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2012-11-02: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) that supersedes an existing Emergency Airworthiness Directive (EAD) for certain Eurocopter Deutschland GmbH (ECD) Model EC135 helicopters. The existing EAD, which was previously sent to all known U.S. owners and operators of ECD Model EC135 helicopters and not made generally effective by publication in the Federal Register, currently requires inspecting the ring frame between the rear structure tube (tailboom) and the tail rotor fenestron housing (fenestron housing) for a crack before the first flight of each day and replacing any cracked ring frame with an airworthy ring frame. Since we issued that EAD, we have determined that a pre-flight pilot check in conjunction with a recurring 25-hour inspection is sufficient for determining the airworthiness of the ring frame. Additionally, ECD has developed a modification that is terminating action for the requirements of that EAD. This superseding AD revises the inspection requirements of the EAD to allow an owner/operator to perform the pre-flight pilot check, adds a recurring inspection of the ring frame, and allows for installation of a ring frame reinforcement as an optional terminating action for the AD requirements. The actions are intended to detect a crack in the ring frame which could result in loss of the fenestron structure and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
99-04-01: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 747 series airplanes, that requires repetitive inspections of the outboard nacelle struts to detect fatigue cracking of the strut skin and spring beam support fittings, and to detect cracked or loose fasteners of the support fittings; and corrective actions, if necessary. This amendment also provides for optional terminating action for the repetitive inspection requirements. This amendment is prompted by reports indicating that several cracked or broken spring beam support fittings were found on the outboard nacelle struts. The actions specified by this AD are intended to detect and correct such fatigue cracking and loose fasteners, which could result in failure of the outboard nacelle struts and consequent separation of the engine.
57-10-01: 57-10-01 MOONEY: Applies to Model M-20 Aircraft Serial Numbers 1002 Through 1126 Incorporating Main Landing Gear Retracting Bellcrank Bracket P/N 5035. To be accomplished as soon as practicable but not later than July 1, 1957. Cracks have been reported in the main landing gear retracting bellcrank bracket P/N 5035. In one case complete failure of the bracket resulted in jamming the elevator control system. Therefore, it is required that bracket PN 5035 be replaced by new redesigned brackets P/N 5101 which have a 0.095 inch wall tubing. The revised retracting bellcrank bracket P/N 5101 incorporated a reinforcing angle at the lower front corner and a cross member between the gear bungee fittings. (Mooney Service Letter 20-22 covers this same subject.)
87-23-04 R1: 87-23-04 R1 ROLLS-ROYCE plc: Amendment 39-5753 as amended by amendment 39-6180. Applicability: Rolls-Royce plc (R-R) RB211-22B, -524, -524B, -524B2, -524B3, and -524C2 turbofan engines. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent low pressure turbine (LPT) stage 1 disk uncontained failure, accomplish the following: (a) Modify LPT stage 2 vane nozzle assemblies, Part Numbers (P/N) LK63392, LK63331, LK63333, LK59046, LK59816, LK59853, LK59818, LK59038, LK55447, LK55420, LK54278, LK55452, and LK59002, in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of R-R Service Bulletin (SB) RB.211-72-8301, Revision 5, dated May 13, 1988, at the next shop visit of the LPT module, but not later than June 30, 1989. NOTE: For the purpose of this AD, an LPT module shop visit is defined as separation of the LPT rotor assembly from the LPT case/vane nozzle assembly as necessitated by (1) its condition or (2) a requirement for scheduled maintenance. (b) Aircraft may be ferried in accordance with the provisions of FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to a base where the AD may be accomplished. (c) Upon submission of substantiating data by an owner or operator through an FAA Airworthiness Inspector, and alternative method of compliance with the requirements of this AD or adjustments to the compliance times specified in this AD, may be approved by the Manager, Engine Certification Office, ANE-140, Engine and Propeller Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. The LPT stage 2 vane nozzle assembly modification shall be done in accordance with Rolls-Royce SB RB.211-72-8301, Revision 5, dated May 13, 1988. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552 (a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from Rolls-Royce plc, Technical Publications Department, P.O. Box 31, Derby DE2 8BJ, England. Copies may be inspected at the Regional Rules Docket, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, Federal Aviation Administration, New England Region, 12 New England Executive Park, Room 311, Burlington, Massachusetts 01803, or at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L Street, N.W., Room 8301, Washington, DC. Amendment 39-5753, AD 87-23-04 became effective on December 11, 1987. This amendment (39-6180, AD 87-23-04 R1) becomes effective on May 31, 1989.
99-03-04: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all Boeing Model 737-100, -200, -300, -400, and -500 series airplanes, that requires installation of components to provide shielding and separation of the fuel system wiring (that is routed to the fuel tanks) from adjacent wiring. This amendment also requires installation of flame arrestors and pressure relief valves in the fuel vent system. This amendment is prompted by testing results, obtained in support of an accident investigation, and by re-examination of possible causes of a similar accident. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent possible ignition of fuel vapors in the fuel tanks, and external ignition of fuel vapor exiting the fuel vent system and consequent propagation of a flame front into the fuel tanks.
91-02-04: 91-02-04 GROB WERKE GMBH & CO. KG (GROB): Amendment 39-6823; Docket No. 90-CE-29-AD. Applicability: Models G103 "Twin Astir" (including "Trainer") gliders (Serial Numbers (S/N) 3000 through 3291) and G103 "Twin II" (including "ACRO") gliders (S/N 3501 through 3729), certificated in any category. Compliance: Required within the next 50 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To preclude the incorrect installation of the aileron system connecting bolt, accomplish the following: (a) Modify the aileron control system by installing a GROB forkhead nut (GROB part number 103B-4229) and removing the placard that cautions against incorrect installation of the connecting bolts located on the aileron control lever adjacent to the connecting bolt, if installed, as described in GROB Service Bulletin No. TM 315-38/1, dated December 12, 1989. (b) An alternate method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time thatprovides an equivalent level of safety may be approved by the Manager, Brussels Aircraft Certification Staff, Europe, Africa, and Middle East Office, FAA, c/o American Embassy, B-1000 Brussels, Belgium; Telephone (322) 513.38.30 ext. 2718; Facsimile (322) 230.68.99. The request should be forwarded through an appropriate FAA Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Brussels Aircraft Certification Staff. (c) All persons affected by this directive may obtain copies of the document referred to herein upon request to GROB Systems, Incorporated; Aircraft Division, I-75 and Airport Drive, Bluffton, Ohio 45817; Telephone (419) 358-9015; or may examine this document at the FAA, Central Region, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, Room 1558, 601 E. 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri 64106. This amendment (39-6823, AD 91-02-04) becomes effective on February 8, 1991.
2013-16-16: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Agusta S.p.A. (Agusta) Model AB412 and AB412 EP, and Bell Helicopter Textron (Bell) Model 412, 412CF, and 412EP helicopters with certain DART Aerospace Ltd. (Dart) high gear aft crosstubes (crosstube) installed. This AD requires adding a life limit of 10,000 landings to the crosstube and removing from service any crosstubes with more than 10,000 accumulated landings. This AD is prompted by five separate reports of crosstube failures. The actions in this AD are intended to prevent failure of the crosstube and subsequent collapse of the landing gear.
2010-14-06: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD), which applies to certain Model 737-300, -400, and -500 series airplanes. That AD currently requires an inspection to determine the manufacturer and manufacture date of the oxygen masks in the passenger service unit and the lavatory and attendant box assemblies, corrective action if necessary, and other specified action. This new AD expands the applicability in the existing AD. This AD results from a determination indicating that additional airplanes may be subject to the identified unsafe condition. We are issuing this AD to prevent the in-line flow indicators of the passenger oxygen masks from fracturing and separating, which could inhibit oxygen flow to the masks and consequently result in exposure of the passengers and cabin attendants to hypoxia following a depressurization event.
2013-16-09: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus Model A318, A319, A320, and [[Page 48287]] A321 series airplanes. This AD requires an inspection to determine airplane configuration and part numbers of the landing gear control interface unit and main landing gear (MLG) door actuators; and, for affected airplanes, repetitive inspections of the opening sequence of the MLG door actuator, and replacement of the MLG door actuator if necessary. This AD also provides optional terminating action for the repetitive inspections. This AD was prompted by a report of a MLG failing to extend during landing, and a determination that a certain configuration of landing gear control interface unit and actuators may result in masking of centralized fault display system messages that are necessary to mitigate risks associated with failure of MLG extension or down-locking. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct such a configuration, which could prevent the full extension or down-locking of the MLG, possibly resulting in MLG collapse during landing and consequent damage to the airplane and injury to occupants.
2013-15-05: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Bombardier, Inc. Model CL-600-2B19 (Regional Jet Series 100 & 440) airplanes. This AD was prompted by a determination that certain flap actuators require restoration by installing a redesigned flap actuator inboard pinion seal. This AD requires revising the maintenance program by incorporating new airworthiness limitation tasks. We are issuing this AD to prevent flap system failure, and consequent reduced control of the airplane.