Results
2016-01-14: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Airbus Helicopters Deutschland GmbH (AHD) (previously Eurocopter Deutschland GmbH) Model MBB-BK 117 A-1, A-3, A-4, B-1, B-2, C-1, and C-2 helicopters. This AD requires an initial and recurring inspection of the N2 control arm and, depending on the outcome of the inspection, repairing or replacing the N2 control arm. This AD was prompted by a report of a heavily corroded and broken N2 control arm. The actions of this AD are intended to detect corrosion, a crack, or a scratch in the N2 control arm, which could lead to failure of the N2 control arm, a drop in rotor speed, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
98-12-22: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to Bell Helicopter Textron Canada (BHTC) Model 407 helicopters that requires shimming the tail rotor drive system bearing supports (bearing supports). This amendment is prompted by reports of cracked bearing hangar support arms in the area of the fillet radius. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of the bearing supports, which could result in excessive tail rotor drive system vibration, loss of tail rotor drive, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
2002-26-07: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain Bombardier Model CL-600-2C10 (Regional Jet Series 700 & 701) series airplanes. This action requires revising the airplane flight manual (AFM) to advise the flightcrew to limit use of the auxiliary power unit (APU) to ground operation only, except for those in-flight emergencies described in the AFM when use of the APU is specified. This action also provides for optional terminating action for the requirements of this AD. This action is necessary to prevent fuel from being sprayed throughout the APU compartment and drawn out of the APU exhaust duct due to a cracked APU fuel nozzle, which could result in a fire or explosion in the APU compartment during flight. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
47-33-03: 47-33-03 BEECH: (Was Mandatory Note 5 of AD-757-2 and Mandatory Note 4 of AD- 582-2.) Applies to AT-11 and C18S Aircraft. \n\n\tTo be accomplished prior to certification or, if certificated, on next periodic inspection but not later than November 1, 1947. \n\n\tIn order to provide better tail cone drainage, add two drain holes in the tail cone and two 1/4-inch drain holes in the fuselage bulkhead No. 15 as shown in Figure 2. \n\n\n\n\n\t(Beech Service Bulletin No. C18-7 covers this same subject.)
2024-25-02: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain CFM International, S.A. (CFM) Model LEAP-1B engines. This AD was prompted by a report of a quality escape involving certain high- pressure compressor (HPC) stage 2 seals manufactured without detailed finish machining, which could result in deeper rubs and mechanical damage to the seal teeth of the stage 3-4 compressor rotor blisk (stage 3-4 blisk) of the mating compressor rotor during initial operation. This AD requires a visual inspection of the HPC stage 2 seal, a visual inspection of the forward arm seal teeth of the stage 3-4 blisk, an eddy current inspection (ECI) of the forward arm seal teeth of the stage 3-4 blisk, and replacement of the HPC stage 2 seal and the stage 3-4 blisk, if necessary. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2016-01-12: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Bombardier, Inc. Model BD-700-1A10 and BD-700-1A11 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of fluid entry and accumulation in the aft equipment bay. This AD requires modifying the aft equipment bay. We are issuing this AD to prevent excessive quantities of flammable fluid accumulation in the aft equipment bay. Flammable fluid entry and accumulation in the aft equipment bay, in excessive quantities, could exceed safe levels maintained by the drainage and ventilation system.
98-04-31: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all Fairchild Model F27 and FH227 series airplanes, that requires revising the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) to specify procedures that would prohibit flight in severe icing conditions (as determined by certain visual cues), limit or prohibit the use of various flight control devices while in severe icing conditions, and provide the flight crew with recognition cues for, and procedures for exiting from, severe icing conditions. This amendment is prompted by results of a review of the requirements for certification of the airplane in icing conditions, new information on the icing environment, and icing data provided currently to the flight crews. The actions specified by this AD are intended to minimize the potential hazards associated with operating the airplane in severe icing conditions by providing more clearly defined procedures and limitations associated with such conditions.
2002-24-51: This document publishes in the Federal Register an amendment adopting airworthiness directive (AD) 2002-24-51 that was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of the airplane models described previously by individual notices. This AD requires revising the Airplane Flight Manual to require the flightcrew to maintain certain minimum fuel levels in the center fuel tanks and, for certain airplanes, to prohibit the use of the horizontal stabilizer fuel tank and the certain center auxiliary fuel tanks. This action is prompted by reports indicating that two fuel tank pumps showed evidence of extreme localized overheating of parts in the priming and vapor pump section of the fuel pump; such overheating provides an ignition source in the fuel tank during dry running of the pump, which could result in fire/explosion of the fuel tank. The actions specified by this AD are intended to require the flightcrew to maintain certain minimum fuel levels in the center fuel tanks and, for certain airplanes and, for certain airplanes to prohibit the use of the horizontal stabilizer fuel tank and certain center auxiliary fuel tanks.
99-10-03: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all British Aerospace Model BAC 1-11 200 and 400 series airplanes, that requires an inspection to detect cracking of the flap control lever and to identify the material from which the lever is made; replacement of the flap control lever with an improved part, if necessary; and repetitive inspections for airplanes having a lever made from certain material. This amendment is prompted by issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of the flap control lever, which could result in restricted flap movement and consequent reduced controllability of the airplane.
2024-25-09: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 757 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of several occurrences of a power transfer unit (PTU) control valve that failed to open when commanded. This AD requires installing new relays and changing certain wire bundles leading to the PTU control valve. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
47-02-04: 47-02-04 DOUGLAS: (Was Mandatory Note 12 AD-762-7.) Applies to C-54 and DC-4 Aircraft.\n \n\tTo be accomplished not later than March 15, 1947. \n\n\tRelocate engine primer solenoid to prevent fuel leaking into firewall junction box. This change shall be accomplished in accordance with item 25 of Douglas Service Bulletin C-54-266, dated May 17, 1946, or part 2A, item 4; and part 2C, item 12 of Douglas Service Bulletin DC-4 No. 66, dated June 18, 1947. \n\n\tRevised May 24, 1948.
47-02-09: 47-02-09 CULVER: (Was Mandatory Note 2 of AD-778-2.) Applies to Models V and V2 Aircraft Serial Numbers V-1 to V-150 Inclusive. Compliance required prior to April 1, 1947. Replace the brazed cabin heater valve box mounted on the firewall with a similar welded valve box which has fire resistant properties equivalent to the firewall. (Culver Service Bulletin No. 7 covers this same subject.)
75-17-21: 75-17-21 HAWKER SIDDELEY AVIATION, LTD: Amendment 39-2323. Applies to DH-125 and BH-125 airplanes certificated in all categories. Compliance required as indicated. To prevent possible rapid loss of cabin pressurization, accomplish the following: Within 50 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, inspect all Hellerman type cabin pressure seal bungs for displacement and rework as necessary in accordance with the following: (a) Locate all Hellerman type cabin pressure seal bungs for the particular aircraft being inspected. NOTE: Refer to the relevant aircraft wiring diagram manual (2 volumes) and to the maintenance practices in the Maintenance Manual, Chapter 24-00 (all series pre-600) and Chapter 24-01 (series 600). Pressure bung installations may be of the normal or reverse type assembly as defined in the Maintenance Manual reference noted in paragraph (c) of this AD. The total number may vary from one airplane toanother depending on the electrical equipment installed. (b) Gain access to the bungs in accordance with the procedures in the Maintenance Manual, Chapters 24 and 25. (c) Inspect the bungs (both normal and reverse assemblies) for displacement and reinspect and/or rework as necessary in accordance with the instructions contained in Part B of temporary revision dated April 1, 1975, to HSA Maintenance Manual, Chapter 24-00 (all series except 600) and Chapter 24-01 (series 600), or the appropriate sections of the referenced chapters if the temporary revision has been incorporated into the HSA Maintenance Manual, or an FAA-approved equivalent. (d) Where pressure bung(s) have been removed for rework, upon re-installation of the pressure bung(s) conduct a cabin leak rate check in accordance with the appropriate provisions of chapter 21 of the HSA Maintenance Manual prior to further flight to ensure the integrity of the pressure cabin. This amendment becomes effective August 19, 1975.
2016-01-19: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for MD Helicopters Inc. (MDHI) Model 500N and 600N helicopters with certain rotating cone assemblies installed. This AD requires establishing a life limit of 10,000 hours time-in-service (TIS) on these rotating cone assemblies. This AD was prompted by the determination that MDHI created rotating cone assemblies with new dash numbers but incorrectly failed to identify them as life-limited parts. The actions are intended to prevent operation of rotating cone assemblies past their life limits, failure of the rotating cone assemblies, loss of directional control, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
86-19-07: 86-19-07 BOEING: Amendment 39-5402. Applies to all Model 767 airplanes, certificated in any category, listed in Boeing Service Bulletin 767-52-0042, Revision A, dated January 15, 1986. To prevent structural failure of the vertical fin in the event of a rupture of the aft pressure bulkhead, accomplish the following within 12 months after the effective date of this amendment, unless already accomplished: \n\n\tA.\tInstall a stronger replacement fin access door or reinforce the existing fin access door in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 767-52-0042, Revision A, dated January 15, 1986, or later FAA-approved revisions. \n\n\tB.\tAlternate means of compliance or adjustment of compliance times, which provide an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service document from the manufacturer, may obtain copies upon request to the Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207. This document may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective October 2, 1986.
86-02-52 R1: 86-02-52 R1 PRATT & WHITNEY: Amendment 39-5264. Applies to Pratt & Whitney (PW) JT8D-1, -1A, -1B, -7, -7A, -7B, -9, -9A, -11, -15, -15A, -17, -17A, -17R, and -17AR model turbofan engines overhauled by Aerothrust Corporation of Miami, Florida, with the following serial numbers: 648779 654034 657429 667109 688132 649019 654072 657480 667127 688418 649218 654344 657591 667130 688440 649255 654595 657699 667144 688441 649281 654799 657714 667203 688444 649283 654806 657742 667204 688445 649285 654857 665873 667216 688473 649347 654909 666661 674268 688504 649581 654975 666685 674465 688505 649655 655366 666716 674564 688509 653453 655813 666738 674611 688839 653509 655920 666764 687309 688844 653512 655967 666804 687323 689877 653526 656047 666850 687413 689935 653571 656089 666853 687715 696688 653645 656120 666878 687727 696720 653699 656854 666976 687806 702937 653838 656975666980 687836 702938 653854 657066 666989 687840 702975 653992 657112 666993 687841 653996 657201 667042 657258 667059 Compliance is required as indicated unless already accomplished. To prevent fracture of the combustion chamber which could result in an uncontained engine failure, accomplish the following: NOTES: 1) For the initial inspection, time since inspection (TSI) is defined as hours or cycles since installation by Aerothrust. Thereafter, for the repetitive inspections, TSI is defined as hours or cycles since the last inspection. 2) For the initial inspection, the cumulative crack length at the 2-3 seam weld is that present at the time of installation by Aerothrust as determined by individual chamber x-ray film records on file at Aerothrust. 3) Investigation is continuing and pending the results, additional engine serial numbers may be added to this AD. (a) Remove from service within the next 100 hours or 100cycles time in service from the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs first, chambers with greater than 8 inches but less than or equal to 12 inches cumulative crack length at installation by Aerothrust. (b) Remove from service, prior to further flight, chambers with greater than 12 inches cumulative crack length at installation by Aerothrust. (c) Inspect combustion chamber 2-3 seam welds in accordance with PW Service Bulletin Number 5639, dated November 15, 1985, or FAA approved equivalent, per the following schedule: (1) Inspect chambers with 3 inches or less cumulative crack length as follows: (i) Prior to accumulating 2,000 hours or 1,500 cycles TSI, whichever occurs first; or (ii) For chambers with greater than 1,900 hours or 1,400 cycles TSI on the effective date of this AD, inspect within the next 100 hours or 100 cycles time in service, whichever occurs first. (2) Inspect chambers with greater than 3 inches but less than or equal to 6 inches cumulative crack length as follows: (i) Prior to accumulating 1,500 hours or 1,000 cycles TSI, whichever occurs first; or (ii) For chambers with greater than 1,400 hours or 900 cycles TSI on the effective date of this AD, inspect within the next 100 hours or 100 cycles time in service, whichever occurs first. (3) Inspect chambers with greater than 6 inches but less than or equal to 8 inches cumulative crack length as follows: (i) Prior to accumulating 250 hours or 200 cycles TSI, whichever occurs first; or (ii) For chambers with greater than 150 hours or 100 cycles TSI on the effective date of this AD, inspect within the next 100 hours or 100 cycles time in service, whichever occurs first. (4) Chambers for which the cumulative crack length at installation by Aerothrust cannot be confirmed must be inspected within the next 100 hours or 100 cycles time in service, whichever occurs first. (d) Reinspect chambers, thereafter, in accordancewith the appropriate inspection interval of paragraphs (c)(1) through (c(3), as determined by the crack length at last inspection or at installation by Aerothrust, whichever crack length is greater. Remove from service, prior to further flight, any chambers with greater than 8 inches cumulative crack length at reinspection. Aircraft may be ferried in accordance with the provisions of FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to a base where the AD can be accomplished. Upon request, an equivalent means of compliance with the requirements of this AD may be approved by the Manager, Engine Certification Office, New England Region. Upon submission of substantiating data by an owner or operator through an FAA maintenance inspector, the Manager, Engine Certification Office, New England Region, may adjust the compliance time specified in this AD. Pratt & Whitney Service Bulletin Number 5639, dated November 15, 1985, identified and described in this document is incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). All persons affected by this directive who have not already received this document from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Pratt & Whitney, East Hartford, Connecticut. This document may also be examined at the Office of the Regional Counsel, Federal Aviation Administration, Rules Docket Number 86-ANE-3, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts 01803, weekdays, except Federal holidays, between 8:00 a.m. and 4:30 p.m. This amendment becomes effective April 14, 1986, as to all persons except those persons to whom it was made immediately effective by TAD T86-02-52, issued January 29, 1986, which contained this amendment. TAD T86-02-52 superseded TAD T85-17-51R1 for the engines affected by this TAD, and this TAD supersedes TAD T86-02-51.
93-16-15: 93-16-15 TELEDYNE CONTINENTAL MOTORS: Amendment 39-8743. Docket 93-ANE-55. Applicability: Teledyne Continental Motors (TCM) Model IO-520B, IO-520BA, IO-520BB, IO-520C, IO- 520CB, IO-520M, IO-520MB; IO-550A, IO-550B, IO-550C, IO-550G; TSIO-520B, TSIO-520BB, TSIO-520D, TSIO-520DB, TSIO-520E, TSIO-520EB, TSIO-520J, TSIO-520JB, TSIO-520K, TSIO-520KB, TSIO-520L, TSIO-520LB, TSIO-520N, TSIO-520NB, TSIO-520UB, TSIO-520VB, TSIO-520WB; TSIO-550B; and TSIOL- 550A and TSIOL-550B reciprocating engines, with serial numbers lower than those listed in TCM Mandatory Service Bulletin (MSB) No. M93-9, Revision 1, dated March 10, 1993; which are equipped with the following fuel pumps: Part Numbers (P/N) 646210-1, -2, -8, -10, -11; P/N 646212-2, -5, -16, -17; P/N 646758-5, -7, -8, -9; P/N 646765-6 and -7; P/N 646766-1 and -2; 646767-1; 649368-19; or engines equipped with any fuel pump, regardless of part number that have had the fuel pump replaced in the field prior to the effective date of this AD with fuel pump drive shaft, P/N 646176, installed. These engines are installed on but not limited to the following aircraft: Beech Bonanza 35-C33A, E33A/C, F33A/C, S35, V35/A/B, A36/TC, B36TC; Beech Baron 95-C55/A, D55/A, E55/A, 58/A/P/PA/TC/TCA; Cessna 310R, T310P/Q/R, 320 D/E/F, 335 series, 340 series, 401 series, 402 series, 414 series; Cirrus VK-30; Lancaire IV; Mooney M20K with Rocket Engineering Corporation "Rocket Mooney" STC; Navion Model H; and Questair. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. To prevent possible fuel pump drive shaft disengagement and loss of engine power, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 30 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, visually inspect the fuel pump to determine which combination of fuel pump drive shaft and fuel pump drive coupling is installed, and replace, if necessary, fuel pump drive couplings that have less than the minimum required coupling engagement with longer fuelpump drive couplings, in accordance with Figure 1 of TCM MSB No. M93-9, Revision 1, dated March 10, 1993, as follows: (1) If fuel pump drive shaft, P/N 646176, is installed with fuel pump drive coupling, P/N 631263, replace the fuel pump drive coupling with a serviceable fuel pump drive coupling, P/N 653359. (2) If fuel pump drive shaft, P/N 643689, is installed with either fuel pump drive coupling, P/N 631263 or 653359, no further action is required. (3) If fuel pump drive shaft, P/N 646176, is installed with fuel pump drive coupling, P/N 653359, no further action is required. (b) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office. The request should be forwarded through an appropriate FAA Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office. NOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this airworthiness directive, if any, may be obtained from the Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office. (c) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. (d) The inspections, and replacement, if necessary, shall be done in accordance with the following service bulletin: Document No. Pages Revision Date TCM MSB No. M93-9 1-5 1 March 10, 1993 Total pages: 5. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. Copies may be obtained from Teledyne Continental Motors, P.O. Box 90, Mobile, AL 36601; telephone (205) 438-3411. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, New England Region, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC. (e) This amendment becomes effective December 14, 1993, to all persons except those persons to whom it was made immediately effective by priority letter AD 93-16-15, issued September 27, 1993, which contained the requirements of this amendment.
2024-25-04: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2023-23- 10, which applied to all Embraer S.A. Model ERJ 190-300 airplanes. AD 2023-23-10 required repetitive inspections of the press-fitted bushings of the wing ailerons for migration and broken sealant, measurements of the distance between the aileron surfaces and hinge fittings, functional checks of the backlash of the wing aileron control system, and all applicable related investigative and corrective actions. Since the FAA issued AD 2023-23-10, it was determined that certain requirements needed to be clarified. This AD continues to require all actions of ANAC AD 2023-06-01 with revised compliance requirements, as specified in an Ag[ecirc]ncia Nacional de Avia[ccedil][atilde]o Civil (ANAC) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
85-01-03: 85-01-03 McDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-4977. Applies to McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9 and C-9 (Military) series airplanes, manufacturer's fuselage numbers 1 through 1125, certificated in all categories. Compliance required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent failures of the spoiler drive link(s), P/N 3923250-1, -501 and/or -503; and spoiler fitting(s), P/N 3923251-1 and/or -501, accomplish the following: Part I \n\n\tA.\tApplies to McDonnell Douglas DC-9-10 through -50, and C-9 (Military) series airplanes. \n\n\t\t1.\tFor operators who have accomplished terminating action in accordance with Airworthiness Directive (AD) 74-16-02, Amendment 39-2213, dated May 27, 1975, within the next 3,000 flight hours or 3,000 cycles, whichever occurs first, from the effective date of this AD, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 3,000 flight hours or 3,000 cycles, whichever occurs first, perform non-destructive inspection (NDI) in accordance with the instructions contained in McDonnell Douglas Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) Manual, TR 7-1 through 7-4, referenced in McDonnell Douglas DC-9 Service Bulletins 27-228 and/or 27-229, both service bulletins dated August 19, 1982, or later NDT Manual or Service Bulletin revisions approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. Alternate means of compliance which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tNOTE: McDonnell Douglas Service Bulletins 27-228 and 27-229, both dated August 19, 1982, and 27-240, dated June 30, 1983, are hereinafter referred to as SB 27-228, SB 27-229, and SB 27-240. \n\n\t\t2.\tFor operators who have instituted the program of visual/repetitive inspections in accordance with AD 74-16-02, Amendment 39-2213, dated May 27, 1975, at the next scheduled repetitive inspection, comply with the instructions in accordance with this AD, as applicable. \n\n\t\t3.\tFor operators who have not implemented AD 74-16-02, Amendment 39-2213, dated May 27, 1975: \n\n\t\t\ta.\tWithin the next 300 flight hours or 300 cycles, whichever occurs first, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 300 flight hours or 300 cycles from the effective date of this AD: \n\n\t\t\t\t(1)\tVisually inspect the exposed surfaces on the forward and aft lugs, including the areas surrounding the grease fittings on the spoiler actuating link, and \n\n\t\t\t\t(2)\tVisually inspect the exposed surface and areas surrounding the grease fitting on the spoiler fitting. \n\n\t\t\tb.\tAt or prior to the accumulation of an additional 1,000 flight hours or 1,000 cycles, whichever comes first, from first visual inspection on these parts, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 3,000 flight hours or 3,000 cycles, whichever comes first, institute the program of NDI inspections as required by Part I, paragraph A.1, above, until terminating action in accordance with Part I, Paragraph A.6., below, is accomplished. \n\n\t\t\tNOTE: The requirements for visual inspections may be terminated upon instituting the NDI program specified in Part I, paragraph A.1, of this AD. \n\n\t\t4.\tIf no cracks are found in the spoiler drive link or fitting assemblies in the areas identified by Figures 1 through 7 of NDT Manual TR 7-1 through TR 7-4 referenced in SB 27-228 and/or SB 27-229, or a FAA approved alternate NDT method in accordance with Part I, paragraph C.3., below, continue repetitive inspections in accordance with Part I, paragraph A.1., above, until such time terminating action is accomplished in accordance with Part I, paragraph A.6., below. \n\n\t\t5.\tIf cracks are found in the spoiler drive links, or fittings in areas identified by Part I, paragraph A.3., above. \n\n\t\t\ta.\tReplace with new flight spoiler components, in accordance with paragraph 2. of the Accomplishment Instructions, Figure 1, of SB 27-240. \n\n\t\t\tb.\tReplace with spoiler drive link, or aft attach fitting, and continue repetitive inspection in accordance with Part I, paragraph A.1., above, until terminating action is accomplished in accordance with Part I, paragraph A.6., below. \n\n\t\t6.\tReplacement of the flight spoiler components with new components in accordance with SB 27-240, dated June 30, 1983, or later FAA approved revisions, constitutes terminating action for repetitive inspection requirements of this AD. \n\n\t\tNOTE: Accomplishment of the preventive modification in accordance with SB 27-240 will constitute terminating action for the repetitive inspection requirements of this AD. \n\n\tB.\tApplies to McDonnell Douglas DC-9-80 series airplanes: \n\n\t\t1.\tAirplanes that are not affected by AD 74-16-02, Amendment 39-2213, dated May 27, 1975, but are affected by McDonnell Douglas Report MDC-J8855, Revisions A through G, or later FAA approved revisions, will continue existing inspection program. This program performs NDT inspections of the flight spoiler drive links or fittings, as follows: \n\n\t\t\ta.\tOne time visual inspection prior to exceeding 5000 total airplane flight hours. \n\n\t\t\tb.\tInitial ultrasonic and/or eddy current inspection within 1000 flight hours after visual inspection. \n\n\t\t\tc.\tRepetitive ultrasonic and/or eddy current inspections at intervals not to exceed 3000 flight hours or 3000 landings whichever occurs first, until Service Bulletin 27-240 is accomplished. \n\n\t\t\td.\tReplacement of flight spoiler drive link with a new P/N 3923250-503 link requires reinstituting the repetitive ultrasonic and/or eddy current inspections within 6000 flight hours or 6000 landings, whichever occurs first. \n\n\t\t\te.\tReplacement of flight spoiler drive fitting with new P/N 3923251-1 "G" or -501 fitting assembly requires reinstituting the repetitive ultrasonic and/or eddy current inspections within 6000 flight hours or 6000 landings, whichever comes first. \n\n\t\t2.\tAccomplishment of the preventative modifications in accordance with SB 27-240 will constitute terminatingaction for the special inspection requirements listed in McDonnell Douglas Report MDC-J8855, Parts III and IV, Revisions A through G, or later FAA approved revisions. \n\n\tC.\tApplies to all McDonnell Douglas DC-9 and Military C-9 series airplanes: \n\n\t\t1.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of modifications required by this AD. \n\n\t\t2.\tUpon the request of an operator, an FAA Maintenance Inspector, subject to approval by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, may adjust the repetitive inspection intervals specified in this AD to permit compliance at an established inspection period of that operator, if the request contains substantiating data to justify the change for that operator. \n\n\t\t3.\tAlternate means of compliance which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\t\tNOTE: For purposes of this AD, if the time-in-service hours of either the spoiler actuating link or the spoiler fitting cannot be established, the part will be considered to have the same number of time-in-service hours as the airplane on which it is installed. \n\nPart II \n\n\tApplies to all DC-9 series aircraft, fuselage numbers 1 through 1125, certificated in all categories, as indicated below: \n\n\tTo provide crews with operation information should spoiler float occur, evidenced by abrupt roll, and to provide for a permanent change in the "Emergency Procedures" Section of the FAA approved Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) (and appropriate AFM sections of the operator's manual required by FAR 121.133 and 121.141), accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tPLACARD \n\n\tWithin 30 days after effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, install a placard as close as practicable to the flap position indicator, containing the following wording or an equivalent wording as approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, reading as follows: \n\n\tDC-9-10 \n\n\t"Flap selection excess 20 degrees must be made prior to 1000 feet AGL. See Section I, AFM for alternate procedures." (The last sentence may be omitted from the placard if the use of alternate landing flap setting is not desired.) \n\n\tDC-9-20, -30, -40, -50, and C-9 (Military Series) \n\n\t"Flap selection excess 25 degrees must be made prior to 1000 feet AGL. See Section I, AFM for alternate procedures." (The last sentence may be omitted from the placard if the use of alternate landing flap setting is not desired.) \n\n\tDC-980 Series \n\n\t"Flap selection excess 28 degrees must be made prior to 1000 feet AGL. See Section I, AFM for alternate procedures." (The last sentence may be omitted from placard if the use of alternate landing flap setting is not desired.) \n\n\tB.\tLIMITATIONS \n\n\t\t1.\tThe limitations set forth below are effective as of June 14, 1974, for the Models DC-9-10 through -40 series and C-9A and C-9B airplanes; and effective within 30 days after the effective date for the Models DC-9-50 and -80 series airplanes. \n\n\t\t2.\tWithin 30 days after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, incorporate the "Limitations" set forth below into the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM). Operators must initiate actions to notify and ensure that the flight crewmembers are apprised of these limitations. \n\n\tDC-9-10 Series \n\n\tSec. I Limitations: (New Title) "Flaps": \n\n\t"Flap selection in excess of 20 degrees must be made prior to descending below 1000 feet above ground level except for the following: \n\n\tApproach and landing may be made with a maximum of 30 degree flap when 15 percent is added to the 50 degree flap landing field length." \n\n\tSec. I Limitations: Performance and Operating Limitations. Add a new paragraph as follows: \n\n\t"When using the 30 degrees flaps for landing, the maximum permissible quick turn around landing weight shown on the plot 'Maximum Permissible Quick Turn Around Landing Weight Flaps Down' in Section IV must be reduced by 15 percent." \n\n\tDC-9-20, -30, -40, -50, and C-9 (Military Series) \n\n\tSec. I Limitations: (New Title) "Flaps" \n\n\t"Flap selection in excess of 25 degrees must be made prior to descending below 1000 feet above ground level except for the following: \n\n\tApproach and landing may be made with a maximum of 25 degree flap when 20 percent is added to the 50 degree flap landing field length." \n\n\tSec. I Limitations: Performance and Operating Limitations. Add new paragraph as follows: \n\n\t"When using the 25 degree flap for landing, the maximum permissible quick turn around landing weight shown on the plot 'Maximum Permissible Quick Turn Around Landing Weight Flaps Full Down' in Section IV must be reduced by 20 percent." \n\n\tDC-9-80 Series \n\n\tSec. I Limitations: "Flaps" \n\n\t"Flap selection in excess of 28 degrees must be made prior to descending below 1000 feet above ground level." \n\n\t\t3.\tThe above "Limitations" may be terminated, and the "Placard" removed when operator(s) have implemented the repetitive inspections required by Part I of this AD. \n\n\tC.\tEMERGENCY PROCEDURES \n\n\t\t1.\tThe Emergency Procedures set forth below are effective as of June 14, 1974, for the Models DC-9-10 through -40 series and C-9A and C-9B airplanes; and effective within 30 days after the effective date of this AD for the Models DC-9-50 and -80 series airplanes. \n\n\t\t2.\tWithin 30 days after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, incorporate the "Emergency Procedures" set forth below into the Airplane Flight Manual. These procedures constitute a permanent change to the manual. Operators must initiate action to notify and ensure that flight crewmembers are apprised of this change. \n\n\tDC-9-10, -20, -30, -33F, -40, and C-9 (Military Series) \n\n\tSection II: Emergency Procedure (New Title) "Spoiler Float"; \n\n\t"Should rapid roll develop during extension of flap to 50 degrees, retract immediately to single engine landing flap setting. Adjust speed as required." \n\n\tDC-9-34, -50 Series \n\n\tSection II: Emergency Procedure (New Title) "Spoiler Float"; \n\n\t"Should rapid roll develop during extension of flap beyond 25 degrees, retract immediately to single engine landing flap setting. Adjust speed as required." \n\n\tDC-9-80 Series \n\n\tSection II: Emergency Procedure (New Title) "Spoiler Float"; \n\n\t"Should rapid roll develop during extension of flap beyond 28 degrees, retract immediately to single engine landing flap setting. Adjust speed as required." \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Director, Publications and Training, C1-750 (54-60). These documents also may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 4344 Donald Douglas Drive, Long Beach, California. \n\n\tThis supersedes AD 74-16-02, Amendment 39-2213, dated May 27, 1975. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective February 14, 1985.
2021-09-11: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Saab AB, Support and Services Model SAAB 2000 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report indicating that the left-hand main landing gear (MLG) collapsed after touchdown, causing severe damage to the airplane. This AD requires modifying the MLG hydraulic transfer valve, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
91-15-15: 91-15-15 E.I. DUPONT DE NEMOURS & COMPANY: Amendment 39-7079. Docket No. 91-ANE-21. Applicability: E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., TSO-C116 Crewmember Protective Breathing Equipment Model 4566M37B-042N, with serial numbers below S/N V9100000, installed on, but not limited to transport category aircraft. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. To prevent the failure of a crewmember to remove the pouch from the bracket in case of a fire, accomplish the following within 45 days after the effective date of this AD: (a) Remove the Velcro Strips and insert new left and right spacers in accordance with Paragraph 2, Procedure Instructions, of E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., Service Bulletin 002, dated February 5, 1991. (b) Aircraft may be ferried in accordance with the provisions of FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to a base where the AD can be accomplished. (c) Upon submission of substantiating data by an owner or operator through an FAA Inspector (maintenance, avionics, or operations, as appropriate), and alternate method of compliance with the requirements of this AD or adjustments to the compliance specified in this AD may be approved by the Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office, 181 South Franklin Ave., Valley Stream, New York, 11581-1145. (d) The modifications shall be done in accordance with the following E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. Service Bulletin No. 002: Page No. Issue Date 1-5 Original February 5, 1991 Total Pages: 5 This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., P.O. Box 791, 505 Blue Ball Road, Elkton, Maryland 21921. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, New England Region, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, Room 311, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts, or New York Aircraft Certification Office, 181South Franklin Ave., Valley Stream, New York, or at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L Street, NW, Room 8401, Washington, D.C. Airworthiness Directive 91-15-15, published in the Federal Register on July 26, 1991, was not distributed to the public by FAA due to a clerical error in the AD. This corrected version of AD 91-15-15, Amendment 39-7079, published in the Federal Register on August 15, 1991, becomes effective on August 15, 1991.
2003-16-09: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain Learjet Model 45 airplanes. This action incorporates a reduced life-limit replacement interval for certain shear pins in the trunnion assemblies of the main landing gears (MLG) into the airworthiness limitations section of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness, and requires replacement of those certain shear pins with new, improved shear pins. This action is necessary to prevent failure of the shear pins in the trunnion assemblies of the MLGs, which could result in the collapse of a MLG, and consequent reduced controllability of the airplane during takeoff or landing. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2002-24-08: This amendment supersedes Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2002- 05-05, which currently applies to certain Cirrus Design Corporation (Cirrus) Models SR20 and SR22 airplanes. AD 2002-05-05 currently requires you to incorporate temporary operating limitations into the Limitation Section of the airplane flight manual (AFM) for certain affected airplanes and install a cable clamp external to the cone adapter on the Cirrus Airplane Parachute System (CAPS) activation cable for all affected airplanes. AD 2002-05-05 resulted from a report from the manufacturer that certain CAPS may not activate in an emergency situation. This AD is the result of the manufacturer redesigning the CAPS activation system. This AD requires you to modify the CAPS activation system. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of the CAPS activation system in an emergency situation. Failure of this system could result in occupant injury and/ or loss of life and loss of aircraft.
2002-24-07: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain Aerostar Aircraft Corporation (Aerostar) Models PA- 60-601 (Aerostar 601), PA-60-601P (Aerostar 601P), PA-60-602P (Aerostar 602P), and PA-60-700P (Aerostar 700P). This AD requires you to replace Roto-Master and Rajay scavenge pumps with improved design Aerostar scavenge pumps. This AD is the result of failures of the existing Roto- Master and Rajay scavenge pumps found during regular maintenance inspections. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent in-flight failure of the oil scavenge pumps, which could result in loss of engine oil and possible loss of engine power.
2002-23-19: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all Dassault Model Falcon 2000 series airplanes, and certain Dassault Model Falcon 900EX and Mystere Falcon 900 series airplanes. That AD currently requires repetitive operational tests of the flap asymmetry detection system to verify proper functioning, and repair, if necessary; repetitive replacement of the inboard flap jackscrews with new or reconditioned jackscrews; and repetitive measurement of the screw/nut play of the jackscrews on the inboard and outboard flaps to detect discrepancies, and corrective action if necessary. This amendment removes Model 900EX and Mystere Falcon 900 series airplanes from the applicability of the existing AD. For Model Falcon 2000 series airplanes, this amendment also adds certain repetitive measurements, deletes certain repetitive measurements, and extends the interval for repetitive replacement of certain jackscrews. This amendment is prompted by issuance ofmandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent jamming of the flap jackscrews during the approach to landing, which could result in inability to move the flaps or an asymmetric flap condition, and consequent reduced controllability of the airplane.