Results
97-05-04: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Airbus Model A320-111, -211, and -231 series airplanes, that currently requires replacing the existing standby generator control unit (GCU) with a new improved standby GCU. That action was prompted by reports of improper functioning of the standby GCU. This amendment requires replacement of the GCU on additional affected airplanes. For some airplanes, it also will require that a wiring modification be accomplished prior to replacement of the GCU. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent such improper functioning of the GCU, which could result in the loss of the standby emergency generation system.
2009-24-10: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: In-flight engine shutdown incidents were reported on aircraft equipped with TAE-125-01 engines. This was found to be mainly the result of operation over a long time period with broken piston cooling oil nozzles which caused thermal overload of the piston. We are issuing this AD to prevent engine in-flight shutdown, possibly resulting in reduced control of the aircraft.
69-20-03: 69-20-03 GRUMMAN: Amdt. 39-848, as amended by Amdt. 39-924, applies to all G-159 aircraft. Compliance required within the next 50 hours' time in service after the effective date of this airworthiness directive as amended. To prevent fuel filter blockage due to ice and possible engine flameout, accomplish the following or an equivalent approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Southern Region. (a) Install a fuel temperature indicator on each engine fuel system in accordance with Grumman Gulfstream Service Change 114, with Amendment 1 or later approved revision. (b) Mark gage with red radial lines at +5 degrees C and +54 degrees C and a green arc from +5 degrees C to +54 degrees C. (c) Install a placard adjacent to fuel temperature indicator which reads as follows: "Caution See AFM for use of fuel filter heater." The use of a fuel additive as outlined in Advisory Circular 20-29A along with an appropriate Airplane Flight Manual supplement or Revision 21 to the G-159 Airplane Flight Manual is considered an equivalent means for showing compliance with paragraphs (a), (b), and (c). Amendment 39-848 effective October 5, 1969. This amendment (39-924) becomes effective January 23, 1970.
2020-21-17: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2018-16- 05, which applied to certain The Boeing Company Model 757 airplanes. AD 2018-16-05 required repetitive inspections for skin cracking and shim migration at the upper link drag fittings, diagonal brace cracking, and fastener looseness; and applicable on-condition actions. This AD retains the actions required by AD 2018-16-05, reduces the compliance times for certain inspections, and adds repetitive inspections at certain fastener hole locations and applicable on-condition actions. This AD was prompted by reports of bolt rotation in the engine drag fitting joint and fastener heads; an inspection of the fastener holes revealed that cracks were found in the skin. This AD was also prompted by a report of multiple cracks in the drag fitting at fastener holes found during an inspection required by AD 2018-16-05. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
94-15-03: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to all Boeing Model 767 series airplanes. This action requires revising the Non-Normal Procedures Section of the FAA-approved Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) to include procedures that will enable the flight crew to identify fuel system leaks and to take appropriate action to prevent further fuel loss. This amendment is prompted by reports that flight crew procedures related to fuel system leaks are not defined adequately in the FAA-approved AFM for these airplanes. The actions specified in this AD are intended to ensure that the flight crew is advised of the potential hazard related to fuel exhaustion due to undetected leakage, and the procedures necessary to address it.
2008-09-25 R1: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above that would revise an existing AD. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Bombardier Aerospace has completed a system safety review of the aircraft fuel system against fuel tank safety standards introduced in Chapter 525 of the Airworthiness Manual through Notice of Proposed Amendment (NPA) 2002-043. The identified non-compliances were then assessed using Transport Canada Policy Letter No. 525-001, to determine if mandatory corrective action is required. The assessment showed that it is necessary to introduce Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations (CDCCL), in order to preserve critical fuel tank system ignition source prevention features during configuration changes such as modifications and repairs, or during maintenance actions. Failure to preserve critical fuel tank system ignition source prevention features could result in a fuel tank explosion. * * * This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI. DATES: This AD becomes effective December 10, 2009. On June 6, 2008 (73 FR 24157, May 2, 2008), the Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the AD. We must receive comments on this AD by January 11, 2010.
2020-25-09: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Pratt & Whitney Division (PW) PW4164, PW4164-1D, PW4168, PW4168-1D, PW4168A, PW4168A-1D, and PW4170 model turbofan engines with a certain outer combustion chamber assembly and 3rd stage low-pressure turbine (LPT) duct segments installed. This AD was prompted by reports of damaged or failed 3rd stage LPT duct segments on PW engines with the Talon IIB outer combustion chamber assembly configuration installed. This AD requires removing and replacing certain 3rd stage LPT duct segments. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2008-08-07: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: A crack has been found in an axle adaptor during fatigue testing. It was found that the internal edges of the dowel holes did not have the correct radius and the crack had developed from the edge of one of the dowel holes. A crack in the axle adaptor can cause the axle adaptor to fail and ultimately lead to loss of [the] wheels and total loss of brake capability. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2009-23-08: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: It has been found the occurrence of two events of aircraft being dispatched with the cargo door opened without indication. In one of the events the aircraft took off with the cargo door opened. * * * * * The unsafe condition is a cargo door opening during flight, which could result in reduced structural integrity and consequent rapid decompression of the airplane. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
92-07-13: 92-07-13 BOEING: Amendment 39-8209. Docket No. 91-NM-154-AD.\n\n\tApplicability: Model 767 series airplanes; as listed in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-52A0061, Revision 1, dated September 26, 1991; certificated in any category.\n\n\tCompliance: Required within the next 60 days after the effective date of this AD, unless accomplished previously.\n\n\tTo ensure proper retention of the girt bar to the girt bar carrier, accomplish the following:\n\n\t(a)\tAdjust the ball plunger for the girt bar locks in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-52A0061, Revision 1, dated September 26, 1991.\n\n\t(b)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. The request shall be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager,Seattle ACO.\n\n\t(c)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.\n\n\t(d)\tThe repair shall be done in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-52A0061, Revision 1, dated September 26, 1991. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L Street NW., Room 8401, Washington, DC.\n\n\t(e)\tThis amendment becomes effective on May 4, 1992.
71-11-08: 71-11-08 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amdt. 39-1217. Pursuant to the authority of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, delegated to me by the Administrator, the following airworthiness directive, applicable to all operators of Douglas DC-9 and Military C-9A airplanes, was effective immediately upon receipt of telegram dated May 10, 1971. \n\n\tBecause of repeated incidents of the pilot's or first officer's instrument panel assemblies sliding aft; and in one instance, producing control column interference, one of the following alternate actions is to be accomplished within 25 flight hours in service after receipt of this telegram: \n\n\t(1)\tInstall placard on captain and first officer instrument panel stating "Check panel security before takeoff." Or \n\n\t(2)\tIncorporate a check item in flight crew aircraft acceptance check list stating "Check security of captain and first officer instrument panels." Or \n\n\t(3)\tIn the maintenance program include security of captain and first officer instrument panel as a "required inspection item" whenever the panels are disturbed, subject to the approval of the assigned principal inspector. \n\n\t(4)\tSecondary safety latches may be installed in accordance with Douglas Service Bulletin 31-16, dated October 14, 1969, or later FAA approved revision. Accomplishment of this modification will constitute of itself compliance with this AD. \n\n\tEquivalent methods of compliance must be referred to the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective upon publication in the Federal Register for all persons except those to whom it was made effective immediately by telegram dated May 10, 1971.
2020-24-07: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2018-26-02 for Airbus Helicopters (previously Eurocopter France) Model AS350B3, EC130B4, and EC130T2 helicopters. AD 2018-26-02 required inspecting the pilot's and co-pilot's throttle twist for proper operation. This new AD retains the requirements of AD 2018-26-02 and adds calendar time compliance times for the required actions. This AD was prompted by a public comment that prompted additional review. The actions of this AD are intended to address an unsafe condition on these products.
2009-23-04: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Boeing Model 767 airplanes. This AD requires repetitive replacement of the internal electrical feed-through connectors of the boost pumps of the main fuel tank. This AD results from a report of cracking in the epoxy potting compound on the internal feed-through connector of the fuel boost pump in the area of the soldered wire connector lugs. We are issuing this AD to prevent a hazardous electrical path from the dry side to the wet side of the fuel boost pump through a cracked feed- through connector, or between pins or a pin and the shell on one side of the feed-through connector, which could create an ignition source on the wet side of the fuel boost pump or cause a fire in the fuel pump enclosure and lead to subsequent explosion of the fuel tank.
2003-25-01: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the specified Eurocopter France (Eurocopter) model helicopters with a Breeze 300-pound electric hoist (hoist) installed that requires modifying and re-identifying the hoist operator control unit and replacing certain fuses. This amendment is prompted by a test of a hoist that revealed an anomaly in the electrical control circuit. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of the hoist pyrotechnic squib electrical control unit, lack of adequate current to activate the hoist pyrotechnic squib, an inability of the pilot to cut the rescue hoist cable in the event of cable entanglement or other emergency, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
2009-23-02: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: During the Acceptance Test Procedure (ATP) of returned Inboard Flap Actuators * * * an excessive wear condition was identified regarding endplay between the flap actuator and ball screw. Excessive wear of the screw and ball nut could potentially lead to a flap system jam. * * * * * * * * The unsafe condition is a flap system jam, which could result in a skewed flap condition with consequent reduced controllability of the airplane. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
67-02-05: 67-02-05 VICKERS: Amdt. 39-323 Part 39 Federal Register December 20, 1966. Applies to Viscount Models 744 and 745D airplanes. Compliance required as indicated. To prevent further failures of the flying control rod guide beam at Fuselage Station 399.25, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 25 landings after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the last 225 landings, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 250 landings from the last inspection until modified in accordance with (c) or repaired in accordance with (b), visually inspect the control rod guide beam attached to the bottom of the floor beam at Fuselage Station 399.25 for cracks at the top and bottom extremities of the vertical slot for the trim chains. (b) Repair cracked beams before further flight in accordance with British Aircraft Corporation PTL 261, Issue 1, or later ARB-approved issue, or an FAA-approved equivalent, and either inspect as specified in (a) at intervals not to exceed 500 landings from the last inspection until modified in accordance with (c) and repair in accordance with this paragraph if applicable, or modify cracked beams before further flight in accordance with (c). (c) Modify beams in accordance with British Aircraft Corporation Modification D.3179 within the next 1500 landings after the effective date of this AD. (d) For the purpose of complying with this AD, subject to acceptance by the assigned FAA maintenance inspector, the number of landings may be determined by dividing each airplane's hours' time in service by the operator's fleet average time from takeoff to landing for the airplane type. (e) Upon request of the operator, and FAA maintenance inspector, subject to prior approval of the Chief, Aircraft Certification Staff, Europe, Africa, Middle East Region, may adjust the repetitive inspection intervals specified in this AD to permit compliance at an established inspection period of the operator if the request contains substantiating data to justify the increase for that operator. This directive effective January 19, 1967.
2003-24-13: The FAA adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Cessna Aircraft Company (Cessna) Models 172R, 172S, 182S, 182T, T182T, 206H, and T206H airplanes that are equipped with a Honeywell KAP 140 autopilot computer system installed on the center instrument control panel near the throttle. This AD requires you to install an update to the operating software of the KAP 140 autopilot computer system, change the unit's part number, and change the software modification identification tag. This AD is the result of reports of inadvertent and undetected engagement of the autopilot system. We are issuing this AD to prevent unintentionally engaging the KAP 140 autopilot computer system, which could cause the pilot to take inappropriate actions.
2020-25-01: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Textron Aviation Inc. (Textron) (type certificate previously held by Beechcraft Corporation) Models F90, 65-90, 65-A90, B90, C90, H90 (T-44A), E90, 65-A90-1 (JU-21A, U-21A, RU-21A, RU-21D, U-21G, RU- 21H), 65-A90-2 (RU-21B), 65-A90-3 (RU-21C), 65-A90-4 (RU-21E, RU-21H), 99, 99A, 99A (FACH), A99, A99A, B99, C99, 100, A100 (U-21F), and B100 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of fatigue cracks in the lower forward wing fitting. This AD requires a one-time inspection for the presence of washer part number (P/N) 90-380058-1 on the left-hand (LH) and right-hand (RH) lower forward wing bolt and, if applicable, removing washer P/N 90-380058-1, inspecting the wing fitting, bolt, and nut, replacing the wing fitting if it is cracked, and replacing the washer with washer P/N 90-380019-1. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
95-09-04: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain de Havilland Model DHC-8-100 and -300 series airplanes, that requires an inspection to verify the integrity of the shield grounds for the cable harness of the electronic engine control (EEC), and correction of any discrepancy. This amendment also requires measurement of the electrical resistance of certain shield grounds, and repair, if necessary. This amendment is prompted by a report of an engine flameout after a lightning strike, due to several shields for the cable harness of the EEC not being properly grounded to the airframe. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent engine flameout due to insufficient protection of the EEC.
59-24-03: 59-24-03 BROWN-LINE CORPORATION SAFETY BELT: Applies to All Model WB-2002-2 Safety Belts. Investigation of two recent accidents involving aircraft in which the subject model safety belts were installed, disclosed that the wearer could not free himself from the belt, thereby preventing his escape from the aircraft. The design of this belt buckle is such that it will not enable the wearer to quickly and easily release the belt from the buckle. Thus this belt does not conform with Section 4.1.2 of TSO-C22 (See NOTE) and compliance is considered essential to safety in cases of fire or emergencies involving landings in water. Accordingly, since this model safety belt does not meet the necessary safety requirements, it is not acceptable for installation in civil aircraft. Furthermore, all belts of this model that are in service must be replaced with acceptable safety belts within the next 25 hours of service time or the next periodic inspection whichever occurs first. NOTE: Section 4.1.2 of TSO-C22 states in part: ". . . . shall include an easily operable quick release mechanism which will enable the wearer to release himself easily under a load simulating the wearer hanging in the belt".
2003-24-14: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9-81 (MD-81), DC-9-82 (MD-82), DC-9-83 (MD-83), DC-9-87 (MD-87), and MD-88 airplanes. This action requires one-time inspections to detect discrepancies of electrical wiring installations in various areas of the airplane, and corrective action if necessary. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent smoke and fire in various areas of the airplane due to heat damage and/or electrical arcing of improperly installed wiring. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2003-24-09: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell \nDouglas Model MD-11 series airplanes, that currently requires performing a general visual inspection to detect chafing or damage of the parallel power feeder cables of the number 2 integrated drive generator (IDG); repairing any chafed cable and damaged structure; and repositioning the parallel power feeder cables of the number 2 IDG. This amendment revises the applicability of the existing AD by adding certain airplanes and removing certain other airplanes. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent chafing and arcing of the parallel feeder cables of the number 2 IDG, which could result in smoke and/or fire in the right aft galley area. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
95-08-11: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 767 series airplanes, that requires replacement of the currently installed door opening actuators of the emergency off-wing escape system with new, improved actuators. This amendment is prompted by reports indicating that the requirements of a previously issued AD do not adequately preclude leakage from these actuators. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of the escape slide to deploy due to failure of the door opening/snubbing actuator, which could delay and possibly jeopardize successful emergency evacuation of an airplane.
2008-04-18 R1: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above that would revise an existing AD. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: It has been found that former revisions of the Maintenance Review Board Report (MRBR) of the EMB-120( ) aircraft do not fully comply with some Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations (CDCCL) and Fuel System Limitations (FSL). These limitations are necessary to preclude ignition sources in the fuel system, as required by RBHA-E88/SFAR-88 (Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 88). * * * * * The potential of ignition sources, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the airplane. This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafecondition described in the MCAI.
2020-25-04: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2016-24-08 for all Rolls-Royce Deutschland Ltd. & Co KG (RRD) RB211-Trent 875-17, RB211-Trent 877-17, RB211-Trent 884-17, RB211-Trent 884B-17, RB211- Trent 892-17, RB211-Trent 892B-17, and RB211-Trent 895-17 model turbofan engines. AD 2016-24-08 required repetitive inspections of the engine upper bifurcation nose fairing assembly and repair or replacement of any fairing assembly that fails inspection. This AD retains the requirements to perform repetitive inspections of the engine upper bifurcation nose fairing assembly and repair or replacement of any fairing assembly that fails inspection. As a terminating action to these inspections, this AD also requires the modification of the engine upper bifurcation nose fairing assembly. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.