Results
76-07-03: 76-07-03 FAIRCHILD: Amendment 39-2565. Applies to all FH-227 airplanes incorporating the outward opening large cargo door per STC SA2246WE. Compliance required within the next 300 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. (a) To prevent inadvertent opening of the large cargo door in flight, accomplish the alteration in paragraph 2, Accomplishment Instructions, in Fairchild Service Bulletin FH-227-52-17, dated October 27, 1975, for FH-227 airplanes, or an equivalent alteration approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Eastern Region. This amendment is effective April 6, 1976.
77-05-05: 77-05-05 ADS SUPPLY COMPANY, AIR SPARES INTERNATIONAL, INC. AND SPENCER AIRCRAFT INDUSTRIES: Amendment 39-2849 as amended by Amendment 39-2868 and 39-2881 is further amended by Amendment 39-3199. Applies to various unapproved appliances, identified herein by the Boeing part number, sold by or procured through ADS Supply Company, Bellevue, Washington, Air Spares International, Inc., Seattle, Washington, or Spencer Aircraft Industries, Seattle, Washington, and installed in various Boeing model airplanes. Compliance required as indicated. Accomplish the following: A. Before further flight, except as provided in paragraph F, remove part number 65-52811 - Landing Gear Accessory Unit. B. Before further flight, except as provided in paragraph G, remove part number 65-52809 - Fire Detection Accessory Unit and part number 69-37307 - Engine and Fire Control Module. C. By March 18, 1977, remove the following appliances: (Additional dash numbers identify airline configurations.) Boeing Part No. Unit 65-52801- APU Accessory Unit 65-52807- Flap/Slat Position Switching Unit 69-37335- Fuel System Module Assembly 65-52804- Audio Accessory Unit 65-60211- Landing Gear Accessory Unit 69-37369- Ground Proximity System Test Accessory Module 69-37336- Ground Proximity Aural Warning Accessory Module 65-52805- Flight Instrument Accessory Unit 69-37346- Window and Pitot Heat Module 69-37338- Gyro Switching Panel D. By April 2, 1977, remove the following appliances: (Additional dash numbers identify airline configuration.) Boeing Part No. Unit 65-49808- Electrical Power Relay Module 65-52803- Window Heat Accessory Unit 65-52808- Compartment Overheat Accessory Unit 65-52810- Air Conditioning Accessory Unit 69-37314- AC System Generator and APU Module 69-37315- Generator Drive Standby Power Module 69-37317- Hydraulic Pump Module 69-37319- Air Conditioning Module 69-37320- Engine and Wing Anti-Ice Module 69-37324- Cabin Temperature Module 69-55179- Light Dimming Module 69-37344- VHF Navigation and Compass Switching Unit 65-52806- Miscellaneous Solid State Switching Module 69-37357- Thrust Reverser Override Module 69-37352- Door Warning Annunciator E. By April 8, 1977, remove the following appliances: (Additional dash numbers identify airline configuration.) Boeing Part No. Unit 65-37568- Landing Gear Accessory Unit 65-60209- Engine Fire Detection Control Unit Assembly 65-24917- Autopilot Accessory Unit 69-37313- Flight Control Module 65-24920- Fire Detector Module 69-37321- Electrical Module Assembly 65-60214- Flight Instrument Accessory Unit F. Operations with part number 65-52811 - Landing Gear Accessory Unit may continue until March 18, 1977, provided that before further flight a placard is installed adjacent to the speed brake handle stating "DO NOT ARM." Airplanes may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a maintenance base to accomplish the above. G. Operations with part number 65-52809 - Fire Detection Accessory Unit and part number 69- 37307 - Engine and APU Fire Control Module may continue until March 18, 1977, provided that before further flight, and daily thereafter, conduct tests in accordance with a procedure available from the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Northwest Region. Airplanes may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a maintenance base to accomplish the above. H. By May 6, 1977, remove the following appliances: (Additional dash numbers identify airline configuration.) Boeing Part No. Unit 69-37339- Stall Warning Test Module 65-79479- Autobrake Accessory Unit 69-37334- Cabin Altimeter and Rate of Climb Module 65-73606- Engine Accessory Unit 65-52812- Autopilot Accessory Unit 65B-46136- Fire Detector Module I. By May 27, 1977, remove the following appliance: (Additional dash numbers identify airline configuration.) Boeing Part No. Unit 65-52802-1 Autopilot Switching Unit J. By May 26, 1978, (notwithstanding the dates of compliance listed in paragraphs A through I above) remove all appliances with Boeing part numbers listed in paragraphs A through I above which have been sold by or procured through Spencer Aircraft Industries (additional dash numbers identify airline configuration). K. Upon request of the operator, an FAA Principal Inspector, subject to the prior approval of the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Northwest Region, may adjust the compliance schedule in this AD for specific appliances if the request contains substantiating data to justify the increase for that operator. Amendment 39-2849 deleted Amendment 39-2837, AD 77-04-03. Amendment 39-2849 became effective March 10, 1977. Amendment 39-2868 became effective April 7, 1977. Amendment 39-2881 became effective April 28, 1977. This Amendment 39-3199 becomes effective May 9, 1978.
2002-12-15: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), that is applicable to Pratt & Whitney PW4000 series turbofan engines. That AD requires operators to perform initial and repetitive inspections for cracking of high pressure compressor (HPC) front drum rotors based on cycle usage. That AD also requires the removal from service of any cracked HPC front drum rotors. This amendment clarifies inspection requirements for cracking of HPC front drum rotors that have fewer than 1,000 cycles-since-new (CSN). This amendment is prompted by comments from operators seeking more clarity about the inspection requirements of paragraph (a)(1) of that AD. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent HPC drum rotor failure from cracks that could result in an uncontained engine failure and damage to the airplane.
2025-01-02: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus SAS Model A319-111, -112, -113, -114, -115, -131, -132, and -133 airplanes; Model A320-211, -212, -214, -216, -231, -232, and - 233 airplanes; and Model A321-111, -112, -131, -211, -212, -213, -231, and -232 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a full-scale fatigue test that found cracks on the main landing gear (MLG) bay rear skin panel at the stringer run-out at Frame 46 and Stringer 32 on the left-hand and right-hand sides. This AD requires repetitive special detailed inspections (SDIs) of the affected area for cracking and applicable corrective actions, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2025-01-04: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain DAHER AEROSPACE (DAHER) Model TBM 700 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of wear of the inner flap actuator drive nut. This AD requires cleaning and lubricating the internal actuator rods, measuring the play between the drive nuts and the internal actuator rods, and if any play is found, replacing the drive nuts. This AD also allows replacing the drive nuts with certain other design drive nuts as terminating action for the requirements. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2002-12-14: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for specified Eurocopter France (ECF) model helicopters that currently requires inserting statements into the Limitations section of the Rotorcraft Flight Manual (RFM) prohibiting flight under certain atmospheric conditions. This amendment contains the same requirements but corrects, expands, and updates the applicability. This amendment is prompted by an incident in which a Multi-Purpose Air Intake (MPAI) inlet seal deflated after the P2 air system line, which feeds the seal, clogged due to the formation of ice. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent clogging of the MPAI seal P2 air system line due to ice formation, which could result in deflation of the MPAI seal, loss of engine power, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
67-31-03: 67-31-03 BRITISH AIRCRAFT: Amdt. 39-519, Part 39, Federal Register November 30, 1967. Applies to Model BAC 1-11 200 and 400 Series Airplanes. Compliance required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent reversal of the rudder feel function, within the next 500 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, accomplish the following: (a) Replace the paired links located in the rudder feel simulator linkage, Hobson P/N CH 504-071 or CH 504-280 with redesigned Hobson slotted links, P/N CH 504-446 in accordance with British Aircraft Corporation on BAC 1-11 Alert Service Bulletin PM 3290, or later ARB-approved issue, or an equivalent approved by the Chief, Aircraft Certification Staff, FAA, Europe, Africa, and Middle East Region. (b) Attach Hobson slotted links P/N CH 504-446 with bolts P/N CH 127803-25 (NAS 1108-25) and CH-127803-22 (NAS 1108-22), or self-retained bolt P/N CH 127800 (NAS 1108-27-SR) and rivet P/N CH 524-129-3. If bolts P/N CH127803-25 (NAS 1108-25) and CH 127803-22 (NAS 1108-22) are used, replace these bolts with self-retained bolt P/N CH 127800 (NAS 1108-27-SR) and rivet P/N CH-524-129-3 during the next overhaul of the rudder feel simulator units. This amendment effective November 30, 1967.
52-25-01: 52-25-01 DOUGLAS: Applies to All Models DC3 Aircraft Equipped With Vacuum Systems. \n\n\tTo be accomplished not later than May 1, 1953. \n\n\tTo guard against the possibility of excessive air temperatures and associated fire hazards in the vacuum system discharge line, one of the following modifications must be accomplished: \n\n\t1.\tInstall a fusible plug in the side of the vacuum pump discharge port at right angles to the axis of the discharge port boss. Some pumps incorporate a plugged hole in the discharge port which may be enlarged to a 3/8-inch pipe tapped hole to accommodate the fusible plug. This plug should employ an AN 840-8D fitting with a binary eutectic mixture of 67.8 percent tin and 32.2 percent cadmium, which has a melting point of 351 degrees F. A drawing describing the design of such a plug is shown in Figure 2. The 3/8-inch plug fitting is intended for pumps such as the Model 3P-211 and 3P-485. For smaller pumps such as the 3P-207, an AN 840-6D fitting, incorporating the same modification as shown below, should be used. Brass fittings of the same design as the above dual fittings are acceptable. Incorporation of an overboard drain line clamped to the fusible plug is recommended but is not mandatory. On installations which do not use an overboard discharge line the possibility exists that the plug may damage other nacelle components if it can hit them upon being blown out of the adapter at high velocity. Therefore, if no overboard discharge line is provided, the installation must be made in such a manner that the plug will not be directed toward any vulnerable components when it issues from the adapter, or \n\n\t2.\tEmploy an oil separator equivalent in principle to the Genisco No. 40081 incorporating a pressure relief valve which can be disassembled for cleaning. \n\n\t(Douglas Service Letter A-129-T-1271/WB-11-Q-4 dated April 1, 1949, covers this type modification.)
2025-01-07: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2022-11- 01, which applied to certain Airbus SAS Model A300 series airplanes; Model A300 B4-600, B4-600R, and F4-600R series airplanes; and Model A300 C4-605R Variant F airplanes (collectively called Model A300-600 series airplanes). AD 2022-11-01 required a detailed inspection (DET) of the main landing gear (MLG) support rib 5 lower flange, a fluorescent penetrant inspection (FPI) around the spot facing of certain fastener holes if necessary, and applicable corrective actions. This AD was prompted by the determination that additional airplanes are affected by the unsafe condition. This AD continues to require the actions in AD 2022-11-01 and adds airplanes to the applicability, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2015-21-10: We are superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2015-19-03 for all The Boeing Company Model 737-600, -700, -700C, -800, -900, and - 900ER series airplanes. AD 2015-19-03 required revising the maintenance or inspection program to include new airworthiness limitations. This AD continues to require a maintenance or inspection program revision, but with revised language. This AD was prompted by a determination that certain language in the airworthiness limitation was not accurate in AD 2015-19-03. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct latent failures of the fuel shutoff valve to the engine, which could result in the inability to shut off fuel to the engine and, in case of certain engine fires, an uncontrollable fire that could lead to wing failure.
86-20-12: 86-20-12 CESSNA: Amendment 39-5442. Applies to the Model 404 (Serial Numbers 404- 0001 through 404-0136, 404-0201 through 404-0246, 404-0401 through 404-0460, 404-0601 through 404-0695, and 404-0801 through 404-0859) airplanes certificated in any category: Compliance: Required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To ensure the structural integrity of the engine mount beams, accomplish the following: (a) Inspect the engine beams for cracks in accordance with the provisions of Cessna Multi-Engine Service Bulletin MEB 86-7, dated April 18, 1986, per the following schedule: (1) On all airplanes with 1600 or more hours time-in-service (TIS), fluorescent penetrant inspect the engine beams within the next 100 flight hours and at each 800 hours TIS thereafter. (2) On all airplanes with less than 1600 hours TIS, fluorescent penetrant inspect the engine beams between 1600 and 1700 hours TIS and at each 800 hours TIS thereafter. (3) The fluorescent penetrant inspections required by paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) of this AD are no longer required on engine beams that have Service Kit SK 404-40 installed. (b) If cracks are found in the inspection of Paragraph (a), prior to further flight perform the following in accordance with Cessna Service Bulletin MEB 86-7: (1) If cracks found in the top (horizontal portion) of the beam are less than 2.00 inches in length, stop drill and install SK 404-40 in accordance with MEB 86-7. (2) If cracks found in the top (horizontal portion) of the beam are greater than 2.00 inches in length, contact Cessna Aircraft Company for FAA approved repair disposition at the following address: Cessna Aircraft Company, Customer Service, P.O. Box 1521, Wichita, Kansas 67201; Telephone (316) 946-7550. (c) Aircraft may be flown in accordance with Federal Aviation Regulation 21.197 to a location where the provisions of this AD can be accomplished. (d) Any equivalent method of compliance with this AD must be approved by the Manager, Wichita Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, 1801 Airport Road, Room 100, Mid- Continent Airport, Wichita, Kansas 67209. All persons affected by this directive may obtain copies of the documents referred to herein upon request to Cessna Aircraft Company, P.O. Box 1521, Wichita, Kansas 67201; or FAA, Office of the Regional Counsel, Room 1558, 601 East 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri 64106. This amendment becomes effective October 21, 1986.
2025-01-03: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain CFM International, S.A. (CFM) Model LEAP-1A and LEAP-1C engines. This AD was prompted by an investigation of an in-flight shut down event that revealed the aft arm of the high-pressure turbine (HPT) rotor interstage seal had failed. This AD requires removal from service and replacement of the HPT rotor interstage seal for LEAP-1A engines. Since the HPT rotor interstage seal part number is interchangeable between LEAP-1A and LEAP-1C engines, this AD also prohibits installation of these affected parts onto any LEAP-1A or LEAP-1C engine. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
85-11-05 R1: 85-11-05 R1 CESSNA: Amendment 39-5106. Applies to Cessna Model T303 (serial numbers T30300001 thru T30300315) airplanes certificated in all categories. Compliance: Required before further flight, unless already accomplished. To prevent possible flutter of the vertical stabilizer that could cause the loss of the vertical stabilizer and/or airplane control, accomplish the following: (a) Fabricate and install adjacent to the anti-ice system switches the following placard using letters of a minimum 0.10 inch in height: "FLIGHT INTO KNOWN ICING PROHIBITED" and operate the airplane in accordance with this limitation. (b) Insert a copy of this AD in front of the airplane limitation section in the Airplane Flight Manual. (c) The requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this AD may be accomplished by the holder of a pilot certificate issued under Part 61 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) on any airplane owned or operated by him. The person accomplishing these actions must make the appropriate aircraft maintenance record entry as prescribed by FAR 03.9. (d) The placard required in paragraph (a) may be removed and flight into known icing conducted for those airplanes on which the Cessna known icing equipment is installed (as listed in the Equipment List in the Airplane Flight Manual) when the rudder is modified in accordance with Cessna Multi-Engine Service Bulletin MEB85-7, Revision 1, dated June 28, 1985. (e) An equivalent means of compliance with this AD may be used if approved by the Manager, Aircraft Certification Office, Federal Aviation Administration, 1801 Airport Road, Room 100, Mid-Continent Airport, Wichita, Kansas 67209; Telephone (316) 946-4400. All persons affected by this directive may obtain copies of the documents referred to herein upon request to the Cessna Aircraft Company Customer Services, Post Office Box 1521, Wichita, Kansas 67201, or FAA, Office of the Regional Counsel, Room 1558, 601 East12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri 64106. This amendment becomes effective on July 31, 1985, to all persons except those to whom it has already been made effective by priority letter from the FAA dated May 31, 1985, and is identified as AD 85-11-05.
2025-03-04: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus Helicopters Model AS332L, AS332L1, AS 365 N3, SA-365C1, SA- 365C2, SA-365N, and SA-365N1 helicopters. This AD was prompted by a report that certain rescue hoist cable assemblies may be equipped with a defective ball end. This AD requires inspecting certain rescue hoist cable assemblies and, depending on the results, replacing the rescue hoist cable assembly. This AD also allows installing certain rescue hoist cable assemblies and certain rescue hoists provided its requirements are met. These actions are specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2015-19-51: We are publishing a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation Model S-76A, S-76B, S-76C, and S-76D helicopters, which was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of these helicopters. This AD requires inspecting the main rotor (M/R) and tail rotor (T/R) pushrod assemblies and the jamnuts, and applying slippage marks across the pushrod tubes and jamnuts. This AD is prompted by an accident of a Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation Model S-76C helicopter. During preliminary investigation, a failed pushrod assembly was identified. These actions are intended to prevent loss of M/R or T/R flight control and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
87-03-02: 87-03-02 SAAB FAIRCHILD: Amendment 39-5511. Applies to Model SF-340A series airplanes, serial numbers 03 through 044, certificated in any category. Compliance is required as indicated below, unless previously accomplished. To prevent partial loss of control as a result of an inoperative tail deicing system, accomplish the following: A. Within the next 90 days after the effective date of this AD, install a tail deicer valve heater blanket and its associated equipment in accordance with SAAB Fairchild Service Bulletin SF340-30-015, Revision 1, dated December 13, 1985. B. An alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. C. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of the modification required by this AD.All persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service document from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to SAAB Aircraft, Product Support AB, S-58188, Linkoping, Sweden. This document may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. This amendment becomes effective February 12, 1987.
2021-10-02: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Bombardier, Inc., Model BD-700-1A10 and BD-700-1A11 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports indicating that the left- and right-hand elevator torque tube bearings were contaminated with sand and corrosion, restricting free rotation. This AD requires repetitive general visual inspections of the left- and right-hand elevator torque tube bearings for any sand, dust, or corrosion; repetitive functional tests of the elevator control system; and replacement of the elevator torque tube bearings if necessary. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
92-01-04: 92-01-04 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-8127. Docket No. 91-NM-237-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model MD-11 series airplanes; equipped with McDonnell Douglas Electronic Systems Company Central Aural Warning System (CAWS), Part Number H05A0035-50 or Part Number H05A0035-51; certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo eliminate the loss of Autopilot Disconnect, Windshear, Altitude, Stabilizer in Motion, Radio Altitude, and Overspeed aural alerts, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tWithin 5 days after the effective date of this AD, and thereafter prior to the first flight of each day, with the aircraft power active, accomplish the following: \n\n\t\t(1)\tPosition or verify that CAWS circuit breakers B1-1018, B1-1381, and B1-1019 are closed. \n\n\t\t(2)\tCycle all three CAWS circuit breakers to the open position. Leave the circuit breakers open for a minimum of five seconds. \n\n\t\t(3)\tReturn all three circuit breakers to the closed position. \n\n\t(b)\tWithin 60 days after the effective date of this AD, replace the CAWS unit in accordance with McDonnell Douglas Alert Service Bulletin A31-18, dated November 11, 1991. Such replacement constitutes terminating action for the requirements of paragraph (a) of this AD. \n\n\t(c)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. The request shall be forwarded through an FAA Principal Avionics Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Los Angeles ACO. \n\n\t(d)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\t(e)\tThe replacement requirement of this AD shall be done in accordance with McDonnell Douglas Alert Service Bulletin A31-18, dated November 11, 1991. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California, 90846. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue S.W., Renton, Washington; at the Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3229 East Spring Street, Long Beach, California; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L Street N.W., Room 8401, Washington, D.C. \n\n\t(f)\tThis amendment (39-8127, AD 92-01-04) becomes effective on January 24, 1992.
96-26-05: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all Fokker Model F27 Mark 100, 200, 300, 400, 500, 600, and 700 series airplanes, that requires an inspection to detect cracking of the torque tube assembly of the left-hand (LH) elevator and surrounding structure; and to detect loose or sheared rivets in that assembly. This amendment also requires either replacement or repair of discrepant parts, as appropriate. This amendment is prompted by a report of fatigue cracking found on the torque tube support of the LH elevator. The actions specified by this AD are intended to ensure that cracking is detected and corrected in a timely manner so as to prevent failure of the torque tube or its support structure, which could result in reduced controllability of the airplane.
2015-20-12: We are superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 98-26-02 for certain Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation (Sikorsky) Model S-61A, D, E, L, N, NM, R, and V helicopters. AD 98-26-02 required determining whether the main rotor shaft (MRS) was used in repetitive external lift (REL) operations, performing a nondestructive inspection (NDI) for cracks, replacing any unairworthy MRS, and establishing retirement lives for each REL MRS. This new AD retains some of the requirements of AD 98-26- 02 but determines a new retirement life for each MRS, expands the applicability to include additional helicopters, and requires removing from service any MRS with oversized dowel pin bores. This AD was prompted by the manufacturer's reevaluation of the retirement life for the MRS based on torque, ground-air-ground (GAG) cycle, and fatigue testing. We are issuing this AD to prevent MRS structural failure, loss of power to the main rotor, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
86-14-09: 86-14-09 BRITISH AEROSPACE AVIATION GROUP: Amendment 39-5348. Applies to all Model BAe HS 748 airplanes on which Modification 6909 has not been incorporated, certificated in any category. Compliance is required within the next 500 flight hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, unless accomplished within the last 500 flight hours time-in-service, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 1000 flight hours time-in-service. To prevent the loss of autofeather capability, accomplish the following: A. Inspect the microswitch rocker arm assemblies in accordance with BAe Service Bulletin 76/15, Revision 3, dated November 1983. Replace any cracked rocker arm assemblies prior to further flight. B. The installation of modified rocker arm assemblies, in accordance with BAe Service Bulletin 76/15, Revision 3, dated November 1983, terminates the requirement for the inspection called for in paragraph A., above. C. An alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. D. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of inspections and/or modifications required by this AD. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service document from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to British Aerospace, Inc., Librarian, Box 17414, Dulles International Airport, Washington, D.C. 20041. This document may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. This amendment becomes effective August 4, 1986.
89-11-07: 89-11-07 McDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-6222. \n\n\tApplicability: McDonnell Douglas Model DC-6, -6A, -6B, R6D, C-118A (Military), and DC-7 series airplanes, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo detect stress corrosion cracks and to prevent failure of the wing center spar main landing gear fittings, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tWithin one month after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the last five months, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 500 hours time-in-service or one year, whichever occurs first, perform a dye penetrant inspection of the wing center spar main landing gear fittings around the bore and up to the wing lower skin, paying particular attention to the milled pocket in the outboard fitting, in accordance with Douglas Rework Drawing SR 06578001, "NC." After each inspection, apply LPS-3 corrosion inhibiting oil or equivalent to each fitting. After thefirst dye penetrant inspection, later inspections may be accomplished by using the following procedure: \n\n\t\t1.\tClean the LPS-3 using the best available cleanser, \n\n\t\t2.\tConduct a dye penetrant inspection, and, if unsuccessful, \n\n\t\t3.\tConduct a visual inspection. \n\n\tB.\tIf a crack is found as a result of the inspection required by paragraph A., above, prior to further flight, accomplish the following: \n\n\t\t1.\tIf a crack is found inside the recessed pocket areas, perform an eddy current inspection to determine if the crack extends above or below the recessed pocket areas. \n\n\t\t2.\tIf cracks are found inside the recessed pocket areas which are within the limits shown on McDonnell Douglas Rework Drawing SR 06578001, "NC," dated July 25, 1988, accomplish the trimout rework in accordance with that drawing. For a period of one year thereafter, conduct inspections in accordance with paragraph A. at intervals not to exceed three months. Thereafter, conduct inspections at intervals not to exceed 500 hours time-in-service or one year, whichever occurs first. \n\n\t\t3.\tIf cracks are found in the main landing gear cylinder bore or cracks are found which extend beyond the rework limits shown on McDonnell Douglas Rework Drawing SR 06578001,"NC," dated July 25, 1988, replace the fitting(s) with airworthy parts prior to further flight. If cracked fittings are replaced with new fittings made from 7075-T6 forging material, inspect the fittings in accordance with paragraph A., above, within 60 months after installation and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 12 months. \n\n\tC.\tInstallation of new fittings made of 7050-T7452 hand forging material constitutes terminating action for the inspections required by this AD. \n\n\tD.\tAn alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), who will either concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tE.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a base to comply with the repair requirement of this AD when approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to the McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Director of Publications, C1-LOO (54-60). These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or at the Los Angeles Aircraft CertificationOffice, 3229 East Spring Street, Long Beach, California. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6222, AD 89-11-07) becomes effective on June 23, 1989.
2019-14-13: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all The Boeing Company Model 767-200, -300, -300F, and -400ER series airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of uncommanded fore/aft movements of the Captain's and First Officer's seats. This AD requires an identification of the part number, and if applicable the serial number, of the Captain's and First Officer's seats, and applicable on- condition actions. This AD also requires a one-time detailed inspection and repetitive checks of the horizontal movement system of the Captain's and First Officer's seats, and applicable on-condition actions. This AD also provides an optional terminating action for the repetitive checks of the horizontal movement system for certain airplanes. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
74-24-04: 74-24-04 LOCKHEED: Amendment 39-2015. Applies to all Model 382 series airplanes, Serial Numbers 3946 and 4101 through 4298, certificated in all categories, except those airplanes which have been modified in accordance with STC ST441SO, or equivalent. Compliance required within the next 200 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To prevent cracks in the lower center wing section, modify the wing in accordance with Lockheed Service Bulletin 382-121, or later FAA approved revision, or an equivalent approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Southern Region. This amendment becomes effective November 20, 1974.
2015-21-07: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus Model A330-200, A330-200 Freighter, A330-300, A340-200, A340- 300, A340-500, and A340-600 series airplanes. This AD requires a detailed inspection of the girt installation of each escape slide and slide raft, and corrective action if necessary. This AD was prompted by a report of incorrect installation of the girt panel on passenger doors and an incorrectly installed quick release (girt) bar into the [[Page 63081]] girt panel of the slide raft. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct incorrect girt installation of the escape slide and slide raft, which could prevent slide deployment during an emergency, and result in reduced evacuation capacity from the airplane and possible injury to occupants.