Results
81-12-51: 81-12-51 FLUG UND FAHRZEUGWERKE AG: Amendment 39-4239. Applies to AG Model Diamant HBV and 16.5 gliders, certificated in all categories. Compliance required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent loss of the rudder lower close tolerance bolt, which could result in loss of the rudder, accomplish the following: (a) Before further flight, unless already accomplished within the last 25 flight hours, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 25 flight hours until replacement per paragraph (b) is accomplished, inspect the rudder close tolerance bolt for tightness in accordance with Flug Und Fahrzeugwerke AG Service Bulletin Number 10, dated April 1981, or in accordance with applicable criteria of FAA Advisory Circular 43.13-1A. If the bolt is loose (free to rotate), before further flight, replace the bolt in accordance with the above noted Service Bulletin, or an FAA- approved equivalent. (b) Unless already accomplished, prior to January 1, 1982, replace the rudder close tolerance bolt in accordance with Flug Und Fahrzeugwerke AG Service Bulletin Number 10, dated April 1981, or an FAA-approved equivalent, as follows: (1) Remove rudder as follows: (i) Push rudder to the right deflection limit so that the bolt is visible through the opening on the left side of the rudder. (ii) Remove connecting bolt at the end of the push rod. (iii) Remove close tolerance bolt. (iv) Remove rudder from the bearing block by pulling the rudder backwards. As soon as the rudder is off the bearing block, pull the rudder downwards to remove it from the upper bearing. (2) Modification procedure: (i) On the lower bearing block, remove both rivets from the anchor nut. Then rivet bracket and sheet together again (without anchor nut). (ii) Mount rudder in reverse order to Item 1. (iii) Check deflections according to the flight manual, Item 5.2. (plus or minus 30 degrees, +3 degrees, -0 degrees).(iv) Check rudder and elevator controls for free movement. (3) Material: Materials Part Number 1 connecting bolt D1.206-0303 1 spacer R20002 AN 960-C10L 2 castle nuts M6 VSM 13780 2 cotter pins 1.6 x 16 VSM 12760 1 close tolerance bolt D1.201-1228.1 2 rivets MS 20470-AD2-10 (c) For the purpose of compliance with this AD, an equivalent procedure may be approved by the Chief of the FAA Engineering and Manufacturing Branch of any FAA region. The manufacturer's specifications and procedures identified and described in this directive are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). All persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Flug Und Fahrzeugwerke AG, CH-9422 Staad SG, Switzerland. These documents may be examined at FAA Headquarters, Room 916, 800 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, D.C. 20591. This amendment becomes effective October 22, 1981, as to all persons except those persons to whom it was made immediately effective by telegraphic AD T81-12-51, issued June 10, 1981, which contained this amendment.
2009-25-09: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the specified Eurocopter France (Eurocopter) helicopters. This AD results from a mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) AD issued by the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Community. The MCAI Emergency AD states that there has been a report of the failure of a flexible coupling on one of the main gearbox (MGB) inputs, which may be the result of loss of the tightening torque load, or insufficient tightening of the nuts on the bolts fixing the discs of the flexible coupling to its sliding and fixed hinges. This condition, if not corrected, could result in failure of the coupling discs, and if this condition develops on both the left-hand (LH) and right-hand (RH) MGB inputs, a complete loss of power to the transmission and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
80-13-09: 80-13-09 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-3811. Applies to McDonnell Douglas Model DC-10-10, -10F, -30, -30F and -40 Series Airplanes certificated in all categories utilizing Air Cruisers Part No. 24D30051 series passenger evacuation systems with the following serial numbers: \n\n\tLeft Hand Door: Air Cruisers Company P/N 24D30051 series, all serial numbers prior to S/N 1531, except 1508, 1510, 1511, 1515, 1519, 1521, 1523 and 1525. \n\n\tRight Hand Door: Air Cruisers Company P/N 24D30051 series, all serial numbers prior to S/N 1630, except 1605, 1611, 1613, 1615, 1619, 1621 and 1623. \n\n\tCompliance required within next eighteen (18) calendar months after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent improper deployment of the Air Cruisers Company emergency evacuation system due to delay in separation of the velcro tracking restraint device, accomplish the following: \n\n\ta.\tModify the affected evacuation system assemblies in accordance with Part 2, Accomplishment Instructions, of Air Cruisers Company Service Bulletin No. 25-75 dated January 24, 1980. \n\n\tb.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of modifications required by this AD. \n\n\tc.\tAlternative modifications or other actions which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective August 30, 1980.
47-10-29: 47-10-29 LOCKHEED: (Was Mandatory Note 32 of AD-763-3.) Applies to All Model 49 Serials Prior to 2080 on Which Metal Ailerons Are Installed. Compliance required prior to April 1, 1947. Between aileron Stations 69.5 and 99.7, install drain holes in the lower aileron surface outboard of each rib and forward of each stringer (17 holes total). (LAC Service Bulletin 49/SB-214 covers this same subject.)
80-18-03: 80-18-03 PIPER (Ted Smith): Amendment 39-3900. Applies to Aerostar Model 601 and 601P series airplanes certificated in all categories. Compliance required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent possible engine failure due to excessive lean fuel/air mixture, accomplish the following: (a) Within 30 days from the effective date of this AD, index and mark the left hand and right hand engine fuel pressure gauges with a yellow arc between the 12 psi and 18 psi range, and incorporate provisions in the Airplane Flight Manual Operations Limitations Section as follows: 1. In the Power Plant Instruments paragraph and under the Yellow ARC Caution column of the fuel pressure data add "12 -18 psi" 2. In the Fuel System Limitations paragraph add the statement "Fuel boost pump must be "ON" when fuel pressure indication is less than 18 psi and engine is operating above idle power." (b) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of the modifications required by this AD. (c) Alternative modifications or other actions which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. This amendment becomes effective October 6, 1980.
80-19-10: 80-19-10 CESSNA: Amendment 39-3922. Applies to Model 335 (Serial Numbers 335-0001 thru 335-0054 and 335-0056) and Model 340A (Serial Numbers 340A0901 thru 340A0994 and 340A1002) airplanes certified in all categories. COMPLIANCE: Required as indicated unless the requirements of Paragraph B) have been previously accomplished. To prevent flight in adverse weather conditions with no means to supply electrical power to the deicer systems: A) Prior to further flight: 1. Install, and operate the airplane in accordance with, a temporary placard on the instrument panel just below the glareshield in the pilot's line of forward vision when seated in the left control seat which states, "Not Approved For Flight In Icing Conditions." 2. Install black electrician's tape or equivalent over the bottom portion of the airplane Operational Limits placard, which is located on the pilot's sun visor, to cover the wording "AND FLIGHTS INTO ICING CONDITIONS IF THE PROPER OPTIONAL EQUIPMENT IS INSTALLED AND OPERATIONAL." 3. Pull the propeller deice and optional heated windshield circuit breakers, if installed, and install a band around each breaker to prevent activating those circuits. B) Within 25 hours time-in-service after the effective date of the AD, perform the wiring inspection and accomplish the wiring change, if required, in accordance with Cessna Multi-engine Customer Care Service Information Letter ME80-31 dated July 18,1980. Make the prescribed entry in the airplane maintenance records. C) Remove the temporary placard, cover tape and circuit breaker bands specified in Paragraphs A)1., 2., and 3. when Paragraph B has been accomplished. D) Within seven days notify, in writing, the Chief, Aircraft Certification Program, Federal Aviation Administration, Room 238, Terminal Building No. 2299, Mid-Continent Airport, Wichita, Kansas 67209 of any incorrect wiring of the deicer buss found when complying with Paragraph B). One acceptable means of making these reports is Malfunction or Defect Report (FAA Form 8010-4). (Reporting approved by the Office of Management and Budget under OMB No. 04-R0174.) Failure to comply with this paragraph subjects owners/operators to agency enforcement action. E) The airplane may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a location where this AD may be accomplished. F) Any equivalent method of compliance with this Airworthiness Directive must be approved by the Chief, Aircraft Certification Program, Federal Aviation Administration, Room 238, Terminal Building No. 2299, Mid-Continent Airport, Wichita, Kansas 67209. This amendment becomes effective on September 29, 1980, to all persons except those to whom it has already been made effective by an airmail letter from the FAA dated September 4, 1980, and is identified as AD 80-19-10.
2009-24-22: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Learjet Model 45 airplanes. This AD requires inspecting the baggage bay door fire barrier seal for inconel mesh in the fire barrier seal material; for certain airplanes, inspecting the fiberglass doublers for presence of red Room Temperature Vulcanizing (RTV) sealant; and doing related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. This AD results from reports of incorrect external baggage door seal material and door seal sealant, as well as incorrect sealant on interior baggage panels used during manufacture of the airplane. We are issuing this AD to prevent the use of door seals and sealant that do not meet flammability requirements, which could result in an uncontrollable and undetected fire within the baggage compartment.
62-16-03: 62-16-03 LOCKHEED: Amdt. 461 Part 507 Federal Register July 12, 1962. Applies to All Models 1049-54, 1049B, 1049C, 1049D, 1049E, 1049F, 1049G, and 1049H Series Aircraft. Compliance required as indicated. As a result of corrosion found on the wing rear spar upper cap exposed surfaces which exceeded the negligible damage limits the following is required: (a) Within the next 700 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, inspect the exposed surfaces of the rear spar upper caps from wing Station 80 to wing Station 458 using a wood or micarta pick as a probe and a good light source to illuminate the area. (b) If no corrosion is found, coat the spar cap with zinc chromate primer. The aircraft may then be returned to service. (c) If corrosion damage is found on the exposed surfaces of the rear spar upper cap, remove enough rivets from the aft upper surface skin to allow lifting the skin for the purpose of inspecting the aftouter surface of the rear spar upper cap in accordance with (a). (d) Repair all corrosion damage in accordance with Lockheed Report 8882, figure 2- 25 and paragraph 1-67N, or FAA approved equivalent. If no corrosion is found on the aft outer surface of the rear spar upper cap, coat it with zinc chromate. (e) All rear spar upper caps which have been inspected and repaired in accordance with (a) through (d) shall be reinspected and repaired in accordance with (a) through (d) at periods thereafter not to exceed 5,000 hours' time in service or two calendar years, whichever occurs first. The first periodic reinspection of any rear spar upper cap which was inspected and repaired in the manner prescribed in (a) through (d) prior to the effective date of this AD, shall be accomplished within 5,000 hours' time in service or two calendar years, whichever occurs first, following the date of that inspection. (f) Upon request of the operator, and FAA maintenance inspector, subject to prior approval of the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Western Region, may adjust the repetitive inspection intervals specified in this AD to permit compliance at an established inspection period of the operator if the request contains substantiating data to justify the increase for such operator. (Lockheed Field Service Letters FS/249582L dated November 4, 1960, and FS/250141L dated December 20, 1960, cover this same subject.) This directive effective August 13, 1962.
2007-15-06 R1: The FAA is revising an existing airworthiness directive (AD), which applies to all Airbus Model A318-111 and -112 series airplanes, and all Model A319, A320, and A321 series airplanes. That AD currently requires revising the Airworthiness Limitations section of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness to incorporate new limitations for fuel tank systems. This AD clarifies the intended effect of the AD on spare and on-airplane fuel tank system components. This AD results from fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer. We are issuing this AD to prevent the potential of ignition sources inside fuel tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane. DATES: This AD is effective December 14, 2009. The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of a certain publication listed in the AD as of December 14, 2009. On August 28, 2007 (72 FR 40222, July 24,2007), the Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain other publications listed in the AD. We must receive any comments on this AD by January 11, 2010.
2008-24-04: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for the specified Eurocopter France (Eurocopter) model helicopters. That AD currently requires certain checks of the magnetic chip detector plug (chip detector) and the main gearbox (MGB) oil-sight glass, certain inspections of the lubrication pump (pump), and replacing the MGB and the pump with an airworthy MGB and pump, if necessary. Also, the AD requires that before a pump or MGB with any hours time-in-service (TIS) can be installed, it must meet the AD requirements. This AD adds all serial-numbered pumps to the applicability and requires using an improved procedure for detecting oil pump wear. This amendment is prompted by additional cases of MGB lubrication pump deterioration and a further investigation that determined that all serial-numbered pumps might be affected and the development of an improved procedure that is more accurate for detecting oil pump wear earlier. The actions specified by this AD areintended to implement improved procedures to detect a failing MGB oil pump, prevent failure of the MGB pump, seizure of the MGB, loss of drive to an engine and main rotor, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
47-06-02: 47-06-02 GLOBE: (Was Mandatory Note 5 of AD-766-5.) Applies to Models GC-1A and GC-1B Aircraft Serial Numbers 3 to 408 Inclusive; 1004 to 1319 Inclusive; and 2001 to 2239 Inclusive. Compliance required prior to April 1, 1947. Replace the warning placard located at the landing gear emergency extension crank with a revised placard, Globe P/N 11-532-3735, having the added instruction: "Crank back to the full up position before the next retraction of the landing gear". Complete rewinding is necessary to prevent damage to the retraction system. (Globe Customer Service Maintenance Bulletin No. 6 covers this same subject.)
82-26-05: 82-26-05 CESSNA: Amendment 39-4519. Applies to Models 335 (S/N 335-0001 through 335- 0065), 340 (S/N 340-0001 through 340-0555), and 340A (S/N 340A0001 through 340A1521) airplanes certificated in any category. COMPLIANCE: Required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To ensure structural integrity of the rudder balance weight rib, accomplish the following: a) Within the next 100 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD and each 100 hours time-in-service thereafter, remove the fiberglass rudder tip cap and visually inspect the original rudder balance weight rib, Cessna P/N 0831311-1, for cracks. If cracks are found, before further flight, install a new rudder balance weight rib Cessna P/N 5331004-2. b) After Cessna P/N 5331004-2 rudder balance weight rib has been installed, the inspections required by paragraph a) of this AD may be discontinued. c) Aircraft may be flown, in accordance with Federal Aviation Regulation 21.197, to a location where the provisions of this AD can be accomplished. d) Any equivalent method of compliance with this AD must be approved by the Manager, Aircraft Certification Office, Federal Aviation Administration, Room 238, Terminal Building 2299, Mid-Continent Airport, Wichita, Kansas 67209; telephone (316) 269-7000. Cessna Service Information Letter, ME 82-8 dated April 2, 1982, pertains to this subject. This amendment becomes effective December 27, 1982.
2008-06-21 R1: The FAA is revising an existing airworthiness directive (AD), which applies to all McDonnell Douglas Corporation airplane models identified above. That AD currently requires revising the FAA-approved maintenance program, or the Airworthiness Limitations (AWLs) section of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness, as applicable, to incorporate new AWLs for fuel tank systems to satisfy Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 88 requirements. For certain airplanes, this AD also requires the initial accomplishment of a certain repetitive AWL inspection to phase in that inspection, and repair if necessary. This AD clarifies the intended effect of the AD on spare and on-airplane fuel tank system components. This AD results from a design review of the fuel tank system. We are issuing this AD to prevent the potential for ignition sources inside fuel tanks caused by latent failures, alterations, repairs, or maintenance actions, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, couldresult in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane. \n\nDATES: This AD is effective December 10, 2009. \n\tOn April 23, 2008 (73 FR 14673, March 19, 2008), the Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of a certain publication listed in the AD. \n\tWe must receive any comments on this AD by January 25, 2010.
2008-17-08: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: A DG-500MB experienced, after the engine shutdown, an uncommanded retraction of its powerplant. Investigations revealed that some bolts of the extension retraction mechanism had fractured because of fatigue stress due to increasing push-pull loads acting on incorrectly tightened screws. This condition, if not corrected, could lead to damage of the propeller and the fuselage, thereby reducing the structural integrity of the sailplane. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
62-16-01: 62-16-01\tBOEING: Amdt. 465 Part 507 Federal Register July 24, 1962. Applies to All Models 707 and 720 Series Aircraft. \n\n\tCompliance required within the next ten hours' time in service unless already accomplished. \n\n\tTo eliminate arcing and subsequent fire hazard resulting from presence of moisture and lint accumulation between the electrical razor outlet terminals, deactivate all electrical razor outlets by pulling all applicable AC and DC circuit breakers. Secure circuit breakers in open position. Outlets may be reactivated upon accomplishment of Boeing Service Bulletin No. 1736 or an FAA approved equivalent. \n\n\tThis directive effective upon publication in the Federal Register for all persons except those to whom it was made effective immediately by telegram dated July 6, 1962.
2009-10-09 R1: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) to revise AD 2009-10-09, which applies to Cessna Aircraft Company (Cessna) 150 and 152 series airplanes. AD 2009-10-09 requires either installing a placard prohibiting spins and other acrobatic maneuvers in the airplane or replacing the rudder stop, the rudder stop bumper, and the attachment hardware with a new rudder stop modification kit and replacing the safety wire with jamnuts. Since we issued AD 2009-10-09, we became aware of a need to clarify certain model and serial number designations, remove the duplicate requirement of replacing the safety wire with jamnuts, and clarify the conditional acceptability of using modification kit part number (P/N) SK152-25 as a terminating action to this AD. Consequently, this AD retains the actions currently required in AD 2009-10-09, corrects model designation for certain serial numbers, removes the duplicate requirement of replacing safety wire with jamnuts, and clarifies the conditional acceptability of using modification kit P/N SK152-25 as a terminating action to this AD. We are issuing this AD to prevent the rudder from traveling past the normal travel limit. Operation in this non-certificated control position is unacceptable and could cause undesirable consequences, such as contact between the rudder and the elevator. DATES: This AD becomes effective on December 11, 2009. As of June 17, 2009 (74 FR 22429, May 13, 2009), the Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of Cessna Aircraft Company Service Bulletin SEB01-1, dated January 22, 2001; Cessna Aircraft Company Service Kit SK152-25A, Revision A, dated February 9, 2001; and Cessna Aircraft Company Service Kit SK152-24A, Revision A, dated March 9, 2001, listed in this AD.
2008-04-19 R1: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above that would revise an existing AD. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: \n\n\tSubsequent to accidents involving Fuel Tank System explosions in flight * * * and on ground, * * * Special Federal Aviation Regulation 88 (SFAR88) * * * required a safety review of the aircraft Fuel Tank System * * *. \n* * * * *\n\n\tFuel Airworthiness Limitations are items arising from a systems safety analysis that have been shown to have failure mode(s) associated with an 'unsafe condition' * * *. These are identified in Failure Conditions for which an unacceptable probability of ignition risk could exist if specific tasks and/or practices are not performed in accordance with the manufacturers' requirements. \n\nThis AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI. \n\nDATES: This AD becomes effective November 18, 2009. \n\tOn April 3, 2008 (73 FR 10652, February 28, 2008), the Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the AD. \n\tWe must receive comments on this AD by December 18, 2009.
2008-13-15: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Fuel system reassessment, performed according to RBHA-E88/SFAR- 88 (Regulamento Brasileiro de Homologacao Aeronautica 88/Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 88), requires the inclusion of new maintenance tasks in the Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations (CDCCL) and in the Fuel System Limitations (FSL), necessary to preclude ignition sources in the fuel system. * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2009-22-02: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all American Champion Aircraft Corp. Models 7ECA, 7GCAA, 7GCBC, 7KCAB, 8KCAB, and 8GCBC airplanes, manufactured prior to 1989 and equipped with folding rear seat backs. This AD requires inspection of the rear seat back hinge areas for cracking and excessive elongation of the rear seat hinge bolt hole and, if cracking or excessive elongation is found, replacement of the rear seat frame. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct cracking of the rear seat back hinge area and excessive elongation of the rear seat hinge bolt hole, either of which could result in failure of the seat back. This failure could lead to a rear- seated pilot or passenger inadvertently interfering with the control stick while attempting to not roll to the rear of the airplane upon seat back failure. Consequently, this failure could result in loss of control.
2009-22-01: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. That AD currently requires initial and repetitive inspections of the low-pressure (LP) turbine discs stage 2 and stage 3 for corrosion, on certain serial number engines. This AD requires the same actions, but extends the applicability to additional engine serial numbers. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Strip results from some of the engines listed in the applicability section of this directive revealed excessively corroded low-pressure turbine disks stage 2 and stage 3. The corrosion is considered to be caused by the environment in which these engines are operated. Following a life assessment based on the strip findings it is concluded that inspections for corrosion attack are required. The action specified by this AD is intended to avoid a failure of a low-pressure turbine disk stage 2 or stage 3 due to potential corrosion problems which could result in uncontained engine failure and damage to the airplane. We are issuing this AD to detect corrosion that could cause the stage 2 or stage 3 disk of the LP turbine to fail and result in an uncontained failure of the engine.
78-24-04: 78-24-04 ISRAEL AIRCRAFT INDUSTRIES (IAI): Amendment 39-3351. Applies to Model 1121, 1121A, and 1121B airplanes, Serial Numbers through 150 except 107 and equipped with Ni-Cad battery overtemperature warning or combination overtemperature warning and indicator systems, which rely on a common single sensor per battery. Compliance required within the next 150 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To reduce the possibility of damage to the flexible fuel lines and potential fire in the event of an uncontrolled Ni-Cad battery thermal runaway, modify the flexible fuel line installation and after modification perform inspections and leak tests in accordance with Commodore Jet Service Bulletin No. CJ-16, dated May 31, 1977, or equivalent, approved by the Chief, Aircraft Certification Staff, FAA, Europe, Africa, and Middle East Region, c/o American Embassy, APO NY 09667. This amendment becomes effective December 20, 1978.
2009-21-09: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for Rolls-Royce plc RB211 Trent 875-17, Trent 877-17, Trent 884- 17, Trent 892-17, Trent 892B-17, and Trent 895-17 turbofan engines with high-pressure (HP) compressor rotor rear stage 5 and 6 discs and cone shafts, part numbers (P/Ns) FK25230 and FK27899 installed. That AD currently requires removal from service of these HP compressor rotor rear stage 5 and 6 discs and cone shafts before reaching newly reduced life limits. This AD requires removing these parts at new reduced cycle limits. This AD results from Rolls-Royce plc reducing the lives of these parts and changing the life calculating method to use "Standard Duty Cycles'' with "Multiple Flight Profile Monitoring'' and "Flight Cycles'' with "Heavy Flight Profile Monitoring''. We are issuing this AD to prevent stage 5 and 6 disc crack initiation and propagation that might lead to uncontained disc failure and damage to the airplane.
2009-21-01: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 737-300 and 737-400 series airplanes. This AD requires repetitive inspections to detect cracking of the aft fuselage skin, and related investigative/corrective actions if necessary. This AD results from reports of cracks in the aft fuselage skin on both sides of the airplane. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct cracking in the aft fuselage skin along the longitudinal edges of the bonded skin doubler, which could result in reduced structural integrity of the airplane.
2009-19-05: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 747 airplanes. This AD requires repetitive inspections for cracking of the fuselage frames in section 41, and corrective actions if necessary. This AD results from reports of cracking in fuselage frames made of 2024 aluminum alloy that were installed during previous modification of the frames in section 41 and during production. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct frame cracks, which could result in cracking of the adjacent fuselage skin and consequent rapid decompression of the airplane.
81-09-07: 81-09-07 SIKORSKY AIRCRAFT: Amendment 39-4099. Applies to S-76A series helicopters certificated in all categories with P/N 76150-09000 series and P/N 76150-09100-041, -042, -043, main rotor blades. For main rotor blades with 340 or more hours time in service, compliance required within the next 25 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. For main rotor blades with less than 340 hours time in service on the effective date of this AD, compliance required before the accumulation of 365 hours time in service. To prevent operation with cracked bolts in the main rotor blade tip plate attachment joint, accomplish the following: 1. In accordance with Sikorsky Alert Service Bulletin No. 76-65-23, dated April 16, 1981, replace the four NAS624H6 bolts which mate the 76150-09030 tip plate assembly with the 76150-09000 or 76150-09100 main rotor blade, per paragraphs D(1) through D(8), and subsequently inspect for torque per paragraph D(9), or an equivalent procedure approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Federal Aviation Administration, New England Region. 2. Report within 24 hours any discrepancies found during the rework and inspections required herein, including main rotor blade time in service, to the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Federal Aviation Administration, New England Region, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts 01803. Reporting approved by the Office of Management and Budget under OMB No. 04-401 74. The manufacturer's specifications and procedures identified and described in this directive are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a) (l). All persons affected by this directive, who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer, may obtain copies upon request to Sikorsky Aircraft, Division of United Technologies Corporation, Stratford, Connecticut 06602. These documents may also beexamined at FAA, New England Region, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts 01803, and at FAA Headquarters, 800 Independence Avenue, S.W., Washington, D.C. This AD supersedes AD 80-14-05. This amendment becomes effective May 7, 1981.