 26, 1971.
2008-05-16: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Eurocopter France (ECF) Model EC130 B4 helicopters that requires, within 110 hours time-in-service (TIS), modifying and testing the wiring of the battery overheat sensing circuit. This amendment is prompted by a malfunction in the battery overheat sensing circuit found during a scheduled inspection. The actions specified by this AD are intended to correct the connection of the thermal switch to the cockpit indicator light, to notify the flight crew of an overheated battery, and to prevent a thermal runaway of the battery, an in-flight fire, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
84-04-02: 84-04-02 AIRBUS INDUSTRIE: Amendment 39-4816. Applies to Model A300 B2 and B4 series airplanes, that have not incorporated modification No. 1642, described in Airbus Industrie Service Bulletin A300-55-017, Revision 3, dated November 5, 1979. Compliance is required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To detect cracks in the upper machined skins of the lefthand, righthand, and center spar boxes of the horizontal stabilizer, and to prevent the possible structural failure of the horizontal stabilizer, accomplish the following: A. Prior to the accumulation of 12,000 hours time in service, or within the next 300 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, unless already accomplished, inspect the upper skins of the horizontal stabilizer's lefthand, righthand, and center spar boxes in accordance with the instructions in paragraph 2.B inspection, of Airbus Industrie Service Bulletin A300-55-022, Revision 1, dated March 28, 1979. B.Repeat the inspection required in paragraph A. of this AD at intervals not exceeding 3,000 hours total time in service from the last inspection until the aircraft has accumulated 21,000 hours total time in service. After 21,000 hours total time in service have been accumulated, perform the inspection required in paragraph A. of this AD at intervals not exceeding 1,500 hours time in service from the last inspection. C. If cracks are found during the inspections required by paragraphs A. or B. of this AD, perform inspections and repairs in accordance with the Modification, Inspection and Repair Alternatives Flow Chart in Figure 1 of the Service Bulletin and continue the inspection required by paragraphs A. or B. D. Incorporation of Airbus Industrie Modification 1642 constitutes terminating action to the requirements of this AD. E. Alternate means of compliance which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. F. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of inspections and/or modifications required by this AD. This amendment becomes effective March 28, 1984.
2008-06-10: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Bombardier Model CL-600-2B19 (Regional Jet Series 100 & 440) airplanes. This AD requires repetitive detailed inspections for cracking of the left side and right side frame and reinforcement angles at fuselage station (FS) 640 between stringer 9 and stringer 12, and corrective actions if necessary. This AD also provides an optional terminating action for the repetitive inspections. This AD results from reports that cracks have been discovered on the frame and reinforcement angles at FS 640. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct cracking of the frame, which could lead to failure of the fuselage structure and possible loss of the airplane.
65-24-03: 65-24-03 FAIRCHILD: Amdt. 39-147 Part 39 Federal Register October 8, 1965. Applies to Model F-27 Series Airplanes. Compliance required as indicated. (a) For airplanes repaired in accordance with Fairchild Service Bulletin 51-2 within the last 575 hours' time in service before the effective date of this AD, comply with (c) and (d) beginning within 600 hours' time in service after the repair. (b) For airplanes not repaired in accordance with Fairchild Service Bulletin 51-2 within the last 575 hours' time in service before the effective date of this AD, comply with (c) and (d) beginning within the next 25 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD. (c) Inspect in accordance with Service Bulletin 51-2, Revision 8, dated September 23, 1966, including Supplements 001 through 011 or later additional supplements and revisions approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Eastern Region, or in accordance with an equivalent inspection program approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Eastern Region. (d) If cracks are found or if repaired cracks are found to be propagating, replace the cracked part with a part of the same part number or an FAA-approved equivalent, or incorporate an FAA Engineering approved repair before further flight, except that the airplane may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a base where the repair can be made. (e) Upon request of an operator, an FAA maintenance inspector, subject to prior approval of the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Eastern Region, may adjust the repetitive inspection intervals specified in this AD to permit compliance at an established inspection period of the operator if the request contains substantiating data to justify the increase for such operator. This supersedes AD 63-16-3. This directive effective November 7, 1965. Revised April 4, 1967
2008-05-04: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: [A]ll permanent fuselage skin * * * and lap joint doubler * * * repair principles published in the SRM (Structural Repair Manual) * * * have been replaced with Oct/05 Revision by updated, simplified and harmonized repair principles. These updates led to the de-validation of some repairs and to reassess the repair inspection requirements. This situation if not corrected, can affect the aircraft structural integrity with a possible risk of decompression. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2008-02-12: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain McDonnell Douglas Model 717-200 airplanes. This AD requires modification of the conduit for the forward boost pump of the center fuel tank. This AD results from the finding that a potential chafing condition exists in the volute assembly of the forward boost pump for the center fuel tank. We are issuing this AD to prevent chafing of the fuel boost pump wiring that could lead to arcing to the inside of the 45-degree angle fitting, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.