Results
2005-23-09: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for General Electric Company (GE) CF6-80E1A1, -80E1A2, -80E1A3, -80E1A4, and -80E1A4/B turbofan engines. This AD requires initial and repetitive fluorescent-penetrant inspections (FPI) of certain areas of high pressure compressor (HPC) cases, part number (P/N) 1509M97G07 and P/N 2083M69G03. This AD results from the discovery that HPC cases, P/N 1509M97G07 and P/N 2083M69G03, were inadvertently left out of the Airworthiness Limitations Section (ALS), Chapter 05-21-02, of GE Engine Manual, GEK 99376, Revision 17. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of the HPC case aft mount flange, due to cracking.
2005-23-11: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Hamilton Sundstrand Power Systems (formerly Sundstrand Power Systems) auxiliary power units (APUs) models T-62T-46C2, T-62T-46C2A, T-62T- 46C3, T-62T-46C7, and T-62T-46C7A, with compressor impeller assembly, part number (P/N) 4502020 or 4502020A, installed. This AD requires removal from service of those compressor impeller assemblies at reduced service life limits. This AD results from two reports of uncontained failures of compressor impeller assemblies. We are issuing this AD to prevent an uncontained APU failure and damage to the airplane.
2011-15-11: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD requires inspecting the wings for internal and external damage, repairing any damage, reinforcing the wings, installing operational limitation placards in the cockpit, and adding limitations to the airplane flight manual supplement. This AD was prompted by a review of installed Flint Aero, Inc. wing tip auxiliary fuel tanks, Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) SA5090NM. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct damage in the wings and to prevent overload failure of the wing due to the installation of the STC. Damage in the wing or overload failure of the wing could result in structural failure of the wing, which could result in loss of control.
54-24-02: 54-24-02 LOCKHEED: Applies to 1049C, Serial Numbers 4520 Through 4548; Model 1049E, Serial Numbers 4549 Through 4556, 4558 Through 4560, and 4563 Through 4565; Model 1049D, Serial Numbers 4163 Through 4166. Compliance required as indicated. 1. Perform a visual inspection of the outer wing main beam web between Stations 551 and 637, left and right, for cracks as soon as practical, and reinspect at intervals of approximately 125 hours until this area is reinforced as outlined in paragraph 2. If cracks are found repair and reinforce as per paragraph 2 immediately. Inspection for fuel stains alone as an indication of a crack is not sufficient due to the presence of sealant on the inside of the tank surface. 2. Reinforce the main beam web between wing Stations 551 and 637, left and right as soon as possible, convenient with aircraft check periods, but not later than 1,000 hours after receipt of parts from the manufacturer or March 1, 1955, whichever occurs first. This may beaccomplished by the addition of extruded aluminum alloy (75ST6) stiffeners (LS347-3), one between each of the original stiffeners in this area. (Lockheed Service Bulletin No. 1049/SB-2559 describes this reinforcement.)
64-18-04: 64-18-04 GENERAL DYNAMICS: Amdt. 778 Part 507 Federal Register July 29, 1964. Applies to Models 240, 340 and 440 Series Aircraft Incorporating Nose Landing Gear Retract Fork, Menasco P/N 523526 R/L. Compliance required as indicated. In order to detect cracks and prevent the failure of the nose landing gear retract fork, Menasco P/N 523526 R/L, accomplish the following: (a) Within 800 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the last 200 hours' time in service, and thereafter at periods not to exceed 1,000 hours' time in service from the last inspection, inspect all nose landing gear retract forks, Menasco P/N 523526 R/L, for cracks in the 0.190 (+0, -.030) inch radius at the upper end of the fork shank diameter using dye penetrant, magnetic particle, or an FAA approved equivalent inspection, and dimensionally inspect for a 0.190 (+0, -.030) inch radius. Any fork having less than 0.160 inch minimum radius shall havethe radius hand reworked to a 0.190 (+0, - .030) inch radius. (Care should be taken that the adjacent 1.2500/1.2495 inch diameter is not undercut.) Refinish the reworked area in accordance with the instructions contained in Convair Service Airgram No. 179, dated June 18, 1956, or an FAA Western Region, Aircraft Engineering Division approved equivalent. If cracks are found in either half of the fork assembly, remove and replace the complete fork assembly with a new fork assembly before further flight. (b) The repetitive inspections specified in (a) may be discontinued when the fork assembly has been reworked to the 0.190 (+0, -.030) inch radius, and has been shot peened and refinished in accordance with the instructions contained in Convair Service Airgram No. 179, dated June 18, 1956, or an FAA Western Region, Aircraft Engineering Division approved equivalent. (c) Upon request of the operator, an FAA maintenance inspector, subject to prior approval of the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region, may adjust the repetitive inspection intervals specified in this AD to permit compliance at an established inspection period of the operator if the request contains substantiating data to justify the increase for such operator. (Convair Service Airgram No. 179 dated June 18, 1956, covers this same subject.) This directive effective August 28, 1964.
98-19-03: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Pratt & Whitney PW4000 series turbofan engines, that requires fluorescent penetrant and eddy current inspections of 2nd stage high pressure turbine (HPT) rotating airseals for cracks, removal from service of cracked parts, incorporation of improved 2nd stage HPT rotating airseals, and modification of 2nd stage ring segments and vane clusters to increase cooling flow and reduce stress as terminating action to the inspection requirements. This amendment is prompted by reports of 2nd stage HPT rotating airseal cracking. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent 2nd stage HPT rotating airseal cracking, which could result in an uncontained engine failure and damage to the aircraft. The incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the regulations is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of November 9, 1998.
2011-13-11: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above that would supersede an existing AD. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Some operators reported slow operation of the MLG [main landing gear] door opening/closing sequence, leading to the generation of ECAM [Electronic Centralised Aircraft Monitoring] warnings during the landing gear retraction or extension sequence. * * * * * This condition, if not corrected, could prevent the full extension and/or downlocking of the MLG, possibly resulting in MLG collapse during landing or rollout and consequent damage to the aeroplane and injury to occupants. * * * * * After in-service introduction of the new MLG door actuator, P/N 114122012, several operators reported failures of internalparts of the MLG door actuator. Investigations confirmed that these failures could result in slow extension of the actuator rod, delaying the MLG Door operation, or possibly stopping just before the end of the stroke, preventing the door to reach the fully open position. * * * * * This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
61-03-04: 61-03-04 LOCKHEED: Amdt. 244 Part 507 Federal Register January 27, 1961. Applies to All Model 1649A Aircraft. Compliance required as indicated. One of the following modifications to the vent system must be accomplished within 400 hours of time in service after the effective date of this directive. (a) Modify only the right-hand vent float valve of the No. 7 tank (LAC P/N 634024- 3, Aero Supply Mfg. Co. P/N 22-1845-002) to a combination pressure relief and suction relief valve by removing the float assembly so that only the pressure and suction relief features remain operational. Replace the valve spring (P/N 22-0228-1) with spring (P/N 22-0337-1) having a higher cracking pressure. (b) Replace only the original right-hand side valve assembly on No. 7 fuel tank with a new valve assembly LAC P/N 634024-5 (Aero Supply Mfg. Co. P/N 22-1845-003). (Lockheed Letter dated August 22, 1960, directed to all 1649 operators completely covers the details of this modification.)This directive effective February 13, 1961.
2017-22-14: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Rockwell Collins, Inc. TSS-4100 Traffic Surveillance System Processing Units that incorporate TSSA-4100 Field Loadable Software (FLS) Rockwell Collins part numbers 810-0052-002/-003/-010/-011/-012/-100/-101 and are installed on airplanes. This AD was prompted by five instances of air traffic control observing coasting (extrapolated stale data) of automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast data (position/velocity data). This AD requires installing the TSSA-4100 FLS upgrades on the TSS-4100 units. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
98-18-19: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model MD-90-30 series airplanes. This action requires a one-time inspection of the actuator attach bolts of the elevator load feel (ELF) located under the forward cockpit floor, and corrective actions, if necessary. This amendment is prompted by a report indicating that, during manufacture of an airplane, an actuator attach bolt of the ELF was installed improperly. The actions specified in this AD are intended to ensure that the actuator attach bolts are installed properly. Improper installation of such bolts could result in disconnection of the ELF mechanism, and consequent loss of pitch control of the airplane.