Results
2012-01-11: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Cirrus Design Corporation (Cirrus) Model SR22T airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of partial loss of engine power due to a dislodged rubber gasket/seal being ingested into the turbocharger. This AD requires inspection and modification of the air box flange welds and slots and installation of induction system air box seals as applicable. We are issuing this AD to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
81-26-01 R1: 81-26-01 R1 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS HELICOPTER COMPANY (MDHC): Amendment 39-4275 as revised by Amendment 39-6689. Docket No. 89-ASW-43. Applicability: All Model 369 series helicopters equipped with main rotor drive shaft, part number (P/N) 369D25510, certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent failure of the main rotor drive shaft, P/N 369D25510, which could result in the loss of the helicopter, accomplish the following: (a) Prior to the accumulation of 300 hours' total time in service on the P/N 369D25510 drive shaft, or within the next 25 hours' additional time in service from December 17, 1981, for the Model 369D or from the effective date of this amended AD for Models 369E and F (whichever occurs later), and thereafter at repetitive intervals not to exceed 300 hours' additional time in service since the last such inspection: (1) Visually inspect the spherical spline and adjacent shaft area of thedrive shaft, P/N 369D25510, in accordance with the instructions contained in Hughes Service Information Notices (SIN) DN-99, dated November 30, 1981; FN-4, dated July 29, 1983; or MDHC SIN EN- 4, dated April 29, 1983, as applicable. (2) Replace cracked parts with like serviceable part prior to return to service and continue to inspect at 300-hour intervals. NOTE: Drive shaft retirement is established at 3,410 hours' time in service. (3) Drive shaft retirement is established at 3,410 hours' time in service for Models 369F and FF, and 5,020 hours' time in service for Models 369D and E. (b) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate aircraft to a base for the accomplishment of inspections or modifications required by this AD. (c) An alternative method of compliance, which provides an equivalent level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, ANM-100L, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 3229 East Spring Street, Long Beach, California 90806-2425; telephone (213) 988-5200. The repair and inspection procedures shall be done in accordance with Hughes Service Information Notices (SIN) DN-99, dated November 30, 1981, incorporated by reference (See 46 FR 60807, December 14, 1981); FN-4, dated July 29, 1983; or MDHC SIN EN-4, dated April 29, 1983, as applicable. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Company, 5000 E. McDowell Road, Attention: Publications Department, MS 543/P 213, Mesa, Arizona 85205. Copies may be inspected at the Regional Rules Docket, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, Federal Aviation Administration, 4400 Blue Mound Road, Room 158, Bldg. 3B, Fort Worth, Texas, or at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L Street, NW., Room 8301, Washington, DC. Airworthiness Directive 81-26-01 R1 revises AD 81-26-01, Amendment 39-4275 (46 FR 60807, December 14, 1981). This amendment (39-6689), AD 81-26-01 R1) becomes effective on October 31, 1990.
2025-08-05: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus SAS Model A319-111, -112, -113, -114, -115, -131, -132, and -133 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a widespread fatigue damage (WFD) scenario review for a certification project that indicated several cracks found around the potable water and wastewater service panels were WFD instead of typical fatigue. This AD requires modification of the potable water and wastewater service panels, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2018-03-22: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for GE Aviation Czech s.r.o. M601D-11, M601E-11, M601E-11A, M601E-11AS, M601E- 11S, and M601F turboprop engines. This AD requires removal of certain power turbine (PT) disks installed on the affected engines. This AD was prompted by a design review by the manufacturer that determined PT rotors with certain disks have less overspeed margin than originally stated during product certification. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2003-05-10: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), that is applicable to General Electric Company (GE) CF34-3A1, -3B, and -3B1 turbofan engines with scavenge screens part numbers (P/Ns) 4047T95P01 and 5054T86G02 installed in the B-sump oil scavenge system. That AD currently requires initial and repetitive visual inspections and cleaning of the B-sump scavenge screens. This amendment requires initial and repetitive visual inspections and cleaning of the B-sump scavenge screens until a screenless fitting is installed. This amendment is prompted by six reports of B-sump oil scavenge system failure causing engine in-flight shutdowns. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent B-sump scavenge screen blockage due to coking, which could result in ignition of B-sump oil in the secondary air system, fan drive shaft separation, and uncontained engine failure.
2003-05-05: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain Robert E. Rust (R.E. Rust) Models DeHavilland DH.C1 Chipmunk 21, 22, and 22A airplanes. This AD requires you to inspect the fuselage to determine if a steel fuselage center-section tie bar fitted with bushings in the end lug bolt holes is installed. If this bushed steel fuselage center-section tie bar is installed, this AD decreases the safe life limit. This AD is the result of reports that certain replacement steel fuselage center-section tie bars installed on the affected airplanes could fail before the originally published safe life limit. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent early failure of these bushed steel fuselage center-section tie bars, which could result in reduced structural integrity of the wings. Such a condition could lead to loss of control of the airplane.
98-11-01: This amendment supersedes Airworthiness Directive (AD) 97-23-04, which currently requires replacing the fuel tank vent valves with modified fuel tank vent valves on certain Pilatus Aircraft Ltd. (Pilatus) Models PC-12 and PC-12/45 airplanes. This AD retains the fuel tank vent valves replacement required by AD 97-23-04, and requires drilling a 4.8 millimeter (0.1875 inch) hole in each fuel filler cap. This AD also requires inserting a temporary revision in the Pilot's Operating Handbook (POH) that specifies checking to assure that the fuel filler cap hole is clear of ice and foreign objects. This AD is the result of mandatory continued airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the airworthiness authority for Switzerland. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent the fuel tank inward vent valve from freezing, which, if followed by a cold soak at altitude, could result in wing airfoil distortion and structural damage with consequent degradation of the airplane's handling qualities.
2003-05-06: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain Robert E. Rust (R.E. Rust) Models DeHavilland DH.C1 Chipmunk 21, 22, and 22A airplanes. This AD requires you to check the airplane logbook to determine whether certain modifications have been incorporated on the airplane and incorporate the modifications that have not already been accomplished. This AD is the result of the manufacturer performing a design study on the structural integrity of certain parts and reports of service failure of other parts installed on the affected airplanes. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent reduced structural integrity in the primary structure of the airplane, which could result in failure of the rudder torque tube, elevator fasteners, and the vertical fin rear spar, or jamming or damage to the elevator. Such failures could lead to loss of control of the airplane.
58-04-01: 58-04-01 DOUGLAS: Applies to All DC3 Series Aircraft Which Have an "Airstair" Type Cabin Door Installation. \n\n\tCompliance required not later than July 1, 1958. \n\n\tThe DC-3 Series aircraft passenger entrance door has been altered by modifiers to hinge the door at the bottom and install steps on the inside of the door, which are used for entering or leaving the aircraft when the door is opened. Numerous instances have occurred wherein the door has opened in flight, or a passenger has inadvertently opened the door and, in some cases, with fatal or near fatal results. \n\n\tIn order to overcome this hazard, it is required that means be provided for safeguarding against inadvertent opening of such doors in flight. CAM 4b.356-2 and -4 outlines the FAA policies which should be followed in complying with this directive.
2012-01-09: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 757-200, -200CB, and -300 series airplanes with off-wing escape slide systems installed. This AD was prompted by reports of in-flight loss of the off-wing escape slide. \n\n((Page 3580)) \n\nThis AD requires modifying the door latch fittings and witness mark placards of the off-wing escape slide systems; and for certain airplanes, replacing the bearings and lockbase retainer in the door latch assembly, relocating and adjusting the sensor target and the sensor proximity switch, and testing to ensure positive door locking and corrective action if necessary. For certain airplanes, this AD would also require installing a bumper assembly and placards. We are issuing this AD to prevent the in-flight loss of the off-wing escape slide, which could result in the unavailability of the escape slide during an emergency evacuation. Additionally, the departed slide could cause damage to the fuselage, wing, flaps, or stabilizer, which could degrade flight control.
2003-05-08: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Dornier Model 328-100 and -300 series airplanes, that requires replacement of certain flight data recorder (FDR) and cockpit voice recorder (CVR) impact switches with certain new impact switches. This action is necessary to prevent the loss of data recorded on the FDR and CVR, which, in the event of an accident, could result in the inability to retrieve data from the FDR and CVR during the accident investigation. This loss of data could hinder the identification of the unsafe condition which caused the accident, and prevent the FAA from developing and mandating actions to prevent additional accidents caused by that same unsafe condition.
89-24-02: 89-24-02 PRATT & WHITNEY: Amendment 39-6365. Applicability: Pratt & Whitney (PW) JT8D-7, -7A, and -7B turbofan engines. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent engine failure, cowl penetration, fire, or airframe damage associated with a second stage fan disk fracture, accomplish the following: (a) Visually inspect for the presence and protrusion of a spacer within 100 cycles in service (CIS) after the effective date of this AD. NOTE (1) defines the spacer location. If a spacer is found during inspection, accomplish the following: (1) If the spacer radial protrusion is in excess of 0.125 inches, trim the spacer to the fan case inner flow surface. (2) If the spacer radial protrusion is in excess of 0.250 inches over a circumferential length greater than 3 inches, remove the second stage fan disk, first stage stator assembly, and the spacer. Inspect the disk in accordance with paragraphs (d)(1), (d)(2), and (d)(3), within 100 CIS after inspection and thereafter, reinspect the disk in accordance with paragraph (e). (b) Thereafter, visually reinspect for first stage stator spacer protrusion, if a spacer is installed, in accordance with the limits noted in paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2), at intervals not to exceed 200 CIS since last inspection (SLI) and until the first stage stator assembly and spacer are removed per paragraph (c) below. (c) Remove the first stage stator assembly and spacer, and install a new or a refurbished first stage stator assembly in accordance with PW JT8D Engine Manual, Part Number (P/N) 481672, at the next engine shop visit, but no later than 4,000 CIS after the effective date of this AD. (d) Inspect all second stage fan disks which have operated in an engine with a spacer installed at the next engine shop visit, but no later than 4,000 CIS after the effective date of this AD, or as required by paragraph (a)(2) above. The inspection shall include the following: (1) Eddy current inspect disk pin holes and remove from service all disks defined as not serviceable in accordance with the instructions in the APPENDIX (United Airlines Eddy Current Non-Destructive Test Procedure Number MJ-70-NDT-352, dated June 6, 1989) to this AD. (2) Visually inspect the inner surface of the disk pin hole for evidence of galling or other surface damage. Reject disks with damage in excess of 0.003 inches deep. (3) Dimensionally inspect the disk pin hole diameters. Reject disks if any disk pin hole diameter exceeds 0.5498 inches (Reference PW JT8D Engine Manual, Section 72-33-04, Inspection -01, Page 801, Reference 222). (e) Thereafter, reinspect second stage fan disks in accordance with paragraphs (d)(1), (d)(2), and (d)(3) above, at intervals not to exceed 4,000 CIS SLI if the disk operated in an engine with a spacer radial protrusion in excess of the limits established in paragraph (a)(2) above. (f) If a first stage stator spaceris found during the initial visual inspection, report the following information in writing within 30 days of the inspection to the Manager, Engine Certification Office, Engine and Propeller Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, Federal Aviation Administration, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts 01803; Telex Number 949301 FAANE BURL: (1) Engine serial number (S/N). (2) Inspection date. (3) First stage stator spacer maximum radial protrusion and circumferential length of protrusion. (4) Second stage fan disk P/N and S/N. (g) Report the following information in writing within 30 days of the second stage fan disk inspection to the Manager, Engine Certification Office, Engine and Propeller Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, Federal Aviation Administration, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts 01803; Telex Number 949301 FAANE BURL: (1) Engine serial number (S/N). (2) Inspection date. (3)Second stage fan disk P/N and S/N. (4) Second stage fan disk total time and cycles (if estimate, so note). (5) Second stage fan disk time and cycles since installation. (6) Second stage fan disk inspection results for rejected disks (specify rejection criteria used). Information collection requirements contained in this regulation (Section 39.13) have been approved by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-511) and have been assigned OMB Control Number 2120-0056. (h) Records showing that United Airlines (UAL) has not performed maintenance on the engine may be used in lieu of the visual inspection requirements of paragraph (a) above to verify the absence of the spacer, provided the operator's FAA Airworthiness Inspector is supplied with a complete maintenance history of the engine and determines that UAL has never maintained, overhauled or altered the engine after October 10, 1972.NOTES: (1) The location where the first stage stator spacer would be installed is shown in the PW JT8D Engine Manual, P/N 481672, Section 72-33-65, Repair-00, Page 901/902, Figure 901, Index 3. (2) Engine shop visit is defined as the input of an engine to a repair shop with low pressure compressor rotor overhaul capability where the subsequent engine maintenance entails the following: (a) Separation of a major engine flange (lettered or numbered) other than flanges mating with major sections of the nacelle or reverser. Separation of flanges purely for purposes of shipment, without subsequent internal maintenance, is not a "shop visit." (b) Removal of a disk, hub, or spool. (i) Aircraft may be ferried in accordance with the provisions of FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to a base where the AD can be accomplished. (j) Upon submission of substantiating data by an owner or operator through an FAA Airworthiness Inspector, an alternate method of compliance with therequirements of this AD or adjustments to the compliance times specified in this AD, may be approved by the Manager, Engine Certification Office, ANE-140, Engine and Propeller Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, Federal Aviation Administration, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts 01803. This amendment (39-6365, AD 89-24-02) becomes effective on November 13, 1989. 89-24-02 APPENDIX NOTE: United Airlines Eddy Current Non-Destructive Test Procedure Number MJ-70-NDT-352, dated June 6, 1989, pertain to these inspections.
2018-03-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Textron Aviation Inc. Models 401, 401A, 401B, 402, 402A, 402B, 402C, 411, 411A, 414, 414A 421, 421A, 421B, 421C, and 425 airplanes. This AD requires repetitively inspecting the left and the right forward lower carry through spar cap for cracks and replacing the carry through spar if cracks are found. This AD was prompted by a report of a fully cracked lower forward carry through spar cap found on an affected airplane. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2012-01-07: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for BRP-- POWERTRAIN GMBH & CO KG Rotax 914 F2, 914 F3, and 914 F4 reciprocating engines. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as isolated manufacturing deviations reportedly found on the threads of a certain batch of fuel pressure regulators, part number (P/N) 887130, installed on Rotax 914 F series engines, which could result in fuel leakage during engine operation. We are issuing this AD to prevent fuel leaks, which could result in an in-flight fire and damage to the aircraft.
57-14-03: 57-14-03 VICKERS: Applies to All Viscount 700 Series Aircraft. Compliance required as indicated. Investigation of a recent case resulting in asymmetric flaps occurring just prior to touchdown shows excessive end float of the flap torque shaft can occur between the flap gearbox and No. 1 flap unit port and starboard. Following action considered essential by Vickers with which the FAA concurs and considers mandatory. 1. At next daily inspection unscrew flap universal joint cap port and starboard and check engagement of trunnion blocks within universal joint body of the torque tube. With trunnion block journals facing fore and aft ensure maximum outboard float of torque shaft is obtained by gentle tapping if necessary. Where trunnion blocks do not protrude from body more than 0.4 of an inch, aircraft may continue to fly but corrective action (item 3.) must be taken within 300 hours flying. 2. If trunnion blocks protrude more than 0.4 of an inch, corrective action (item 3.) must be taken within 25 hours flying time, or if trunnion blocks protrude 0.52 of an inch or more, corrective action must be taken prior to further flight. 3. Set torque shaft with trunnion blocks flush with end of universal body and prepare and fit tubular fiber or fluon (teflon equivalent) distance piece to suit dimension between inboard vertical face of No. 1 flap unit chain box and adjacent end of torque tube. Internal diameter of distance piece 1.52 inches with suitable recess to clear greaser on chain box if necessary. Before removal, splined shaft must be marked to ensure correct reassembly. On completion of inspection torque tubes should be moved toward gearbox as far as end float permits.
2003-05-03: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the specified Bell Helicopter Textron Canada (Bell) model helicopters that requires preflight checking and repetitively inspecting for a crack in certain tailbooms that have not been redesigned and replacing the tailboom if a crack is found; modifying and re-identifying certain tailbooms and installing an improved horizontal stabilizer assembly; and assigning a 5,000 hour time-in-service (TIS) life limit. This amendment is prompted by cracking discovered in other areas of certain tailbooms and introduction of a redesigned tailboom with a chemically milled skin, which does not require the current inspections. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent separation of the tailboom and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
2021-18-05: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2020-15-12 for certain Rolls-Royce Deutschland Ltd & Co KG (RRD) Trent 1000 model turbofan engines. AD 2020-15-12 required initial and repetitive ultrasonic or visual inspections of the intermediate-pressure compressor (IPC) stage 1 rotor blade root (front face), IPC stage 2 rotor blade root (front and rear face), and IPC shaft stage 2 dovetail post (front face), and removal of any cracked parts from service. AD 2020-15-12 also required an inspection after asymmetric power and cabin depressurization events. This AD was prompted by IPC rotor blade separations resulting in engine failures. This AD requires initial and repetitive ultrasonic or visual inspections of certain IPC stage 1 rotor blade root, IPC stage 2 rotor blade root, and IPC shaft stage 2 dovetail posts until replacement of the IPC stage 1 and stage 2 rotor blades with redesigned IPC stage 1 and stage 2 rotor blades in kitted sets. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2003-05-04: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to Rolls-Royce Deutschland Ltd. & Co KG (RRD) Model Tay 620-15 and 650-15 turbofan engines. That AD currently requires initial and repetitive inspections of certain low pressure (LP) fuel tubes. This amendment requires the same inspections and adds two engine models to the applicability. This amendment is prompted by a report that certain Tay 611-8 and 651-54 turbofan engines may use the same LP fuel tube. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent a dual-engine flameout due to fuel exhaustion, which could lead to forced landing and possible damage to the airplane.
79-08-04 R2: 79-08-04 R2 LOCKHEED-CALIFORNIA COMPANY: Amendment 39-3448 as amended by Amendment 39-4097 is further amended by Amendment 39-5035. Applies to Lockheed-California Company L-1011-385 series airplanes certificated in all categories. To preclude failure of the main landing gear truck pivot pins, P/N 1523058-101 or -103, perform the following, unless already accomplished: (a) Within the next 50 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, or unless paragraph (b) or (c), below, has already been accomplished, perform a visual inspection of the open end inside surface of the truck pivot pins in accordance with Lockheed wire PSC/78-46863-OL, dated October 25, 1978. If there is a visual indication of a crack, the pin must be inspected before further flight in accordance with paragraph (b) of this AD, or replaced with a new pin. NOTE: For most reliable results, the above visual inspection should be conducted with a good source of lightand a mirror, and only after the open end inside surface is thoroughly cleaned of all accumulated dirt and grease. (b) Within the next 300 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished or unless paragraph (c) has already been accomplished, perform the ultrasonic inspection of the open end inside surfaces in accordance with Part I of Lockheed- California Company Service Bulletin 093-32-149, Revision 2. (1) If there is no ultrasonic indication or if it is not in excess of Standard (Reflector) "A", repeat the inspection at 300 hours time in service intervals until paragraph (c) is accomplished. (2) If there is an ultrasonic indication in excess of Standard (Reflector) "A", but less than one inch in the Standard (Reflector) "B" location repeat the inspection at 150 hours time in service intervals until paragraph (c) is accomplished. (3) If there is an ultrasonic indication in excess of one inch in the Standard (Reflector) "B" location remove the cracked pin and replace with like serviceable item before next flight. (c) Install landing gear truck pivot pin "fail-safe" retainer per Part 2 of Lockheed- California Company Service Bulletin 093-32-149, Revision 2 in accordance with the following schedule: (1) Within 1500 hours time in service from the effective date of this AD for all aircraft except as provided otherwise in paragraph (c)(2). (2) Within 2500 hours time in service from the effective date of this AD for aircraft which have been satisfactorily inspected per the requirement of Part 2 of Lockheed- California Company Service Bulletin 093-32-135. NOTE: The installation of the above "fail-safe" retainer is considered to be an interim safety action. (d) Within twelve (12) calendar months after the effective date of this AD, accomplish the installation or modification of the main landing gear uplock snubber, truck pivot pin and bushings using Kits 1630462-101, -103, -105, and -107, or alternate Kits 1630462-109, -111, - 113, and -115, in accordance with Lockheed-California L-1011 Service Bulletin 093-32-154, Revision 2, dated January 5, 1981, or later revisions approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. Compliance with this paragraph constitutes terminating action for this AD. (e) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of inspections required by this AD. (f) Equivalent inspection procedures and truck pin retainer installation may be used when approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. The manufacturer's specifications and procedures identified and described in this directive are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). All persons affected by this directive, who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer, may obtain copies upon request to the Lockheed-California Company, P.O. Box 551, Burbank, California 91520, Attention: Commercial Support Contracts, Dept. 63-11, U-33, B-1. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or at 4344 Donald Douglas Drive, Long Beach, California. Amendment 39-3448 became effective May 23, 1979. Amendment 39-4097 became effective May 22, 1981. This Amendment 39-5035 becomes effective May 13, 1985.
55-20-02: 55-20-02 DOUGLAS: Applies to All Douglas DC-7 Aircraft Serial Numbers 44122 to 44146 Inclusive, 44171 to 44174 Inclusive, 44261 to 44289 Inclusive and 44679 to 44684 Inclusive. \n\n\tCompliance required as soon as possible but not later than February 1, 1956. \n\n\tRevising the injection pump timing on the engines creates higher exhaust gas temperatures across the top surface of the wing along the left-hand side of the outboard nacelle. In order to reduce the wing skin temperature, an additional heat shield must be installed between the center and rear spars, and replace the aft section of the existing heat shields between the front and center spars adjacent to the upper left side of the outboard nacelle in the exhaust path area. \n\n\t(Douglas Service Bulletin DC-7 No. 77 dated July 1, 1955, covers this same subject.)
2003-05-02: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to all aircraft (specifically balloons) that incorporate certain Lindstrand Balloons Ltd (Lindstrand) fuel hoses. This AD requires you to inspect for certain batches of installed fuel hoses and replace any of these fuel hoses. This AD is the result of mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the airworthiness authority for the United Kingdom. The actions specified by this AD are intended to detect and replace defective fuel hoses before they result in propane fuel leaks. Such propane fuel leaks could lead to a propane fuel fire.
70-22-04: 70-22-04 WOOD ELECTRIC: Amdt. 39-1096 as amended by Amendment 39-1207. Applies to Aircraft Incorporating Wood Electric Corp Model 105, 106, 107, 108, 147, 152, 254, 447, 448, or 2100 series circuit breakers. Compliance required as indicated: (a) Within the next 500 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the last 250 hours' time in service, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 750 hours' time in service from the last check; to detect jammed circuit breakers, manually open and close all Wood Electric Corp. Model 105, 106, 107, 108, 147, 152, 254, 447, 448, and 2100 series circuit breakers installed in aircraft. All circuit breakers found jammed must be replaced prior to further flight. This check is not required when the modification in Paragraph (b) has been accomplished. (b) Within the next 1250 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, modify all Wood ElectricCorp. 105, 106, 107, 108, 147, 152, 254, 447, 448 and 2100 series circuit breakers by installing a ring manufactured in accordance with Wood Electric Corp. Drawing Number 64-008 Rev. No. 2 dated June 26, 1970 or later revision or equivalent approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Eastern Region. To accomplish the modification, position the circuit breaker in either the closed or opened position and place the ring below the step (cap) portion of the button and above the threaded mounting neck of the circuit breaker. Exert enough finger pressure to snap the ring into place. Manually open and close the circuit breaker to insure proper positioning of the ring. (c) Upon request with substantiation data submitted through an FAA maintenance inspector, the compliance time specified in this AD may be increased by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Eastern Region. (d) The check required by this AD may be performed by the pilot and the modification required by this AD constitutes preventive maintenance and may be performed by persons authorized to perform preventive maintenance under FAR 43. (Wood Electric Corp. Drawing Number 99-001 Rev. 1 dated June 26, 1970; Boeing Model 707/720 Service Bulletin 2693 Rev. 3 dated July 1, 1970; Boeing Model 727 Service Bulletin 24-35 Rev. 3 dated July 1, 1970 and Boeing Model 737 Service Bulletin 24-1019 Rev. 3 dated July 20, 1970 pertain to the modification required by this AD.) Amendment 39-1096 was effective November 4, 1970. This Amendment 39-1207 is effective May 19, 1971.
82-05-05 R1: 82-05-05 R1 FAIRCHILD SWEARINGEN: Amendment 39-4369. Applies to Models SA227-AC (S/N's AC-420 through AC-481, AC-485 through AC-491, AC-496 through AC-499 and AC-503), SA227-AT (S/N's AT-423 through AT-446, AT-454 through AT-487 and AT- 501), and SA227-TT (S/N's TT-421 through TT-462, TT-468 through TT-480 and TT-486 and TT-426A, TT-444A, TT-456A, TT-459A, TT-462A, TT-468A, TT-477A, TT-483A, TT-486A, and TT-489A) airplanes certificated in all categories. COMPLIANCE: Required as indicated unless already accomplished. To prevent propeller ice accumulation and potentially hazardous severe aircraft vibration, within the next five hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD accomplish the following: a) Install black electrician's tape or equivalent over the words "AND ICING CONDITIONS" in the Approved Types of Operations Section of the Operating Limitations Placard which is located above the left side console. b) Install a temporary placard of 1/4-inch minimum lettering which states "NOT APPROVED FOR FLIGHT IN ICING" in front of and in clear view of the pilot and operate the airplane in accordance with this placard. c) In the Approved Types of Operation Section of the Operating Limitations placard shown in Section I, Limitations Section, of the Model SA227-AC Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) and in Section II, Limitation Section, of the Models SA227-AT and -TT AFM, delete or cover the words "AND ICING CONDITIONS." d) The placard and AFM changes required by this AD may be accomplished by the holder of at least a private pilot certificate issued under Part 61 of the Federal Aviation Regulations on any airplane owned or operated by that person who must make the prescribed entry in the Airplane Maintenance Records indicating compliance with this AD. e) An equivalent method of compliance with this AD may be used when approved by the Chief, Aircraft Certification Division, FAA, Southwest Region, P.O. Box 1689, Fort Worth, Texas 76101. The procedures contained in Fairchild Swearingen SA227 Series Alert Service Bulletin SB A 61-002 PROPELLERS-LEADING EDGE PROTECTION dated February 26, 1982, if accomplished in entirety are approved as an equivalent method of compliance with this AD. This amendment becomes effective on May 3, 1982, to all persons except those to whom it has already been made effective by a priority letter from the FAA dated February 26, 1982, and is identified as AD 82-05-05.
2003-05-01: This amendment supersedes an emergency airworthiness directive (AD) that was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of WSK PZL-Rzeszow S.A. Franklin 6A-350-C1, -C1A, -C1L, -C2, -C2A, and 4A- 235 series reciprocating engines. This action requires removing diaphragm type AC4886 fuel pump, AC part number (P/N) 5656774, PZL P/N 26.11.1710, before further flight, and prohibits installing diaphragm type AC4886 fuel pump, AC P/N 5656774, PZL P/N 26.11.1710. This amendment is prompted by several reports of failures of the valves and diaphragms in certain diaphragm type AC4886 fuel pumps, AC P/N 5656774, PZL P/N 26.11.1710, and adds the 6A-350-C1R engine to the applicability. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent reduction or loss of engine power or external fuel leaks.
2003-04-27: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all Bombardier CL-600-2C10 series airplanes, that requires revising the Airworthiness Limitations Section of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness to incorporate functional and operational checks of the active and standby actuators of the rudder travel limiter (RTL) system. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent a significant latent failure in the RTL, which could lead to a critical loss of RTL function under certain conditions, and consequent loss of controllability of the airplane or structural damage. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.