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2006-04-03: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all Airbus Model A330-200 and -300 series airplanes, Model A340-200 and -300 series airplanes, and Model 340-541 and -642 airplanes. This AD requires identifying the part number of the emergency evacuation slides or slide rafts installed on Type "A" exit doors, and modifying the regulator valves of the slide and slide raft assemblies if necessary. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of an emergency evacuation slide raft to deploy and inflate during an emergency situation, which could impede an evacuation and result in injury to passengers or crewmembers. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
68-16-02: 68-16-02 SIAI-MARCHETTI: Amdt. 39-628. Applies to Model S.205/22R airplanes - Serial Nos. 213, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 379, 380, 381, 382, and 384. Compliance required within the next 200 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To provide a position indicating means for the main landing gear, install a Burgess MK4BR microswitch on the right and left wing in accordance with Siai-Marchetti Service Bulletin No. 205B5A, dated April 11, 1968, or later RAI-approved issue, or an FAA-approved equivalent. This amendment becomes effective September 7, 1968.
99-19-34: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Bombardier Model DHC-8-100 and -300 series airplanes, that requires modification of certain hydraulic systems that provide hydraulic pressure for the control of the rudder and for the main landing gear brakes. This amendment is prompted by issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent damage to certain hydraulic system components in the number 2 engine nacelle, which could result in loss of the number 1 and number 2 hydraulic systems, and consequent reduced controllability of the airplane.
52-15-02: 52-15-02 MARTIN: Applies to All Models 202 Airplanes With Hamilton Standard Reversing Propeller Installations. I. Prior to reactivation of the reversing feature of the propellers: A. Modify the following terminal strips and pin connector assemblies as specified in items 1 and 2 of Attachment A (see AD 52-13-02 Lockheed): (1) Terminal strip at nacelle firewall junction box. (2) Terminal strip at center wing panel. (3) Terminal strip at fuselage Section 225. (4) Terminal strip at nose junction box. (5) 19 pin connector assembly at the propeller control relay box. B. Modify Hamilton Standard propeller reversing relay box at the front of the control pedestal to shield the reversing solenoid circuit relay contacts, etc., from all other circuits which are energized at any time except when reversing is desired. Reversing relay boxes which have separate pin connectors for the reversing solenoid wire and the remaining circuits, shall beso installed that it is not possible inadvertently to interchange any connectors on the two relay boxes. C. Rewire the feathering button circuit so that the wire from the feathering button to the fixed terminal for the auxiliary pump on the "A" relay is not energized when feathering is being accomplished and so that the hold in coil on the feathering button is inoperative during unfeathering. Isolate reversing circuit relay contacts in the propeller control relay box in a manner equivalent to the change specified in item I.B. Protect the exposed relay terminals as specified in items 3. of Attachment A. D. Modify the reversing solenoid circuit wiring in accordance with item 4. of Attachment A. E. Revise the reversing circuits to comply with Hamilton Standard Service Bulletin No. 236. F. In order to prevent reversing of a normally operating propeller when unfeathering the other propeller: If the reversing solenoid circuits for the two propellers are adjacent toeach other in any connectors, at terminal strips, in wire bundles, or any other points where contact may occur between the two circuits due to a fault, isolate the two circuits from each other as specified in Attachment A and observe the maintenance practices in item II.A. G. The "reverse operable" warning device shall be clearly visible when the lock is open just a sufficient amount to permit moving the throttles into the reverse regime. It shall not be possible for the flap to catch on its track or on the control pedestal and remain held in the up position. H. Incorporate throttle pedestal cover plate No. 2021A19719 which has a steel track to prevent lifting the throttles before they reach the idle position. I. If an alternate manually controllable ground circuit is installed to permit unfeathering in case of an open blade switch circuit, the alternate circuit shall be removed. J. Increase the height of the throttle quadrant stop at the positive idle positionso that a lift of at least 1/4-inch is required to lift the pin over the stop. II. Maintenance practices (to be instituted when reversing is reactivated): A. At each nearest scheduled service to 350 hours: (1) Inspect all points specified in I.A.(1) through I.A.(4) unless the modifications made to the system conform to item 1(a) or 1(b) of Attachment A. Perform an electrical check of the reverse safety switches in the pedestal assembly to assure that the switch is open when the throttles are moved forward out of the reverse position, unless it is shown that failure of any of the reverse safety switches to open will be clearly apparent to the flight crew by reason of improper operation of the propeller control system. Because of the many technical considerations involved, analyses showing that the objective of this revision has been accomplished should be referred to the FAA for engineering evaluation and approval. B. At any time that an electrical faultoccurs in a circuit which is carried in the same bundles or the same conduits as the reversing solenoid circuit, representative terminal points in the faulty circuit are to be inspected to determine whether any damage may have occurred within the bundles or conduit. If there is evidence of possible damage, all the wiring involved is to be removed and inspected. Damaged wiring is to be replaced as necessary. III. Operating instructions: (comply with item 5 of Attachment A.) IV. (Note: Propeller governor design changes which are under development and whose purpose is to provide a high pressure hydraulic circuit bypass to safeguard against inadvertent reversing and to provide ability to feather even when the reversing solenoid is energized are still under consideration and may be the subject of a future directive.)
86-23-04: 86-23-04 FOKKER B.V.: Amendment 39-5459. Applies to Model F27 airplanes; serial numbers 10105 to 10648 inclusive, 10654, 10658, 10659, 10660, 10662 to 10667 inclusive, 10669, 10672 and 10678; certificated in any category. To ensure structural integrity of the elevator trim tab, accomplish the following, unless already accomplished: A. Within 60 days after the effective date of this AD, conduct a one-time visual inspection of the elevator trim tab in accordance with Fokker Service Bulletin F27/55-59, Revision 1, dated October 15, 1985. B. If incorrect rivets are installed, repair the tab before further flight in accordance with the above service bulletin. C. An alternate means of compliance or adjustment of compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. D. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of inspections and/or modifications required by this AD. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service document from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to the Manager of Maintenance and Engineering, Fokker B.V., Product Support, P.O. Box 7600, 11172J Schiphol Oost, the Netherlands. This document may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or at the Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. This amendment becomes effective December 10, 1986.
93-01-25: 93-01-25 AIRBUS INDUSTRIE: Amendment 39-8479. Docket 92-NM-243-AD. Applicability: Model A320 series airplanes, manufacturer's serial numbers 002 through 180, inclusive; 183 through 194, inclusive; 196 through 315, inclusive; 317 through 321, inclusive; 323 through 325, inclusive; and 328 through 334, inclusive; certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. To prevent fuel leakage onto the engine and the potential for an engine fire, accomplish the following: (a) Within 500 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, perform a torque check of the connection on the fuel return line at rib 9 in accordance with Airbus Industrie All Operator Telex (AOT) 28-04, Revision 1, dated September 9, 1992. (1) If the red witness marks are incorrectly aligned, prior to further flight, accomplish paragraphs (a)(1)(i) and (a)(1)(ii) of this AD in accordance with the AOT. (i) Tighten the connection totorque values between 478 and 522 inch-pounds. (ii) Remove the existing witness marks and remark with an indelible marker pen. (2) If the red witness marks are correctly aligned, this AD does not require retorquing or remarking. (b) Within 500 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, perform a leak check of the sealant in pylon zone "A", in accordance with All Operator Telex (AOT) 28-04, Revision 1, dated September 9, 1992. (1) If any leak is found or if the water level drops while conducting the leak check, prior to further flight, replace the sealant in accordance with the AOT. (2) If no leak is found and if the water level does not drop while conducting the leak check, this AD does not require replacement of the sealant. (c) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Standardization Branch. NOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Standardization Branch. (d) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. (e) The checks, torquing, marking, and replacement shall be done in accordance with Airbus Industrie All Operator Telex 28-04, Revision 1, dated September 9, 1992. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from Airbus Industrie, Airbus Support Division, 1 Rond Point Maurice Bellonte, 31707 Blagnac Cedex, France. Copies may be inspected atthe FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC. (f) This amendment becomes effective on February 10, 1993.
85-01-05: 85-01-05 BRITISH AEROSPACE: Amendment 39-5047. Applies to Model 125 800A series airplanes with manufacturer serial numbers 258003 through 258020, certificated in all categories. To detect the lack of engine fire protection caused by improper wiring which would result in the wrong fire bottle operating, accomplish the following, unless previously accomplished: (A). Within ten (10) hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, inspect and rewire, if necessary, the electrical circuits of the engines' fire protection system, in accordance with the accomplishment instructions of British Aerospace 125 Service Bulletin 26-A25(253028), dated December 20, 1984. (B). Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of inspections required by this AD. (C). Alternate inspections, modifications, or other actions which provide an acceptable level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from their manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to British Aerospace, Inc., Librarian, Box 12414, Dulles International Airport, Washington, D.C. 20041. This amendment becomes effective May 13, 1985, and was effective earlier to those recipients of AD 85-01-05 dated January 15, 1985, distributed by priority letter.
93-09-13: 93-09-13 DE HAVILLAND, INC.: Amendment 39-8579. Docket 92-NM-232-AD. Applicability: Model DHC-8-100 and -300 series airplanes on which Modification 8/1970 has not been accomplished; certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. To prevent loss of conductivity, which could lead to overheat damage to wiring or connectors, accomplish the following: (a) Within 60 days after the effective date of this AD, replace aluminum washers installed at the bus bar connections with steel washers, in accordance with de Havilland Alert Service Bulletin S.B. A8-24-44, dated October 23, 1992. (b) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Engine and Propeller Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, New York ACO. NOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the New York ACO. (c) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. (d) The replacement shall be done in accordance with de Havilland Alert Service Bulletin S.B. A8-24-44, dated October 23, 1992. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from de Havilland, Inc., Garratt Boulevard, Downsview, Ontario M3K 1Y5, Canada. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the FAA, Engine and Propeller Directorate, New York Aircraft Certification Office, 181 South Franklin Avenue, Room 202, Valley Stream, New York; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC. (e) This amendment becomes effective on June 17, 1993.
2014-03-16: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Rolls-Royce Deutschland Ltd & Co. KG (RRD) Tay 620-15, 650-15, and 651- 54 turbofan engines. This AD requires replacement of low-pressure compressor (LPC) fan blades. This AD was prompted by the discovery that the LPC fan blades leading edges erode in service and create an unacceptable blade flutter margin. We are issuing this AD to prevent LPC fan blade failure, damage to the engine, and damage to the airplane.
99-19-33: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to all LET Aeronautical Works (LET) Model L-13 "Blanik" sailplanes. This AD requires painting (using a contrasting color, i.e., red paint) the left hand elevator drive mechanism in order to not have the elevator drive bellcrank inadvertently installed backwards. This AD is the result of mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the airworthiness authority for the Czech Republic. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent the elevator drive bellcrank from being installed backwards, which could result in an incorrect rigging of the elevator flight control with potential reduced or loss of control of the sailplane.