Aircraft-logs.com

Results
2009-05-12: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Cessna Aircraft Company (Cessna) Models 208 and 208B airplanes. This AD requires you to modify the aileron carry-through cable attachment to the aileron upper quadrant with parts of improved design. This AD results from reports of a "catch'' in the aileron control system when the control yoke is turned. We are issuing this AD to prevent the cable attach fitting on the aileron upper quadrant assembly from rotating and possibly contacting or interfering with the aileron lower quadrant assembly, which could result in limited roll control and reduced handling capabilities.
2020-18-10: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus SAS Model A319-151N and -153N; A320-251N, -252N, and -253N; and A321-251N, -252N, -253N, -251NX, -252NX, and -253NX airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report indicating that Kathon FP 1.5 biocide added to fuel and running through an airplane's engines can lead to engine performance degradation. This AD requires removing Kathon FP 1.5 biocide from the fuel tanks and engines and prohibits operation of an airplane with Kathon FP 1.5 biocide in a fuel tank or engine, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD 2020- 0176, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
63-02-01: 63-02-01 BOEING: Amdt. 527 Part 507 Federal Register January 11, 1963. Applies to All 707/720 Series Aircraft. \n\n\tCompliance required within the next 500 hours' time in service, unless already accomplished. \n\n\tThe upper and lower fairings installed over the anticollision lights have been found to disturb the light distribution in certain peripheral areas. To prevent a reduction in the effective light intensity: \n\n\t(a)\tRemove the anticollision light upper fairing, (P/N's 69-10789, 9-66041-3000) and the lower fairing, (P/N's 69-10789-1, 9-66041 or 9-66041-3000); and \n\n\t(b)\tPlug the mounting holes for the fairing assembly fasteners with Boeing material specification 5-13 Type A aerodynamic smoother or equivalent. \n\n\t(Boeing Service Bulletin No. 1651 covers the same subject.) \n\n\tThis directive effective February 12, 1963.
2003-20-04: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Saab Model SAAB 2000 series airplanes, that requires an inspection to detect chafing or damage to the electrical wire harnesses in the left and right wing fuel tanks, applicable corrective action(s) if necessary, and installation of harnesses. For certain airplanes, this AD also requires modifying the collector tank walls. This action is necessary to prevent chafing damage to the electrical wire harnesses in the left and right wing fuel tanks, which could cause misleading data and erroneous fuel pump cautions to be displayed to the flightcrew, and could result in electrical arcing with consequent increased potential for fire or explosion in the fuel tank. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2009-06-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Transport Canada has received numerous service difficulty reports concerning Viking DHC-7 and Bombardier DHC-8 aircraft fluorescent lamp holder damage due to overheating. It has been determined that lamp holder overheating is a result of arcing between the fluorescent tube pins and the lamp holder contacts when the tube is not properly seated during installation. Overheating of lamp holders, if not corrected, could generate fumes and smoke * * . * * * * * The unsafe condition could result in an in-flight fire. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2009-06-12: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: * * * * * The Bombardier CL-600-2B19 airplanes have had a history of flap failures at various positions for several years. Flap failure may result in a significant increase in required landing distances and higher fuel consumption than planned during a diversion. * * * * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2020-18-15: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus SAS Model A350-941 and -1041 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report indicating that when the number 2 engine thrust reverser (T/R) was opened, the right-hand T/R hinge nut located at position 4 was found detached; investigation revealed that certain nuts could have been installed with noncompliant locking features, or with locking features that could degrade quicker than anticipated. This AD requires replacing any existing nut on the T/R hinge with a new nut, installing a new nut and washer if necessary, and applying a torque stripe at each T/R hinge location, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2020-18-14: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all General Electric Company (GE) GE90-110B1 and GE90-115B model turbofan engines with a certain high-pressure turbine (HPT) rotor stage 2 disk installed. This AD was prompted by a report from the manufacturer that a subsurface anomaly was found on a HPT rotor stage 2 disk. This AD requires an ultrasonic inspection (USI) of the HPT rotor stage 2 disk and, depending on the result of the inspection, replacement of the HPT rotor stage 2 disk with a part eligible for installation. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
62-08-07: 62-08-07 GRUMMAN: Amdt. 420 Part 507 Federal Register April 14, 1962. Applies to Model G-164 Aircraft Serial Numbers 1 Through 100 Inclusive. For aircraft with 200 or more hours' time in service, compliance is required within 10 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD. For aircraft with less than 200 hours' time in service, compliance is required within 25 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, or before 210 hours' total time in service is exceeded whichever occurs first. To preclude loss of aileron control, accomplish the following: (a) Replace the aileron cable control sector support brackets, upper and lower, in lower wing panels with new support brackets, P/N 1854-13 (Kit of replacement parts, A1854, furnished by Grumman), or FAA approved equivalent. Install the parts and the aileron cables in accordance with Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp. Mandatory Service Bulletin No. 20 dated January 24, 1962, or FAA approved equivalent.(b) Visually inspect aileron control system pushrod assemblies, Grumman P/N's A1866-1 and A1866-3, in both lower wing panels, for loose rod end fittings due to elongation of rivet holes. Repair or replace loose fittings prior to further flight. After initial compliance, visually inspect the aileron control system pushrod assemblies at each periodic inspection thereafter until one of the following, or FAA approved equivalent is accomplished: (1) Insert aluminum alloy bar, 2024-T3, 7/16 O.D. x 7/8-inch plugs in each end of A1866-11 and A1866-13 tubes and reinstall the rod ends with two AN 470-AD5 rivets per rod end. (2) Install Grumman P/N A1866-25 in lieu of A1866-1 and P/N A1866-27 in lieu of A1866-3. (Grumman Service Bulletin No. 20 dated January 24, 1962, and the Addendum thereto dated February 3, 1962, cover this subject.) This directive effective April 25, 1962.
2003-20-06: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9-31 and DC-9-32 airplanes. This action requires, among other actions, various inspections to detect cracks of the cockpit enclosure window sill, and follow-on and corrective actions, as applicable. This action is necessary to prevent fatigue cracking of the internal doublers and frame structure of the fuselage skin of the cockpit enclosure window sill, which could result in rapid decompression of the fuselage and consequent reduced structural integrity of the airplane. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.