Results
74-18-12: 74-18-12 AIRESEARCH MANUFACTURING COMPANY of ARIZONA: Amendment 39-1941. Applies to AiResearch Model TFE 731-2-2B engines installed in, but not limited to Lear-Gates Learjet model 35/36 Aircraft, certificated in all categories. (A) Before further flight, unless previously accomplished, and prior to the installation of replacement fuel control assemblies, replace the hydromechanical fuel control orifice assembly in accordance with AiResearch Alert Service Bulletin TFE 731-A73-3006, dated August 12, 1974, or later FAA approved revisions. (B) Equivalent procedures may be approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region, upon submission of adequate substantiation data. (C) Aircraft may be flown to a base for performance of maintenance required by this AD per FAR's 21.197 and 21.199. This amendment is effective September 3, 1974, for all persons except those to whom it was made effective immediately by telegram dated August 5, 1974.
2012-08-11: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Bombardier, Inc. Model DHC-8-400 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by test reports that showed that failure of a retract port flexible hose of a main landing gear (MLG) retraction actuator could cause excessive hydraulic fluid leakage. This AD requires a detailed inspection for defects and damage of the retract port flexible hose on the left and right MLG retraction actuator and replacement of the flexible hose if needed. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct defects and damage of the retract port flexible hose which could lead to an undamped extension of the MLG and could result in MLG structural failure, leading to an unsafe asymmetric landing configuration.
50-41-01: 50-41-01 TAYLORCRAFT: Applies to All Model B Series Aircraft, Serial Numbers 1001 and Up. Compliance required not later than November 15, 1950. Reports have been received of interference between the elevator horn bolt and the fin cover plate apparently caused by improper field installation of the cover plate through bolt. Cases are known where the bolt has worn through the cover plate and such interference may result in jamming of the elevator control system. An inspection of the parts should be made and if evidence of interference is noted, suitable means of preventing the cover plates from interfering with the elevator horn bolt should be incorporated; a spacer bushing at least 1/4 x 0.028 x 1 1/4 inches installed around the cover plate through bolt is considered satisfactory. (Taylorcraft, Inc. Service Bulletin 65 covers this same subject.)
68-11-01: 68-11-01\tBOEING: Amendment 39-605. Applies to Model 707 Series airplanes equipped with Collins Model 51RV-1 navigation receivers and Pratt & Whitney P/N 563586 or General Laboratories P/N 42721 solid state engine ignitor systems. \n\tCompliance required as indicated. \n\tReports indicate a localizer course indicator error may exist when the Pratt & Whitney P/N 563586 or General Laboratories P/N 42721 solid state engine ignitors are turned "ON". Since this unsafe condition is likely to exist in other Boeing Model 707 Series airplanes, the Director determined that: \n\tA.\tFlight operations shall not be predicated on the use of localizer receiver information when engine ignition systems are "ON". \n\tB.\tThe operating limitations specified in subparagraph A of this paragraph must be placed in the aircraft in the form of a placard in clear view of the pilot. For purposes of this AD any documents including a pilot check list including these limitations constitute a placard within the meaningof this paragraph. \n\tC.\tThis limitation does not apply when a 1000 microfarad 50 volt capacitor has been installed across the 28 volt DC input lead to the Collins 51RV-1 receiver in the radio junction box in accordance with Boeing telegraphic Alert Bulletin 2752 dated May 10, 1968, or an equivalent suppression system approved by the Western Region Aircraft Engineering Division. \n\tThis amendment becomes effective on May 31, 1968, for all persons except those to whom it was made effective immediately by telegram dated May 10, 1968.
2012-08-13: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 777-200 and -300 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of two failures of the single-tabbed bracket on the rudder. This AD requires replacing certain single-tabbed bonding brackets in the airplane empennage with two-tabbed bonding brackets. This AD also requires, for certain airplanes, installing new bonding jumpers, and measuring the resistance of the modified installation to verify resistance is within specified limits. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of the bonding jumper bracket, which could result in loss of lightning protection ground path, which could \n\n((Page 24358)) \n\nlead to increased lightning-induced currents and subsequent damage to composite structures, hydraulic tubes, and actuator control electronics. In the event of a lightning strike, loss of lightning ground protection could result in the loss of control of the airplane.
71-19-02: 71-19-02 SOCIETE NATIONAL INDUSTRIELLE AEROSPATIALE (S.N.I.A.S.): Amendment 39-1281. Applies to Sud Model SE.210, MK. V1-R "Caravelle" airplanes. To prevent a possible fire due to unnoticed overheating of a hydraulic system, within the next 500 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, incorporate S.A. Modification 1262 by installing a Green and Blue Hydraulic System Fluid Overheat Detection System in accordance with Sud Service-Caravelle Bulletin No. 29-70, Revision 10, dated October 12, 1970, or later SGAC-approved issue or an FAA-approved equivalent. This amendment becomes effective September 27, 1971.
68-20-06: 68-20-06 NAVION: Amendment 39-663. Applies to Navion through Navion H airplanes. Compliance required within the next 50 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, and each annual inspection thereafter. To prevent failure of the Rudder Horn, P/N 145-24401, accomplish the following: Inspect for horizontal cracks or corrosion in the edge of the rudder horn. These cracks would appear as delaminations or swelling under the paint. Replace corroded or cracked rudder horns with new or unused part of the same part number or Federal Aviation Administration approved equivalent part before further flight. This amendment becomes effective October 3, 1968.
67-15-03: 67-15-03 ROLLS-ROYCE: Amdt. 39-399 Part 39 Federal Register April 14, 1967. Applies to All Dart Series 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 531, and 532-7 Series Engines with Rolls-Royce Modification 529 (Part 2) Bearing in the Rear Position. Compliance required as indicated. (a) Inspect the oil filter on all Dart 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 531, and 532-7 Series engines modified in accordance with Rolls-Royce Modification 529 Part 2 Standard at the following times: (1) Within 25 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the last 25 hours, and thereafter at intervals not exceeding 50 hours' time in service from the last inspection; and (2) Before further flight, when an increase in oil consumption or a drop in oil pressure is reported. (b) If metal particles are found in the filters, remove the engine from service and further inspect to determine whether repairs are required. (c) If the inspection in (b) indicates that repairs are required, modify the rear bearing in accordance with Rolls Royce Dart Service Bulletin No. Da. 72-232, by implementing any of the following modifications as applicable (1) Mod. 1023, Mod. 1030 and DRS. 411; (2) Mod. 1106 or Mod. 1109; or (3) Mod. 1167. (d) Upon request of the operator, an FAA maintenance inspector, subject to prior approval of the Chief, Aircraft Certification Staff, Europe, Africa and Middle East Region, may adjust the repetitive inspection intervals specified in this AD to permit compliance at an established inspection period of the operator if the request contains substantiating data to justify the increase for such operator. This supersedes AD 63-21-7. This directive effective May 14, 1967.
2012-07-06: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 777 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a new revision to the airworthiness limitations of the maintenance planning document. This AD requires revising the maintenance program to update inspection requirements to detect fatigue cracking of principal structural elements (PSEs). We are issuing this AD to ensure that fatigue cracking of various PSEs is detected and corrected; such fatigue cracking could adversely affect the structural integrity of these airplanes.
75-05-10: 75-05-10 BOEING: Amendment 39-2107. Applies to Boeing Model 727-200 series airplanes certificated in all categories, and Boeing Model 727-100, Serial Numbers 18877, 18878, 18879, 19281 and 19279 only. Compliance required as indicated. \n\tTo prevent escape slide latch cable failure and ensuing inability to open emergency exit and deploy escape slide, accomplish the following: \n\tA.\tWithin 25 hours time in service after effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, inspect door mounted escape slide latch cable at both entry and service doors (4 doors). If corrosion or breakage is found, replace prior to further flight with a carbon steel assembly of the same type design and reinspect at intervals not to exceed 500 hours time in service, or replace with corrosion resistant assembly, per Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 727-25- 223, or later FAA approved revisions, or replace in a manner approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Northwest Region. \n\tB.\tBySeptember 1, 1975, unless already accomplished, replace carbon steel cable assembly with corrosion resistant assembly per Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 727-25-223, or later FAA approved revisions, or in a manner approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Northwest Region. \n\tThe manufacturer's specifications and procedures identified and described in this directive are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). \n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, P. O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. The documents may also be examined at FAA Northwest Region, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective March 25, 1975.
2012-06-06: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 757 airplanes. This AD requires replacing the power control relays for the fuel boost pumps and override pumps with new relays having a ground fault interrupter (GFI) feature. This AD also requires an electrical bonding resistance measurement for certain GFI relays to verify that certain bonding requirements are met. This AD also requires, for certain airplanes, an inspection to ensure that certain screws are properly installed, and installing longer screws if necessary. This AD was prompted by fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer. We are issuing this AD to prevent damage to the fuel pumps caused by electrical arcing that could introduce an ignition source in the fuel tank, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.
72-16-02 R3: 72-16-02 R3 BEECH: Amendment 39-1494 as amended by Amendment 39-1549 and 39-2211 is further amended by Amendment 39-4085. Applies to Beech Models C45G, TC-45G, C-45H, TC-45H, TC-45J (SNB-5), RC-45J (SNB-5P), D18C, D18S, E18S, E18S-9700, G18S, H18, JRB-6, 3N, 3NM and 3TM Aircraft certificated in all categories with STC SA4-1531, STC SA111WE, STC SA1832WE or any other STC modification incorporating the provisions of the Volpar Tri-Gear Installation. \n\n\tCompliance required as indicated. \n\n\t1.\tNose Landing Gear Fork \n\n\t\ta.\tFor airplanes incorporating Volpar nose landing gear fork P/N 347 perform the following: \n\n\t\t\t(i)\tWithin the next 50 hours time in service or 25 landings, whichever occurs earlier, after the effective date of this amendment to AD 72-16-02, unless already accomplished within the last 50 hours time in service or 25 landings, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 100 hours time in service or 70 landings, whichever occurs earlier, from the last inspection, inspect the fork for cracks using dye penetrant or fluorescent penetrant inspection methods in accordance with Volpar Service Bulletin No. 17, as revised July 29, 1969, or later FAA-approved revisions, or an equivalent inspection approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region, until modified in accordance with paragraph 1b. below. \n\n\t\t\t(ii)\tBefore each flight conduct a visual check of fork P/N 347 for cracks until modified in accordance with 1b. below. This visual check may be performed by the pilot in command and shall be recorded in the appropriate aircraft records per FAR 91.173. \n\n\t\tb.\tIf cracks are found by the inspections or checks per paragraph 1.a.(i) or 1.a.(ii) above, replace fork prior to further flight with Volpar P/N 884. \n\n\t\tc.\tThe inspections and checks required per paragraphs 1.a.(i) and 1.a.(ii) may be discontinued when Volpar fork P/N 884 is installed. \n\n\t2.\tNOSE LANDING GEAR TRUNNION \n\n\t\ta.\tFor airplanes incorporating Volpar nose landing gear trunnion P/N 271 with outside boss diameter of 1.01 + .01 in. (color coded clear) within the next 50 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the last 950 hours time in service, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 1000 hours time in service from the last inspection, inspect the trunnion for cracks using dye penetrant or fluorescent penetrant inspection methods in accordance with Volpar Service Bulletin No. 19, dated 16 January 1970, or later FAA-approved revision, or an equivalent inspection approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region, until modified in accordance with paragraph 2b. below. \n\n\t\tb.\tIf cracks are found by the inspection per paragraph 2a. above, replace trunnion prior to further flight with Volpar P/N 271 \n\n\t\tc.\tThe inspections required per paragraph 2a. may be discontinued upon accomplishment of paragraph 2b. above. \n\n\t3.\tMain Landing Gear Cylinder and Top Brace Assembly \n\n\t\ta.\tFor airplanes with Volpar tri-gear which do not incorporate the Volpar P/N 859 strap reinforcement on Beech main landing gear cylinder and top brace assembly P/N 404-188406, inspect the cylinder and top brace assembly for cracks within 50 hours' time in service after the effective date of amendment 39-1594 to AD 72-16-02, unless already accomplished. For inspection purposes accomplish the following: \n\n\t\t\t(1)\tSupport aircraft on jacks. \n\n\t\t\t(2)\tRemove main wheel and brake assembly. \n\n\t\t\t(3)\tRemove main landing gear shock strut assembly from aircraft. \n\n\t\t\t(4)\tClean surfaces and inspect the cylinder and top brace assembly for cracks using magnetic particle inspection method per MIL-I-6868 or dye penetrant inspection method "C", type II, per MIL-I-6866. \n\n\t\tb.\tIf cracks are found by the inspections per paragraph 3a. above, repair in accordance with FAR Part 43 prior to accomplishing modification per paragraph 3c. below. \n\n\tNOTE: The repair is restricted to theareas shown on the attached Figure No. 2. If cracks are found in areas other than shown, disassemble shock strut and replace cylinder and top brace assembly as follows: \n\n\t\t\t(1)\tRelease air charge and remove AN 6286 valve from main landing gear shock strut. \n\n\t\t\t(2)\tRemove the following components from shock strut: \n\n\t\t\t\t(a)\tCylinder cap assembly P/N 414-188438 \n\n\t\t\t\t(b)\tBracket P/N 709 \n\n\t\t\t\t(c)\tTorque links P/N 738 and P/N 706 \n\n\t\t\t(3)\tDrain oil from the cylinder. \n\n\t\t\t(4)\tRemove the AN 365-820 nut from the lower end of the piston at the P/N 426 fork. \n\n\tNOTE: Care must be taken to avoid shearing the roll pin installed on the E-G-H18 aircraft metering rod assembly. Use a 3/4" socket to hold the upper end of the metering rod. On C-45 and D18 aircraft, a slotted screw driver is used to hold the metering rod. \n\n\t\t\t(5)\tRemove the P/N 426 fork from the piston by pressing off. Heat may be used on the fork to facilitate removal. Heat to a maximum of 300 degrees F - 350 degrees F. \n\n\t\t\t(6)\tRemove the P/N 275 stud from the bottom of the piston and slide piston, metering rod, inner cylinder and seals from the outer cylinder assembly. \n\n\t\t\t(7)\tReverse the above procedure for the assembly of shock strut using a cylinder and top brace assembly that has been inspected and modified in accordance with paragraph 3c. below. \n\n\t\t\t(8)\tComplete a landing gear operational check before returning the aircraft to service. \n\n\tCAUTION: (a)\tThe AN 936-816 lock washer should be installed on to the threaded portion of the metering rod between the P/N 275 stud and the base of the piston. \n\n\t\t(b)\tThe AN 6227-7 "O" ring should be installed in groove on metering rod before installation in the piston. \n\n\t\t(c)\tThe 426 fork should not be driven or pressed on to piston with the AN 365 nut. Heat should be used on the P/N 426 fork. Cool piston with ice to allow slide fit, then torque AN 365 nut in place on stud. \n\n\tc.\tIf no cracks are found by the inspections perparagraph 3a. above, modify cylinder and top brace assembly with Volpar P/N 859 strap reinforcement prior to further flight in accordance with the attached Figure No. 1. \n\n\tNOTE: Following the installation of the reinforcement, reinspect the top brace assembly for cracks using magnetic particle inspection method per MIL-I-6868. If cracks are found, repair in accordance with FAR Part 43 prior to further flight. \n\n\tAmendment 39-1494 became effective August 3, 1972. \n\n\tAmendment 39-1549 became effective November 3, 1972. \n\n\tAmendment 39-2211 became effective May 27, 1975. \n\n\tThis amendment 39-4085 becomes effective April 16, 1981.
2012-06-02: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus Model A300 B4-600, B4-600R, and F4-600R series airplanes, and Model C4-605R Variant F airplanes (collectively called A300-600 series airplanes), and Model A310 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report of a crack in the selector valve pipe of the forward cargo door located in the avionics bay opposite the line replaceable unit racking. This AD requires replacing a certain aluminum high pressure pipe with a new corrosion resistant stainless steel pipe. We are issuing this AD to prevent cracking in the selector valve pipe of the forward cargo door which could impact the 90 VU avionics line replaceable unit, and could result in multiple computer failures, affecting flight safety.
74-20-01: 74-20-01 CESSNA: Amendment 39-1966. Applies to Models 310Q (Serial Numbers 1038 through 1069, 1071 through 1081, 1083 through 1086, 1088 through 1105, 1107, 1109, 1110, 1112, 1113, 1115 through 1118, 1122, 1123, 1125 and 1126); Model 340 (Serial Numbers 0325 through 0354); Model 402B (Serial Numbers 0575 through 0581, 0583 through 0586, 0588, 0590 through 0611, 0613, 0614 and 0617); Model 414 (Serial Numbers 0503 through 0529, 0531 and 0532); and Model 421B (Serial Numbers 0322, 0584 through 0625, 0627, 0629 through 0633, 0635 and 0636) airplanes. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To preclude possible main landing gear trunnion failure, accomplish the following: A) Within 25 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, visually inspect the LH and RH main landing gear assembly to determine whether the landing gear assembly serial numbers fall within the following serial number blocks: Aircraft Models Affected Main Landing Gear Assembly Serials Affected L/H R/H Model 310Q B170 thru B279 W146 thru W273 Model 340 B199 thru B345 B164 thru B330 Model 402B B199 thru B345 B164 thru B330 Model 414 B199 thru B345 B164 thru B330 Model 421B W108 thru W185 W090 thru W170 If a main landing gear assembly falls within the above serial number blocks, visually inspect the trunnions for cracks or forming flaws in accordance with Cessna Service Letter ME74-14 dated August 9, 1974, or subsequent revisions. Repeat these inspections at intervals of 25 hours' time in service thereafter until the trunnions are replaced. B) If cracks or forming flaws are found during any inspection required by Paragraph A, prior to further flight, replace the main landing gear upper strut with an airworthy part in accordance with Cessna Service Kit 421-63. C) Within 100 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, replace main landing gear upper strut assemblies of the serial numbers listed in Paragraph A with an airworthy part in accordance with Cessna Service Kit 421-63. D) The inspections required by this AD may be discontinued upon replacement of the affected main landing gear upper strut assemblies. E) Any equivalent method of compliance with this AD must be approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Central Region. This amendment becomes effective September 25, 1974.
70-06-04: 70-06-04 BRITTEN NORMAN, LTD: Amdt. 39-951. Applies to Models BN-2 and BN-2A airplanes having serial numbers C19 through C130 which have modification NB/M/155 incorporated. To ensure the security of the locking keys in the outboard side of the four wing to fuselage attachment spindles, accomplish the following: (a) Within 10 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, remove the four access panels W11, W14, W33, and W36 from the upper surface of the wing center section and visually inspect to ensure that the waisted locking key in each of the four attachment spindles is in position and is tightly retained there by the outboard face of the plain nut. (b) If any movement or incorrect positioning of any locking key is evident during the inspection required by paragraph (a), before further flight re-secure the affected locking key in accordance with Britten-Norman Service Bulletin No. BN-2/SB.25, dated January 8, 1970, or later ARB issue or an FAA-approved equivalent. This amendment becomes effective March 17, 1970.
2012-05-09: We are issuing an airworthiness directive (AD) for all Mooney Aviation Company, Inc. (Mooney) Models M20B, M20C, M20D, M20E, M20F, M20G, M20J, M20K, M20L, M20M, M20R, M20S, and M20TN airplanes that supersedes an existing AD that is applicable to certain Model M20R and M20TN airplanes. The existing AD currently requires inspecting the tail pitch trim assembly for correct positioning and proper attachment and inspecting the Huck Bolt fasteners for proper security with repair as necessary for certain Models M20R and M20TN. That AD also requires sending the inspection results to the FAA and Mooney. This AD retains all of the actions, except the reporting requirement from the previous AD and adds airplane models to the applicability. This AD was prompted by a report of an incident on a Mooney Model M20TN airplane regarding failure of the tail pitch trim assembly, which could result in loss of control. We are issuing this AD to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
74-16-07: 74-16-07 LOCKHEED: Amendment 39-1909. Applies to Model L-1011-385-1 series aircraft with Lockheed serial numbers 1002 through 1066, certificated in all categories. Compliance required within 1,800 hours additional time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To prevent a single failure from causing a cargo door to open during takeoff roll, accomplish one of the following: (a) Modification as described in Lockheed Service Bulletin 093-52-045 dated October 18, 1973, or later FAA-approved revisions. (b) Equivalent modifications, approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. Aircraft may be flown to a base where maintenance may be performed per FAR's 21.197 and 21.199. This amendment becomes effective September 11, 1974.
75-04-02: 75-04-02 SIKORSKY AIRCRAFT: Amendment 39-2082. Applies to S-55, S-55B, S-55C and S-62A Helicopters certificated in all categories, including military type HRS-1, HRS-3, CH-19, H-19B, H-19G, H-19A, H-19D, HO4S-3G, UH-19D, H19D5, UH-19B, UH-19D helicopters, equipped with P/N S10-10-3325-1 and S10-10-3325-2 main rotor spindles. (a) Within the next 10 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the preceding 50 hours' time in service, conduct a dye penetrant inspection of the exposed areas of the lugs of the main rotor spindles. (b) If a crack is found during the above inspection, replace the cracked spindle with a spindle that has been inspected in accordance with paragraph (a) above and found to be free of cracks, prior to flight. (c) Report in writing any cracks found during the inspection of paragraph (a) to: Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Federal Aviation Administration, New England Region, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts 01803. Each report must include the length and location of the cracks and the total time in service of the spindle. Sikorsky message SST62A6C74.3 covers this inspection. This amendment becomes effective February 19, 1975.
70-03-07: 70-03-07 AIRESEARCH: Amdt. 39-936. Applicable to operators of aircraft with AiResearch model GTP30-141 Auxiliary Power Units installed, including but not limited to, those Convair 600/640 aircraft listed in AiResearch Telegraphic Bulletin No. 49-A1838, dated January 17, 1970, or later FAA approved revisions. Within ten (10) hours time in service, install a placard in full view of the pilot, to read: "Operation of the APU is prohibited in flight, except in emergency. Operate the APU at no load for at least one minute before shutdown." This placard may be removed when the APU is replaced with APU modified to series 4 or Change 5 in accordance with AiResearch Telegraphic Service Bulletin No. 49-A1838, dated January 17, 1970, or later FAA approved revisions. This amendment is effective upon publication in the Federal Register for all persons except those to whom it was made effective immediately by telegram dated January 23, 1970.
2011-12-10: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for the specified Robinson model helicopters that currently requires a visual inspection for skin separation along the leading edge of blade skin aft of the skin-to-spar bond line on the lower surface of each main rotor blade (blade) and in the tip cap area. The existing AD also requires a ``tap test'' for detecting a separation or void in both bonded areas and repainting any exposed area of the blades. If any separation or void is detected, the AD requires, before further flight, replacing the blade. Thereafter, before each flight, the existing AD also requires checking for any exposed (bare) metal along the skin-to- spar bond line on the lower surface of each blade near the tip. If any bare metal is found, that AD requires an inspection by a qualified mechanic. This amendment contains the same requirements but expands the applicability to include all serial-numbered model helicopters and limits the applicability to specific blade part numbers. This amendment also requires a repetitive inspection of the blade and any necessary rework. This amendment is prompted by a fatal accident in Israel. We have also included responses to comments objecting to the recording requirements in the current AD relating to the pilot checks before each flight and to comments that the burden of the before-each-flight pilot check exceeds the benefit. We have concluded that a check before the first flight of each day is sufficient for aviation safety. The actions specified by this AD are intended to provide more specific AD actions, to relieve the burdens associated with the before-each-flight check by changing it to a daily check, to detect blade skin debond, and to prevent blade failure and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
75-07-02: 75-07-02 CESSNA: Amendment 39-2132. Applies to Models 177, 177RG and F177RG airplanes. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless already accomplished. \n\n\tTo preclude separation of the foam rubber air filter seal, within 25 hours' time in service, after the effective date of this AD, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA)\tOn Models 177 (Serial Numbers 17702040 through 17702220); 177RG (Serial Numbers 177RG0433 through 177RG0625); and Model F177RG (Serial Numbers F177RG0093 through F177RG0122) airplanes, remove the air filter seal attached with double-backed adhesive tape and replace with a new P11-0766 air filter seal using EC1300LP adhesive in accordance with Cessna Service Letter SE 75-3, dated January 24, 1975, or later revision. \n\n\tB)\tOn Models 177 (Serial Numbers 601 and 17700001 through 17702039); 177RG (Serial Numbers R177RG0001 through 177RG0442); and F177RG (Serial Numbers F177RG0001 through F177RG0092) airplanes, visually inspect the air filter for the date of manufacture and on those air filters manufactured between November 1, 1973, and November 1, 1974, replace the air filter seal in accordance with Paragraph A above. \n\n\tC)\tAny alternate method of compliance with this AD must be approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Central Region. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective March 26, 1975.
2012-02-18: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all DASSAULT AVIATION Model MYSTERE-FALCON 50 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of cracking of the flap tracks. This AD requires revising the maintenance program to include revised airworthiness limitations. We are issuing this AD to prevent cracking of the flap tracks, which could lead to flap asymmetry and loss of control of the airplane.
73-20-03: 73-20-03 HILLER AVIATION: Amdt. 39-1724. Applies to Hiller Model UH-12, UH-12A, UH-12B, UH-12C, UH-12D, and UH-12E Helicopters certificated in all categories. Compliance required within the next 5 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished on receipt of the airmail AD dated September 6, 1973, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 50 hours time in service from the last inspection. To detect cracks in the main rotor hub P/N's 51437, 51437-6, 51437-7, 51437-8, 51437- 9, 51437-11, 51437-901, and 51437-11-911, accomplish the following: Conduct dye penetrant inspection of the main rotor hubs P/N's 51437, 51437-6, 51437-7, 51437-8, 51437-9, 51437-11, 51437-901, 51437-11-911, inside the hub in the area opposite the control rotor trunnion attachments. If cracks are found, replace with a new part before further flight and continue the 50 hour interval dye penetrant inspections. Report cracks found, model and serial number, and total time in service on the main rotor hub, to Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, Federal Aviation Administration, Western Region, P.O. Box 92007, Worldway Postal Center, Los Angeles, California 90009. (Reporting approved by the Bureau of the Budget under B.O.B. No. 04-R0174). This amendment is effective on October 30, 1973.
74-20-12: 74-20-12 COMMANDER AIRCRAFT DIVISION, ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL: Amendment 39-1979. Applies to Rockwell Model 690A series airplanes, S/N 11100 through 11197. Compliance required as indicated unless already accomplished. 1. Before the first flight of each day after the effective date of this A.D., check the cutout around the openable pilot's and co-pilot's side windows for cracks. 2. If cracks are found in either side window, replace the openable side window with a non-openable side window, P/N 360012-501, before further flight, except flight with cabin unpressurized may be made in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a base where the replacement can be accomplished. 3. Within 50 hours' time in service after the effective date of this A.D., unless already accomplished, replace all openable side windows, with a non-openable side window, P/N 360012-501, in accordance with Rockwell Service Bulletin 143 dated September 10, 1974, or an equivalent method approved by the Chief,Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Flight Standards Division, Southwest Region, Fort Worth, Texas. This amendment becomes effective October 4, 1974.
2012-04-01: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for all RR RB211-Trent 800 series turbofan engines. That AD currently requires removal from service of certain critical engine parts based on reduced life limits. This new AD reduces the life limits of additional critical engine parts. This AD was prompted by RR reducing the life limits of additional critical engine parts. We are issuing this AD to prevent the failure of critical rotating parts, which could result in uncontained failure of the engine and damage to the airplane.