Results
2010-02-09: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Some operators have reported airframe vibration under specific flight conditions including gusts. Investigations have revealed that under such conditions, vibrations may occur when the hinge moment of the elevator is close to zero, associated to elevator free-play. * * * * * The unsafe condition is excessive vibration of the elevators, which could result in reduced structural integrity and reduced controllability of the airplane. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
91-07-16: 91-07-16 BOEING: Amendment 39-6957. Docket No. 90-NM-266-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model 757 series airplanes, line numbers 001 through 209, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required within 90 days after the effective date of this AD, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent the loss of various systems capabilities, release of smoke into the airplane, and possibility of fire, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tInstall a wire bundle stand-off in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 757- 24-0061, dated November 15, 1990. Visually inspect the wires in wire bundles W1232 and W1234 around the area of the placement of the new stand-off for signs of chafing. Any wire found damaged must be replaced or repaired prior to further flight. \n\n\tB.\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Seattle ACO. \n\n\tC.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue S.W., Renton, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6957, AD 91-07-16) becomes effective on May 6, 1991.
63-14-01: 63-14-01 BOEING: Amdt 580 Part 507 Federal Register June 27, 1963. Applies to All Models 707 and 720 Series Aircraft. \n\n\tCompliance required within the next 2,000 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD unless already accomplished. \n\n\tThere have been a number of instances of separation of the two-piece fuel tank adapter, Boeing P/N 10-3062-1, during pressure fueling. This has resulted in a potentially hazardous fire condition from spillage of fuel. \n\n\tTo prevent further fuel spillage from this cause, replace the two-piece fuel tank adapter, Boeing P/N 10-3062-1, with the one-piece fuel tank adapter, Boeing P/N 10-3062-2, on the pressure fueling receptacles. \n\n\t(Boeing Service Bulletin No. 715 covers this subject.) \n\n\tThis directive effective July 29, 1963.
58-09-03: 58-09-03 VICKERS: Applies to All Viscount 700 Series Aircraft. Compliance required not later than December 31, 1958. In order to give the flight crew immediate warning of an unacceptable drop in oil pressure on any engine, installation is required of an oil pressure warning means for each engine or a master warning means for all engines with provision for isolating the individual warning means from the master warning means, as provided for in Civil Air regulations, Part 4b, paragraph 4b.604(1). Vickers Modification Bulletin No. D.2270 covers this subject and is considered to describe an acceptable method of compliance. Capital Airlines Modification No. ME-A-58-84 is also considered to describe an acceptable method of compliance. Modifications made in any other way should be submitted to the FAA engineering evaluation and approval.
2010-04-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Following scheduled maintenance, an A310 operator reported finding cracks around the wing top skin panels fastener holes at Rib 2 (LH or RH) [left-hand or right-hand], between stringers 2 and 14 on some of its aircraft. This condition, if not corrected, may lead to degradation of the structure in this area. An inspection programme is necessary to restore and retain the structural integrity. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
68-03-05: 68-03-05 AVIONS MARCEL DASSAULT: Amendment 39-552. Applies to Dassault Fan Jet Falcon airplanes, Serial Numbers 1 thru 107, 109 thru 113, and 115. Compliance required as indicated. To detect and prevent binding of the auxiliary hydraulic system selector valve control cables, accomplish the following unless already accomplished. (a) Within the next 10 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, ground test the functioning of the auxiliary hydraulic system selector valve control cables under simulated flight pressurization deflection of the fuselage floor, in accordance with Dassault Service Bulletin 29-17, Revision 1, dated November 22, 1967, or later SGAC-approved revision, or FAA-approved equivalent. If control cable binding is evidenced during the ground test, comply with paragraph (d) before further flight, except that the airplane may be flown unpressurized to a base where the modification can be performed in accordance with FAR Sec. 21.197.(b) If control cable binding is not evidenced during the ground test, flight test the functioning of the auxiliary hydraulic system selector valve control cables under actual pressurization deflection of the fuselage floor at the next flight, in accordance with Dassault Service Bulletin 29-17, Revision 1, dated November 22, 1967, or later SGAC-approved revision, or FAA-approved equivalent. Passengers may not be carried during this test. If control cable binding is evidenced during this flight test, comply with paragraph (d) before further flight, except that the airplane may be flown unpressurized to a base where the modification can be performed in accordance with FAR Sec. 21.197. (c) If control cable binding is not evidenced during the tests required by paragraphs (a) and (b), comply with paragraph (d) within the next 50 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD. (d) Modify the fuselage floor support angles and the upper fairleads, clamps and antichafing strips of the auxiliary hydraulic system selector valve control cables, in accordance with Dassault Service Bulletin 29-17, Revision 1, dated November 22, 1967, or later SGAC- approved revision, or an equivalent approved by the Chief, Aircraft Certification Staff, FAA, Europe, Africa and Middle East Region. Performance of this modification at any time makes further action under this AD unnecessary. This amendment becomes effective February 13, 1968.
2010-04-02: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: During the year 2000, life extension exercise programs were launched for Airbus A310 and A300-600 aircraft. Certification of Extended Service Goal (ESG) is based on analysis, except for fan cowl and thrust reverser (T/R) latches, which are always certified by tests. * * * testing of the T/R door centre latch has shown that this does not meet the requirements for ESG. * * * * * The unsafe condition is possible failure of the T/R latch and detachment of the T/R from the airplane, which could result in structural damage and consequent reduced controllability of the airplane. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition onthese products.
93-14-15: 93-14-15 AVCO LYCOMING: Amendment 39-8639. Docket No. 91-ANE-30. Applicability: Lycoming Model IO-360-A1B6D and IO-360-A3B6D engines, modified per Aircraft Design, Inc., STC SE4757NM; installed on Mooney M20J, modified per Aircraft Design, Inc., STC SA4758NM. Compliance: Required within 30 days after the effective date of this AD, unless accomplished previously. To prevent possible premature engine failure, accomplish the following: (a) Fabricate and install on the instrument panel a placard, in accordance with FAR 23.1541(b), stating "DO NOT OPERATE ENGINE ABOVE 33.0 IN Hg." (b) Re-mark the manifold pressure gauge by removing the radial red line at 38.5 Hg and placing the radial red line at 33.0 Hg. (c) Revise the Limitations and Normal Procedure Sections of the Aircraft Flight Manual Supplement as follows: (1) Delete "38.5" Hg" as it appears in these sections and insert in lieu thereof "33.0" Hg." (2) Delete "36.0 Hg" as it appears in Normal Climb Throttle and insert in lieu thereof "33.0 Hg." (d) Attach this AD as a permanent appendix to the Aircraft Flight Manual. (e) An alternative method of compliance, or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office. The request shall be forwarded through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office. NOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Seattle Aircraft Certification Office. (f) Special flight permits may be issued, in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199, to ferry the aircraft to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. (g) This amendment becomes effective on August 23, 1993.
92-11-01: 92-11-01 MESSERSCHMITT-BOLKOW-BLOHM (MBB): Amendment 39-8250. Docket Number 92-ASW-12. Applicability: MBB Model BO 105 LS A-3 helicopters, serial numbers (S/N) 2001 through 2037, certificated in any category and equipped with a torque indication hose assembly, part number (P/N) AE707355-1. Compliance: Required no later than July 31, 1992, unless previously accomplished. To prevent failure of the torque indication hose assembly during an engine compartment fire, thereby, fueling the fire with engine oil and leading to possible loss of the helicopter, accomplish the following: (a) Replace the existing torque indication hose, P/N AE707355-1, on each engine with a new fire resistant torque indication hose, P/N AE705145-14, in accordance with Part 2, Accomplishment Instructions of MBB Alert Service Bulletin No. ASB-BO 105 LS-60-4, Revision 1, dated November 15, 1991. (b) Special flights permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operatethe helicopter to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. (c) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, 181 South Franklin Avenue, Room 202, Valley Stream, New York 11581. The request shall be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager of the New York Aircraft Certification Office. NOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this airworthiness directive, if any, may be obtained from the Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office. (d) The removal and replacement of the torque indication hose shall be done in accordance with Part 2, Accomplishment Instructions of MBB Helicopters Alert Service Bulletin No. ASB-BO 105 LS-60-4, which incorporates the followingpages: Pages Revision Level Date 1 through 2 Revision 1 November 15, 1991 3 through 5 Original August 30, 1991 This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from MBB Helicopter Corporation, 900 Airport Road, P.O. Box 2349, West Chester, Pennsylvania 19380. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, 4400 Blue Mound Road, Bldg. 3B, Room 158, Fort Worth, Texas; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L Street N.W., Room 8401, Washington, D.C. (e) This amendment becomes effective on August 28, 1992.
2021-23-18: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus Helicopters Deutschland GmbH Model MBB-BK 117 D-2 helicopters. This AD was prompted by a report of chafing marks on a wiring harness near the locking washer of the lateral control rod. This AD requires an inspection of the wiring harness and the routing of the wiring harness and corrective actions if necessary, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
82-21-01: 82-21-01 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-4471. Applies to McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9-80 series airplanes, Fuselage Number 924 through 1011, 1013 through 1022, 1025 through 1035, 1043 through 1055, and 1061, certificated in all categories. \n\n\tCompliance required as indicated unless previously accomplished. To prevent failure of the throttle push-pull control cable, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tWithin 300 hours after the effective date of this AD, perform a one-time pull check of the throttle push-pull control cable on both engines in accordance with McDonnell Douglas DC-9 Super 80 Alert Service Bulletin A76-38 dated July 22, 1982, Revision 1 dated July 27, 1982, or later revisions approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Area Aircraft Certification Office, FAA Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tB.\tIf the force is above the service bulletin limits and/or the push-pull control does not move smoothly, determine cause for roughness or binding and repair accordingly. If cause is isolated to cable blade element replace the throttle control cable assembly with a serviceable item. \n\n\t\tCAUTION:\tUSE EXTREME CARE WHEN WORKING WITH ENGINE PUSH-PULL CABLES. DO NOT BEND CABLE IN RADIUS SMALLER THAN 7-INCHES (18CM) MINIMUM OR DAMAGE TO CABLE WILL RESULT. \n\n\tNOTE: Cable has a flat internal sliding ribbon and will bend in one direction only. \n\n\tC.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tD.\tAlternate means of compliance which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Area Aircraft Certification Office, FAA Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tNOTE: One alternate means of compliance is specified in Pacific Southwest Airlines (PSA) Engineering Specification DC-9-76-1 dated May 14, 1982, or Revision A, dated May 25, 1982. \n\n\tThe manufacturer's specifications and procedures identified and described inthis directive are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Director, Publications and Training, C1-750 (54-60). These documents also may be examined at FAA Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, C-68966, Seattle, Washington 98168, or Los Angeles Area Aircraft Certification Office, 4344 Donald Douglas Drive, Long Beach, California 90808. \n\n\tThis Amendment becomes effective October 21, 1982.
81-07-11 R1: 81-07-11 R1 CESSNA: Amendment 39-4078 as amended by Amendment 39-4096. Applies to Model 335 (S/N 335-0001 thru 335-0065), Model 340 (S/N 340-0001 thru 340-0555) and Model 340A (S/N 340A0001 thru 340A1203) airplanes certificated in any category. COMPLIANCE: Required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To ensure the integrity of the elevator balance weight support structure and specified components of the horizontal stabilizer, accomplish the following: A) Prior to further flight and at each l0 hours time-in-service interval thereafter, accomplish the following in accordance with Cessna Multi-engine Customer Care Service Information Letter ME79-44, Revision 5, dated September 29, 1980: 1. On all airplanes, remove the elevator tip covers and visually inspect the elevator balance weights for looseness. a. On all Models 335 and 340 airplanes and on Model 340A (S/Ns 340A0001 thru 340A1038) airplanes, visually inspect the P/N 0832250-4, -33 and -75 ribs, and P/N 0832000-61, -62 gussets for cracks and/or loose rivets. b. On Model 340A (S/Ns 340A1039 thru 340A1203) airplanes, visually inspect the P/N 832250-100 and -33 ribs, P/N 5334108-2 channel, -3 spar extension and -4 gussets for cracks and/or loose rivets. 2. Visually inspect the horizontal stabilizer outboard hinge bracket assembly (on Models 340 (all S/Ns) and 340A (S/Ns 340A0001 through 340Al035), the P/N is 5132013-5; on Model 340A (S/Ns 340A1036 thru 340Al203) the P/N is 5132013-10; and on Model 335 (all S/Ns) the P/N is 5132013-7), the outboard hinge bearing, the aft spar, and the tip ribs for cracks, loose rivets, or signs of chafing. 3. Prior to further flight, replace any defective parts found during any inspection required by this AD with airworthy parts of the same part number. B) Within 24 hours following any inspection specified by paragraph A), the owner/operator must submit a written report of any cracks, loose rivets, or signs of chafing discovered during any inspection required by this AD to the Federal Aviation Administration, Aircraft Certification Program, Room 238, Terminal Building 2299, Mid-Continent Airport, Wichita, Kansas 67209. (Reporting approved by the Office of Management and Budget Order 0MB No. 04-R0174.) C) On or before December 15, 1981, replace the horizontal tail in accordance with Cessna Service Kit Instructions SK 340-24, dated March 16, 1981, and Cessna Service Kits SK 340-24-1, -2, or -3, and SK 340-19, as appropriate. After installation of the appropriate Cessna Service Kit(s), the requirements of paragraphs A) and B) of this AD are no longer applicable. D) Airplanes may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a location where the provisions of paragraph C) of this AD can be accomplished. E) Any equivalent method of compliance with this AD must be approved by the Chief, Aircraft Certification Program Office, Room 238, Terminal Building 2299, Mid-Continent Airport, Wichita, Kansas 67209; telephone (316) 942-4285. This AD supersedes AD 80-21-04, Amendment 39-3959. Amendment 39-4078 became effective April 13, 1981. This amendment 39-4096 becomes effective April 17, 1981.
75-16-09: 75-16-09 ROLLS ROYCE (1971) LIMITED: Amendment 39-2281. Applies to Rolls Royce RB 211 series engines, serial numbers 10479 and prior. Compliance required before September 1, 1975, unless already accomplished. To prevent engine loss of oil and possible inflight engine shutdown, modify the HS external gearbox oil tank filler cap and housing in accordance with Rolls Royce (1971) Limited Service Bulletin RB211-72-3533, dated August 12, 1974, or an FAA-approved equivalent. This amendment becomes effective August 27, 1975.
2010-03-05: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Model 747-200C and -200F series airplanes. This AD requires a high frequency eddy current (HFEC) inspection for cracks of certain fastener holes, and corrective action if necessary. This AD also requires repetitive replacements of the upper chords, straps (or angles), and radius fillers of certain upper deck floor beams, and, for any replacement that is done, detailed and open-hole HFEC inspections for cracks of the modified upper deck floor beams, and corrective actions if necessary. This AD results from a report from the manufacturer that the accomplishment of certain existing inspections, repairs, and modifications is not adequate to ensure the structural integrity of the affected 7075 series aluminum alloy upper deck floor beam upper chords on airplanes that have exceeded certain thresholds. We are issuing this AD to prevent cracking of the upper chords and straps (or angles) of the floor beams, which could lead tofailure of the floor beams and consequent loss of controllability, rapid decompression, and loss of structural integrity of the airplane.
2010-03-08: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain Model 767-200, -300, and -300F series airplanes. The existing AD currently requires repetitive detailed and eddy current inspections to detect cracks or corrosion of certain midspar fuse pins, and corrective actions if necessary. That AD also provides optional terminating action, which ends the repetitive inspections. This new AD requires reduced intervals for certain repetitive inspections. This AD results from a report of a fractured midspar fuse pin. We are issuing this AD to prevent loss of the strut and engine due to corrosion damage and cracking of both fuse pins on the same strut. \n\nDATES: This AD becomes effective February 19, 2010. \n\tThe Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the AD as of February 19, 2010. \n\tThe Director of the Federal Register previously approved the incorporation by reference of a certain publication listed in the AD as of March 5, 2001 (66 FR 8085, January 29, 2001). \n\tThe Director of the Federal Register previously approved the incorporation by reference of a certain other publication listed in the AD as of October 17, 2000 (65 FR 58641, October 2, 2000). \n\tWe must receive any comments on this AD by March 22, 2010.
82-20-03: 82-20-03 GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY: Amendment 39-4464. Applies to CF6-45 series and -50 series model turbofan engines. Compliance required as indicated unless already accomplished. Inspect all first stage HPT disks, P/Ns 9045M34P07 and 9045M34P09, for cracks in accordance with General Electric CF6-45/50 Engine Service Bulletin 72-700, dated November 20, 1980, or Alert Service Bulletin 72-709 dated February 19, 1981, or later revision approved by the Manager, Engine Certification Branch, FAA, New England Region, per the following schedule utilizing two complete independent inspections, hereafter referred to as "double inspections." A. Disks not previously inspected shall be "double inspected" prior to reaching 2,000 cycles in service for MTU serial number disks and 3,200 cycles in service for MPO serial number disks. All disks removed from service for inspection shall be reinspected every 750 cycles in service thereafter. B. Disks previously inspected shall be reinspected using the "double inspection" procedure prior to reaching 750 cycles in service since last inspection and every 750 cycles in service thereafter. C. All first stage turbine disks exposed at each high pressure rotor disassembly shall be "double inspected" prior to further flight per General Electric CF6-45/50 Service Bulletins 72-700 or 72-709. D. Disks with crack indications must be removed from service prior to further flight. E. First stage HPT disks, P/Ns 9045M34P07 and 945M34P09, shall not be returned to service after February 1, 1984. NOTE: For the purposes of this AD, "return to service" is defined as installation on an aircraft. F. All MTU prefix serial numbered disks reworked per General Electric CF6-45/50 Service Bulletin 72-700 at zero cycles of service may follow the initial inspection limits for MPO prefix serial numbers. Established life limits of first stage HPT disks are not to be exceeded. Airplanes may be ferried in accordancewith the provisions of Federal Aviation Regulation 21.197 to a base where the AD can be accomplished. Upon request of an operator, an equivalent means of compliance with the requirements of this AD may be approved by the Manager, Engine Certification Branch, FAA, New England Region. The manufacturer's specifications and procedures identified and described in this directive may be obtained upon request to General Electric Company, Neumann Way, Cincinnati, Ohio 45215. These documents may also be examined at the FAA, New England Region, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts. A historical file on this AD is maintained by the FAA, New England Region Office, Burlington, Massachusetts. This airworthiness directive supersedes AD's T80-16-51, T81-05-51, T82-05-51, and T82-08-51. This Amendment 39-4464 becomes effective on October 31, 1982.
57-12-01: 57-12-01 BELL: Applies to Model 47H1 Helicopters Serial Numbers 1347 Through 1349 and 1351 Through 1371. Compliance required as soon as possible but not later than August 1, 1957. Due to possible misalignment in the fore and aft synchronized elevator control pulley quadrant which may cause the control cables to be misaligned and cause chafing, the following inspection and rework is necessary. 1. Inspect the synchronized elevator control cables for alinement into the cable groove on the forward 47-267-112-5 pulley quadrant and the aft 47-267-410-1 elevator pulley quadrant. Inspect the forward 47-267-112-5 pulley quadrant support bracket bolt holes for elongation. If alinement and bolt holes are satisfactory, no rework to the support bracket is necessary. 2. If bolt hole elongation or misalignment exist, the rework as outlined in Bell Service Bulletin No. 111 is required. (Bell Service Bulletin No. 111, dated March 15, 1957, covers this same subject.)
2010-02-10: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: During a scheduled maintenance inspection on the MLG [main landing gear], the bogie stop pad was found deformed and cracked. Upon removal of the bogie stop pad for replacement, the bogie beam was also found cracked. * * * * * A second bogie beam crack has subsequently been found on another aircraft, located under a bogie stop pad which only had superficial paint damage. This condition, if not detected and corrected, could result in the aircraft departing the runway or to the bogie detaching from the aircraft or gear collapses, which would all constitute unsafe conditions at speeds above 30 knots. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2010-02-12: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Several cases have been reported where a passenger door actuator detached from the passenger door. This caused the passenger door to drop to the platform in an uncontrolled manner. This condition, if not corrected, could result in injury to persons on the ground and damage to the aircraft. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
91-18-15: 91-18-15 FOKKER: Amendment 39-8018. Docket No. 91-NM-54-AD. Applicability: Model F-28 Mark 0100 series airplanes, Serial Numbers 11244 through 11335, certificated in any category. Compliance: Required prior to the accumulation of 6,000 landings since new or within 100 days after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, unless previously accomplished. To prevent cracks and the resultant reduced structural integrity of the vertical stabilizer, accomplish the following: A. Reinforce the flanges of rib 5.0 by installing finger clips, in accordance with Fokker Service Bulletin F100-55-014, dated November 29, 1990. B. An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM- 113, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. NOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113. C. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD, accomplish the following: D. The installation requirements shall be done in accordance with Fokker Service Bulletin F100-55-014, dated November 29, 1990. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from Fokker Aircraft USA, Inc., 1199 North Fairfax Street, Alexandria, Virginia 22314. This amendment (39-8018, AD 91-18-15) becomes effective on October 8, 1991.
91-20-10: 91-20-10 BELL HELICOPTER TEXTRON, INC.: Amendment 39-8044. Docket No. 90- ASW-11. Applicability: All Model 47G2, 47G2A, 47G2A1, 47G3, 47G3B1, 47G3B2, 47G3B2A, 47G4, 47G4A, 47G5, 47G5A, 47J, 47J2, and 47J2A helicopters, certificated in any category, with main rotor (M/R) grip part number (P/N) 47-120-252-11, installed. Compliance: Required within the next 50 hours' time in service after the effective data of this AD, unless already accomplished. To prevent failure of the M/R grip, which could result in loss of control of the helicopter, accomplish the following: (a) Visually inspect the M/R grip and determine if one of the following serial numbers is installed: IT- 0251, 0253, 0254, 0255, 0256, 0257, 0260, 0261, 0262, 0263, 0264, 0265, 0267, 0268, 0270, 0271,0272, 0273, 0274, 0275, 0276, 0277, 0278, 0279, 0280, 0281, 0282, 0284, 0285, 0286, 0289, 0290, 0291, 0293, 0294, 0295, 0296, 0297, 0299, 0300, 0302, 0303, 0306, 0308, 0312, 0313, 0315, 0316, 0317,0319, 0323, 0324, 0326, 0327, 0328, 0329, 0330, 0333, 0334, 0335 ITM- 0005, 0007, 0022, 0046, 0077, 0096, 0109, 0112, 0114, 0115, 0125, 0128, 0133, 0155, 0161, 0165, 0166, 0167, 0168, 0170, 0171, 0178, 0182, 0183, 0185, 0187, 0189, 0191, 0192, 0194, 0197, 0198, 0202, 0204, 0211, 0212, 0218, 0234, 0235, 0236, 0237, 0238, 0239, 0240, 0241, 0242, 0243, 0244, 0245, 0246, 0248, 0249, 0250, 0251, 0252, 0253, 0255, 0256, 0257, 0258, 0259, 0261, 0262, 0263, 0264, 0265, 0266, 0267, 0269, 0270, 0271, 0272, 0273, 0274, 0275, 0276, 0277, 0278, 0279, 0280, 0281, 0282, 0283, 0284, 0286, 0287, 0288, 0289, 0290, 0291, 0292, 0293, 0294, 0295, 0296, 0297 (b) If one of the M/R grips listed in paragraph (a) is installed, remove and replace with a serviceable part. (c) An alternate method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance times, which provides an equivalent level of safety, may be used if approved by the Manager, Rotorcraft Certification Office, Federal Aviation Administration, Fort Worth, Texas 76193-0170, telephone (817) 624-5170. NOTE: If any of the M/R grips identified in paragraph (a) are found, either installed or as spares, the FAA recommends that the parts be permanently marked or defaced so that they cannot be misconstrued as airworthy. This amendment (39-8044, AD 91-20-10) becomes effective on November 14, 1991.
94-01-04: 94-01-04 HONEYWELL: Amendment 39-8786. Docket 93-NM-68-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) II computer units; part numbers 4066010-901, -902, and -903; as installed on, but not limited to, the following airplanes, certificated in any category: \n\n\tAirbus Industrie Model A300-600, A310-200, A310-300, A320-200, and A340 series airplanes; \n\tBoeing Model 727-100 and -200; 737-100, -200, -300, -400, and -500; 747-100, -200, -300, -400 and 747SP; 757-200; and 767-200 and -300 series airplanes; \n\tCessna Citation Model C550 and C560 series airplanes, and Cessna Citation III and VII series airplanes; \n\tCanadair Challenger Model CL-600-2B16 and -2A12 series airplanes; \n\tBritish Aerospace Model 125-800A; \n\tGulfstream Model GII, GIIB, GIII, and GIV series airplanes; \n\tLockheed Model L-1011 series airplanes; \n\tMcDonnell Douglas Model DC-9-10, -20, -30-, -40, and -50; DC-10-10, -15, -30, and -40; MD-11; and DC-9-80 series airplanes; and Model MD-88 airplanes; \n\tDassault Aviation Model Mystere-Falcon 50 and 900 series airplanes; \n\tShort Brothers Model SD3-60 series airplanes; \n\tde Havilland Model DHC-8-100 and DHC-7 series airplanes; \n\tFokker Model F27 series airplanes; and \n\tCorporate Jets Limited Model BAe 125-800A and BAe 125-1000A series airplanes. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. \n\n\tTo prevent collisions or near misses caused by incompatibility between the TCAS II processors and the current air traffic control system, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tBefore December 31, 1994, accomplish the requirements of paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) of this AD in accordance with Honeywell Service Bulletin 4066010-34-SW16, dated December 20, 1993. \n\n\t\t(1)\tRemove existing Honeywell TCAS II computer units, part numbers 4066010-901, -902, and -903, and replace those units with new units that incorporate updated collision avoidance system (CAS) logic, identified as Version 6.04A in Mitre letter F046-L-0069, dated September 21, 1993. \n\n\t\t(2)\tModify the computer surveillance logic on Honeywell TCAS II computer units, part numbers 4066010-901, -902, and -903, to ensure that these units accommodate Mode C altitude input of 100-foot increments and that the system will be tracked and coordinated by intruding aircraft when the Mode S transponder CA field is set at CA=7. \n\n\t(b)\tPrior to further flight after accomplishing the requirements of paragraph (a) of this AD, revise the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) or AFM Supplement by accomplishing either paragraph (b)(1) or (b)(2) of this AD. \n\n\t\t(1)\tRevise the Normal Procedures Section of the AFM to include the appropriate TCAS operating characteristic relative to the modifications required by paragraph (a) of this AD, in accordance with a method approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Or \n\n\t\t(2)\tRevise the Normal Procedures Section of the AFM to include thefollowing TCAS operating characteristic relative to the modification required by paragraph (a) of this AD. This may be accomplished by inserting a copy of this AD in the AFM or AFM Supplement. \n\n\t\t"All Resolution Advisory (RA) and Traffic Advisory (TA) aural messages are inhibited at a radio altitude of less than 1,100 feet above ground level (AGL) climbing, and less than 900 feel AGL descending." \n\n\t(c)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Avionics Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Los Angeles ACO. \n\n\tNOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Los Angeles ACO. \n\n\t(d)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. \n\n\t(e)\tThe replacement and modification shall be done in accordance with Honeywell Service Bulletin 4066010-34-SW16, dated December 20, 1993. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from Honeywell Inc., Commercial Flight Systems Group, Air Transport Systems Division, P.O. Box 21111, Phoenix, Arizona 85036. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3229 East Spring Street, Long Beach, California; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC. \n\n\t(f)\tThis amendment becomes effective on February 4,1994.
67-03-04: 67-03-04 HOWARD AND LOCKHEED: Amdt. 39-342 Part 39 Federal Register January 20, 1967. Applies to All Howard Model 500 Series Airplanes, and to Lockheed Model PV-1 Series Airplanes, Serial Numbers 5272, 5373, 5500, 5554, 5560, and 6642. Compliance required as indicated. To detect cracks in the flap cable support clamps, P/N 5-104268-1, unless already accomplished, within the next 10 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 100 hours' time in service from the date of the last inspection, remove the flap actuator clamp, P/N 5-104268-1, attached to the flap actuating cylinder, and inspect for cracks in the bend radius using dye penetrant or FAA-approved equivalent. Before further flight replace any clamp found cracked in accordance with Dee Howard Company, San Antonio, Texas, Drawing Number 13-0766-013-3, or later FAA Engineering and Manufacturing Branch approved equivalent. The inspection provisions of this AD may bediscontinued when P/N 5-104268-1 is replaced in accordance with this AD. This directive effective January 25, 1967.
2010-02-11: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Reports have been received of finding corrosion at the Frame 29 wing-to-fuselage attachment lug plate joint. This condition, if not detected and corrected, could result in a degradation of the structural integrity of Frame 29 and the wing-to-fuselage attachment. * * * * * The unsafe condition is degradation of the structural integrity of Frame 29 and the wing-to-fuselage attachment, which could result in loss of control of the airplane. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
97-11-14: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain British Aerospace Model BAC 1-11 200 and 400 series airplanes, that requires inspections of the main landing gear (MLG) A-frame attachment fittings to detect corrosion or cracking, and repair or replacement of cracked or corroded components with new components. This amendment is prompted by findings of corroded and cracked A-frame components of the MLG. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent corrosion and cracking of MLG A-frame components, which could result in collapse of the MLG.