Results
2009-09-05: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD), which applies to certain Airbus Model A318-100 and A319-100 series airplanes; A320-111 airplanes; A320-200 series airplanes; and A321-100 and A321-200 series airplanes. That AD currently requires a one-time inspection of the horizontal hinge pin of the 103VU electrical panel in the avionics compartment to determine if the hinge pin can move out of the hinge, and related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. This new AD instead requires installing a hinge pin stopper on the internal door of the 103VU electrical panel. This AD results from a report indicating that electrical wire damage was found in the 103VU electrical panel due to contact between the hinge pin and the adjacent electrical wire harness. We are issuing this AD to prevent contact between the horizontal hinge pin and the adjacent electrical wire harness, which could result in damage to electrical wires, and consequent arcing and/or failure of associated systems.
2009-09-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Several cases of Gas Generator Turbine (HP Turbine) blade rearward displacement have been detected during borescope inspection or in repair centre following engine disassembly. Two of them resulted in blade rubs between the rear face of the fir-tree roots and the rear bearing support cover. High HP blade rearward displacement can potentially result in blade release due to fatigue of the blade, which would cause an uncommanded in-flight engine shutdown. We are issuing this AD to prevent an uncommanded in-flight engine shutdown which could result in an emergency autorotation landing or, at worst, an accident.
2009-09-01: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: During a routine inspection on an Airbus A321 aircraft, the operator discovered that a bearing of the flap track No. 1 pendulum assembly had migrated out of position. * * * This condition, if not corrected, could lead to separation of the bearing/flap track assembly, resulting in the detachment of the affected flap surface from the wing and consequent loss of control of the aircraft. * * * * * This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
2009-07-52: This document publishes in the Federal Register an amendment adopting Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2009-07-52 and supersedes Emergency AD 2009-07-51, issued March 17, 2009, which was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of Bell Helicopter Textron Canada Limited (Bell) Model 206A series, 206B series, 206L series, 407, and 427 helicopters by individual letters. This AD requires, before further flight, inspecting each cyclic control lever assembly (lever assembly) that has less than 50 hours time-in-service (TIS) to determine if it is correctly installed and properly staked in the lever assembly. This amendment is prompted by a Transport Canada AD report of a bearing incorrectly installed in the copilot lever assembly. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of a bearing, failure of the lever assembly, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter. DATES: Effective May 1, 2009, to all persons except those persons to whom it was made immediately effective by Emergency AD 2009-07-52, issued on March 19, 2009, which contained the requirements of this amendment. Comments for inclusion in the Rules Docket must be received on or before June 15, 2009.
2009-08-09: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: A damaged wiring harness which caused the air conditioning system circuit breaker to trip and evidencing a local overheating has been found on an in-service aircraft. The investigation revealed that the damage (chafed wires) found on the wiring harness resulted from an interference with the under- floor attachment fittings of the cabin partition net which was due to an incorrect routing of the harness while on the production line. Such conditions could result in an electrical short and potential loss of several functions essential for the safety of flight. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2009-08-06: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for GE CF6-80A series turbofan engines with certain stage 1 high-pressure turbine (HPT) rotor disks, installed. This AD requires removal from service of those stage 1 HPT rotor disks within 30 days after the effective date of the AD. This AD results from the FAA learning that those disks are susceptible to cracks developing at the aft chamfer of the blade dovetail slots. We are issuing this AD to prevent cracks developing at the aft chamfer of the blade dovetail slots that could propagate to a failure of the disk and cause an uncontained engine failure and damage to the airplane.
2009-08-07: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Honeywell International Inc. ALF502L-2 and ALF502L-2C turbofan engines with certain high-pressure compressor (HPC) first stage discs installed. This AD requires performing a dimensional inspection to determine if excessive disc balance material was removed and a magnetic particle inspection if the disc passes the dimensional inspection. This AD results from reports of discs found with excessive material removed from the balancing locations of the disc. We are issuing this AD to prevent the discs from fracturing before reaching the currently published life limit. A disc fracture could result in an uncontained failure of the disc and damage to the airplane.
2009-08-03: We are adopting a superseding airworthiness directive (AD) for the specified Bell Helicopter Textron Canada Limited (BHTC) Model 206A, 206B, 206L, 206L-1, 206L-3, 206L-4, 222, 222B, 222U, 230, 407, 427, and 430 helicopters. That AD currently requires replacing each affected tail rotor blade (blade) with an airworthy blade that has a serial number not listed in the Rotor Blades, Inc. (RBI) document that is attached to each of the Bell Helicopter Textron Alert Service Bulletins (ASBs) listed in the applicability section of the AD. That AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the aviation authority of Canada. The MCAI states that there have been three reports of blade tip weights departing from the blade during flight. Since issuing that AD, BHTC has issued revised service information to correct part numbers and serial numbers listed in the RBI document that is attached to each BHTC ASB and to add additional part-numbered and serial-numbered blades to the list. The actions of this AD are intended to prevent loss of a blade tip weight, loss of a blade, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
2009-08-05: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Liberty Aerospace Incorporated Model XL-2 airplanes. This AD requires you to repetitively inspect the exhaust muffler for cracks and to replace the exhaust muffler when cracks are found. This AD is the result of reports that cracks have been found in the exhaust muffler during maintenance and service inspections. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct cracks in the exhaust muffler, which could result in carbon monoxide entering the cabin through the heating system. Carbon monoxide entering into the airplane cabin could lead to incapacitation of the pilot.
2009-08-01: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD), which applies to all Honeywell FMSs served by Honeywell NZ-2000 navigation computers and IC-800 integrated avionics computers. That AD currently requires identifying affected computers by part number and software modification level and revising the Limitations section of applicable airplane flight manuals to provide procedures for retaining optimum position determination and intended navigation. This new AD requires upgrading new software, which terminates the existing requirements. This AD results from reports of in-flight unannunciated shifts of computed position in airplanes with the subject FMS computers. We are issuing this AD to prevent a shift in the FMS computed position, which could result in uncommanded deviations from the intended flight path of the airplane, and, if those deviations are undetected by the flight crew, compromised terrain/traffic avoidance. DATES: This AD becomes effective May 14, 2009. The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the AD as of May 14, 2009. On April 18, 2007 (72 FR 15818, April 3, 2007), the Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of Honeywell Technical Newsletter A23-6111-008, Revision 001, dated February 22, 2007.
2009-07-13: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the specified MD Helicopters, Inc. (MDHI) model helicopters that requires, within 30 days, reducing the current gross weight limit to a maximum gross weight limit of 5,400 pounds and inserting a copy of this AD into the Limitations section of the Rotorcraft Flight Manual (RFM) or making certain optional modifications that constitute terminating actions. This amendment is prompted by flight tests that show that the information currently listed in the Limitations section of the RFM is inconsistent with the actual performance of the helicopter. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent loss of directional control of the helicopter.
2009-08-02: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all McDonnell Douglas airplanes identified above. This AD requires revising the airplane flight manual to provide the flightcrew with procedures to preclude dry running of the fuel pumps. This AD results from fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer. We are issuing this AD to prevent pump inlet friction (i.e., overheating or sparking) when the fuel pumps are continually run as the center wing fuel tank becomes empty, and/or electrical arc burnthrough, which could result in a fuel tank fire or explosion.
2009-07-14: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: A number of wings manufactured by Diamond Aircraft Industries Inc. in Canada have been found to exhibit voids in the adhesive joint between the main spar caps and the upper wing skins. The available information indicates that wings with voids continue to meet the certification design limits, provided the voids are within established criteria. However, to detect any wings that may have voids exceeding these criteria, Diamond has issued Mandatory Service Bulletin MSB-40-060 and MSB-F4-016 (single document) that describes instructions for inspection of the aircraft that had these wings installed during manufacture. Aircraft that have voids within the inspectioncriteria may continue to operate without restriction, pending the outcome of ongoing investigations. Aircraft that have voids exceeding the inspection criteria must be repaired. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2009-07-09: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: It has been evidenced in-service that aileron trim actuator and rod spring lever attachment bracket--between frame 18 and 19 LH--on some aircraft may present loose rivets. If left uncorrected, this condition could lead to the separation of the attachment bracket which could result in loss of aileron trim and loss of artificial force feedback, and consequent reduced controllability of the airplane. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2009-07-04: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain McDonnell Douglas Model MD-90-30 airplanes. This AD requires modifying the auxiliary hydraulic power system (including doing all applicable related investigative and corrective actions). This AD results from fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer, as well as reports of shorted wires in the right wheel well and evidence of arcing on the power cables of the auxiliary hydraulic pump. We are issuing this AD to prevent shorted wires or electrical arcing at the auxiliary hydraulic pump, which could result in a fire in the wheel well; and to reduce the potential of an ignition source adjacent to the fuel tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.
2008-23-15: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 767-200, -300, and -400ER series airplanes. This AD requires installing new relay(s), circuit breakers as applicable, and wiring to allow the flightcrew to turn off electrical power to the in- flight entertainment (IFE) systems and certain circuit breakers through a utility bus switch, and doing other specified actions. This AD results from an IFE systems review. We are issuing this AD to ensure that the flightcrew is able to turn off electrical power to IFE systems and other non-essential electrical systems through a switch in the flight compartment. The flightcrew's inability to turn off power to IFE systems and other non-essential electrical systems during a non-normal or emergency situation could result in the inability to control smoke or fumes in the airplane flight deck or cabin.
2009-07-07: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain McDonnell Douglas Model 717-200 airplanes. This AD requires modifying the wire installation of the auxiliary hydraulic pump in the right wheel well of the main landing gear (MLG). This AD results from fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer. We are issuing this AD to prevent a tire burst when the MLG is in the retracted position from causing damage to the wire assembly of the auxiliary hydraulic pump and subsequent electrical arcing, creating the potential of an ignition source to the center wing tank, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.
2006-08-08 R1: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) to revise AD 2006-08-08, which applies to certain Air Tractor, Inc. (Air Tractor) Models AT-400, AT-401, AT-401B, AT-402, AT-402A, and AT-402B airplanes. AD 2006-08-08 currently requires you to repetitively eddy current inspect the wing lower spar cap in order to reach the safe life and, for certain Models AT-402A and AT-402B airplanes and those that incorporate or have incorporated Marburger Enterprises, Inc. (Marburger) winglets, lowers the safe life for the wing lower spar cap. Since we issued AD 2006-08-08, we have received information to update inspection intervals for the Models AT-401B, AT-402A, and AT-402B airplanes based on a revised damage tolerance analysis. Consequently, this AD would not only retain the actions of AD 2006-08-08, but would reduce the number of repetitive inspections for all affected Model AT- 401B airplanes and certain Models AT-402A and AT-402B airplanes. We are issuing this AD to prevent fatiguecracks from occurring in the wing lower spar cap before the originally established safe life is reached. Fatigue cracks in the wing lower spar cap, if not detected and corrected, could result in wing separation and loss of control of the airplane. \n\n\nDATES: This AD becomes effective on May 5, 2009. \n\tAs of April 21, 2006 (71 FR 19986, April 19, 2006), the Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of Snow Engineering Co. Drawing 21088, dated November 3, 2004; Snow Engineering Co. Process Specification 197, page 1, revised June 4, 2002, pages 2 through 4, dated February 23, 2001, and page 5, dated May 3, 2002; and Snow Engineering Co. Service Letter 202, page 3, dated October 16, 2000, listed in this AD.
2009-07-08: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Piper Aircraft, Inc. Models PA-46-350P and PA-46R-350T airplanes. This AD requires you to inspect the 35-amp and 250-amp current limiters to verify they are installed in the proper locations and correct the installation if the current limiters are not installed in the proper locations. This AD also limits operation to "only under day visual flight rules (VFR)'' until the current limiter installation is inspected and corrected. This AD results from three reports of incorrectly installed current limiters. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct incorrect installation of 35-amp and 250-amp current limiters, which could result in failure of the 35-amp current limiter if installed in the 250-amp location. This failure could lead to a total loss of electrical power.
2009-07-06: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Hamilton Sundstrand Propellers model 568F propellers with certain part number (P/N) and serial number (SN) blades. This AD requires removing affected propeller blades from service for rework. This AD results from reports of blades with corrosion pits in the tulip area of the blades. We are issuing this AD to prevent cracks from developing in the tulip area of the blade, which could result in separation of the blade and loss of airplane control.
86-02-05: 86-02-05 BRITISH AEROSPACE: Amendment 39-5204. Applies to Vickers Viscount Model 700 series airplanes certificated in any category. Compliance is required as follows, unless previously accomplished. To prevent nose landing gear collapse as a result of a faulty hydraulic cut out valve, accomplish the following: A. Within the next 1000 hours time-in-service or nine months after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs first, modify the aircraft hydraulic system cut out valve, Part Number AIR 41916, in accordance with Automotive Products Modification Standard SA 3490, dated December 16, 1959 (reference BAe Technical News Sheet No. 369, Issue 1, dated August 5, 1985). B. Alternate means of compliance which provide an acceptable level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. C. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of inspections and/or modifications required by this AD. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to British Aerospace Inc., Box 17414, Dulles International Airport, Washington, D.C. 20041. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. This amendment becomes effective February 3, 1986.
2009-06-17: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Following in-flight test deployments, several Air-Driven generators (ADGs) failed to come on-line. Investigation revealed that, as a result of a wiring anomaly that had not been detected during ADG manufacture, a short circuit was possible between certain internal wires and their metallic over-braided shields, which could result in the ADG not providing power when deployed. * * * The unsafe condition is that failure of the ADG could lead to loss of several functions essential for safe flight. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2009-06-09: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: \n\n\tDuring overhaul on a Dornier 328-100 landing gear unit, parts of the MLG (main landing gear) main body and trailing arm bushings have been found corroded. Investigation showed that over time, these bushings can migrate, creating the risk of corrosion in adjacent areas. Such corrosion, if not detected, could cause damage to the MLG, possibly resulting in MLG functional problems or failure. \n\n* * * * *\nFunctional problems or failure of the MLG could result in the inability of the MLG to extend or retract. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2009-06-08: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 767 airplanes. This AD requires repetitive inspections for cracking of the wing skin, and related investigative/ corrective actions if necessary. This AD results from reports of cracks found in the lower wing skin originating at the forward tension bolt holes of the aft pitch load fitting. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct cracking in the lower wing skin for the forward tension bolt holes at the aft pitch load fitting, which could result in a fuel leak and reduced structural integrity of the airplane.
2009-06-10: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 727-100 and 727-200 series airplanes. This AD requires repetitive internal and external high frequency eddy current, mid frequency eddy current, low frequency eddy current, and magneto optic imaging inspections to detect cracks, corrosion, delamination, and materials loss in the lower fastener row of the lower skin and the upper fastener row of the upper skin, and corrective actions if necessary. This AD results from a report of decompression in a Boeing Model 737 airplane at flight level 290. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct scratches and excessive reduction in material thickness from excessive blend-out or corrosion, which could lead to premature cracking in the lap joint. Such cracking could adversely affect the structural integrity of the airplane.