Results
2008-08-07: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: A crack has been found in an axle adaptor during fatigue testing. It was found that the internal edges of the dowel holes did not have the correct radius and the crack had developed from the edge of one of the dowel holes. A crack in the axle adaptor can cause the axle adaptor to fail and ultimately lead to loss of [the] wheels and total loss of brake capability. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2009-23-08: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: It has been found the occurrence of two events of aircraft being dispatched with the cargo door opened without indication. In one of the events the aircraft took off with the cargo door opened. * * * * * The unsafe condition is a cargo door opening during flight, which could result in reduced structural integrity and consequent rapid decompression of the airplane. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
92-07-13: 92-07-13 BOEING: Amendment 39-8209. Docket No. 91-NM-154-AD.\n\n\tApplicability: Model 767 series airplanes; as listed in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-52A0061, Revision 1, dated September 26, 1991; certificated in any category.\n\n\tCompliance: Required within the next 60 days after the effective date of this AD, unless accomplished previously.\n\n\tTo ensure proper retention of the girt bar to the girt bar carrier, accomplish the following:\n\n\t(a)\tAdjust the ball plunger for the girt bar locks in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-52A0061, Revision 1, dated September 26, 1991.\n\n\t(b)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. The request shall be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager,Seattle ACO.\n\n\t(c)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.\n\n\t(d)\tThe repair shall be done in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-52A0061, Revision 1, dated September 26, 1991. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L Street NW., Room 8401, Washington, DC.\n\n\t(e)\tThis amendment becomes effective on May 4, 1992.
71-11-08: 71-11-08 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amdt. 39-1217. Pursuant to the authority of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, delegated to me by the Administrator, the following airworthiness directive, applicable to all operators of Douglas DC-9 and Military C-9A airplanes, was effective immediately upon receipt of telegram dated May 10, 1971. \n\n\tBecause of repeated incidents of the pilot's or first officer's instrument panel assemblies sliding aft; and in one instance, producing control column interference, one of the following alternate actions is to be accomplished within 25 flight hours in service after receipt of this telegram: \n\n\t(1)\tInstall placard on captain and first officer instrument panel stating "Check panel security before takeoff." Or \n\n\t(2)\tIncorporate a check item in flight crew aircraft acceptance check list stating "Check security of captain and first officer instrument panels." Or \n\n\t(3)\tIn the maintenance program include security of captain and first officer instrument panel as a "required inspection item" whenever the panels are disturbed, subject to the approval of the assigned principal inspector. \n\n\t(4)\tSecondary safety latches may be installed in accordance with Douglas Service Bulletin 31-16, dated October 14, 1969, or later FAA approved revision. Accomplishment of this modification will constitute of itself compliance with this AD. \n\n\tEquivalent methods of compliance must be referred to the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective upon publication in the Federal Register for all persons except those to whom it was made effective immediately by telegram dated May 10, 1971.
2020-24-07: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2018-26-02 for Airbus Helicopters (previously Eurocopter France) Model AS350B3, EC130B4, and EC130T2 helicopters. AD 2018-26-02 required inspecting the pilot's and co-pilot's throttle twist for proper operation. This new AD retains the requirements of AD 2018-26-02 and adds calendar time compliance times for the required actions. This AD was prompted by a public comment that prompted additional review. The actions of this AD are intended to address an unsafe condition on these products.
2009-23-04: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Boeing Model 767 airplanes. This AD requires repetitive replacement of the internal electrical feed-through connectors of the boost pumps of the main fuel tank. This AD results from a report of cracking in the epoxy potting compound on the internal feed-through connector of the fuel boost pump in the area of the soldered wire connector lugs. We are issuing this AD to prevent a hazardous electrical path from the dry side to the wet side of the fuel boost pump through a cracked feed- through connector, or between pins or a pin and the shell on one side of the feed-through connector, which could create an ignition source on the wet side of the fuel boost pump or cause a fire in the fuel pump enclosure and lead to subsequent explosion of the fuel tank.
2003-25-01: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the specified Eurocopter France (Eurocopter) model helicopters with a Breeze 300-pound electric hoist (hoist) installed that requires modifying and re-identifying the hoist operator control unit and replacing certain fuses. This amendment is prompted by a test of a hoist that revealed an anomaly in the electrical control circuit. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of the hoist pyrotechnic squib electrical control unit, lack of adequate current to activate the hoist pyrotechnic squib, an inability of the pilot to cut the rescue hoist cable in the event of cable entanglement or other emergency, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
2009-23-02: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: During the Acceptance Test Procedure (ATP) of returned Inboard Flap Actuators * * * an excessive wear condition was identified regarding endplay between the flap actuator and ball screw. Excessive wear of the screw and ball nut could potentially lead to a flap system jam. * * * * * * * * The unsafe condition is a flap system jam, which could result in a skewed flap condition with consequent reduced controllability of the airplane. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
67-02-05: 67-02-05 VICKERS: Amdt. 39-323 Part 39 Federal Register December 20, 1966. Applies to Viscount Models 744 and 745D airplanes. Compliance required as indicated. To prevent further failures of the flying control rod guide beam at Fuselage Station 399.25, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 25 landings after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the last 225 landings, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 250 landings from the last inspection until modified in accordance with (c) or repaired in accordance with (b), visually inspect the control rod guide beam attached to the bottom of the floor beam at Fuselage Station 399.25 for cracks at the top and bottom extremities of the vertical slot for the trim chains. (b) Repair cracked beams before further flight in accordance with British Aircraft Corporation PTL 261, Issue 1, or later ARB-approved issue, or an FAA-approved equivalent, and either inspect as specified in (a) at intervals not to exceed 500 landings from the last inspection until modified in accordance with (c) and repair in accordance with this paragraph if applicable, or modify cracked beams before further flight in accordance with (c). (c) Modify beams in accordance with British Aircraft Corporation Modification D.3179 within the next 1500 landings after the effective date of this AD. (d) For the purpose of complying with this AD, subject to acceptance by the assigned FAA maintenance inspector, the number of landings may be determined by dividing each airplane's hours' time in service by the operator's fleet average time from takeoff to landing for the airplane type. (e) Upon request of the operator, and FAA maintenance inspector, subject to prior approval of the Chief, Aircraft Certification Staff, Europe, Africa, Middle East Region, may adjust the repetitive inspection intervals specified in this AD to permit compliance at an established inspection period of the operator if the request contains substantiating data to justify the increase for that operator. This directive effective January 19, 1967.
2003-24-13: The FAA adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Cessna Aircraft Company (Cessna) Models 172R, 172S, 182S, 182T, T182T, 206H, and T206H airplanes that are equipped with a Honeywell KAP 140 autopilot computer system installed on the center instrument control panel near the throttle. This AD requires you to install an update to the operating software of the KAP 140 autopilot computer system, change the unit's part number, and change the software modification identification tag. This AD is the result of reports of inadvertent and undetected engagement of the autopilot system. We are issuing this AD to prevent unintentionally engaging the KAP 140 autopilot computer system, which could cause the pilot to take inappropriate actions.