Results
2014-05-13: We are superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2004-12-07 for certain The Boeing Company Model 757 series airplanes equipped with Rolls-Royce RB211 engines. AD 2004-12-07 required modification of the nacelle strut and wing structure; and for certain airplanes, repetitive detailed inspections of certain aft bulkhead fasteners for loose or missing fasteners, and corrective action if necessary. For certain other airplanes, AD 2004-12-07 required a one-time detailed inspection of the middle gusset of the inboard side load fitting for proper alignment, and realignment if necessary; a one-time eddy current inspection of certain fastener holes for cracking, and repair if necessary; and a detailed inspection of certain fasteners for loose or missing fasteners, and replacement with new fasteners if necessary. This new AD specifies a maximum compliance time limit. This AD was prompted by reports indicating that the actual operational loads applied to the nacelle are higher than the analytical loads that were used during the initial design. We are issuing this AD to prevent fatigue cracking in primary strut structure and consequent reduced structural integrity of the strut.
2014-05-12: We are superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2010-15-08 for all The Boeing Company Model 737-100, -200, -200C, -300, -400, and -500 series airplanes. AD 2010-15-08 required repetitive inspections for discrepancies of each carriage spindle of the outboard mid-flaps; repetitive gap checks of the inboard and outboard carriages of the outboard mid-flaps to detect fractured carriage spindles; measuring to ensure that any new or serviceable carriage spindle meets minimum allowable diameter measurements taken at three locations; repetitive inspections, measurements, and overhaul of the carriage spindles; replacement of any carriage spindle when it has reached its maximum life limit; and corrective actions if necessary. This new AD requires reducing the life limit of the carriages, reducing the repetitive interval for certain inspections and gap checks for certain carriages. This new AD also adds an option, for certain replacements, of doing an inspection, and related investigativeand corrective actions if necessary. This AD was prompted by a report of failure of both flap carriages. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct cracked, corroded, or fractured carriage spindles, which could lead to severe flap asymmetry, and could result in reduced control or loss of controllability of the airplane.
75-18-01: 75-18-01 ENTWICKLUNGSGEMEINSCHAFT (MESSERSCHMITT-BOLKOW-BLOHM GmbH): Amendment 39-2318. Applies to Phoebus A1 and B1 gliders, serial numbers 702 thru 751, certificated in all categories. Compliance is required as indicated. To prevent loss of rudder control, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 10 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 100 hours' time in service from the last inspection, inspect the rudder control cable lever as follows: (1) Remove headrest, luggage container, and seat. (2) Disconnect rudder control cables from cable lever. (3) Remove rudder control rod and rudder control cable lever (P/N 15120-4236). (4) Inspect rudder control cable lever weld for cracks using a magnifying glass with a magnification power of not less than five. (5) If a crack is found comply with paragraph (b) of this AD. (b) If a rudder control cable lever weld crack is found during an inspection required by paragraph (a), replace the rudder control cable lever P/N 15120-4236 with a serviceable part of the same part number or an FAA-approved equivalent. (MBB Service Bulletin No. PHOEBUS 27-20/1, dated March 1975, pertains to this AD.) This amendment becomes effective August 18, 1975.
2004-23-11: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9-14 and DC-9-15 airplanes; and Model DC-9-20, DC-9-30, DC-9-40, and DC-9-50 series airplanes. This AD requires repetitive high frequency eddy current inspections to detect cracks in the vertical radius of the upper cap of the center wing rear spar, and repair if necessary. This AD is prompted by reports of cracks in the upper cap of the center wing rear spar that resulted from stress corrosion. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct cracking of the left or right upper cap of the center rear spar, which would cause a possible fuel leak and structural failure of the upper cap, and result in reduced structural integrity of the airplane.
2014-05-18: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Bombardier, Inc. Model DHC-8-400 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report that a batch of main landing gear (MLG) door actuators with a certain part number having certain serial numbers could be assembled with the scraper installed backward. This AD requires repetitive functional checks of the MLG alternate extension system (AES) and eventual replacement of certain MLG door actuators with actuators that have either been reworked or do not have certain serial numbers. We are issuing this AD to prevent incorrectly installed scrapers, which could hinder the operation of the MLG AES, and result in failure of the MLG AES on one side, and consequent unsafe asymmetrical landing configuration.
2014-05-08: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus Helicopters Model AS332L1 helicopters. This AD requires replacing the rivets on the left-hand (LH) and right-hand (RH) Y350 longitudinal beams (longitudinal beams Y350). This AD was prompted by a report that non-conforming rivets had been installed on an AS332 helicopter during a production modification. The actions of this AD are intended to prevent failure of the longitudinal beams Y350 and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
2014-05-15: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Airbus Helicopters Model AS332C, AS332L, AS332L1, AS332L2, and SA330J helicopters. This AD prohibits use of the hydraulic hoist in helicopters equipped with certain parts and configurations until a hoist beam lower fitting protector is installed. This AD was prompted by a report that the hoist cable jammed during a rescue at sea. The actions of this AD are intended to prevent the hoist cable from jamming and subsequent cable failure, which could result in injury and damage to the helicopter.
2014-05-07: We are superseding airworthiness directive (AD) 2010-11-51 for Eurocopter France (Eurocopter) Model AS350B, BA, B1, B2, C, D, and D1 helicopters and Model AS355E, F, F1, F2, and N helicopters with certain part-numbered tail gearbox (TGB) control levers installed. AD 2010-11- 51 required repetitive visual inspections of the TGB control lever for a crack and replacing a cracked TGB control lever with an airworthy TGB control lever. This new AD retains the requirements of AD 2010-11-51 and also requires inspecting other areas of the TGB control lever not previously inspected and at additional inspection intervals. This AD was prompted by several reports of cracking in a TGB control lever. The actions of this AD are intended to prevent failure of the TGB control lever, loss of tail rotor control, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
2014-04-13: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Agusta S.p.A. (Agusta) Model AB412 and AB412 EP helicopters. This AD requires inspecting the tail rotor (T/R) blade for a crack, corrosion, nick, scratch, dent, or other damage and replacing or repairing the blade, depending on the damage. This AD is prompted by reports of T/R blade failures caused by fatigue cracking that originated from surface damage. These actions are intended to prevent failure of the T/R blade and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
2014-05-05: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 777 airplanes. This AD requires, for certain airplanes, replacing radio altimeter transceivers with upgraded units, and, for all airplanes, replacing low range radio altimeter antennas with new antennas. This AD was prompted by operator reports of erratic low range radio altimeter (LRRA) operation while the airplane is airborne. We are issuing this AD to prevent adverse system responses and flight deck effects that could result in loss of controllability of the airplane or landing short of the runway during landing.
2021-05-02: The FAA is removing Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2021-05-02, which applied to all Airbus Helicopters Model AS350B, AS350BA, AS350B1, AS350B2, AS350B3, AS350C, and AS350D helicopters; Model AS355E, AS355F, AS355F1, AS355F2, AS355N, and AS355NP helicopters; and Model EC130B4 and EC130T2 helicopters. AD 2021-05-02 required determining whether the helicopter has been operated in a severe environment since the last inspection of the main rotor hub-to-mast attachment screws, an inspection of the main rotor hub-to-mast attachment screws if the helicopter has been operated in a severe environment, and replacement of the main rotor hub-to-mast attachment screws if necessary, as specified in a European Aviation Safety Agency (now European Union Aviation Safety Agency) (EASA) AD, which was incorporated by reference. Since the FAA issued AD 2021-05- 02, reported inspection results and further investigation have confirmed that the report of failed main rotor hub-to-mast attachment screws, which prompted AD 2021-05-02, was an isolated case which resulted from a maintenance mistake. Therefore, the FAA has determined that no unsafe condition is likely to exist or develop on the main rotor hub-to-mast attachment screws on other helicopters in the fleet. Accordingly, AD 2021-05-02 is removed.
92-19-10: 92-19-10 BOEING: Amendment 39-8368. Docket No. 92-NM-23-AD. Supersedes AD 90-20-08, Amendment 39-6742.\n\n\tApplicability: Model 727-100 and -100C series airplanes, certificated in any category.\n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously.\n\n\tTo prevent degradation of the skin panel structural integrity, which could lead to depressurization of the cabin, accomplish the following:\n\n\t(a)\tFor Model 727-100 and -100C series airplanes, having line position 001 through 547: Within 15 months after October 23, 1990 (the effective date of AD 90-20-08, amendment 39-6742), conduct an internal and external close visual inspection for corrosion of the skin panels, doublers, and triplers located between body stations (BS) 950 and BS 1183 and stringers S-26L and S-26R. Perform the inspections in accordance with Parts II.A. and II.B. of Boeing Service Bulletin 727-53-0085, Revision 3, dated September 28, 1989, or Revision 4, dated July 11, 1991. Repeat the external inspection at intervals not to exceed 15 months. Repeat the internal inspection and apply corrosion inhibitor at intervals not to exceed 36 months.\n\n\t(b)\tFor all Model 727-100 and -100C series airplanes, having line position 548 or subsequent: Within 15 months after the effective date of this AD, conduct an internal and external close visual inspection for corrosion of the skin panels, doublers, and triplers located between BS 950 and BS 1183 and stringers S-26L and S-26R. Perform the inspections in accordance with Parts II.A. and II.B. of Boeing Service Bulletin 727-53-0085, Revision 4, dated July 11, 1991. Repeat the external inspection at intervals not to exceed 15 months. Repeat the internal inspection and apply corrosion inhibitor at intervals not to exceed 36 months.\n\n\t(c)\tIf no corrosion or minor corrosion, as defined in Part II.A.2. of Boeing Service Bulletin 727-53-0085, Revision 3, dated September 28, 1989; or Revision 4, dated July 11, 1991, is detected as a result of any inspection required by paragraphs (a) or (b) of this AD, prior to further flight, accomplish the procedures specified in paragraph (c)(1) or (c)(2) of this AD, as applicable:\n\n\t\t(1)\tFor each internal close visual inspection conducted in accordance with paragraph (a) or (b) of this AD, perform an internal ultrasonic inspection for voids in accordance with Part II.C.2. of the applicable service bulletin. If voids or minor corrosion are detected, perform a Low Frequency Eddy Current (LFEC) inspection to determine the amount of material loss, in accordance with Part II.D. of the applicable service bulletin.\n\n\t\t(2)\tFor each external close visual inspection conducted in accordance with paragraph (a) or (b) of this AD, perform an external ultrasonic inspection for voids in accordance with Part II.C.3. of the applicable service bulletin. If voids or minor corrosion are detected, perform a LFEC inspection to determine the amount of material loss, in accordance with Part II.D. ofthe applicable service bulletin.\n\n\t(d)\tIf major corrosion, as defined in Parts II.A.3. or II.B. of Boeing Service Bulletin 727-53-0085, Revision 3, dated September 28, 1989, or Revision 4, dated July 11, 1991, is detected as a result of any inspection required by paragraphs (a) or (b) of this AD; or if material loss is 10 percent or more of the skin, doubler, or tripler thickness; prior to further flight, repair or replace the affected skin panel in accordance with Parts V. or VI. of the applicable service bulletin.\n\n\t(e)\tIf material loss is less than 10 percent of the skin, doubler, or tripler, and voids are present, prior to further flight, repair in accordance with Part III.B., III.D., IV.B., V., or VI. of Boeing Service Bulletin 727-53-0085, Revision 3, dated September 28, 1989; or Part VI.B., III.C., IV.B., V., or VI. of Revision 4, dated July 11, 1991.\n\n\t(f)\tFor repairs made in accordance with Part III. or IV. of the service bulletin, within 15 months after the repair is made, perform a LFEC inspection to determine corrosion progression, in accordance with Part II.D. of Boeing Service Bulletin 727-53-0085, Revision 3, dated September 28, 1989; or Revision 4, dated July 11, 1991. Repeat the inspections at intervals not to exceed 15 months.\n\n\t(g)\tBlind fasteners installed in accordance with Part IV. of Boeing Service Bulletin 727-53-0085, Revision 3, dated September 28, 1989; or Revision 4, dated July 11, 1991, are to be used as an interim repair only. The blind fasteners have a life limit of 10,000 landings before they must be replaced with solid fasteners in accordance with Part IV. of the service bulletin.\n\n\t\t(1)\tThe blind fasteners must be inspected for loose or missing fasteners after accumulating 3,000 landings since installation or 1,000 landings after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 3,000 landings.\n\n\t\t(2)\tBlind fasteners installed prior to the effective date of this AD must be replaced prior to accumulating 10,000 landings or within 3,000 landings after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later.\n\n\t(h)\tReplacement of the skin panels with an unbonded skin panel in accordance with Part II. of Boeing Service Bulletin 727-53-85, Revision 2, dated July 3, 1975; Part VI. Boeing Service Bulletin 727-53-0085, Revision 3, dated September 28, 1989; or Revision 4, dated July 11, 1991; constitutes terminating action for the inspection requirements of this AD for those panels.\n\n\t(i)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Seattle ACO.\n\n\tNOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Seattle ACO.\n\n\t(j)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.\n\n\t(k)\tThe inspections, repair, and replacement shall be done in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 727-53-85, Revision 2, dated July 3, 1975; Boeing Service Bulletin 727-53-0085, Revision 3, dated September 28, 1989; or Boeing Service Bulletin 727-53-0085, Revision 4, dated July 11, 1991; as applicable. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW.,suite 700, Washington, DC.\n\n\t(l)\tThis amendment becomes effective on November 20, 1992.
2014-03-15: We are superseding airworthiness directive (AD) 2008-14- [[Page 12371]] 16 for certain 328 Support Services GmbH (Type Certificate Previously Held by AvCraft Aerospace GmbH; Fairchild Dornier GmbH; Dornier Luftfahrt GmbH) Model 328-100 and 328-300 airplanes. AD 2008-14-16 required installing warning placards on the inside of the passenger door and service doors and modifying the hinge supports and support struts of the passenger doors. This new AD continues to require the actions required by AD 2008-14-16 and also requires replacing the fasteners which were installed as part of the modification with new fasteners of the correct length, adds new airplanes, and removes one airplane. This AD was prompted by reports that certain fasteners, which were installed as part of the modification, are the wrong length. We are issuing this AD to prevent incidents of inadvertent opening and possible detachment of a passenger door in-flight, resulting in damage to airframe and systemsand loss of control of the airplane.
2014-03-04: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Bombardier, Inc. Model DHC-8-400 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report of a translating door handle jamming during opening of an aft door. This AD requires replacing the handle shaft with a new single-piece machined handle shaft on the aft entry and service doors, and requires revising the maintenance program by incorporating a new airworthiness limitation task. We are issuing this AD to prevent a migrated pin from jamming a translating door handle, which could prevent opening of the door and impede an emergency evacuation.
70-16-07: 70-16-07 HUGHES: Amendment 39-1059. Applies to Model 369 Series helicopters, certificated in all categories, which incorporate P/N 369A1100 and P/N 369A1100-501 main rotor blade serial numbers listed in Hughes Service Information Notice No. HN-8, dated November 19, 1969, or later FAA approved revision and serial numbers listed in OH-6A Information Notice Numbers, 120, 120A, and 120B dated October 24, 1969; November 5, 1969; and December 19, 1969, respectively. Compliance required as indicated: To prevent failure of the main rotor blade P/N 369A1100 and P/N 369A1100-501 accomplish the following or an equivalent inspection procedure approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region: Within 25 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, determine the identification notation on the blade top and bottom doublers in accordance with the procedures in Part I a, b, and c of Hughes Service Information Notice No. HN-8, dated November 19, 1969, or later FAA approved revision. (a) For blades displaying "PR-12" ink stamps or blades lacking ink stamps below the part number on either of the doublers: (1) Inspect prior to further flight in accordance with Part I d of Hughes Service Information Notice No. HN-8, above. (2) If indications of cracks or doubler peeling or separation are found, remove the blade from service prior to further flight. (3) If indications of cracks or doubler peeling or separation are not found, repeat the inspection required under (1) above, at periods not to exceed 25 hours time in service from the last inspection until the blades are removed from service as specified in (4), below. (4) Remove from service prior to the accumulation of 100 hours time in service from the effective date of this AD. (b) Blades displaying ink stamp letters and numerals other than "PR-12" below the part number on both doublers may be returned to service with no further inspection, following refinishing and identification per Hughes Service Information Notice No. HN-8, dated November 19, 1969, or later FAA approved revision. This amendment becomes effective August 8, 1970.
91-09-12: 91-09-12 BOEING: Amendment 39-6976. Docket No. 90-NM-245-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: All Model 737-300, 737-400, and 737-500 series airplanes, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required within the next 36 months after the effective date of this AD, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo preclude cross connection of the engine fire extinguishing wiring and plumbing during maintenance, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tFor airplanes listed in Boeing Service Bulletin 737-26-1067, dated June 28, 1990: Modify the engine fire extinguishing system wiring and plumbing in accordance with the service bulletin. Accomplishment of this modification constitutes terminating action for the repetitive inspections and functional tests required by Airworthiness Directive 89-03-51, Amendment 39-6213, on Boeing Model 737-300, 737-400, and 737-500 airplanes following maintenance on the engine fire extinguishing wiring and plumbing. \n\n\tB.\tFor airplanes line position 1890 and subsequent on which PRR 34774 or an equivalent modification was incorporated during production: The repetitive inspections and functional tests required by Airworthiness Directive 89-03-51, Amendment 39-6213, are terminated. \n\n\tC.\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Seattle ACO.\n \n\tD.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6976, AD 91-09-12) becomes effective on May 28, 1991.
2014-04-11: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Airbus Helicopters Model AS350B, BA, B1, B2, B3, and D, and Model AS355E, F, F1, F2, and N helicopters with certain tail rotor (T/R) blades. This AD requires installing additional rivets to secure each T/R blade trailing edge tab (tab), and inspecting for evidence of debonding of the tab after the rivets are installed. This AD was prompted by reports of T/R blade tab debonding. The actions of this AD are intended to prevent loss of a T/R blade tab, which could result in excessive vibration and loss of control of the helicopter.
2014-05-02: We are superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2002-10-11, which applied to certain The Boeing Company Model 737-100, -200, -200C, -300, -400, and -500 series airplanes. AD 2002-10-11 required repetitive inspections for cracking and corrosion of the aft pressure bulkhead, and corrective actions if necessary; and, for certain airplanes, enlargement of frame chord drain holes, and repetitive inspections of the frame chord drain path for debris, and corrective actions if necessary. This new AD specifies a drain path inspection for all airplanes. For certain airplanes, this new AD reduces the repetitive inspection interval; and adds repetitive inspections of the frame chord drain path for obstructions and debris, and corrective actions if necessary. This AD was prompted by three reports of severe corrosion in the area affected by AD 2002-10-11. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct corrosion or cracking of the aft pressure bulkhead, which could result in loss of the aft pressure bulkhead web and stiffeners, and consequent rapid decompression of the airplane.
2014-03-01: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Agusta S.p.A. (Agusta) Model AB139 and AW139 helicopters with a certain wire strike protection system (WSPS) top cable cutter assembly installed. This AD requires reworking or replacing the top cable cutter assembly to increase clearance between the WSPS and the main rotor (M/R) blades and requires that the reworked or replaced part be marked at the end of the part number to reflect the field modification. This AD was prompted by a report of in-flight contact between the top cable-cutter assembly and two M/R blades. The actions of this AD are intended to prevent damage to the M/R blades and subsequent loss of helicopter control.
91-15-22: 91-15-22 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-7087. Docket No. 91-NM-18-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: McDonnell Douglas Model DC-10-40 series airplanes, as listed in McDonnell Douglas Service Bulletin 71-154, dated January 18, 1991, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent fuel line and engine fuel shutoff cable damage and possible fire caused by an uncontained engine failure, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tWithin one year after the effective date of this AD, replace the fuel line shield on the left side of the number 2 engine bellmouth panel, and install an additional plate, as applicable, in accordance with the accomplishment instructions of McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service Bulletin 71-154, dated January 18, 1991. \n\n\tB.\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (AC0), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Los Angeles ACO. \n\n\tC.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tD.\tThe replacement and installation requirements shall be done in accordance with McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service Bulletin 71-154, dated January 18, 1991. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: DC-10 Technical Publications, Technical Administrative Support C1-L5B. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, Renton, Washington; or at the LosAngeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3229 East Spring Street, Long Beach, California; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L Street N.W., Room 8401, Washington, D.C. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-7087, AD 91-15-22) becomes effective on September 9, 1991.
2014-03-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Cessna Aircraft Company (Cessna) Models 310, 320, 340, 401, 402, 411, 414, and 421 airplanes. This AD was prompted by an investigation of recent and historical icing-related accidents and incidents for the products listed above. This AD requires either having the supplemental airplane flight manual/airplane flight manual supplement (SAFM/AFMS) inside the airplane and accessible to the pilot during the airplane's operation or installing a placard that prohibits flight into known icing conditions and installing a placard that increases published airspeed on approach at least 17 mph (15 knots) in case of an inadvertent encounter with icing. We are issuing this AD to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2014-03-05: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Bombardier, Inc. Model BD-700-1A10 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report that the manufacturer has determined that some completion centers used the heater/brake monitoring unit (HBMU) logic circuit to control the line voltage of the drain mast heaters. Since the drain mast heaters are connected in parallel with the number 2 pitot static (PS) probe heater circuit, a number 2 PS probe heater failure may not be detected by the fault monitoring capabilities of the HBMU. This AD requires modification of the air data probes and sensors. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct an unannunciated failure of two PS probe heaters, which could affect controllability of the airplane in icing conditions.
2014-02-06: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Agusta S.p.A. (Agusta) Model AB412 helicopters. This AD requires visually inspecting the main rotor swashplate outer ring (outer ring) for a crack and replacing that outer ring if a crack exists. This AD is prompted by two cases of cracks caused by fatigue on certain outer rings. These actions are intended to prevent the failure of the outer ring, which would lead to loss of main rotor blade pitch control and subsequently loss of helicopter control.
2018-07-16: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Austro Engine GmbH model E4 and E4P diesel piston engines. This AD requires replacement of the waste gate controller and the control rod circlip. This AD was prompted by reports of broken or disconnected turbocharger waste gate control rods on some engines. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2014-04-01: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Slingsby Aviation Ltd. Model T67M260 airplanes. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as cracked horizontal stabilizer attachment brackets. We are issuing this AD to require actions to address the unsafe condition on these products.