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84-13-02: 84-13-02 McDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-4881. Applies to McDonnell Douglas Model DC-8-11, through -61 series airplanes, certificated in all categories, having accumulated 30,000 flight hours or 14,000 landings. Compliance required as indicated unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent failure of the wing front spar lower cap, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tWithin 300 flight hours or upon the accumulation of either 30,000 flight hours or 14,000 landings, whichever occurs later, after the effective date of this AD perform the initial inspection in accordance with paragraph 1.C in McDonnell Douglas DC-8 Service Bulletin 57-89, Revision 2, dated July 27, 1983, or later revision approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tB.\tIf no cracks are found, repeat the inspection of paragraph A., above, at intervals not to exceed 3,600 flight hours until the modification described in paragraph C., below, is accomplished.C.\tThe repetitive inspection requirement of paragraph B., above, may be discontinued for aircraft modified (enlarge and stress-coin attachment holes and install angles) in accordance with McDonnell Douglas DC-8 Service Bulletin 57-89, Revision 2. \n\n\tD.\tIf cracks are found, repair in accordance with McDonnell Douglas DC-8 Service Bulletin 57-89 under Conditions II through VI. \n\n\tE.\tAlternate means of compliance which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tF.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tG.\tReport the results of the initial inspections required by paragraph A., above, to the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. Include in the reporting information the date and condition of the structure or repair per McDonnell Douglas DC-8 Service Bulletin 57-89, McDonnell Douglas factory serial number, fuselage number, registration number, and accumulated number of flight hours and landings. \n\n\tH.\tFor purposes of complying with this AD, subject to acceptance by the assigned FAA Maintenance Inspector, the number of landings may be determined by dividing each airplane's time in service by the operator's fleet average from takeoff to landing for the airplane type. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Director, Publications and Training, C1-750 (54-60). These documents also may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 4344 Donald Douglas Drive, Long Beach, California.This amendment becomes effective June 27, 1984.
2013-22-14 R1: We are revising an airworthiness directive (AD) 2013-22-14 for any DG Flugzeugbau GmbH Model DG-1000T glider equipped with a Solo Kleinmotoren Model 2350 C engine. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as engine shaft failure and consequent propeller detachment. We are issuing this AD to require actions to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2000-03-20: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all Airbus Model A300-600 series airplanes, that requires repetitive ultrasonic inspections to detect cracks on the forward fittings in the radius of frame 40 adjacent to the tension bolts in the center section of the wings, and various follow-on actions. This amendment is prompted by reports of cracking due to fatigue-related stress in the radius of frame 40 adjacent to the tension bolts at the center/outer wing junction. The actions specified by this AD are intended to detect and correct fatigue cracking on the forward fittings in the radius of frame 40 adjacent to the tension bolts in the center section of the wings, which could result in reduced structural integrity of the wings.
89-03-05: 89-03-05 BOEING: Amendment 39-6120. Applicability: Model 757 series airplanes listed in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 757- 27A0086, dated June 9, 1988, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent unacceptable airframe vibrations during flight, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tFor airplanes on which the elevator power control actuator (PCA) rod end and reaction link rod end bearings are lubricated at intervals of 1,000 flight hours or less, in accordance with Boeing Service Letter 757-SL-27-26, dated April 1, 1988: Within the next 90 days after the effective date of this AD or prior to the accumulation of 4,000 flight hours total time-in-service, whichever occurs later, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 4,000 flight hours, perform an elevator freeplay check in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 757- 27A0086, dated June 9, 1988. \n\n\tB.\tFor all other airplanes: Within the next 90 daysafter the effective date of this AD or prior to the accumulation of 3,000 flight hours total time-in-service, whichever occurs later, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 3,000 flight hours, perform an elevator freeplay check in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 757-27A-0086, dated June 9, 1988. \n\n\tC.\tIf freeplay exceeds the limits specified in the service bulletin, before further flight, replace elevator PCA reaction link rod end bearings and PCA rod end bearings, as necessary, in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 757-27A0086, dated June 9, 1988. \n\n\tD.\tTerminating action for the repetitive inspection requirements of paragraph A. and B. of this AD consists of replacing all old design PCA reaction link rod end bearings with improved bearings and subsequent successful completion of freeplay inspection, in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 757-27A0086, dated June 9, 1988. \n\n\tE.\tAn alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliancetime, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), who may add any comments and then send it to the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office. \n\n\tF.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle,Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6120, AD 89-03-05) becomes effective March 6, 1989.
91-07-01: 91-07-01 BOEING: Amendment 39-6945. Docket No. 91-NM-45-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model 737 series airplanes, line numbers 1975 through 1989; and Model 757 series airplanes, line numbers 338 through 343; equipped with an Electronic Flight Instrument System (EFIS) using symbol generators, part number S242T404-420; certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent blanking of either pilot's EFIS display and loss of one pilot's primary flight instruments, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tWithin 10 days after the effective date of this AD, inspect the EFIS symbol generators installed on the airplane and record the modification status. EFIS symbol generators which do not have Modification 3 implemented, must be removed and modified in accordance with Collins Service Bulletin EFIP-701E-34-03, dated February 1, 1991, prior to further flight. \n\n\tB.\tAny EFIS Symbol Generators with part number S242T404-420 which do nothave Modification 3 implemented, must be modified in accordance with Collins Service Bulletin EFIP-701E-34-03, dated February 1, 1991, before installation on an airplane. \n\n\tC.\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Avionics Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Seattle ACO. \n\n\tD.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD.\n \n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service information from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. This information may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue S.W., Renton, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6945, AD 91-07-01) becomes effective on April 3, 1991.
2000-03-22: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 747-100, -200, and 747SP series airplanes, that requires repetitive detailed visual and ultrasonic inspections to detect missing, damaged, or broken taperlock bolts in the diagonal brace underwing fittings; and corrective actions, if necessary. This AD also requires eventual replacement of the aft 10 taperlock bolts with new bolts, which constitutes terminating action for the repetitive inspections. This amendment is prompted by reports of damaged, broken, and corroded taperlock bolts of the diagonal brace underwing fittings on the outboard strut due to stress corrosion cracking. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent loss of the underwing fitting load path due to missing, damaged, or broken taperlock bolts, which could result in separation of the engine and strut from the airplane.
92-20-06: 92-20-06 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-8380. Docket No. 92-NM-88-AD. Supersedes AD 91-06-10, Amendment 39-6929. \n\n\tApplicability: Model DC-9 and Model DC-9-80 series airplanes, and Model MD-88 airplanes; equipped with BFGoodrich, Aircraft Evacuation Systems (formerly Sargent Industries, Pico Division; formerly Pico, Inc.) evacuation slides, P/N 11331; certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. \n\n\tTo prevent obstruction or hindrance with the emergency evacuation of the airplane and possible injuries to the passengers and the crew, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tFor airplanes on which the evacuation slides have been modified in accordance with Section 2, Accomplishment Instructions, of BFGoodrich Service Bulletin 11331-25-226, Revision 2, dated January 4, 1991: Within 12 months after the effective date of this AD, modify the girt bar flap in accordance with Paragraph 2B of BFGoodrich Service Bulletin 11331-25-248, dated April 15, 1992. \n\n\t(b)\tFor airplanes on which the evacuation slides have not been modified in accordance with Section 2, Accomplishment Instructions, of BFGoodrich Service Bulletin 11331-25-226, Revision 2, dated January 4, 1991: Within 12 months after the effective date of this AD, install a new girt bar flap and firing line, and modify the valise, in accordance with Paragraph 2A of BFGoodrich Service Bulletin 11331-25-248, dated April 15, 1992. \n\n\t(c)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Los Angeles ACO. \n\n\tNOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any,may be obtained from the Los Angeles ACO. \n\n\t(d)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. \n\n\t(e)\tThe installation and modifications shall be done in accordance with BFGoodrich Service Bulletin 11331-25-248, dated April 15, 1992. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from BFGoodrich Company, Aircraft Evacuation Systems, 3414 South 5th Street, Phoenix, Arizona 85040. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the FAA, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3229 East Spring Street, Long Beach, California; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC. \n\n\t(f)\tThis amendment becomes effective on November 20, 1992.
2000-04-03: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Models DC-3 and DC-4 series airplanes that requires an inspection to determine the type of airframe pneumatic deicing boots installed. This amendment also requires revising the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) to include requirements for activation of the pneumatic deicing boots for those airplanes equipped with "modern" boots. This amendment is prompted by reports of inflight incidents and an accident that occurred in icing conditions where the airframe pneumatic deicing boots were not activated. The actions specified by this AD are intended to ensure that flightcrews activate the pneumatic wing and tail deicing boots at the first signs of ice accumulation. This action will prevent reduced controllability of the aircraft due to adverse aerodynamic effects of ice adhering to the airplane prior to the first deicing cycle.
80-22-12 R2: 80-22-12 R2 BOEING: Amendment 39-3951 as amended by Amendment 39-4577 is further amended by Amendment 39-4661. Applies to all Model 707, 720, 727, and 737 series airplanes certificated in all categories. Compliance time as follows: To assure the flight crew has positive warning when the leading edge devices are not extended for takeoff, accomplish the following unless already accomplished: \n\n\tA.\tOn or before March 31, 1983, except as provided for in paragraph C., below, install leading edge device logic that will provide aural warning when the leading edge devices have not been extended prior to takeoff in accordance with the following: \n\n\t\t(1)\t(For Boeing 707/720 Series Airplanes) Boeing Service Bulletin No. 3404, Revision 2, dated January 21, 1983, or other previous or subsequent FAA approved revisions. \n\n\t\t(2)\t(For Boeing 727 Series Airplanes) Boeing Service Bulletins No. 727-31-50, Revision 1, dated January 15, 1982, or No. 727-31-52, dated January 15, 1982, or other previous or subsequent FAA approved revisions. \n\n\t\t(3)\t(For Boeing 737 Series Airplanes) Boeing Service Bulletin No. 737-31-1038, Revision 3, dated October 29, 1982, or other previous or subsequent FAA approved revisions.\n \n\tB.\tAlternate means of compliance which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tC.\tThis modification may be delayed until December 26, 1983, for the Model 727 and 737 series airplanes, provided the following cockpit checklist procedure, as implemented by each operator, is FAA approved by the appropriate Principal Operations Inspector: \n\n\t\t"The Leading Edge Device (LED) annunciator panel must be observed and must indicate proper leading edge device position prior to each takeoff."\n \n\tD.\tModification of the airplane in accordance with paragraph A. or B., above, constitutes terminating action for this AD. Once the modification is completed, the special cockpit procedure described in paragraph C., above, may be discontinued.\n \n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to the Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. These documents may also be examined at FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington 98108. \n\n\tAmendment 39-3951 became effective November 24, 1980. \n\n\tAmendment 39-4577 became effective March 7, 1983. \n\n\tThis Amendment 39-4661 becomes effective June 21, 1983.
80-02-16 R1: 80-02-16 R1 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-3674 as amended by Amendment 39-5438. Applies to McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9-10, -30, and C-9 (Military) series airplanes, Fuselage Numbers 1 through 735, certificated in any category, equipped with the aft pressure bulkhead auxiliary emergency exit door (P/N 5910367). \n\n\tCompliance required as indicated, unless already accomplished. \n\n\tTo detect fatigue cracks and prevent failure of the auxiliary emergency exit door, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tWithin 500 landings after the effective date of this AD and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 4,000 landings or one (1) year whichever comes first, inspect by x-ray each auxiliary emergency exit door shear pin fitting assembly in accordance with McDonnell Douglas DC-9 Alert Service Bulletin A52-116, dated December 12, 1979. \n\n\t(b)\tAny shear pin fitting assembly found cracked must be replaced with an FAA approved assembly prior to further flight. \n\n\t(c)\tNew shear pin fitting assemblies installed in accordance with paragraph (b), of the same type design, must be inspected initially before 20,000 landings after installation and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 4,000 landings or one (1) year whichever comes first, in accordance with paragraph (a). \n\n\t(d)\tAccomplishment of modification in accordance with McDonnell Douglas DC-9 Service Bulletin 52-117, R1, dated October 6, 1982, or later FAA-approved revisions, constitutes terminating action for the repetitive inspection requirements of this AD. \n\n\t(e)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of inspections required by this AD. \n\n\t(f)\tAlternative inspections, modifications or other actions which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. \n\n\t(g)\tFor the purposes of complying with this AD, subject to the acceptance by the assigned FAA Maintenance Inspector, the number of landings may be determined by dividing each airplane's hours' time in service by the operator's fleet average time from takeoff to landing for the DC-9 airplane. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Director, Publications and Training, C1-L65 (54-60). These documents also may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 4344 Donald Douglas Drive, Long Beach, California. \n\n\tAmendment 39-3674 became effective January 28, 1980. \n\n\tThis amendment, 39-5438, becomes effective November 14, 1986.
92-02-01: 92-02-01 BOEING: Amendment 39-8137. Docket No. 91-NM-103-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model 747 series airplanes, line number 001 through 113, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent sudden decompression of the airplane, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tWithin the next 500 flight cycles after the effective date of this AD, unless previously accomplished within the last 1,500 flight cycles, perform an initial high frequency eddy current inspection of the doorstop support fittings at the forward edge of the number 5 main entry doors, in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-53A2326, dated December 20, 1990, to determine material type, if not known, and accomplish the following prior to further flight: \n\n\t\t(1)\tFor doorstop support fittings which have been determined to be made of 7075-T73 aluminum: No further action is required under the inspection requirements of this AD. \n\n\t\t(2)\tFor doorstop support fittings which have been determined to be made of 7079-T6 aluminum: Visually inspect the fittings for cracking in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-53A2326, dated December 20, 1990. Repeat this inspection thereafter at intervals not to exceed 2,000 flight cycles. \n\n\t(b)\tIf cracking is found as the result of the inspections required by paragraph (a) of this AD, prior to further flight, replace the cracked doorstop support fittings with doorstop support fittings made of 7075-T73 aluminum, in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-53A2326, dated December 20, 1990. Continue to reinspect any remaining doorstop support fittings made of 7079-T6 material in accordance with paragraph (a)(2) of this AD. \n\n\t(c)\tReplacement of all doorstop fittings made of 7079-T6 material in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-53A2326, dated December 20, 1990, constitutes terminating action for the repetitive inspection requirements of this AD. \n\n\t(d)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Seattle ACO. \n\n\t(e)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\t(f)\tThe inspection and replacement shall be done in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-53A2326, dated December 20, 1990. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. Copies may be inspected at the FAA,Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington, or at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L Street NW., Room 8401, Washington, D.C. \n\n\t(g)\tThis amendment (39-8137, AD 92-02-01) becomes effective on March 23, 1992.
2013-25-07: We are superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2007-18-09 for all Airbus Model A318, A319, A320, and A321 series airplanes. AD 2007- 18-09 required repetitive inspections of the upper support of the nose landing gear (NLG), and related investigative and corrective actions if necessary; and also provided an optional terminating action for the [[Page 54580]] repetitive inspections. This new AD adds installation of a new enhanced manufacturing and maintainability (EMM) braking and steering control unit (BSCU) standard, and adds airplanes to the applicability. This AD was prompted by a determination that previously allowed terminating actions no longer address the unsafe condition and that a new terminating action is necessary. We are issuing this AD to prevent landings with the NLG turned 90 degrees from centerline, which could result in reduced controllability of the airplane.
2010-17-10: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Several low pressure turbine (LPT) shafts have been found with cracks originating from the rear cooling air holes. The cracks were found at normal component overhaul, by the standard Magnetic Particle Inspection (MPI) technique defined in the associated engine manual. The cracks have been found to initiate from corrosion pits. Propagation of a crack from the rear cooling air holes may result in shaft failure and subsequently in an uncontained Low Pressure Turbine failure. For the reasons stated above, this AD requires the inspection of the affected engines' LPT shafts and replacement of the shaft, as necessary. We are issuing this AD to detect cracks, initiated by corrosion pits, originating from the rear cooling air holes, which could result in shaft failure and subsequently in an uncontained failure of the LPT and damage to the airplane.
2010-17-01: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: A PW617F-E engine powered twin engined aircraft had recently experienced an uncommanded power reduction on one of its engines. Investigation showed that the Fuel Filter Bypass Valve poppet in the Fuel Oil Heat Exchanger (FOHE) on that engine had worn through the housing seat, allowing unfiltered fuel and debris to contaminate the Fuel Metering Unit (FMU), resulting in fuel flow drop and subsequent power reduction. Pratt & Whitney Canada Corp. issued an Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) No. PW600-72-A66019 to inspect and replace any discrepant valve with the same type new valve. The inspection results confirmed that failure of a worn through poppet is dormant and it can affect both engines at the same time that could result in an unsafe condition on PW617F-E powered aircraft. We are issuing this AD to prevent uncommanded power reduction, which could result in the inability to continue safe flight and safe landing.
2000-03-21: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 767 series airplanes, that requires a one-time detailed visual inspection to detect discrepancies of the wire expando sleeve of the wire bundles adjacent to the landing gear control lever module; certain follow-on actions and repair, if necessary; and wrapping the wire expando sleeve with tape, or with zippertubing and tape. This amendment is prompted by reports indicating that the landing gear failed to extend on an in-service airplane, and that the landing gear control cable was severed on a second in-service airplane. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent interference between the landing gear control lever and wire bundles adjacent to the landing gear control lever module, and to prevent wire chafing and arcing between the landing gear control cable and adjacent wire bundles, which could result in the inability to extend the landing gear prior to landing.
91-25-02: 91-25-02 BOEING: Amendment 39-8103. Docket 91-NM-07-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model 747 series airplanes; equipped with BFGoodrich single-piece ramp/slide, part numbers (P/N) 7A1418-1 through -16, for Door 3 evacuation system; certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent failure of the Door 3 evacuation system, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tWithin 12 months after the effective date of this AD, accomplish the requirements of paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) of this AD: \n\n\t\t(1)\tModify the regulator assembly, P/N 4A3474-1 (a subassembly of reservoir assembly P/N 4A3416-1), to the P/N 4A3474-2 or 4A3474-3 configuration, by installing improved internal components in accordance with paragraph 2., Accomplishment Instructions, of BFGoodrich Service Bulletin No. 4A3416-25-233, dated December 14, 1990; or Revision 1, dated October 1, 1991. \n\n\t\t(2)\tReidentify the Door 3 ramp/slide in accordance with paragraph 3.B.,Identification, of BFGoodrich Service Bulletin No. 4A3416-25-233, dated December 14, 1990; or Revision 1, dated October 1, 1991. \n\n\t(b)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Los Angeles ACO. \n\n\t(c)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with requirements of this AD. \n\n\t(d)\tThe modification requirements shall be done in accordance with BFGoodrich Service Bulletin No. 4A3416-25-233, dated December 14, 1990; or BFGoodrich Service Bulletin No. 4A3416-25-233, Revision 1, dated October 1, 1991. This incorporation by reference was approved bythe Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from BFGoodrich Company, Aircraft Evaluation Systems, 3414 South 5th Street, Phoenix, Arizona 85040. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue S.W., Renton, Washington; or at the Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3229 East Spring Street, Long Beach, California; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L Street N.W., Room 8401, Washington, D.C. \n\n\t(e)\tThis amendment (39-8103), AD 91-25-02, becomes effective on January 9, 1992.
2014-18-01: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Rockwell Collins TDR-94 and TDR-94D Mode select (S) transponders that are installed on airplanes. This AD was prompted by instances where the TDR-94 and TDR-94D Mode S transponders did not properly respond to Mode S Only All-Call interrogations when the airplane transitioned from a ground to airborne state. This AD requires inspecting the setting of the airplane type code category strapping and requires either modifying the airplane type code category setting or installing the software upgrade to convert the affected transponders to the new part number. We are issuing this AD to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
90-03-13: 90-03-13 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-6493. Docket No. 89-NM-277-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model DC-9-81 (MD-81), DC-9-82 (MD-82), DC-9-83 (MD-83), DC-9-87 (MD-87), and Model MD-88 series airplanes, as listed in McDonnell Douglas Alert Service Bulletin A35-17, Revision 1, dated October 31, 1989, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tNOTE: Work already accomplished in accordance with AD 89-20-05 satisfies the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tTo prevent the possibility of the forward cabin attendant being deprived of oxygen in the event of depressurization, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tWithin 30 days after October 13, 1989 (the effective date of Amendment 39-6338), for those airplanes listed in McDonnell Douglas Alert Service Bulletin A35-17, dated August 22, 1989, inspect the forward cabin attendant oxygen box door for interference and, if interference exists, modify before further flight, in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of McDonnell Douglas Alert Service Bulletin A35-17, dated August 22, 1989. \n\n\tB.\tWithin 30 days after the effective date of this AD, for those airplanes listed in McDonnell Douglas Alert Service Bulletin A35-17, Revision 1, dated October 31, 1989, not included in paragraph A., above, inspect the forward cabin attendant oxygen box door for interference and, if interference exists, modify before further flight, in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of McDonnell Douglas Alert Service Bulletin A35-17, Revision 1, dated October 31, 1989. \n\n\tC.\tAn alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), who will either concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, LosAngeles Aircraft Certification Office. \n\n\tD.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service information from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90801-0001, ATTN: Business Unit Manager, Technical Publications, HCW (54-60). This information may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3229 East Spring Street, Long Beach, California 90806-2425. \n\n\tThis AD supersedes AD 89-20-05, Amendment 39-6338. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6493, AD 90-03-13) becomes effective on February 15, 1990.
2000-02-12: This document publishes in the Federal Register an amendment adopting Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2000-02-12, which was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of Bell Helicopter Textron Canada (BHTC) Model 407 helicopters by individual letters. This AD requires inspecting engine oil cooler blower shaft bearings (bearings) for roughness at specified time intervals and replacing any rough bearings before further flight. This amendment is prompted by several bearing failures. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent bearing failure, loss of tail rotor drive, and a subsequent forced landing.
92-06-07: 92-06-07 BOEING: Amendment 39-8187. Docket No. 91-NM-210-AD. \n\tApplicability: Model 747 series airplanes, listed in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747- 52A2237, dated July 11, 1991, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. \n\n\tTo ensure operation of the emergency door power assist system and door opening when required for emergency evacuation, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tWithin the next 60 days after the effective date of this AD, perform a visual inspection and test of the guide arm assembly and associated hardware for the main entry doors, numbers 1 through 5, left and right sides, in accordance with Section III. of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-52A2237, dated July 11, 1991. \n\n\t\t(1)\tIf all the conditions specified in subparagraphs a. through g., paragraph 4., Section III., of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-52A2237, dated July 11, 1991, are found to exist, no further action is required. \n\n\t\t(2)\tIfany of the conditions specified in subparagraphs a. through f., paragraph 4., Section III., of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-52A2237, dated July 11, 1991, do not exist, repair or replace before further flight, in accordance with Section III. of the service bulletin. \n\n\t\t(3)\tIf the condition specified in subparagraph g., paragraph 4., Section III., of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-52A2237, dated July 11, 1991, does not exist, repair in a manner approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. \n\n\t(b)\tWithin 7 days after the completion of the inspection required by paragraph (a) of this AD, submit to the FAA a report specifying the number of bearings in the guide arm assemblies of each airplane on which any of the condition specified in subparagraphs a., b., or c., paragraph 4., Section III., of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-52A2237, dated July 11, 1991, were not found to exist. The report must be submitted to the Manager, Seattle Manufacturing Inspection District Office, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056. (Facsimile messages may be sent via telephone: (206) 227- 1181.) A copy of the report should also be submitted to the FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI). A report is not necessary for those airplanes on which all of the specified conditions are found to exist. Information collection requirements contained in this regulation have been approved by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq) and have been assigned OMB Control Number 2120-0056. \n\n\t(c)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. The request shall be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Seattle ACO. \n\n\t(d)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. \n\n\t(e)\tThe inspection, test, repair, and replacement shall be done in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-52A2237, dated July 11, 1991. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L Street NW., Room 8401, Washington, DC. \n\n\t(f)\tThis amendment becomes effective on April 21, 1992.
90-09-06: 90-09-06 BOEING: Amendment 39-6581. Docket No. 89-NM-148-AD. \n\tApplicability: Model 747 series airplanes, line number 001 and subsequent, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent inadvertent opening of lower lobe forward and aft cargo doors and the main deck side cargo door, if installed, accomplish the following, (paragraphs A. through D. apply to lower lobe cargo doors only):\n \n\tA.\tWithin the next 10 days after April 3, 1989 (the effective date of Amendment 39-6166, AD 89-05-54), install Boeing placards, P/N 27EBY115 for hook operation, and P/N 27EBY114 for latch operation, or equivalent, adjacent to the respective drive ports. \n\n\tB.\tExcept for airplanes that have been modified in accordance with Boeing service bulletins specified in paragraph D., below, or on which a production equivalent has been installed, within the next 10 days after April 3, 1989, accomplish the following: \n\n\t\t1.\tVisuallyinspect for broken, bent, or otherwise damaged lock sectors which could affect the integrity of the door locking mechanism, and repair or replace damaged sectors prior to further flight, in accordance with FAA-approved procedures. This inspection must be repeated at intervals not to exceed 30 days, and after the next door opening following each manual operation of the door. \n\n\t\t2.\tConduct the mechanical and electrical system tests specified in Boeing Service Bulletin 747-52A2206, Revision 3, Revision 4, or Revision 5, paragraphs III.A. and B. Airplanes which fail mechanical and/or electrical tests must be repaired prior to further flight, in accordance with FAA-approved procedures. Repeat these tests at intervals not to exceed 30 days and repeat the electrical test after restoration of electrical power following manual operation. \n\n\tC.\tWithin the next 14 days after April 3, 1989, change the operating procedures for the lower lobe cargo door to include the requirements specifiedbelow, and thereafter comply with those revised procedures. The procedures required by this paragraph must be accomplished by qualified and trained mechanics, and the training program must be approved by the FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI). Methods for documentation of compliance with the following procedures must be approved by the FAA PMI. \n\n\t\t1.\tPrior to takeoff following each operation of the door, conduct a visual verification, through the external viewports, to ensure proper engagement of the latching cams to ensure the door is fully latched closed. This information must be relayed to and acknowledged by the flight crew. \n\n\t\t2.\tWhen operating the door manually, the cranking torque shall not exceed 70 inch-pounds, and power tools shall not be used to operate latch and hook mechanisms in the manual mode. \n\n\tD.\tWithin the next 30 days after April 3, 1989, accomplish the following: \n\n\t\t1.\tFor those airplanes specified in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-52A2206,Revision 3, dated August 27, 1987, Revision 4, dated April 14, 1988, or Revision 5, dated March 30, 1989: Modify the doors in accordance with paragraphs III.H. through III.O. of the applicable revision of the service bulletin. \n\n\t\t2.\tFor those airplanes specified in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-52A2209, dated August 27, 1987, Revision 1, dated April 14, 1988, or Revision 2, dated March 30, 1989: Modify the doors in accordance with paragraphs III.E. through III.L. of the applicable revision of the service bulletin. \n\n\tAccomplishment of these modifications constitutes terminating action for the repetitive requirements of paragraph B., above. \n\n\tE.\tWithin the next 18 months after the effective date of this Amendment, install a system which provides visual warning signals to alert flight crewmembers and ground crew personnel when forward and aft lower lobe cargo doors, and side main deck cargo door, if installed, are not fully closed, the latch cams are not rotated to the closed position, or the locks are not in the locked position. The warning system must monitor the door closed, latched, and locked condition directly. An amber visual warning signal for flight crewmembers must be located on a forward cockpit panel. Incorrect indication, either open or closed, must be improbable. The modification must be approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. Accomplishment of this modification constitutes terminating action for the special operating procedure required by paragraph C.1., above. \n\n\tF.\tAn alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), who will either concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office. \n\n\tG.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment supersedes Amendment 39-6166, AD 89-05-54. \n\tThis amendment (39-6581, AD 90-09-06) becomes effective on May 29, 1990.
80-07-02: 80-07-02 BOEING: Amendment 39-3721 as amended by Amendment 39-3742. Applies to all Model 707/720/727/737/747 series airplanes that contain the hydraulic components, listed below, that have been repaired or parts produced by FORTNER ENGINEERING AND MANUFACTURING, INC., OF GLENDALE, CALIFORNIA under FAA Repair Station Certificate No. 417-5. Accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tTo detect a control valve which could cause control surface reversal, within three days from the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the last 14 days, conduct a one time manual input hardover test on the flight control systems containing parts listed in paragraph B below, as follows: \n\n\t\tRudder (yaw damper off), elevator (autopilot off) and aileron (autopilot off) and all associated hydraulic systems on. Run the hydraulic systems for approximately ten minutes or until the system is at normal operating temperatures prior to conducting the hardover tests. Apply an abrupt hardover command one way, stop to stop, until the flight surface reaches full travel. The commanded rate must be rapid enough to saturate the control valve, as evidenced by a noticeable resistance in the control input. The flight control shall be held hardover in that position for five seconds. Repeat this procedure applying an abrupt command in the opposite direction. \n\n\t\t1.\tOn the 737, use of single hydraulic systems during the test can be an aid in isolation of individual actuators. \n\n\t\t\ta.\tUse the "B" system electric pumps or an external hydraulic source to pressurize the "B" hydraulic system (ground interconnect closed). \n\n\t\t\tb.\tTurn on the "B" Flight Control hydraulics circuit breaker. \n\n\t\t\tc.\tConduct the elevator and aileron control checks. Failure of the test indicates that the right hand elevator actuator (as viewed from the airplane tail) or the upper aileron actuator is faulty. \n\n\t\t\td.\tOpen the ground interconnect or use an external hydraulic source to pressurize the "A" hydraulic system. \n\n\t\t\te.\tTurn "off" the "B" Flight Control hydraulic circuit breaker and turn "on" the "A" Flight Control hydraulic circuit breaker. \n\n\t\t\tf.\tConduct the elevator and aileron control checks (failure of the test indicates that the left hand elevator actuator or lower aileron actuator is faulty). \n\n\t\t2.\tOn the 727 elevator, conduct the hardover tests using hydraulic system A and then hydraulic system B. If a surface reversal occurs, isolation should be accomplished by removal of an actuator and the use of a bench functional test with a maximum rate input to confirm the fault. If the fault cannot be confirmed, the other actuator should be checked. \n\n\t\t3.\tOn the 707 Rudder package with the series yaw damper, it is recommended that only pedal inputs be made, since this is adequate to provide the necessary valve overtravel (up to 200% of active travel). \n\n\t\t4.\tThe 747 inboard elevator test procedure is as follows: \n\n\t\t\ta.\tTurn on all four ADP's and pressurize #1 hydraulic system only. \n\n\t\t\tb.\tPull column full aft into stops at maximum rate and hold for 3 to 5 seconds. Check for signs of abnormality such as column reversal. Repeat for full forward column.\n \n\t\t\tc.\tTurn off #1 hydraulic system and repeat max rate test with hydraulic systems #2, #3 and #4 individually. \n\n\t\t\td.\tA malfunction in System #1 or #2 indicates a problem with the right hand inboard elevator: System #3 or #4 indicates the left hand inboard elevator. \n\n\t\tDuring these tests, observe the appropriate aileron, elevator or rudder positions or their cockpit indicators. If the flight surface reverses direction or if the rudder pedals or flight control wheel back drive in the opposite direction of command, immediately notify the FAA Northwest Region (telephone (206) 767-2600) and remove the associated power control unit from service. \n\n\tB.\tWithin 30 days from the effective date of this airworthiness directive, remove from service any of the following valve assemblies, andtheir detail subassemblies, that have been overhauled or produced by Fortner Engineering and Manufacturing, Inc., and replace with units which are either new manufacture or have been overhauled in accordance with FAA approved data: \n\n\n\nPCU UNIT (Used on)\nValve Assy. P/N*\nLap Assy. P/N**\t\nSupplier \n707/720 Series\t\nYaw Damper rudder\nPCU P/N 60000( )\n60010-1/-9/\t\t-5005, -5007\n60010-1/-9/-13\nBertea\n \n727 Elevator PCU\nP/N 68000-( ) \n68010-5001\n68010-1\nBertea\n737 Aileron/\tElevator PCU\nP/N 65-44761-( ) \n65-44828-2/-4\n65-44671-1, -3\nBoeing/Bertea \n737 Rudder PCU\nP/N 65-44861-( )\t\n68010-5003\nThis part has been covered by FAA telegraphic AD T80NW-4 dated 1-29-80. \n68010-11\nBertea\n747 Inboard\tElevator PCU\nP/N 93600-( ) \n93610-5003\n93610-11\nBertea \n\n\t*Component part numbers to be removed. Note: Some operators refer to the valve assembly as the lap assembly. \n\t**These part numbers are the original Bertea or Bertea/Boeing detail subassembly part numbers. These lap subassemblies may have been replaced with Fortner assemblies by the repair station or operator. The Fortner Engineering and Manufacturing parts are to be removed from service. \n\n\tC.\tAirplanes may be flown, in accordance with FAR 21.199 to a maintenance base, for the purpose of complying with this AD.\n \n\t\tNOTE: These parts, repaired or produced by Fortner Engineering and Manufacturing, Inc. of Glendale, California, referenced herein were not installed on new production airplanes delivered by Boeing nor were they overhauled or produced by Fortner Accessory Service Corporation, a subsidiary of Parker Haniffin Corporation. \n\n\tAmendment 39-3721 became effective April 3, 1980. \n\tThis amendment 39-3742 becomes effective April 21, 1980.
2000-03-13: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 series airplanes, that requires a one-time detailed visual inspection of the wire bundle installation behind the first observer's station to detect damaged or chafed wires; and corrective action, if necessary. This amendment is prompted by a report indicating that the wire bundle contained in the feedthrough behind the first observer's station was contacting the bottom portion of the feedthrough. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent such contact, which could cause cable chafing, electrical arcing, smoke, or fire in the cockpit.
2000-03-14: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 series airplanes, that requires modification of the battery ground cable installation in the center accessory compartment. This amendment is prompted by reports of battery ground studs that had arced due to loose ground stud attachments. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent such arcing, which could cause smoke and/or fire in the center accessory compartment.
2014-17-08: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Pratt & Whitney Canada Corp. (P&WC) PT6A-114 and PT6A-114A turboprop engines. This AD requires initial and repetitive borescope inspection (BSI) of compressor turbine (CT) blades, and the removal from service of blades that fail inspection. This AD was prompted by several incidents of CT blade failure, causing power loss, and engine failure. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of CT blades, which could result in damage to the engine and damage to the airplane.