Results
2021-22-23: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all The Boeing Company Model 757-200, -200PF, -200CB, and -300 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by crack indications found in the lower aft wing skin bolt holes where the flap tracks attach to the track support fitting; this finding was on a Model 737-300 series airplane, which has a design similar to the Model 757 airplanes. This AD requires repetitive high frequency eddy current (HFEC) inspections for cracking of the lower aft wing skin aft edge at certain flap tracks, and repair if necessary. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2004-10-10: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 737-600, -700, -700C, -800, and -900 series airplanes equipped with certain Honeywell start converter units (SCU). This amendment requires replacement of the SCU of the auxiliary power unit (APU) located in the electrical and electronics (E/E) compartment with a new or modified SCU. This action is necessary to prevent overheating of the electrical connector of the SCU, which could create an ignition source and possible fire in the E/E compartment and cause damage to certain electrical wire bundles on the E2-2 shelf. Such damage could result in loss of power from the APU generator, failure of electrically powered airplane systems, and consequent reduction in the ability of the flight crew to control the airplane in certain adverse operating conditions. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
58-26-03: 58-26-03 FAIRCHILD: Applies to all F-27 aircraft. Compliance required as indicated. A number of failures of the Westinghouse P/N 903J826, 903J826-2, 903J826-3 a.c. deicing generators have occurred in service. These generators have been replaced by an improved generator, J/N 903J826-4. Inspect Westinghouse P/N 903J826-4 at the first removal or by 500 hours, whichever comes first, to determine that the bearing support in the mounting bracket is secure with no evidence of looseness or failed rivets. (Fairchild Service Bulletin 24-1 cover this same subject.)
2012-03-01: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Eurocopter Deutschland (ECD) Model EC135 helicopters. This AD results from a mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) AD issued by the aviation authority of the Federal Republic of Germany, with which we have a bilateral agreement, to identify and correct an unsafe condition. The MCAI AD states that in the past, the FADEC FAIL caution light illuminated on a few EC135 T1 helicopters. It states that this was caused by a discrepancy in the parameters that was generated within the fuel main metering unit and transmitted to the FADEC. This discrepancy led to the display of the FADEC FAIL caution light and ``freezing'' of the fuel main metering valve at its position, resulting in loss of the automatic engine control in the affected system. With the MCAI AD, a synchronization procedure for pilots, which was already used in the past, is being reintroduced, which prevents the parameter discrepancy arising and thus sustains the automatic engine control. The AD actions are intended to prevent failure of the FADEC to automatically meter fuel, indicated by a FADEC FAIL cockpit caution light, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
96-12-03: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain Aviat Aircraft, Inc. (Aviat) Models S-1S, S-1T, S-2, S-2A, S-2S, and S-2B airplanes that are equipped with aft lower fuselage wing attach fittings incorporating either part number (P/N) 76090, 2-2107-1, or 1-210-102. This action requires repetitively inspecting the aft lower fuselage wing attach fitting on both wings for cracks and modifying any cracked aft lower fuselage wing attach fitting. Modifying the aft lower fuselage wing attach fitting on both wings eliminates the repetitive inspection requirement of the AD. Several reports of cracked fuselage wing attach fittings on the affected airplanes prompted this action. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent possible in-flight separation of the wing from the airplane caused by a cracked fuselage wing attach fitting.
2004-10-05: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing transport category airplane models, as listed above. This amendment requires a modification of the air data computer (ADC) system, which involves installing certain new circuit breakers, relays, and related components, and making various wiring changes in and between the flight deck and main equipment center. For certain airplanes, this amendment also requires accomplishment of various other actions prior to or concurrently with the modification of the ADC system. For certain airplanes, this amendment also contains an option that will extend the compliance time to accomplish the modification of the ADC system. This action is necessary to ensure that the flightcrew is able to silence an erroneous overspeed or stall aural warning. A persistent erroneous warning could confuse and distract the flightcrew and lead to an increase in the flightcrew's workload. Such a situation could lead the flightcrew to act on hazardously misleading information, which could result in loss of control of the airplane. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
98-20-06: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Aerospatiale Model ATR42 series airplanes, that requires modification of the electrical power supply for the standby horizon indicator. This amendment is prompted by issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent loss of the standby horizon indicator in the event of failure of emergency direct current (DC) power, which could result in reduced controllability of the airplane during instrument flight rules conditions.
2021-20-09: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2021-03- 03, which applied to certain ATR-GIE Avions de Transport R[eacute]gional Model ATR72 airplanes. AD 2021-03-03 required revising the existing maintenance or inspection program, as applicable, to incorporate new or more restrictive airworthiness limitations. Since the FAA issued AD 2021-03-03, the FAA has determined that new or more restrictive airworthiness limitations are necessary. This AD requires revising the existing maintenance or inspection program, as applicable, to incorporate new or more restrictive airworthiness limitations, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2021-22-04: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2019-21- 10, which applied to all Airbus SAS Model A321-111, -112, -131, -211, - 212, -213, -231, and -232 airplanes. AD 2019-21-10 required a one-time eddy current conductivity measurement of certain structural parts of the outer flaps to determine if the incorrect alloy was used, and replacement if necessary. This AD continues to require a one-time eddy current conductivity measurement of certain structural parts of the outer flaps to determine if the incorrect alloy was used, and replacement if necessary; and also requires a new one-time eddy current conductivity measurement of certain other structural parts of the outer flaps to determine if the parts were properly heat treated, and replacement if necessary; and includes additional affected airplanes; as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. This AD was prompted by a quality control review, which determined that the wrong aluminum alloy was used to manufacture several structural parts and by the issuance of an updated list of suspected parts, including those that may have been improperly heat treated. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
96-11-14: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain Saab Model SAAB 2000 series airplanes. This action requires inspections to detect cracking of the lower rib of the rudder, and repair, if necessary. This action also provides for an optional terminating action, which, if accomplished, terminates the repetitive inspection requirement. This amendment is prompted by reports of fatigue cracking of the lower rib of the rudder. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent such fatigue cracking and subsequent failure of the primary structure of the rudder, which could result in reduced controllability of the airplane.
2012-06-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Bombardier, Inc. Model BD-100-1A10 (Challenger 300) airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports that the horizontal stabilizer trim actuator (HSTA) no-back and the number 1 motor brake assembly (MBA) can both fail dormant. This AD requires revising the airplane maintenance schedule to include new functional tests of the HSTA no-back and HSTA brake system. We are issuing this AD to prevent dormant failure of the HSTA no-back and the number 1 MBA, which along with additional component failure could result in an uncontrollable horizontal stabilizer surface runaway without the ability to retrim, and consequent loss of the airplane.
56-14-02: 56-14-02 DOUGLAS: Applies to All DC3 Series Aircraft Operated at Weights in Excess of 25,200 Pounds. \n\n\tCompliance required as indicated. \n\n\tIt has come to our attention that there are numerous instances wherein DC3 Series Aircraft have been approved for operation at landing and takeoff weights in excess of 25,200 pounds, in accordance with pertinent notes of Aircraft Specifications A-618 or A-669, that have main landing gear axle assemblies installed which are structurally unsatisfactory for the higher weights. The two axle assemblies involved are DACO P/N 5007396, and P/N 5007162 with P/N 5007390 torque collar. \n\n\tTherefore, all DC3 Series Aircraft in which either of these assemblies is installed must be operated at weights not to exceed 25,200 pounds for landing or takeoff (25,346 lbs. if deicers are installed) until satisfactory axle assemblies are installed. Note 9 of DC3 Aircraft Specification A-618 and Note 10 of DC3A Aircraft Specification A-669 contain a list of axle assemblies and the maximum weights for which each is structurally satisfactory.
2021-22-06: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 747-400F series airplanes. This AD was prompted by the determination that more restrictive tasks and limitations are necessary. This AD requires revising the existing maintenance or inspection program, as applicable, to incorporate more restrictive tasks and limitations, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
73-15-01: 73-15-01 SIKORSKY AIRCRAFT: Amdt. 39-1686. Applies to all S-61A, S-61D, S- 61E, S-61V and S-61L Helicopters certificated in all categories. Compliance required as indicated. To prevent fatigue failures of the rear fuselage and pylon hinge fitting assemblies, accomplish the following: (a) For aft fuselage upper and lower hinge fitting assemblies S6120-65118-3, S6120-65118-4, S6120-65118-34, S6120-65121-0, S6120-75702-1 and S6120-75702-2: (1) Within the next 15 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, inspect the hinge fittings in accordance with Section 2A of Sikorsky Service Bulletin No. 61B20-6A dated June 18, 1973 or later approved revisions or an equivalent method approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Federal Aviation Administration, New England Region; (2) Thereafter, on a daily basis inspect the hinge fitting assemblies in accordance with Section 2C of said Bulletin or later approved revisions or an equivalent method approved as above; and (3) At each 150 hours time in service after the initial inspection described in (a)(1) or approved equivalent period inspection, inspect the hinge fitting assemblies in accordance with Section 2G or said bulletin or later approved revisions or an equivalent method approved as above. (b) For aft fuselage upper and lower hinge fitting assemblies and upper and lower pylon hinge fitting assemblies S6120-65118-3, S6120-65118-4, S6120-65118-34, S6120-65121- 0, S6120-75702-1, S6120-75702-2, S6120-66117-0, S6120-66117-2, S6120-66120-0, S6120- 66120-2; (1) Within the next 15 days after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, inspect the aft fuselage hinge fitting lugs and the pylon hinge fitting lugs in accordance with Section 2B of Sikorsky Service Bulletin No. 61B20-6A dated June 18, 1973 or later approved revisions or an equivalent inspection method approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch,Federal Aviation Administration, New England Region. (2) Thereafter, at intervals not to exceed 50 hours time in service from the last inspection, inspect the aft fuselage hinge fitting lugs and the pylon hinge fitting lugs in accordance with Section 2D of said Bulletin, or later approved revisions, or an equivalent inspection method approved as above; and (3) At each 150 hours time in service after the initial inspection described in (b) (1) or approved equivalent period inspection, inspect the aft fuselage hinge fitting lugs and the pylon hinge fitting lugs in accordance with Section 2F of said Bulletin, or later approved revisions or an equivalent inspection method as approved above. (c) If a crack is found, remove and replace the hinge fitting prior to further flight. (d) These inspections are not required on the steel upper hinge fitting assemblies or on any hinge fitting assemblies in the T73 condition. (This supersedes AD 71-11-7) This amendment becomes effective July 27, 1973.
2012-02-13: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Eurocopter France EC130B4 helicopters that have not had Eurocopter Modification 073880 incorporated. This AD is prompted by several reports of cracks in the tailboom/Fenestron junction frame, which could result in structural failure of the tail boom, resulting in detachment of the Fenestron (tail rotor) and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter. We are issuing this AD to correct the unsafe condition on these helicopters.
84-20-04: 84-20-04 BRITISH AEROSPACE, INC.: Amendment 39-4924. Applies to Model DH-114 Heron series 2A, 2DA, and 2X airplanes certificated in all categories. Compliance is required as indicated. To prevent fatigue failure of the tailplane upper pick-up eyebolts, accomplish the following within 90 days after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished: A. Remove the eyebolts, modify the eyebolt holes, and install new eyebolts in accordance with paragraphs 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3, respectively, of British Aerospace Aircraft Group Technical News Sheet No. F.21, Issue 1, dated January 8, 1979. B. Alternate means of compliance which provide an equivalent level of safety maybe used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. C. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of inspections and/or modifications required by this AD.This amendment becomes effective November 5, 1984.
2012-07-03: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for all 328 Support Services GmbH (Type Certificate previously held by AvCraft Aerospace GmbH; Fairchild Dornier GmbH; Dornier Luftfahrt GmbH) Model 328-100 and -300 airplanes. That AD currently requires performing a detailed visual inspection of the cockpit door locking device and the surrounding area for proper installation, and corrective action if necessary. This new AD requires removing or replacing the locking device of the cockpit door; performing operational tests, and repair if necessary; and, for certain airplanes, installing gap filler parts. This AD was prompted by a report that a right-hand power lever jammed in flight-idle position during the landing roll-out, and the airplane was stopped by excessive braking. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct interference with the engine and flight control cables, which could result in reduced controllability of the airplane.
2004-10-02: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Airbus Model A300-600, A310, A319, A320, A321, A330, and A340-200 and -300 series airplanes, that requires a one-time inspection to determine if certain Thales pitot probes are installed, a check for certain part numbers and serial numbers of the affected pitot probes, and cleaning of the drain hole of any affected pitot probes if obstructed. This action is necessary to prevent obstruction of the air intake of the pitot probes, which could result in misleading information being provided to the flightcrew. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
88-25-05: 88-25-05 BELL HELICOPTER TEXTRON, INC. (BHTI); CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF FORESTRY; GARLICK HELICOPTERS; HAWKINS AND POWERS AVIATION, INC.; INTERNATIONAL HELICOPTERS, INC.; PILOT PERSONNEL INTERNATIONAL, INC.; SMITH HELICOPTERS; SOUTHERN AERO CORPORATION; OREGON HELICOPTERS; WEST COAST FABRICATIONS; and HERCULES: Amendment 39-6079. Applies to Model 204B, 205A, and 205A-1 helicopters certificated in any category and Model UH-1B, UH-1E, UH-1F, UH-1L, and TH-1L helicopters certificated in the restricted category that have tail rotor grip assembly P/N 204-011-728-1, -13, or -19 installed. Compliance is required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent failure of the tail rotor (T/R) grip assembly, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 50 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, remove the T/R grip assembly, P/N 204-011-728-1, -13, or -19 with 250 or more hours' time in service and replace with a serviceable part. (b) For those T/R grip assemblies, P/N 204-011-728-1, -13 or -19, with less than 250 hours' time in service on the effective date of this AD, a retirement life of 300 hours is established. (c) Any alternate method of compliance which provides an equivalent level of safety with this AD may be used when approved by the Manager, Helicopter Certification Branch, Federal Aviation Administration, Fort Worth, Texas 76193-0170. This amendment (39-6079, AD 88-25-05) becomes effective December 13, 1988.
2012-06-12: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus Model A340-600 series airplanes. This AD requires a detailed inspection for abnormalities of the ball lock retainer on the off-wing ramp slides; for closure of the soft cover; for full engagement of the slide release pin; for broken, missing, and improper placement of the safety tie thread on the slide release pin; and for proper functioning of the vent valve; and replacement of the off-wing ramp slides if necessary. This AD was prompted by reports of in-flight loss of the blow-out panel and the slide unit from a right-hand off-wing ramp- slide. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct abnormalities of the ball lock retainer, if the soft cover is open, if the slide pin release is not engaged or the safety tie thread is missing, broken, or improperly placed and the vent valve is not functioning properly, which could result in in-flight loss of the off-wing ramp slide.
67-11-05: 67-11-05 MOONEY: Amdt. 39-370, Part 39, Federal Register March 30, 1967. Applies to Model M20 Airplanes, Serial Numbers 1002 through 1200, and Model M20A Airplanes, Serial Numbers 1201 through 1534. Compliance required within the next 100 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless replacement has already been accomplished in accordance with AD 65-22-03, as amended August 20, 1966. To prevent failure of the tail truss due to internal corrosion for which inspection is impractical, remove and replace P/N 4009 with a new tail truss P/N 480007 or an equivalent approved by the Director, Southwest Region, FAA. This directive effective May 1, 1967.
96-17-12: This amendment supersedes Airworthiness Directive (AD) 87-07-01, which currently requires the following on Jetstream Aircraft Limited (JAL) HP137 Mk1, Jetstream series 200, and Jetstream Model 3101 airplanes: repetitively inspecting the nose landing gear (NLG) top cap assembly securing bolts for looseness or cracks, retorquing any loose security bolt, and replacing any cracked security bolt. AD 87-07-01 also provides the option of incorporating a NLG modification as terminating action for the repetitive inspections. A report of cracked and loose bolts found on an airplane with the above-referenced NLG modification prompted this action. This action: retains the repetitive inspections required by AD 87-07-01; increases the AD applicability to include Jetstream Model 3201 airplanes and airplanes that have the NLG top cap assembly modified in accordance with AD 87-07-01; requires replacing two of the NLG top cap assembly securing bolts; and incorporates a new NLG top cap assembly that would eliminate the repetitive inspection requirement of the AD. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent failure of the NLG caused by cracked or loose securing bolts, which, if not detected and corrected, could lead to NLG collapse and damage to the airplane.
2004-10-04: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Bombardier Model CL-215-6B11 series airplanes, that currently requires inspections to detect cracking in the rear engine mount struts, and replacement of struts with new struts, if necessary; and the eventual replacement of all struts with new struts. This amendment requires adding repetitive detailed inspections to detect cracking in the rear engine mount struts and replacement of struts with new struts, if necessary. This amendment also expands the applicability of the existing AD and makes the replacement of all struts with new, machined struts an optional terminating action for the repetitive inspections. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of the rear engine mount struts, which could subsequently result in reduced structural integrity of the nacelle and engine support structure. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition. DATES: Effective June 21, 2004. The incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the regulations is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of June 21, 2004. The incorporation by reference of Canadair Alert Service Bulletin 215-A3040, dated September 2, 1992, as listed in the regulations, was approved previously by the Director of the Federal Register as of April 4, 1994 (59 FR 10272, March 4, 1994).
67-23-03: 67-23-03 BRITISH AIRCRAFT: Amdt. 39-461, Part 39, Federal Register August 4, 1967. Applies to Model BAC 1-11 200 and 400 Series Airplanes. Compliance required as indicated. To prevent failure of the reverse thrust plunger unit rods P/N AC 39-117, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 155 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD and thereafter at an interval not to exceed 600 hours' time in service from the initial inspection, remove and dismantle reverse thrust plunger units P/N AC 39A 111 and visually inspect plunger rods P/N AC 39-117 for cracks, distortion, or other defects in accordance with British Aircraft Corporation Alert Service Bulletin No. 76-A-PM 2837 or later ARB-approved issue, or FAA- approved equivalent. (b) Replace cracked, distorted, or defective plunger rods, P/N AC 39-117, with serviceable plunger rods of the same part number before further flight. (c) Within the next 1,000 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, replace reverse thrust plunger units P/N AB 39 A 111 with plunger units P/N AB 39 A 3477 in accordance with British Aircraft Corporation Service Bulletin No. 76-PM 2837 or later ARB- approved issue or FAA-approved equivalent. (d) The inspections required by paragraph (a) may be discontinued after reverse thrust plunger units P/N AB 39 A 111 have been replaced with plunger units P/N AB 39 A 3477 in accordance with paragraph (c). This amendment effective August 4, 1967.
2012-04-11: We are superseding two existing airworthiness directives (AD). One existing AD is for Airbus Model A319, A320, and A321 series airplanes without Airbus modification 26017. That AD currently requires replacing the flight warning computers (FWCs). The other existing AD is for Airbus Model A320 and A321 series airplanes on which Airbus modification 24612 or Airbus Service Bulletin A320-31-1080 has not been accomplished. That existing AD currently requires revising the limitations section of the airplane flight manual. This new AD requires replacing both FWC units with certain FWC units. This AD was prompted by in-service events of thrust lever mismanagement and a manufacturer analysis on the failure to follow procedure or heed existing cockpit cues. The analysis of the thrust lever management issue showed two categories of scenarios that could lead to thrust asymmetry during landing, with controllability and deceleration consequences. We are issuing this AD to prevent thrust asymmetry conditions which could result in loss of control of the airplane during landing.