Results
98-03-08: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Fokker Model F27 Mark 050 series airplanes. This action requires modification of the window frames surrounding the windshield windows and installation of reinforcement plates on all window frames of the flight compartment. For certain airplanes, this action requires modification of the window frames surrounding the sliding windows and direct vision windows of the flight compartment. This amendment is prompted by the issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent structural degradation of the window frames of the flight compartment, which could result in depressurization of the airplane during flight.
90-21-19: 90-21-19 BOEING: Amendment 39-6765. Docket No. 90-NM-195-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model 727 and 727-100 series airplanes, equipped with main deck cargo doors installed in accordance with Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) SA1368SO, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\tTo prevent inadvertent in-flight opening of the main deck cargo door, accomplish the following: \n\tA.\tWithin 5 days after the effective date of this AD, perform a visual inspection of the main deck cargo door to determine the number of cargo door latch lockpins installed. If 7 latch lockpins are installed, no further action is required. \n\n\tB.\tIf fewer than 7 latch lockpins are installed, within 10 days after the effective date of this AD, accomplish the following: \n\n\t\t1.\tInstall a warning placard in a prominent place in the cockpit stating: "Main Deck Cargo Door Latch Locks Missing - See AFM Limitations Section for Instructions." \n\n\t\t2.\tIncorporate the following into the Limitations Section of the FAA-approved Airplane Flight Manual (AFM). This may be accomplished by inserting a copy of this AD in the AFM. \n\n\t\t\ta.\tPrior to takeoff after operation of the main cargo door: From outside the airplane, verify that the door in the closed position is flush with the fuselage and that the torque tube position indicator is visible through the view port indicating that the torque tube has rotated to the latched position. \n\n\t\t\tb.\tPrior to takeoff after operation of the main cargo door: From inside the airplane: \n\n\t\t\t\t(1)\tVerify that all seven latches are engaged; that latch alignment marks, which indicate latch in overcenter position, are aligned; and that the lockpin in the forward latch position (Position No. l) is properly engaged. \n\n\t\t\t\t(2)\tOn the cargo door control panel, verify that all lights are extinguished, and that the door master power switch, if installed, is in the OFF position. If the master power switch isnot installed, prior to each flight, pull the three cargo door hydraulic pump circuit breakers located on the P6-12B circuit breaker panel. These circuit breakers are to remain pulled during flight. \n\n\t\t\t\t\tWARNING: Do not pull the cargo door control circuit breaker located on the P6-2 circuit breaker panel. This deactivates the cargo door warning annunciator system. \n\n\tC.\tWithin 10 days after the effective date of this AD, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 30 days, accomplish the following: \n\n\t\t1.\tVerify proper rigging of the door latches in accordance with the procedures specified in Section IV, page 8, of Aeronautical Engineers, Inc. (AEI), Service Bulletin Report No. R-690, dated August 22, 1990. \n\n\t\t2.\tPerform a visual inspection of the cargo door warning annunciator system wiring, connectors, and switches for continued proper installation and continued integrity. If deficiencies are found, including broken or frayed wiring, repair prior to further flight.3.\tPerform a functional inspection of the cargo door warning annunciator system, to verify that: \n\n\t\t\ta.\tThe "door closed," "latch lock," and "pin lock" limit switches (and corresponding lights on the door control panel) are functioning properly and in sequence; and \n\n\t\t\tb.\tThe cargo door warning light on the cargo door control panel and the cargo door warning light on the flight engineer's panel are illuminated when the main cargo door is open, and extinguished when the door is verified closed, latched, and locked. \n\n\t\t4.\tWith the cargo door properly rigged and in the closed, latched, and locked position, verify that the torque tube position indicator is properly indexed, and visible through the external view port. \n\n\tD.\tWithin 60 days after the effective date of this AD, install six cargo door latch locking mechanisms in accordance with AEI Service Bulletin Report No. R-690, dated August 22, 1990. Once this installation is accomplished, the repetitive inspections requiredby paragraph C. of this AD may be terminated, and the placard and AFM revision required by paragraph B. of this AD may be removed. \n\n\tE.\tAn alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), ACE-130A, FAA, Central Region. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be submitted directly to the Manager, Atlanta ACO, and a copy sent to the cognizant FAA Principal Inspector (PI). The PI will then forward comments or concurrence to the Manager, Atlanta ACO.\n\n\tF.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service information from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Aeronautical Engineers, Inc., P.O. Box 661027, Miami, Florida 33166. This information may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue S.W., Renton, Washington, or at the FAA, Central Region, Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office, 1669 Phoenix Parkway, Suite 210C, Atlanta, Georgia. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6765, AD 90-21-19) becomes effective on October 29, 1990.
2021-14-12: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all True Flight Holdings LLC Models AA-1, AA-1A, AA-1B, AA-1C, and AA-5 airplanes. This AD was prompted by the report of an accident of an airplane exhibiting bondline corrosion and delamination of the horizontal stabilizers. This AD requires inspecting the horizontal stabilizers, including the bondlines, for cracks, buckles, corrosion, delamination, rust, and previous repair and repairing or replacing parts and applying corrosion inhibitor as necessary. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2021-13-09: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Airbus Helicopters Model SA330J helicopters, all serial numbers. This AD was prompted by reports of the failure of the lower bearing cage of the main rotor hub (MRH) flapping hinges and of the presence of metallic particles at the bottom of a drag hinge. This AD requires repetitive inspections of the MRH chip detectors, or for helicopters not equipped with chip detectors, repetitive inspections of the oil for contamination by metallic particles, and corrective actions if necessary, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2021-15-01: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Rolls-Royce Deutschland Ltd & Co KG (RRD) Trent XWB-75, Trent XWB-79, Trent XWB-79B, Trent XWB-84, and Trent XWB-97 model turbofan engines. This AD was prompted by the manufacturer revising the time limits \n\n((Page 36488)) \n\nmanual (TLM) to incorporate repairs to the low-pressure compressor (LPC) blades and introduce a new fan blade inspection. This AD requires revisions to the airworthiness limitations section (ALS) of the Rolls- Royce (RR) Trent XWB TLM and the operator's existing approved aircraft maintenance program (AMP). The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2004-06-17: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all BAE Systems (Operations) Limited (Jetstream) Model 4101 airplanes, that requires repetitive inspections for damage of the horizontal and vertical stabilizer attachment fittings, and corrective action if necessary. This action is necessary to detect and correct damage of the horizontal and vertical stabilizer attachment fittings, which could result in reduced structural integrity of the horizontal and vertical stabilizers and consequent reduced controllability of the airplane. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2011-10-10: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: [T]he FAA has published SFAR 88 (Special Federal Aviation Regulation 88). In their letters referenced 04/00/02/07/01-L296, dated March 4th, 2002, and 04/00/02/07/03-L024, dated February 3rd, 2003, the JAA [Joint Aviation Authorities] recommended the application of a similar regulation to the National Aviation Authorities (NAA). Under this regulation, all holders of type certificates for passenger transport aircraft * * * are required to conduct a design review against explosion risks. During improvement of the protection of fuel pump wiring against short-circuit by accomplishment of Airbus Service Bulletin (SB) A300-24-6094, a study led by themanufacturer concluded that the harness, installed through the wing panel needed to be protected to prevent possible damage in case of chafing which could potentially lead to short-circuit [and intermittent function or loss of the inner tank fuel pump. Loss of both inner tank fuel pumps could result in inability to use the remaining fuel supply in the inner tank. A short-circuit could also result in an ignition source in a flammable leakage zone]. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2004-06-13: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Airbus Model A319 and A320 series airplanes, that currently requires repetitive inspections to detect cracking and delamination of the containers in which the off-wing emergency evacuation slides are stored, and corrective actions if necessary. That AD also requires eventual modifications of the slides, which terminates the requirement for repetitive inspections. This action removes the currently required repetitive inspections, and requires an additional modification of the off-wing emergency evacuation slides. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent the loss of the emergency evacuation slides during flight, which could result in damage to the fuselage, and to prevent incorrect inflation of the emergency evacuation slides, which could result in the emergency exits being unusable during an emergency evacuation. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition. DATES: Effective April 30, 2004. The incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the regulations is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of April 30, 2004. The incorporation by reference of a certain other publication was approved previously by the Director of the Federal Register as of February 1, 2000 (64 FR 72533, December 28, 1999).
96-09-28: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all Aerospatiale Model ATR-42 and ATR-72 series airplanes. Unless modifications are accomplished or alternative procedures and training are adopted, that AD currently prohibits operation of the airplane in certain icing conditions, and requires restrictions on the use of the autopilot in certain conditions. That AD was prompted by an FAA determination that, during flight, in certain icing conditions, and with the airplane in a specific flight configuration, a ridge of ice can form on the wing and cause an interruption in the airflow over the ailerons, aileron deflection, and resultant lateral control forces. The actions specified by that AD are intended to prevent a roll upset from which the flight crew may be unable to recover. This action adds requirements for modification of the deicing boots on the leading edge of the wing and various follow-on actions. This action also removes certainlimitations and procedures.
2021-14-02: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Aircraft Industries a.s. Models L-420, L 410 UVP-E20, and L 410 UVP-E20 CARGO airplanes. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI identifies the unsafe condition as cracking of the retaining bolt on the nose landing gear (NLG) control. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.