Results
70-09-01: 70-09-01\tBOEING: Amdt. 39-976. Applies to Model 737 series airplanes. \n\n\tCompliance required within the next 250 hours time in service after the effective date of this ad, unless already accomplished. \n\n\tAs a result of FAA evaluations of the 737 electrical system sufficient cause has been found to prevent inadvertent operation of the battery switch located on the forward overhead panel. Inadvertent operation of the battery switch during some operating conditions could result in loss of the standby electrical system. To prevent inadvertent operation of the battery switch on the forward overhead panel on the subject 737 series airplanes, accomplish one of the following: \n\n\t\t(1)\tInstall a switch guard and light plate per the Boeing Service Bulletin No. 24- 1010 Revision (1) dated April 24, 1970, or later FAA approved revisions. \n\n\t\t(2)\tReplace the battery switch with a detent lock type switch, P/N MS 24659-23D or an equivalent MS type, provided the galley switch is a toggle type. \n\n\t\t(3)\tPerform an equivalent installation approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA, Western Region. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective April 23, 1970.
2011-25-51: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Continental Motors, Inc. (CMI) models TSIO-520, TSIO-550-K, TSIOF-550K, and IO-550-N series reciprocating engines. This emergency AD was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of these engines. This AD requires replacing affected CMI starter adapters with starter adapters eligible for installation. This AD was prompted by 5 reports received of fractures in starter adapter shaft gears in certain part number (P/N) CMI starter adapters. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of the starter adapter gear shaft, leading to an inoperable oil scavenge pump and engine in-flight shutdown.
2011-25-01: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the Apical emergency float kits installed on certain model helicopters under supplemental type certificates. This AD requires adding placards on each side of the fuselage to identify the location and operation of the liferaft external inflation handle. This AD also requires replacing each liferaft operation placard to state that external liferafts are installed. This amendment is prompted by a report of a helicopter that crashed into the water, and the pilot did not deploy the floats and liferafts. Two external T-handles were available for deployment of the liferafts but were not used by the passengers because they were unaware of their location. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent helicopter occupants from further injury due to unnecessary exposure to harsh water conditions and to aid in deploying liferafts when liferafts are available on the helicopter and can be activated after a water landing.
75-24-05: 75-24-05 LOCKHEED-CALIFORNIA COMPANY: Amendment 39-2429. Applies to L-1011-385 series airplanes, except serial numbers 193( )-1004, 193( )-1005, and 193( )-1007 through 193( )-1023 inclusive, certificated in all categories, incorporating a fuel line tube assembly, P/N 1515816-121, bearing the manufacturing date identification number 533X190, or, if the manufacturing date identification number cannot be ascertained. Compliance required as indicated, unless already accomplished, to prevent a potential fire hazard due to a massive fuel spillage from Tank One into the center section, accomplish the following: (A) Within the next day after receipt of this telegram, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed one day, until the modification described in paragraph (B), below, is accomplished, perform a close visual check by a flight crew member or other qualified person of the drain mast beneath the hydraulic service center for evidence of fuel leakage. If fuel leakage is detected,perform the modification described in paragraph (B), below, before further flight. (B) Within the next 300 hours additional time in service after receipt of this telegram, replace the fuel line tube assembly, P/N 1515816-121, with a tube assembly, P/N 1515816-179 or -121 that has a legible manufacturing date identification number other than 533X190, in accordance with Lockheed Service Bulletin 093-28-033, dated October 17, 1975, or later FAA- approved revisions. (C) Equivalent checks and modifications may be approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. (D) Special flight permits may be issued per FAR's 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a base to perform the modification described in paragraph (B), above, provided there is no evidence of fuel leaks at the tube assembly coupling, P/N 1515816-121. This amendment becomes effective November 24, 1975, for all persons except those to whom it was made effective by telegram, dated October31, 1975.
2011-24-09: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus Model A340-200 and -300 series airplanes. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: [T]he FAA published SFAR 88 (Special Federal Aviation Regulation 88) [(66 FR 23086, May 7, 2001)]. [[Page 73487]] By mail referenced 04/00/02/07/01-L296 of March 4th, 2002 and 04/00/02/07/03-L024 of February 3rd, 2003 the JAA [Joint Aviation Authorities] recommended to the National Aviation Authorities (NAA) the application of a similar regulation. The aim of this [EASA] regulation is to require * * * a definition review against explosion hazards. * * * * * This AD requires inspections to verify electrical bonding to prevent the potential of ignition sources inside fuel tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the airplane. This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
74-24-01: 74-24-01 BELL: Amendment 39-2011. Applies to Bell Models 206A, 206B, 206A-1 and 206B-1 helicopters certificated in all categories. Compliance required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent possible failure of certain main rotor blade grips, conduct the following: a. Within five hours' time in service after September 23, 1974, inspect the serial numbers of both main rotor grips and replace the following grips, P/N 206-010-102-9, before further flight: S/N JI1-5824, JI1-5861, JI1-5875 through and including 5878; JI1-5880 through and including 5903; JI1-5906 through and including 5912; JI1-5914 through and including 5938; JI1-5940 and 5941; and JI1-5944 through and including 5953. b. Within five hours' time in service after November 15, 1974, inspect the serial numbers of both main rotor grips and replace the following grips P/N 206-010-102-9, before further flight: S/N JI1-5393 through and including 5413; JI1-5417; JI1-5420 through andincluding 5439; JI1-5469; JI1-5516 through and including 5519; JI1-5521 through and including 5531; JI1-5533 through and including 5544; JI1-5546 through and including 5550; JI1-5552 through and including 5587; JI1-5589 through and including 5594; JI1-5595 through and including 5632; JI1-5634 through and including 5636; JI1-5638 through and including 5642; JI1- 5644 through and including 5646; JI1-5648 through and including 5654; JI1-5656 through and including 5695; JI1-5697 through and including 5710; JI1-5712 through and including 5759; JI1 5761 through and including 5785; JI1-5787; JI1-5789 through and including 5794; JI1-5796 through and including 5803; JI1-5805 through and including 5823; JI1-5825 through and including 5860; JI1-5862 through and including 5874; JI1-5972; JI1-5993 and 5994; JI1-6045 and 6046; JI1-6160. c. Main rotor grips that have been inspected by the manufacturer and found airworthy will be given a new serial number by Bell Helicopter Company and may be returned to service. (Telefax messages dated September 6, and October 10, 1974 from Bell Helicopter Company to all 206 operators pertains to this subject.) This supersedes Amendment 39-1973 (39 F.R. 33790), AD 74-20-3. This amendment becomes effective November 15, 1974.
2011-23-13: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Honeywell International Inc. LTS101-600A-2, -3, -3A, and LTS101-700D-2 turboshaft engines with certain power turbine governors (PTG) model AL- AB1, installed, that are marked with compliance symbol N or P, or with no compliance symbol, on the PTG identification plate. This AD requires initial and repetitive replacements of the affected PTGs. This AD was prompted by reports of two accidents where the engines suddenly lost power and the helicopters had to make emergency autorotation landings, leading to substantial damage to the helicopters. We are issuing this AD to prevent loss of engine power, leading to emergency autorotation landing and damage to the helicopter.
2011-23-11: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Pacific Aerospace Limited Model FU24 Airplanes. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Investigation of a recent Cresco 08-600 accident identified a risk of the hopper lid interfering with the opening of the canopy in the event of an emergency landing. The pilot was prevented from opening the canopy by the hopper lid in the fully forward open position. This AD is issued due to the fact that the hopper lid installation on the accident aircraft was an unapproved modification and the Fletcher FU24 hopper installation is a similar design to the Cresco 08-600. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
75-24-06: 75-24-06 HAWKER SIDDELEY AVIATION LIMITED: Amendment 39-2427. Applies to Hawker Siddeley DH-104 "Dove" airplanes, Serial Numbers 04465 and below certificated in all categories, except those that incorporate "Dove" Modification 870. Compliance is required within the next 50 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To detect spanwise cracks in the upper and lower wing main spar joint, accomplish the following: (a) Inspect the upper and lower wing main spar joints for cracks in accordance with the X-ray technique specified in Appendix I, Issue 2 as amended June 16, 1975, of Hawker Siddeley Technical News Sheet (T.N.S.) No. 134, Issue 5, dated March 17, 1975, or an FAA- approved equivalent. (b) If, during the inspection required by paragraph (a) of this AD, a crack is found in a wing main spar joint, before further flight modify the joint in accordance with Appendix 2 of Hawker Siddeley Technical News Sheet (T.N.S.) No. 134, Issue 5, dated March 17, 1975, or an FAA-approved equivalent. This supersedes AD 57-05-02 that was contained in Supplement 2 to Part 507 of the Regulation of the Administrator (22 FR 6046) and that was transferred to Section 39.13 of the Federal Aviation Regulations upon the adoption of Part 39 (29 FR 14403). NOTE: Copies of X-rays or of the results of the equivalent inspections as required by paragraph (a) of this AD are requested to be transmitted to DOT/FAA, Chief, Aircraft Certification Staff, Africa, and Middle East Region, c/o American Embassy, APO New York, N.Y. 09667. (Reporting approved by the Bureau of the Budget under B.O.B. No. 04-R0174). This amendment becomes effective November 28, 1975.
2011-21-13: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for ECD Model MBB-BK 117 C-2 helicopters. This action requires revising the Rotorcraft Flight Manual (RFM) by inserting certain temporary pages into the Emergency and Performance Data sections of the RFM to alert the operators to monitor the power display when a generator is deactivated and provides appropriate actions. This amendment is prompted by reports of too high a current flow when one generator is deactivated. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent failure of the remaining generator when one generator is deactivated, loss of electrical power, loss of systems necessary for flight safety, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.