Results
2011-06-06 R1: We are revising an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to all Eclipse Aerospace, Inc. Model EA500 airplanes equipped with Pratt & Whitney Canada, Corp. (P&WC) Model PW610F-A engines. The existing AD currently requires incorporating an operating limitation of a maximum operating altitude of 30,000 feet into Section 2, Limitations, of the airplane flight manual (AFM). Since we issued that AD, P&WC has developed a design change for the combustion chamber liner assembly. This new AD retains the requirements of the current AD, clarifies the engine applicability, and allows the option of incorporating the design change to terminate the current operating limitation and restore the original certificated maximum operating altitude of 41,000 feet. We are issuing this AD to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2011-26-03: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Model 777-200, -300, and -300ER series airplanes. That AD currently requires installing Teflon sleeving under the clamps of certain wire bundles routed along the fuel tank boundary structure, and cap sealing certain penetrating fasteners of the main and center fuel tanks. This AD expands the applicability in the existing AD. This AD was prompted by fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer, which determined that electrical arcing on the fuel tank boundary structure or inside the fuel tanks could result in a fire or explosion. We are issuing this AD to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
52-01-02: 52-01-02 BELL: Applies to All Models 47B, and 47B3 Helicopters and to Model 47D Helicopters Serial Numbers 1 to 79, Inclusive. Compliance required at next 300-hour overhaul, but not later than March 1, 1952. To increase the safety of the main rotor blade equalizer horns and drag brace fittings, which have failed in accidents involving damage to the main rotor, replace the existing equalizer horn (P/N 47-120-027-2) and drag brace fitting (P/N 47-110-145-2) with revised parts P/N 47- 120-167-1 and P/N 47-110-235-1, respectively. (Bell Service Bulletin No. 77 covers this same subject.)
59-16-04: 59-16-04 SIKORSKY: Amendment 34 (24 F.R. 6581) as amended by Amendment 39-2140. Applies to all model S-58 helicopters including military types HSS-1, HSS-1F, HSS-1N, HUS-1, HUS-1A, HUS-1AN, HUS-1G, HUS-1Z, H-34A, H-34C, H-34J, CH-34A, CH-34C, HH-34F, SH-34G, SH-34H, SH-34J, UH-34D, UH-34E, UH-34G, UH-34J, VH-34C, VH-34D, except for those modified in accordance with Sikorsky Modification Kit, P/N S1607-5695-1. Compliance required as indicated. Due to the present design of the damper trunnion assembly, torque cannot be maintained on the bolt, thereby leading to fretting and fatiguing of the bolt. Although this problem has been partially corrected by replacing the AN 177-34 bolt with S1610-23198 bolt (NAS 627-48 bolt with cotter pin hole), working of the bolt in the assembly has not been completely eliminated. Accordingly, it is considered essential that close surveillance be maintained and the following inspection be carried out pending the development and installation of aredesigned trunnion assembly to correct this difficulty. During the 50-hour periodic inspection of the damper trunnion for freedom per item No. 20(c) of the Periodic Inspection Check Sheet, Airframe System S-58 Maintenance Manual, remove the damper trunnion bolt P/N S1610-23198 and inspect for condition. If indications of wearing, scouring or fretting are found the bolt must be replaced prior to further flight. This amendment 39-2140 becomes effective April 8, 1975.
2011-26-01: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Piaggio Aero Industries S.p.A. Model P-180 airplanes. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as the baggage door lockpins not engaging properly and the baggage door open light illuminating when the baggage door is not open, which could lead to the pilot disregarding a valid warning. We are issuing this AD to require actions to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2011-25-08: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for International Aero Engines (IAE) V2500-A1, V2522-A5, V2524-A5, V2525- D5, V2527-A5, V2527E-A5, V2527M-A5, V2528-D5, V2530-A5, and V2533-A5 turbofan engines. This AD was prompted by three reports of high- pressure turbine (HPT) case burn-through events, numerous reports of loss of stage 1 blade outer air seal segments, and HPT case bulging. This AD requires initial and repetitive 360 degree borescope inspections of HPT stage 1 blade outer air seal segments for evidence of certain distress conditions. This AD also requires incorporation of improved durability stage 1 blade outer air seal segments at the next exposure to the HPT module subassembly as terminating action to the repetitive inspections. We are issuing this AD to prevent HPT case burn-through, uncontrolled under-cowl engine fire, and damage to the airplane.
59-20-04: 59-20-04\tBOEING: Applies to the following 707-100 series aircraft only: Serial Numbers 17586 through 17591, 17609 through 17612, 17628 through 17652, 17658 through 17672, 17696 through 17702, 17925 through 17927. \n\tCompliance required not later than November 15, 1959. \n\tThere have been failures of the welded flanges located at each end of the turbocompressor bleed duct mounted on the high pressure bleed port of the engine. These failures have caused damage to the surrounding structure due to excessive pressure and temperature in the cowl and also required engine shutdown due to high EGT and low EPR. Therefore, the following modification(s) shall be accomplished as indicated: \n\t(a)\tAn additional filetweld shall be added to the external side of the three flanges on the turbocompressor engine bleed duct assembly. (Each pod utilizing a turbocompressor.) \n\t(b)\tThe existing boss weld on the turbocompressor engine bleed duct shall be strengthened by welding gussets to both the boss and duct. These gussets are to be fabricated in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin No. 543 figure 2. \n\tNOTE: The above modification(s) are included in Boeing Airplane Company Service Bulletin No. 543 dated August 14, 1959.
52-16-01: 52-16-01 MARTIN: Applies to All Model 202A Airplanes. Item I is to be accomplished by means of a progressive modification program to be submitted to and approved by the FAA. The program shall begin no later than August 10, 1952, and shall be completed no later than May 1, 1953. I. In order to prevent inadvertent actuation of the propeller reversing solenoid valves, Protect the reversing solenoid circuits from all other electrical circuits and protect the reversing solenoid circuits from each other. This is to be accomplished in accordance with Attachment A (see AD 52-13-02 Lockheed) and the following instructions which pertain to specific features to be considered in isolation of the circuits. Other features which are not specifically referred to in this list shall be treated in an equivalent manner. A. Comply with TWA Engineering Orders 5686, 5776, and 5887. B. Modify the 19 pin connector at the propeller control relay box as specified in item 2 of attachment A. C. Modify the Hamilton Standard relay box on the front of the control pedestal to shield the reversing solenoid relay contacts, etc., from all other circuits which are energized at any time except when reversing is desired. Reversing relay boxes which have separate pin connectors for the reversing solenoid wire and the remaining circuits, shall be so installed that it will not be possible inadvertently to interchange any connectors between the relay boxes. D. Modify the configuration of the propeller control relay box in a manner equivalent specified in item I.C. E. Modify reversing solenoid circuit wiring in accordance with item 4 of attachment A. II. The following maintenance practices are to be instituted not later than August 10, 1952. A. At each nearest scheduled service to 350 hours: (1) Inspect all points covered by TWA Engineering Orders 5686 and 5776. (2) Perform an electrical check of the reverse safety switches in the pedestal assembly to assure that the switch is open when the throttles are moved forward out of the reverse position, unless it is shown that failure of any of the reverse safety switches to open will be clearly apparent to the flight crew by reason of improper operation of the propeller control system. Because of the many technical considerations involved, analyses showing that the objective of this revision has been accomplished should be referred to the FAA for engineering evaluation and approval. B. At any time that an electrical fault occurs in a circuit which is carried in the same bundles or the same conduits as the reversing solenoid circuit, representative terminal points in the faulty circuit are to be inspected to determine whether any damage may have occurred within the bundles or conduit. If there is evidence of possible damage, all the wiring involved is to be removed and inspected. Damaged wiring is to be replaced as necessary. III. Operating instructions: Comply with item 5 of attachment A. IV. (Note: Propeller governor design changes which are under development and whose purpose is to provide a high pressure hydraulic circuit bypass to safeguard against inadvertent reversing and to provide ability to feather even when the reversing solenoid is energized, are still under consideration and may be the subject of a future directive.)
2011-25-09: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain PW4000 turbofan engines. This AD was prompted by an updated low-cycle fatigue (LCF) life analysis performed by PW. This AD requires removing certain part number (P/N) high-pressure turbine (HPT) stage 1 and HPT stage 2 airseals and HPT stage 1 airseal rings before their published life limit and establishes a new lower life limit for these parts. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of these parts, which could lead to an uncontained engine failure and damage to the airplane.
2011-21-18: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the Eurocopter France Model EC 120B helicopters. This AD requires modifying the pilot cyclic control friction device by replacing a certain thrust washer with two thrust washers. This AD is prompted by an incident in which the pilot encountered a sudden restriction of the cyclic control movement during flight. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent jamming of a pilot cyclic control stick and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
53-23-02: 53-23-02 de HAVILLAND: Applies to Model DHC-2 (Beaver) Aircraft, Serial Numbers 164 to 407 Inclusive. Compliance required not later than December 15, 1953. When filling the fuel tanks, it is possible for spilled fuel to seep down between the fuel tank filler neck recess box and the aircraft's outer skin. This permits gasoline fumes to accumulate in the tank bays beneath the floor and can create a fire hazard. The aircraft should be inspected to ascertain if a satisfactory seal exists between the filler neck recess box (C2-FS-1005ND) and the outer skin (C2-S-829ND). If seal is unsatisfactory, fill gap with either "Goodyear Plyabond" or "Minneapolis Mining EC776" metal sealing compounds or equivalent. In the interim, until resealing is accomplished, a "No Smoking" placard should be installed in the cabin. The FAA concurs in this mandatory action by the Canadian Department of Transport. (de Havilland Technical News Sheet No. 68, Series B, dated September 15, 1953,covers this same subject and provides resealing instructions.)
2011-24-12: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Model 737-300, -400, and -500 series airplanes. That AD currently requires repetitive external non-destructive inspections to detect cracks in the fuselage skin along the chem-mill step at stringers S-1 and S-2 right, between station (STA) 827 and STA 847, and repair if necessary. This new AD adds inspections for cracking in additional fuselage crown skin locations, and repair if necessary. This new AD also reduces the inspection thresholds for certain airplanes, extends certain repetitive inspection intervals, and adds airplanes to the applicability of the existing AD. This AD was prompted by reports of additional crack findings of the fuselage crown skin at the chem- milled steps. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct fatigue cracking of the fuselage skin panels at the chem-milled steps, which could result in sudden fracture and failure of the fuselage skin panels, and consequent rapid decompression of the airplane.
2011-24-11: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Honeywell International Inc. ALF502L-2C, ALF502R-3, ALF502R-3A, ALF502R-5, LF507-1F, and LF507-IH turbofan engines. This AD requires removing from service certain second stage high pressure compressor (HPC2) discs. This AD was prompted by a report of cracks found in an HPC2 disc during routine inspection. We are issuing this AD to prevent the affected discs from fracturing before reaching the currently published life limit. A disc fracture could result in an uncontained failure of the disc and damage to the airplane.
55-22-04: 55-22-04 VICKERS-ARMSTRONG: Applies to All Viscount Model 745D Aircraft. Compliance required as indicated. Cracks have been found in the tailplane center section main spar extending along the lines of rivets attaching the web plate. Accordingly, Vickers-Armstrong (Aircraft) Ltd. issued Preliminary Technical Leaflet No. 52 dated August 19, 1955, covering this subject. The British Air Registration Board considers Modification D.1384, the initial and repetitive inspections recommended therein mandatory in which the FAA concurs. Aircraft complying with the limitations specified in PTL No. 52 will be considered serviceable.
58-09-01: 58-09-01 BELL: Applies to Model 47J Helicopters. Compliance required prior to next flight. 1. All 47-110-401-13 main rotor blades known to have hit an object, or to have contacted the universal joint cover on the tail boom causing an indentation over 1/4-inch deep in the universal joint cover, must be removed from service for further detail inspection, and repair if necessary. Such internal inspections and repairs are to be made by the blade manufacturer. 2. Visually inspect the stainless steel leading edge of the -13 blades for cracks and remove cracked blades. No field repairs are authorized. Cracked blades are to be returned to the blade manufacturer for detail inspection and repair. 3. Remove all 47-110-401-9 main rotor blades. These blades must be reworked to the -13 configuration prior to return to service. CAA telegraphic instructions of April 28, 1958, covered this subject.
2011-24-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Bombardier, Inc. Model DHC-8-400 series airplanes. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: There has been one reported incident where the main landing gear (MLG) failed to extend during testing of the MLG alternate release system. Investigation revealed that the door release lever bushing was worn, causing an increase in the lateral movement of the release cable system. An increase in free-play within the release cable system would cause additional wear to the door release lever bushing and may lead to the turnbuckle fouling against the nacelle frame. The bushing wear at the door release lever and turnbuckle fouling could cause a failure in the alternate release system, preventing the landing gear from extending in the case of a failure of the normal MLG extension/retraction system. * * * * * The unsafe condition is loss of control during landing. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2011-24-08: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: A helicopter experienced an inadvertent activation of the 65% N1 (gas generator speed) back up control mode. The subsequent technical investigations carried by Turbomeca revealed that an N2 (power turbine speed) sensor harness wire crimping discrepancy was at the origin of this event. Further quality investigations performed with the supplier led to the conclusion that N2 sensor Part Number (P/N) 0 301 52 001 0 whose Serial Numbers (S/N) are between S/N 242 and S/N 339 inclusive are potentially concerned by the same manufacturing discrepancy. This condition, if not corrected, could lead to the inadvertent activation of the 65% N1 back up mode and consequently to significant power loss on one or more or both engines installed on the same helicopter, potentially resulting in an emergency landing of the helicopter. We are issuing this AD to prevent inadvertent activation of the backup control mode, which could result in engine power loss and emergency landing of the helicopter.
52-28-01: 52-28-01 AERONCA: Applies to All Model 11AC and S11AC Aircraft Equipped With the Auxiliary Fuel Tank Installation. Compliance required not later than January 31, 1953. Accidents have occurred in the above model aircraft due to misuse of the fuel transfer system. These accidents have been caused by pilots attempting to transfer fuel while taking off or in a climb attitude. To preclude the possibility of pilot error with regard to the foregoing, the following placard, or its equivalent, shall be displayed near the fuel transfer system shutoff valve and in view of the pilot: "Transfer fuel in level flight or glide only and when main tank is half full or less. Valve is to be closed except while transferring fuel."
2011-23-08: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain Bombardier, Inc. Model CL-600-2B19 (Regional Jet Series 100 & 440) airplanes. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Seven cases of on-ground hydraulic accumulator screw cap/end cap failure have been experienced on CL-600-2B19 aeroplanes, resulting in the loss of the associated hydraulic system and high-energy impact damage to adjacent systems and structure. * * * * * * * * A detailed analysis of the calculated line of trajectory of a failed screw cap/end cap for each of the accumulators has been conducted, resulting in the identification of several areas where systems and/or structural components could potentially be damaged. Although all of the failures to date have occurred on the ground, an in-flight failure affecting such components could potentially have an adverse effect on the controllability of the aeroplane. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
70-03-02: 70-03-02 BRITISH AIRCRAFT CORPORATION: Amdt. 39-929. Applies to Viscount Models 744, 745D, and 810 series airplanes. Compliance is required as indicated. To prevent possible failure of the fuselage pressure shell in the area under the dorsal fin structure, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 90 days after the effective date of this airworthiness directive or within eight years after the date of manufacture, whichever occurs later, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 12 months from the last inspection, visually inspect the fuselage skin under the dorsal fin for corrosion and breakdown of the protective paint. These inspections may be accomplished through the leading edge access panel for the anti-icing duct connection at the base of the fin and through new inspection holes installed in the dorsal fin in accordance with Figures 2 and 3 of the British Aircraft Corporation Preliminary Technical Leaflet No. 278, Issue 1, for Model 744 and 745D airplanes; orPreliminary Technical Leaflet No. 143, Issue 1 for Model 810 airplanes; or an FAA-approved equivalent. (b) If skin corrosion is found during the inspections required by paragraph (a), before further flight: (1) Repair the corroded area in accordance with the Viscount Repair Manual, or 2) Remove the complete dorsal fin (segments or all at once), repair the corroded skin, and reseal, and repaint the fuselage skin under the dorsal fin in accordance with the Airframe Corrosion Section of Viscount Overhaul Manual, for Model 744 airplanes; the Instruction Manual, for Model 745D airplanes; the Aircraft Manual, for Model 810 airplanes; or an FAA-approved equivalent. (c) The repetitive inspections required by paragraph (a) may be discontinued when all segments of the dorsal fin have been removed and the corrective action required by paragraph (b)(2) has been accomplished. This amendment becomes effective February 22, 1970.
2003-04-08: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain Piaggio Aero Industries S.p.A. (Piaggio) Model P-180 airplanes. This AD requires you to install a placard on the inside of the lavatory door that prohibits occupying the lavatory seat during takeoff and landing. This AD also requires you to incorporate a temporary revision into the Limitations Section of the pilot operating handbook/airplane flight manual (POH/AFM). This AD is the result of mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the airworthiness authority for Italy. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent passengers from occupying the lavatory seat during takeoff and landing. The lavatory/cabin partition could fail and lead to passenger injury in an emergency situation.
98-04-28: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to Cessna Aircraft Company Models T303, 310R, T310R, 335, 340A, 402B, 402C, 404, F406, 414, 414A, 421B, 421C, 425, and 441 airplanes. This action requires revising the FAA-approved Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) to specify procedures that would prohibit flight in severe icing conditions (as determined by certain visual cues), limit or prohibit the use of various flight control devices while in severe icing conditions, and provide the flight crew with recognition cues for, and procedures for exiting from, severe icing conditions. The proposed AD is prompted by the results of a review of the requirements for certification of these airplanes in icing conditions, new information on the icing environment, and icing data provided currently to the flight crew. The actions specified by this AD are intended to minimize the potential hazards associated with operating these airplanes in severe icing conditions by providing more clearly defined procedures and limitations associated with such conditions.
2003-04-03: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to all SOCATA--Groupe AEROSPATIALE (Socata) Models TB 9, TB 10, TB 20, TB 21, and TB 200 airplanes. This AD requires you to repetitively inspect the aileron control gimbal joint for correct alignment and correct operation, and replace any misaligned or defective gimbal joint. This AD is the result of mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the airworthiness authority for France. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of the aileron control gimbal joint. Such failure could lead to loss of control of the airplane.
2003-04-05: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Robinson Helicopter Company (RHC) Model R44 helicopters that requires inspecting the tail rotor pitch control assembly for roughness or binding of the pitch control bearings (bearings) by hand-rotating the pitch control bearing housing (housing). If the housing does not rotate freely, the AD requires replacing the unairworthy pitch control assembly with an airworthy unit. This amendment is prompted by reports of failure of the tail rotor pitch control assembly due to improperly lubricated bearings on the RHC Model R22 helicopters. Although there have been no reported failures on the RHC Model R44 helicopters, the design of the tail rotor pitch control assembly makes it susceptible to the same failures as have occurred on the Model R22 helicopters. The actions specified by this AD are intended to detect corrosion of the bearings and to prevent bearing failure and subsequent loss of directional control of the helicopter.
52-18-01: 52-18-01 CURTISS-WRIGHT: Applies to all Model C-46 aircraft equipped with Curtiss Drawing P/N S20-480-1101-2 Carburetor Adapter Gasket. Compliance required not later than December 1, 1952. Several instances of splitting and tearing of the neoprene carburetor adapter gasket, P/N S20-480-1101-2, permitting portions of gasket material to block the carburetor air passage has resulted in abrupt engine cutout. To eliminate the occurrence of this hazardous condition, either of the following changes or an approved equivalent shall be accomplished: (a) Install new gasket and clamping assembly per USAF T.O. 01-25LA-79. (b) Install carburetor adapter flange, Slick Airways P/N 00391-2. As a precautionary measure, the subject gaskets shall be inspected for signs of looseness and splitting during each periodic inspection until accomplishment of the above.