Results
2001-12-22: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9-81, -82, -83, and -87 series airplanes, and MD-88 airplanes, that requires revising the wiring of the selective calling (SELCAL) system. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent inadvertent very high frequency transmissions and subsequent loss of radio communications for airplane and/or airport operations; and to prevent inadvertent high frequency transmissions and subsequent electrical shock to ground service personnel and/or damage to the airplane during fueling operations or fuel tank maintenance. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
57-03-04: 57-03-04 MARTIN: Applies to All Models 202, 202A, and 404 Aircraft. Compliance recommended at the next engine change or airplane overhaul but required not later than April 1, 1958, except that compliance with item 7 shall be required not later than July 1, 1958. Results of investigation of an accident involving an uncontrolled zone III fire and of several incidents involving combustion heater system malfunctioning indicate the necessity of improving the fire-resistant qualities of certain parts in the nacelle area and increasing the margin of safety of the combustion heater control systems. The following modifications are required to accomplish these ends: 1. Replace anti-icing heater ram air ducts in the nacelles (at least up to the air damper) with fireproof ducting material or lag or coat the aluminum ducting to materially retard the time of burn through. 2. Lag, with fireproof material, the exposed portion in zone III (in front of forward spar) of the fuelline from the selector valve to the tank. 3. Fire detector coverage shall be provided in the detector system in at least the following areas of each nacelle if not previously installed: (a) On aft side of firewall in the vicinity of the pressure transmitters. (b) On outboard side of nacelle between the two electrical junction boxes. (c) On inboard side of nacelle in area of the main fuel supply strainer. (d) On forward side of front spar at the fuel selector valve. (e) On the inboard and outboard sides of the nacelle at Station 434.2 and approximately 20 inches circumferentially from the nacelle top center line. 4. Make following changes in anti-icing heater fuel supply and control system. (Applicable to 202 and 202A aircraft only.) Aluminum tubing in zone III replaced with steel. Install new fuel supply tap points with restrictors. Provide an additional solenoid fuel shutoff valve in series hydraulically in parallel electrically with existing cycling control valve in fuel control box (each heater). Circuitry of present low heat warning light revised to indicate overheat warning. Overheat lockout circuit added. Material of cover attaching clips in each fuel control box changed to steel. 5. Install firebell similar to that in Model 404. (Applicable to 202 and 202A aircraft only.) 6. Make following changes in cabin heater fuel supply and control systems. (Applicable to 202 and 202A aircraft only.) Aluminum tubing within boundaries of nacelles replaced with steel. Material of cover attaching clips in each fuel control box changed to steel. Overheat lockout circuit added. 7. Make following changes in anti-icing and cabin heater fuel supply and control systems. (Applicable to 404 aircraft only.) Add an additional solenoid control valve (in series hydraulically and in parallel electrically) in anti-icing and cabin heater fuel control boxes. Change material of cover attaching clips in each fuelcontrol box to steel. 8. The fire emergency procedure and flight manual shall be changed to provide for actuation of the fuel selector to shut off the fuel and crossfeed early in the emergency sequence, immediately prior to or after closing the firewall shutoff valve. The following Martin Service Instruction Letters cover acceptable methods of compliance with these modifications: Nos. 202/202A-40 and 404-72 cover item 1; Nos. 202/202A-42 and -42A cover item 4; No. 202/202A-43 covers item 5; Nos. 202/202A-45 and - 45A cover item 6; Nos. 404-74 and -74A cover item 7.
2016-19-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 747-100, 747-100B, 747-100B SUD, 747-200B, 747-200C, 747-200F, 747-300, 747-400, 747-400D, 747-400F, 747SR, and 747SP series airplanes. This AD was prompted by several reports of chafing of the wire bundles inside the electrical conduit of the forward and aft boost pumps of the numbers 1 and 4 main fuel tanks due to high vibration. These wire bundles can chafe through the wire sleeving into the insulation, exposing the wire conductors. This AD requires replacing the wire bundles inside the electrical conduit of the forward and aft boost pumps of the numbers 1 and 4 main fuel tanks with new, improved wire bundles inserted into conduit liners. This AD also requires adding a revision to the maintenance or inspection program, as applicable, to include critical design configuration control limitations (CDCCLs) for the fuel boost pump wiring. We are issuing this AD to prevent chafing of the wirebundles and subsequent arcing between the wiring and the electrical conduit creating an ignition source in the fuel tanks, which could result in a fire and consequent fuel tank explosion.
2016-18-16: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all The Boeing Company Model 737-100, -200, -200C, -300, -400, and -500 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer. This AD requires installing an automatic shutoff system for the center and auxiliary tank fuel boost pumps, as applicable; installing a placard in the airplane flight deck if necessary; replacing the P5-2 fuel system module assembly; installing the ''uncommanded ON'' (UCO) protection system for the fuel boost pumps; revising the airplane flight manual (AFM) to advise the flight crew of certain operating restrictions for airplanes equipped with an automatic shutoff system; and revising the maintenance program by incorporating new airworthiness limitations for fuel tank systems to satisfy Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 88 requirements. We are issuing this AD to prevent operation of the center and auxiliary tank fuel boost pumps with continuous low pressure, which could lead to friction sparks or overheating in the fuel pump inlet that could create a potential ignition source inside the center and auxiliary fuel tanks. These conditions, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.
2001-12-19: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), that is applicable to Turbomeca S.A. Artouste II and Artouste III series turboshaft engines. This amendment requires installation of modification TU 24, TU 167, or TU 164, depending on the specific engine series. These modifications will prevent uncommanded partial closing or total closing of the electrical fuel cock, which will prevent uncommanded in-flight engine shutdown. From the effective date of this AD, and until the modification is installed, this amendment will also limit the duration of the engine operating cycle. This amendment is prompted by reports of unexpected power loss during test flights. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent unexpected power loss, which could result in an uncommanded in-flight engine shutdown, autorotation, and forced landing.
87-24-51 R1: 87-24-51 R1 SAAB-FAIRCHILD: Amendment 39-5822 as amended by Amendment 39- 5894. Applies to all Model SF-340A series airplanes, certificated in any category. Compliance is required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. To prevent a reduction in airplane controllability or propeller/engine overspeed due to sheared engine power control cable pins, accomplish the following: A. Prior to the accumulation of 25 flight hours time-in-service after the effective date of this amendment, unless accomplished within the last 175 flight hours time-in-service, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 200 flight hours time-in-service, inspect the engine power control cables, part numbers C82146-1 or C82146-2, located between the hydro mechanical engine control units and the propeller control units, for axial play, in accordance SAAB Service Bulletin SF340-76A-024, Revision 2, dated February 15, 1988. B. If axial play is detected during the inspection required by paragraph A., above, replace the cable with an airworthy cable assembly prior to further flight, and repeat the inspections required by paragraph A. at intervals not to exceed 200 flight hours time-in-service. C. An alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety and which has the concurrence of an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, may be used when approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. D. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of the requirements of this AD. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service document from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to SAAB Scania, Product Support, S-58188, Linkoping, Sweden. This document may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. TAD 87-24-51 was issued November 17, 1987, and became effective upon receipt. Amendment 39-5822 became effective January 27, 1988. This Amendment, 39-5894, becomes effective May 2, 1988.
2001-12-24: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Bombardier Model CL-600-2B19 series airplanes, that currently requires repetitive ultrasonic inspection to detect damage of the actuator lugs of the flight spoiler center hinge; and corrective action, if necessary. This amendment mandates the previously optional terminating action by requiring replacement of the flight spoilers with new improved spoilers. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent uncommanded deployment of a flight spoiler, which could result in reduced controllability of the airplane. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition. The incorporation by reference of certain publications, as listed in the regulations, was approved previously by the Director of the Federal Register as of March 1, 2001 (66 FR 10187).
83-14-09: 83-14-09 EMBRAER: Amendment 39-4692. Applies to Models EMB-110P1 and EMB-110P2 (S/N 110001 through 110386, 110388 through 110397, 110399 through 110401, 110404 through 110408, 110410 through 110412, 110414, 110415 and 110421) airplanes certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To preclude structural failure of the horizontal stabilizer front attachment and fuselage bulkhead 33, accomplish the following: a) Within the next 50 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 500 hours time-in-service, except as provided in paragraph b) of this AD, visually inspect: 1) The rivets (MS20470AD4) that attach the "C" channels (P/N 4A-1419- 05/06/07/08) to the upper and lower flanges of the "U" shaped machined parts (P/N 4A-1411-07- 16/17) for looseness (see Figure 2, EMBRAER Service Bulletin ((SB)) No. 110-53-019, hereinafter referred to as the SB). 2) The rivets (MS20470AD3) that attach the fuselage skin to the "C" channels described in paragraph a) 1) above and the two lower adjacent channels for looseness (see Figure 3 of the SB). 3) The web or flange areas of bulkhead 33 adjacent to the horizontal stabilizer front fittings, at each side of the fuselage for cracks (see Figure 2, Section C-C of the SB). b) If loose rivets are found during any inspection required by paragraph a)1) above, in either the upper or lower "C" channel attachments, repeat the inspections in paragraph a) of the AD at intervals not to exceed 125 hours time-in-service until not more than 500 hours time-in- service is accumulated, at which time replace all five rivets (MS20470AD4) in the flange having the loose rivets with Hi-Lock rivets HL-22-77-5-4 or AN3-5A bolts. If loose rivets are found during any inspection required by paragraph a) 2) above, in both the upper and lower "C" channels, prior to further flight replace the rivets. The detailed rivet replacement is shown in Figure 3 of the SB. Accomplish the repetitive inspections of those flanges in which rivets have been replaced at intervals not to exceed 500 hours time-in-service until the "C" channel attachments are reinforced in accordance with the procedures shown in Figure 4 of the SB. c) If cracks are found during any inspection required by paragraph a)3) of this AD, accomplish the following: 1) If cracks are less than 3 inches, repeat the repetitive visual inspections at intervals not to exceed 125 hours time-in-service until not more than 1000 hours time-in-service is accumulated, at which time repair bulkhead 33 in accordance with Figure 5 of the SB, reinforce the "C" channel attachments, and replace the rivets of the horizontal stabilizer front attachment structure in accordance with Figure 4 of the SB if not previously accomplished. If possible, stop drill the crack ends. 2) If cracks are 3 inches or longer, prior to further flight, repair bulkhead 33web in accordance with Figure 5 of the SB, reinforce the "C" channel attachments, and replace the rivets of the horizontal stabilizer front attachment structure in accordance with Figure 4 of the SB. 3) If the horizontal stablilizer forward attachment fitting (P/N 110-1411-07- 29) rides on the corner of the reinforcing plate (P/N 4A-1419-09), remove excess material from the upper inboard corner of the reinforcing plate (P/N 4A-1419-09), to provide for a proper fit. d) If no cracks are found in the bulkhead 33 web during any inspection required by paragraph a)3) of this AD, the repetitive inspections of that paragraph are no longer required when the "C" channel attachments are reinforced and the rivets of the horizontal stabilizer front attachment are replaced in accordance with the procedures shown on Figure 4 of the SB. e) The repetitive inspections required by paragraphs b) and c) of this AD are no longer required when the bulkhead 33 web is repaired in accordance with Figure 5 of the SB and the "C" channel attachments are reinforced and the horizontal stabilizer front attachment rivets are replaced in accordance with Figure 4 of the SB. f) The intervals between the repetitive inspections required by this AD may be adjusted up to 10 percent of the specified interval to allow accomplishing these inspections concurrent with other scheduled maintenance of the airplane. g) Aircraft may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a location where this (AD) can be accomplished. h) An equivalent method of compliance with this AD may be used if approved by the Manager, Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office, ACE-115A, 1075 Inner Loop Road, College Park, Georgia 30337; telephone (404) 763-7428. This amendment becomes effective July 27, 1983.
2016-19-10: We are superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2000-10-18 for certain Airbus Model A300 series airplanes; Model A300 B4-600, B4-600R, F4-600R series airplanes, and Model A300 C4-605R Variant F airplanes (collectively called Model A300-600 series airplanes); and Model A310 series airplanes. AD 2000-10-18 required repetitive inspections to detect cracks in the lower spar of the engine pylons between ribs 6 and 7, and repair if necessary. This new AD reduces the compliance times for the initial inspection and the repetitive intervals. This AD was prompted by the determination that the compliance times for the initial inspection and the repetitive intervals must be reduced to allow timely detection of cracks in the engine pylon's lower spar between ribs 6 and 7. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct fatigue cracking, which could result in reduced structural integrity of the engine pylon's lower spar, and possible separation of the engine from the airplane.
2001-12-15: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model MD-90-30 series airplanes, that requires revising the wiring of the selective calling (SELCAL) system. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent inadvertent very high frequency transmissions and subsequent loss of radio communications for airplane and/or airport operations; and to prevent inadvertent high frequency transmissions and subsequent electrical shock to ground service personnel and/or damage to the airplane during fueling operations or fuel tank maintenance. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
91-05-12: 91-05-12 AIRBUS INDUSTRIE: Amendment 39-6914. Docket No. 90-NM-158-AD. Applicability: All Model A300 series airplanes, equipped with one or more trimmable horizontal stabilizer (THS) attachment lugs made from 2014 material, certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. To detect cracks and corrosion in the THS attachment lugs at Frame 91 and to prevent reduced structural integrity of the horizontal stabilizer attachment, accomplish the following: A. Prior to the accumulation of 1,200 landings, or within 90 days after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, unless previously accomplished within the last 1,200 landings, perform a visual and eddy current inspection of all attachment lugs made from 2014 material, in accordance with Airbus Industrie Service Bulletin A300-53-269, dated December 18, 1989. Repeat these inspections thereafter at intervals not to exceed 1,200 landings. NOTE: Attachment lugs made from 7075 material are not affected by this AD. B. If cracks or corrosion are detected, prior to further flight, repair or replace the affected lugs in accordance with Airbus Industrie Service Bulletin A300-53-269, dated December 18, 1989. C. Installation of Modification No. 7715/D7222, in accordance with Airbus Industrie Service Bulletin A300-53-270, Revision 1, dated February 22, 1990, or Revision 2, dated August 27, 1990, constitutes terminating action for the repetitive inspections required by paragraph A. of this AD. D. An alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. NOTE: The request should be submitted directly to the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, and a copy sent to the cognizant FAA Principal Inspector (PI). The PI will then forward comments or concurrence to the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113. E. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Airbus Industrie, Airbus Support Division, Avenue Didier Daurat, 31700 Blagnac, France. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue S.W., Renton, Washington. This amendment (39-6914, AD 91-05-12) becomes effective on April 1, 1991.
97-05-05: 97-05-05 DORNIER: Amendment 39-9949. Docket 96-NM-116-AD. Applicability: Model 328-100 series airplanes having serial numbers 3005 through 3014 inclusive; certificated in any category. NOTE 1: This AD applies to each airplane identified in the preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been otherwise modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the requirements of this AD. For airplanes that have been modified, altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of this AD is affected, the owner/operator must request approval for an alternative method of compliance in accordance with paragraph (b) of this AD. The request should include an assessment of the effect of the modification, alteration, or repair on the unsafe condition addressed by this AD; and, if the unsafe condition has not been eliminated, the request should include specific proposed actions to address it. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. To prevent failure of the diagonal braces that connect the left and right wings to the fuselage, which could result in unstable movement of the wings and adversely affect the aerodynamic characteristics of the wings, accomplish the following: (a) Within 90 days after the effective date of this AD, perform the actions required by paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) of this AD. (1) Check the clearance between the diagonal braces that connect the left and right wings to the fuselage and the Z-profile of the frame to which the top fairing is attached, in accordance with Dornier Service Bulletin SB-328-53-051, dated August 16, 1994. (i) If the clearance meets or exceeds the minimum limits specified in the service bulletin, no further action is required by paragraph (a)(1) of this AD. (ii) If the clearance is less than the minimum limits specified in the service bulletin, prior to further flight, modify the Z-profile of the frame to which the top fairing is attached, in accordance with the service bulletin. (2) Check each diagonal brace for damage or wear, in accordance with the service bulletin. (i) If no damage or wear is detected, no further action is required by paragraph (a)(2) of this AD. (ii) If any damage or wear is detected, prior to further flight, repair the diagonal brace in accordance with a method approved by the Manager Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. (b) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113. NOTE 2: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Standardization Branch, ANM-113. (c) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. (d) The actions shall be done in accordance with Dornier Service Bulletin SB-328-53-051, dated August 16, 1994. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. Copies may be obtained from Dornier Luftfahrt GmbH, P.O. Box 1103, D-82230 Wessling, Germany. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC. (e) This amendment becomes effective on April 3, 1997.
2016-19-08: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Viking Air Limited Models DHC-2 Mk. I, DHC-2 Mk. II, and DHC-2 Mk. III airplanes. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and [[Page 64054]] correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as corrosion of the elevator control rod and of the elevator actuating lever on the control column. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct corrosion and/or cracking of the elevator control rod assemblies and the elevator actuating lever, which if not detected and corrected, could cause these components to fail. This failure could result in loss of control.
2010-23-22: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the Eurocopter Model AS332L2 helicopters. This AD results from a mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) AD issued by the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Community. The MCAI AD states that a hard landing occurred during in-flight engine failure (one engine inoperative (OEI)) training. An examination revealed the failure of the right-hand main reduction gear module (module) freewheel unit due to excessive wear on some of its components. The MCAI AD prohibits engine failure OEI training with helicopters on which certain main gearbox (MGB) modules with certain freewheel shafts are installed and mandates the replacement of those modules. The actions are intended to prevent failure of certain freewheel units, loss of power to the main rotor system, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
2001-01-52 R1: This amendment rescinds an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to Bell Helicopter Textron Canada (BHTC) Model 407 helicopters and currently requires, before further flight, imposing never exceed velocity (Vne) restrictions on the helicopter. The requirements of that AD were intended to prevent tail rotor blades from striking the tailboom, separation of the aft section of the tailboom with the tail rotor gearbox and vertical fin, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter. That AD was prompted by an accident suspected of being the result of a tail rotor strike caused by high airspeed. Since the issuance of that AD, accident investigation findings have not substantiated that a tail rotor strike caused by high airspeed was the cause of the accident. This amendment rescinds that AD. This amendment is prompted by the FAA's determination that the Vne restrictions and accompanying actions imposed by that AD do not correct an unsafe condition.
2016-19-07: We are superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2008-19-08, for all Dassault Aviation Model Falcon 10 airplanes. AD 2008-19-08 required repetitive replacement of the flexible hoses installed in the wing (slat) anti-icing system with new hoses. This new AD requires reducing the life limit of these flexible hoses, which reduces the repetitive replacement intervals. This AD was prompted by additional reports of collapse of the flexible hoses installed in the slat anti- icing systems on airplanes equipped with new, improved hoses. We are issuing this AD to prevent collapse of the flexible hoses in the slat anti-icing system, which could lead to insufficient anti-icing capability and, if icing is encountered in this situation, could result in reduced controllability of the airplane.
2016-18-18: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Agusta S.p.A. (Agusta) Model A109A, A109A II, A109C, A109E, A109K2, A109S, and AW109SP helicopters. This AD requires visually inspecting the tail rotor drive shaft assembly (drive shaft) for a crack. This AD was prompted by the discovery of three cracks on the drive shaft of a Model A109S helicopter. The actions of this AD are intended to detect a crack on the drive shaft to prevent failure of the driveshaft, failure of the tail rotor, and subsequent loss of helicopter control.
2005-14-09: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Rolls-Royce plc (RR) models RB211 Trent 768-60, Trent 772-60, and Trent 772B-60 turbofan engines. This AD requires removal of certain Engine Electronic Controller (EEC) part numbers from service. This AD results from nine reports of loss of engine parameters displayed in the airplane cockpit, with the simultaneous loss of capability to change thrust of the affected engine. We are issuing this AD to prevent loss of airplane control after an aborted takeoff due to asymmetric thrust.
98-09-26: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain Dassault Model Falcon 2000 series airplanes. This action requires revising the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) to provide the flightcrew with procedures for monitoring and properly setting the fuel booster pump pressure; and repetitive visual inspections of the fuel lines to detect fatigue cracking and fuel leakage. This action also requires a one-time inspection of the fuel lines to detect cracking, replacement of any discrepant part with a new part, and installation of new brackets between the pressure switch and the fuel pump of the numbers 1 and 2 engines, which constitutes terminating action for the repetitive inspections and the AFM revision. This amendment is prompted by issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent fatigue cracking of the fuel line at the pressure switch pickoff point, which could result in fuel leakage and potential engine fire.
2016-18-14: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain ATR--GIE Avions de Transport R[eacute]gional Model ATR42-500 and Model ATR72-212A airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report indicating that interference occurred between a Type III Emergency Exit door and the surrounding passenger cabin furnishing during a production check. This AD requires measuring the gap between the Type III Emergency Exit doors and certain overhead stowage compartment fittings; removing certain fittings from the overhead stowage compartments and measuring the gap between the Type III Emergency Exit doors and the overhead stowage compartment hooks, if necessary; re-installing or repairing, as applicable, the Type III Emergency Exit doors; and modifying the overhead stowage compartments. We are issuing this AD to prevent interference between a Type III Emergency Exit door and the overhead stowage compartment fitting installed on the rail, which could result in obstructed opening of a Type IIIEmergency Exit door during an emergency evacuation.
2010-23-19: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Two cases of main landing gear (MLG) failure to fully extend have been reported. An MLG failing to extend may result in an unsafe asymmetric landing configuration. Preliminary investigation has shown that interference between the MLG door and the MLG fairing seal prevented the MLG door from opening. * * * * * The unsafe condition is possible loss of controllability of the airplane during landing. This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
62-05-02: 62-05-02 BRANTLY: Amdt. 402 Part 507 Federal Register February 28, 1962. Applies to All Model B-2 Helicopters With Serial Numbers Prior to 180. Compliance required within the next 25 hours' time in service after the effective date of this directive. To preclude failure of the seals in the engine driven fuel pump due to excessively high temperature conditions in the engine compartment, modify the engine driven fuel pump, Lear- Romec Model RD7790D3, to incorporate high temperature seals in accordance with Brantly Service Bulletin No. 16 and Lear-Romec Service Bulletin No. 3. Reidentify modified units by revising the pump nameplate as follows: (a) Add suffix "-3" to the pump serial number. (b) Change pump model number to "RG7790G". (Brantly Service Bulletin No. 16 and Lear-Romec Service Bulletin No. 3 both cover this same subject.) This directive effective February 28, 1962.
77-14-03: 77-14-03 SOCIETE NATIONAL INDUSTRIELLE AEROSPATIALE (formerly SUD AVIATION): Amendment 39-295l. Applies to Alouette III Helicopter Model SE 3160 and SA 316B, certificated in all categories. Compliance is required within the next 100 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished in accordance with Alouette Service Bulletin No. 05.38, as revised June 14, 1971. To prevent possible binding of the tail rotor directional control, either replace the Houdaille type AV4S2 hydraulic damper with type AV4S3, or modify the type AV4S2 hydraulic damper by incorporating Houdaille Kit 10.338, in accordance with subparagraph 1C(2)(b) of Alouette Service Bulletin 05.38 as revised June 14, 1971, or equivalent approved by the Chief, Aircraft Certification Staff, FAA, Europe, Africa, and Middle East Region, c/o American Embassy, A.P.O. New York, N.Y. 09667. This amendment becomes effective August 1, 1977.
87-12-09 R1: 87-12-09 R1 SOCATA GROUPE AEROSPATIALE: Amendment 39-5650 as revised by Amendment 39-6224. Applicability: Models TB 20 and TB 21 (Serial Numbers 275 through 700) airplanes certificated in any category. Compliance: Required within the next 50 hours time-in-service (TIS) after the effective date of this AD, and each 100 hours TIS thereafter, unless already accomplished in accordance with the original issuance of AD 87-12-09. To prevent structural failure of the aileron, possible flutter, and loss of control, accomplish the following: (a) Visually inspect the five aileron balance weight attachment rivets for any detectable looseness, and the aileron skin for cracks using the procedures described in paragraph A, SOCATA TB Service Bulletin (S/B) No. 28, dated December 1986. (1) If one or more loose rivets, or cracks extending less than 9/16 inch (15 mm) from the center of the rivet is found, prior to further flight, repair as described in paragraph B of SOCATA TB AircraftS/B No. 28, dated December 1986. (2) If a crack 9/16 inch or longer from the center of the rivet is found, prior to further flight, replace the P/N TB 20.15.001.000 aileron with P/N TB 20.15.001.001 or P/N TB 20.15.001.002 aileron as applicable. (b) The repetitive inspections specified in this AD are no longer required when the ailerons have been repaired or replaced per the actions specified in either paragraph (a)(1), or (a)(2) above. (c) Airplanes may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a location where this AD may be accomplished. (d) An equivalent means of compliance with this AD may be used if approved by the Manager, Brussels Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, AEU-100, Europe, Africa, and Middle East Office, c/o American Embassy, B-1000 Brussels, Belgium; Telephone (322) 513.38.30. All persons affected by this directive may obtain copies of document(s) referred to herein upon request to SOCATA Groupe AEROSPATIALE, B.P. 38, 65001 Tarbes, France; Telephone 62.51.73.00 or 62.93.99.45 (for recorder); or the Product Support Manager, U.S., AEROSPATIALE, 2701 Forum Drive, Grand Prairie, Texas, 75053; Telephone (214) 641-3614; or may examine these documents referred to herein at the FAA, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, Room 1558, 601 East 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri 64106. This AD revises AD 87-12-09, Amendment 39-5650, which became effective on June 26, 1987. This amendment (39-6224, AD 87-12-09 R1) becomes effective on June 25, 1989.
2010-23-11: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: The manufacturer has informed Transport Canada that a certain number of the resolver stators, which were installed in the angle of attack (AOA) transducers, were not cleaned correctly. This condition can degrade the AOA transducer performance at low temperatures resulting in freezing of the AOA transducer resolver, which may provide inaccurate AOA data to the Stall Protection System (SPS). If not corrected, this condition can result in early or late activation of the stick shaker and/or stick pusher. These conditions could result in reduced ability of the flight crew to maintain a safe flight and landing of the airplane. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.