Results
2018-23-10: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus SAS Model A350-941 airplanes. This AD was prompted by leakage of shrouded pipe T-boxes in the potable water system. This AD requires replacement of the affected potable water T-boxes and clamps with new parts. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2000-16-15: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Saab Model SAAB 340B series airplanes. This action requires adjustment of the cargo baggage net, replacement of baggage net placards with new placards, and installation of certain new baggage net placards. This action is necessary to prevent failure of the cargo bulkhead floor attachments, which could result in damage to the airplane structure and possible injury to passengers and crewmembers. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
81-09-09: 81-09-09 STEWART-WARNER (SOUTH WIND DIVISION): Amendment 39-4102. Applies to Model Series 8240, 8253, 8259, and 8472 marked as meeting the standards of FAA TSO-C20, installed in aircraft certificated in all categories. Compliance required as indicated. To prevent a hazardous condition caused by deterioration of the combustion heater, accomplish the following: A. For combustion heaters having 250 hours or more time in service after the effective date of this AD, conduct the 250 hour inspection in accordance with the manufacturer's service manual (see Note 2) within the next 50 hours of combustion heater operation, unless already accomplished within the last 200 hours of heater time, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 250 hours of combustion heater operation. Also, along with the above inspection, a general inspection of the combustion heater installation must also be accomplished including at least the following: 1. Inspect ventilating air and combustion airinlets and exhaust outlet correcting restrictions and insuring attachment security. 2. Inspect drain line and insure it is free of obstruction. 3. Check all fuel lines for security at joints and shrouds, correcting those showing evidence of looseness or leakage. 4. Check all electrical wiring for security at attachment points, correcting conditions leading to arcing, chafing or looseness. B. For combustion heaters having 1000 hours or more time in service after the effective date of this AD, overhaul the combustion heater in accordance with the manufacturer's service manual (See Note 2) within the next 50 hours of combustion heater operation, unless already accomplished within the last 950 hours of heater time, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 1000 hours of combustion heater operation. An overhaul consists of complete disassembly, cleaning, repair, reassembly and test as outlined in the appropriate service manual. Note 1 - In complying with this AD, if the owner or operator cannot document combustion heater operative time, the aircraft time must be used. Note 2 - The following is a list of combustion heaters covered by this AD and the appropriate service manual. Methods of inspection or overhaul other than those contained in the manufacturer's service manuals must be approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Great Lakes Region. Models Service Manual Number 8240 Series 09-998 or P.M. 35710 8259 Series (Appropriate usage is shown in Manual or Manual Supplements) 8253 Series P.M. 20688 8472 Series 09-1015 This amendment becomes effective May 8, 1981.
2007-02-02: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model DC-8 airplanes. This AD requires a one-time inspection for previous repairs of the aft fuselage skin panel at the longeron 28 skin splice; repetitive inspections for cracks of the same area; and related investigative and corrective actions. This AD also provides optional actions for extending the repetitive inspection intervals. The actions specified by this AD are intended to detect and correct cracks in the aft fuselage skin at the longeron 28 skin splice, which could lead to loss of structural integrity of the aft fuselage, resulting in rapid decompression of the airplane. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2021-16-17: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Airbus Helicopters Deutschland GmbH (AHD) Model MBB-BK 117 D-2 helicopters. This AD was prompted by the discovery that certain parts that are approved for installation on multiple helicopter models are life limited parts when installed on Model MBB-BK 117 D-2 helicopters and some helicopter delivery documents excluded the life limit information. This AD requires determining the total hours time-in- service (TIS) of a certain part-numbered rotor mast nut and re- identifying a certain part-numbered rotor mast nut. This AD also requires establishing a life limit for a certain part-numbered rotor mast nut and helical gear support, and removing each part from service before reaching its life limit. Additionally, this AD requires replacing a certain part-numbered main gearbox (MGB) with a not affected MGB as specified in a European Aviation Safety Agency (now European Union Aviation Safety Agency) (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference (IBR). The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2018-23-07: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus SAS Model A350-941 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a review of the Airbus A350 structure design principles database for type definition that revealed that the balancer fitting part, installed on the tail cone, on a certain frame (FR) has several corrosion-resistant stainless steel nuts that do not meet the requirements for protection against corrosion. This AD requires application of a new additional overcoat sealant and elastic varnish on the affected nuts and fasteners. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
93-14-21: 93-14-21 BOEING: Amendment 39-8646. Docket 93-NM-109-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: All Model 747-400 series airplanes, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. \n\n\tTo reduce the effect on airplane systems should they enter ground operating mode while the airplane is in flight due to depressurization of hydraulic system number one or four, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tWithin 15 days after the effective date of this AD, revise the Limitations Section of the FAA-approved Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) by accomplishing paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) of this AD. \n\n\t\t(1)\tInsert a copy of 747-400 Operations Manual Bulletin 93-5, dated July 26, 1993, into the AFM. \n\n\t\t(2)\tInclude the requirements of paragraphs (a)(2)(i), (a)(2)(ii), and (a)(2)(iii) of this AD in the AFM. This may be accomplished by inserting a copy of this AD in the AFM. \n\n\t\t\t(i)\tDo not operate the airplane unless both the number 4 hydraulic engine drivenpump and the number 4 hydraulic demand pump are operative. \n\n\t\t\t(ii)\tIf hydraulic system number 1 or 4 becomes inoperative while the airplane is in flight, the flight crew shall accomplish the procedures contained in 747-400 Operations Manual Bulletin 93-5, dated July 26, 1993. \n\n\t\t\t(iii)\tIf hydraulic system number 4 becomes inoperative while the airplane is in flight, the flight crew shall consider the ramifications of changes in system operation should the airplane enter the "ground mode." Specifically, consideration shall be given to trip and reserve fuel requirements, and enroute and destination forecasts for potential icing conditions. If these or other conditions present a significant adverse effect on safety if the flight is continued, the crew shall consider, as an alternative, diverting to a suitable airport. It is the responsibility of the captain to assess the situation and execute sound judgement to determine a safe course of action. A landing shall be made at the most suitable airport. \n\n\t(b)\tWithin 60 days after the effective date of this AD, install a system that provides full pitot and total air temperature heat in the event an airplane enters "ground mode" while the airplane is in flight, in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-30A2069, dated July 15, 1993. \n\n\t(c)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Seattle ACO. \n\n\tNOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Seattle ACO. \n\n\t(d)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane toa location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. \n\n\t(e)\tThe AFM revision shall be accomplished in accordance with 747-400 Operations Manual Bulletin 93-5, dated July 26, 1993. The installation shall be done in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-30A2069, dated July 15, 1993. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC. \n\n\t(f)\tThis amendment becomes effective on August 9, 1993.
2004-07-10: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 737-600, -700, -700C, -800, and -900 series airplanes, that requires replacement of the proximity switch electronics unit with a new, improved unit. This action is necessary to prevent a malfunction of the aural warning for the landing gear, leading the crew to open the circuit breaker for the aural warning horn which stops the operation of other aural warnings of malfunctions in other systems and, thus, could jeopardize a safe flight and landing. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2002-10-02: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 757 series airplanes, that requires installation of an extender bracket for the compensator of the Simmonds fuel quantity indication system (FQIS) in the main fuel tanks. This action is necessary to prevent contact between the compensator for the Simmonds FQIS system and a flapper check valve on a baffle rib in the main fuel tanks, which-in conjunction with another wiring failure outside the fuel tank-could result in an electrical arc and a consequent potential source of ignition in the fuel tank. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2000-11-52: This document publishes in the Federal Register an amendment adopting Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2000-11-52, which was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation (Sikorsky) Model S-76 series helicopters by individual letters. This AD requires determining the serial number (S/N) of each main rotor blade and removing certain serial numbered main rotor blades. This AD also requires visually inspecting and replacing, if necessary, other certain serial numbered main rotor blades. This AD is prompted by a report of a crack in a main rotor blade and three reports of root end pocket separation from main rotor blades during flight. The crack and the main rotor blade root end pocket separation were due to improper manufacture of certain main rotor blade skins. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent main rotor blade root end pocket separation, impact with main rotor or tail rotor blades, and subsequent loss of controlof the helicopter
2009-23-09: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Two cases have been reported in which the ADG [air driven generator] has failed to power the essential bus following in-flight deployment as part of its periodic operational check. Subsequent inspection revealed that the ADG power feeder harness wire (* * * [aromatic polyimide]) had chafed on the backshell of its own connector (P1XC), resulting in a short circuit, wire damage and disconnection of the wire from the ADG. Coupled with a dual generator failure, such a disconnection would result in the loss of emergency power to critical systems, with a consequent adverse effect on the controllability of the aircraft. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
80-10-01: 80-10-01 CESSNA: Amendment 39-3762. Applies to Cessna Models 180 through 180J, 185 through 185E, A185E, and A185F airplanes equipped with Airglas Engineering Company, Inc., LW3600-180 or LW3600-180A ski installations in accordance with STC SA213AL. Compliance required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To preclude the possibility of a ski rotating tip-down in flight, with resulting adverse flight and landing characteristics, accomplish the following: (a) Operation of airplanes equipped with Airglas Engineering Company, Inc., LW3600-180 or LW3600-180A ski installations, in excess of 160 KT IAS is prohibited. (b) Prior to further flight, on airplanes equipped with Airglas Engineering Company, Inc., LW3600-180 or LW3600-180A ski installation, install a placard on the instrument panel immediately adjacent to the airspeed indicator and in plain view of the pilot to read as follows: DO NOT EXCEED 160 KTS IAS WITH AIRGLAS LW3600-180 SKIS INSTALLED or DO NOTEXCEED 160 KTS IAS WITH AIRGLAS LW3600-180A SKIS INSTALLED whichever is appropriate. (c) Within the next 50 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, and thereafter at any time the skis are installed, rig and modify the LW3600-180 or LW3600-180A ski check, safety, and bungee cables in accordance with Airglas Engineering Company, Inc. Service Bulletin No. LW3600-3, dated September 21, 1979, or an FAA-approved equivalent. This amendment supersedes Amendment 39-1218 (36 FR 9860) AD 71-11-06. This amendment becomes effective May 12, 1980.
75-16-20: 75-16-20\tMITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES, LIMITED: Amendment 39-2294. Applies to Mitsubishi Model MU-2B, MU-2B-10, MU-2B-15, MU-2B-20, MU-2B-25, MU-2B- 26, MU-2B-30, MU-2B-35, and MU-2B-36 airplanes certificated in all categories. \n\tCompliance is required within the next 25 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the last 75 hours time in service, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 100 hours time in service from the last inspection. \n\tTo prevent possible separation of the control lever on the engine propeller pitch control unit, inspect the propeller pitch control lever, Mitsubishi P/N 022A-43111, P/N 022A-43111-3, or P/N 867304-1 in accordance with paragraph (a) or (b) of this AD, as applicable. \n\t(a)\tFor airplanes with AN3H5A bolt or MS24673-3 bolt installed in a threaded propeller pitch control lever, accomplish the following: \n\t\t(1)\tRemove safety wire and loosen bolt. \n\t\t(2)\tEnsure that the propeller pitch control leveris mounted securely on the shaft. \n\t\t(3)\tRetorque the AN 3H5A bolt to 20-25 inch pounds or the MS24673-3 bolt to 25-30 inch pounds, as applicable, and install safety wire. \n\t\t(4)\tEnsure that the power management system is properly rigged in accordance with Section VI of the Garrett-Airesearch Turboprop Engine Series 331 Maintenance Manual or an FAA-approved equivalent. \n\t(b)\tFor airplanes with AN3-6A bolt and NAS679C3W nut installed in an unthreaded propeller pitch control lever, accomplish the following: \n\t\t(1)\tLoosen the AN3-6A bolt. \n\t\t(2)\tEnsure that the propeller pitch control lever is mounted securely on the shaft. \n\t\t(3)\tRetorque the AN3-6A bolt to 20-25 inch pounds. \n\t\t(4)\tEnsure that the power management system is properly rigged in accordance with Section VI of the Garrett-Airesearch Turboprop Engine Series 331 Maintenance Manual or an FAA-approved equivalent. \n\t(Mitsubishi MU-2 Service Bulletin No. 168, dated April 18, 1975, refers to this same subject). \n\tThis amendment becomes effective August 12, 1975.
2007-02-06: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Pratt & Whitney PW2000 series turbofan engines. This AD requires a onetime focused visual and fluorescent penetrant inspection (FPI) of 21 suspect PW2000 8th stage high pressure compressor (HPC) drum rotor disk assemblies. This AD results from a PW2037 8th stage HPC drum rotor disk assembly failure event caused by tooling damage that occurred during disk assembly manufacture. We are issuing this AD to prevent 8th stage HPC drum rotor disk assembly failure that could result in an uncontained engine failure and damage to the airplane.
2007-02-09: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as cracking in the wing main landing gear (MLG) rib 5 forward attachment lug, which could affect the structural integrity of the MLG attachment. This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
2018-21-10: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all International Aero Engines (IAE) PW1133G-JM, PW1133GA-JM, PW1130G-JM, PW1127G-JM, PW1127GA-JM, PW1127G1-JM, PW1124G-JM, PW1124G1-JM, and PW1122G-JM turbofan engines. This AD was prompted by reports of in- flight engine shutdowns and aborted take-offs as the result of certain parts affecting the durability of the rear high-pressure compressor (HPC) rotor hub knife edge seal. This AD requires replacing the diffuser case air seal assembly, the high-pressure turbine (HPT) 2nd- stage vane assembly, and the HPT 2nd-stage borescope stator vane assembly with parts eligible for installation. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2007-02-05: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for Rolls-Royce plc (RR) RB211 Trent 700 series turbofan engines. That AD currently requires initial and repetitive borescope inspections of the high pressure-and-intermediate pressure (HP-IP) turbine internal and external oil vent tubes for coking and carbon buildup, and cleaning or replacing the vent tubes if necessary. This AD requires the same actions but uses more stringent tube replacement criteria than the previous AD. This AD results from a recent incident where an RB211 Trent 700 series turbofan engine had an oil vent tube rupture as a result of blockage, leading to significant loss of engine oil. The incident indicates that further measures are necessary to control carbon buildup in the oil vent tubes. We are issuing this AD to prevent internal oil fires due to coking and carbon buildup, that could cause uncontained engine failure and damage to the airplane.
75-04-11: 75-04-11 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-2094. Applies to Douglas DC-10 Series -10, -10F, -30, and -30F airplanes, certificated in all categories. \n\n\tTo prevent possible damage to the No. 2 engine due to ingestion of ice and snow, accomplish the following. \n\n\t(a)\tAfter the effective date of this airworthiness directive, when airplanes have been parked during icing conditions (freezing rain, snow, sleet) for any period of time which will enable ice or snow to accumulate on the airplane in the area of the No. 2 engine, inspect the top of the fuselage and the No. 2 engine inlet for the presence of ice and snow accumulation prior to starting engines. If found to exist, remove accumulated ice and snow prior to further flight.\n\n\tNOTE: Guidelines for inspection and safeguarding the aircraft are contained in these documents:\n\n\tDouglas AOL 10-546, dated January 11, 1974\n\n\tDouglas AOL 10-673, dated August 7, 1974\n\n\tDC-10 Maintenance Manual, Chapter 12-31-01 (b) Make appropriatemaintenance record entries to show compliance with this AD.\n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective February 21, 1975.
2000-16-01: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model MD-90-30 series airplanes, that requires replacement of certain ground block screws with new screws; and retermination of the circuit ground wires of the electrical power control unit (EPCU) to separate grounding points. This amendment is prompted by reports of complete loss of the primary electrical power on an airplane during flight. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent a loose electrical ground block of the circuit ground wires of the EPCU, which could result in complete loss of the primary electrical power of an airplane during flight.
2018-22-01: We are superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 88-12-10 for certain Honeywell International Inc. (Honeywell) TPE331 turboprop engines. AD 88-12-10 required reducing the life limit for certain second stage turbine rotors. This AD requires removing certain second stage turbine rotors from service at a reduced life limit. This AD was prompted by report that a TPE331-11U engine experienced an uncontained rotor separation. In addition, cracks were discovered through eddy current inspection (ECI) in the bore of the second stage turbine rotor assembly after publication of AD 88-12-10. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2007-02-08: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as a report of a master cylinder yoke failure. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2021-18-07: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Leonardo S.p.a. Model AB412 and AB412 EP helicopters. This AD was prompted by the results of a fatigue review. This AD requires establishing a life limit for certain part-numbered high landing gear aft crosstubes. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2021-16-13: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Leonardo S.p.a. (Leonardo) Model A109S and AW109SP helicopters with a certain part-numbered vertical fin vibration absorber installation installed. This AD requires repetitive inspections of the vertical fin vibration absorber installation and the surrounding structure and depending on the inspection results, removing certain parts from service. This AD also prohibits installing certain part-numbered vertical fin vibration absorber installations on any helicopter. This AD was prompted by a report of cracks and damage detected on the vertical fin absorber installation and surrounding structure during scheduled inspections. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2018-22-08: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Bombardier, Inc., Model BD-700-1A10 and BD-700-1A11 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports that non-conforming FIREX squib wire harness connectors may have been installed, which could result in FIREX squib wire harness connectors being connected to the wrong FIREX bottle connectors on affected aircraft. This AD requires a visual inspection of the connections between the FIREX squib wire harness connectors and FIREX bottle connectors, installation of split ring lanyards on the FIREX squib wire harness connectors, and corrective actions if necessary. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
95-08-09: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 series airplanes. This action requires modification of the support structure of the cargo liner. This amendment is prompted by a report of chafing and arcing in the vacuum waste exhaust heater that caused a spark to ignite the surrounding insulation blankets. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent fire and/or smoke due to chafing and arcing of the vacuum waste exhaust port heater.