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69-15-05: 69-15-05\tBOEING: Amdt. 39-804. Applies to Model 727 Series airplanes. \n\n\tCompliance required as indicated. \n\n\tTo prevent a slow discharge or no discharge of the engine fire extinguisher container, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tWithin the next 1000 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD unless already accomplished, and after each discharge regardless of time in service, inspect the Accessory Products Company (APCO) fire extinguisher outlet body P/N 805516 to determine that the gas port diameter has not been reduced below the allowable limit as set out in APCO Service Bulletin No. 26-04, dated March 31, 1969, or later FAA approved revision or an equivalent method approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. \n\n\t(b)\tIf an outlet body is found which is below the allowable limit, replace it, or modify it in accordance with APCO Service Bulletin No. 26-04 or later FAA approved revision or an equivalent method approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. \n\n\t(c)\tWithin the next 3000 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD unless already accomplished, modify the APCO fire extinguisher outlet body P/N 805516 in accordance with APCO Service Bulletin NO. 26-04 or later FAA approved revision or an equivalent method approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. \n\n\t(d)\tUpon completion of the modification described in (b) or (c), the inspection \nrequirement of (a) is no longer applicable. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective on July 25, 1969.
2007-04-12: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Inspection of a high time aircraft has revealed cracks in the Horizontal Stabiliser rear spar splice plate and inboard main ribs around the area of the Horizontal Stabiliser rear pivot attachment. Additionally, failure of some attach bolts in service may be due to improper assembly. This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
69-20-02: 69-20-02 MAULE AIRCRAFT CORPORATION: Amdt. 39-846. Applies to the following models: M-4, M-4T, M-4C, M-4S, M-4-210, M-4-210C, M-4-220C. The following are affected serial numbers: M-4, Serial Nos. 3 through 94 M-4T, Serial Nos. 1T through 3T M-4C, Serial Nos. 1C through 11C M-4S, Serial Nos. 1S through 3S M-4-210, Serial Nos. 1001 through 1045 M-4-210C, Serial Nos. 1001C through 1075C, 1079C, 1080C M-4-220C, Serial Nos. 2001C through 2029C, 2032C Compliance required within the next 25 hours' time in service after the effective date of this airworthiness directive unless already accomplished. To prevent the most forward aileron control system pulley, mounted on the lower portion of the control column, from separating from its bearing, accomplish the following: Remove the bolt attaching the most forward aileron control system pulley to the control column. Replace pulley assembly with the addition of washers AN 970-5 and AN 960-516 and an AN 5-27 bolt instead of the original bolt in the following order from front to rear: 1. AN 5-27 bolt, head forward. 2. AN 970-5 washer. 3. AN 960-516 washer. 4. Original pulley. 5. Control column. 6. AN 960-516 washer. 7. AN 365-524 nut or equivalent approved by Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Southern Region. Maule Service Letter No. 19, dated September 4, 1969, covers this same subject. This amendment becomes effective September 30, 1969.
2005-17-17R1: The FAA is revising an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for Turbomeca S.A. Arrius 2F turboshaft engines. That AD currently requires replacing certain O-rings on the check valve piston in the lubrication unit, at repetitive intervals. This AD requires the same actions except it reduces the applicability from all Turbomeca S.A. Arrius 2F turboshaft engines, to Turbomeca S.A. Arrius 2F turboshaft engines that have not incorporated modification Tf75. This AD results from Turbomeca S.A. introducing a check valve piston design requiring no O-ring. We are issuing this AD to prevent an uncommanded in-flight shutdown of the engine, which could result in a forced autorotation landing and damage to the helicopter.
66-11-02: 66-11-02 LOCKHEED: Amdt. 39-213 Part 39 Federal Register March 17, 1966. Applies to Model 188A and 188C Series Airplanes Except Those Modified in Accordance with Lockheed Drawing 841318A (including Notes 10 and 11), Lockheed Drawing 841318B (including Notes 11, 13, and 19), or an Equivalent Approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. Compliance required as indicated. To detect spanwise cracks in the wing lower surface aft of the main gear fulcrum fitting and chordwise cracks in the wing lower surface plank, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 700 landings after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the last 700 landings before the effective date of this AD, and at intervals not to exceed 1,400 landings from the last inspection until repaired or modified in accordance with (b), accomplish the following or an equivalent approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region: (1) Inspect for cracks in accordance with (i) or (ii) the wing plank riser radius (Item 7, Lockheed Service Bulletin 88/SB-620D, Figure 3) of riser number 29, plank 5 and riser number 36, plank 6 between Wing Stations 162 and 172 and between Wing Stations 204 and 214, of airplanes not modified in accordance with Lockheed Drawing 841318. (i) Inspect externally, by the ultrasonic technique described in Lockheed Service Bulletin 88/SB-620D, Section 2.B.(5)(c), pages 25 through 31, or later FAA- approved revision. Test block design must be in accordance with Lockheed Service Bulletin 88/SB- 625B, Figure 2, or later FAA-approved revision. If indication of a crack is found, inspect before further flight in accordance with (ii). (ii) Inspect internally, by dye penetrant method, as described in Lockheed Service Bulletin 88/SB-625B, Sections 2(A) through 2(F), or later FAA-approved revision. (2) Inspect for cracks the internal plank area surrounding the bulkhead angle (P/N810970) at the Wing Station 211 attachment hole or holes, as applicable, located between the lower number 6 plank risers 37 and 38, by dye penetrant method, in accordance with Lockheed Service Bulletin 88 SB-625C, Section 2G, or later FAA-approved revision. (b) Repair cracks found during the inspections required by this AD before further flight in accordance with Lockheed Drawing 841318A (including Notes 10 and 11) or Lockheed Drawing 841318B (including Notes 11, 13, and 19), as applicable, and the accomplishment instructions of Lockheed Service Bulletin 88/SB-625C or later FAA-approved revision, or an equivalent approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. The airplane may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a base where the repair is to be performed. Seal all splice areas to be covered with repairs in accordance with Lockheed Service Bulletin 88/SB-620D or later FAA-approved revision. NOTE: Regional approval required by (b) may be facilitated by obtaining prior approval of a Structural DER. (c) The repetitive inspections required by (a)(2) may be discontinued if, during the inspections required by (a), no cracks are found, and before further flight the airplane is modified in accordance with Note 10 of Lockheed Drawing No. 841318A or Notes 13 and 19 of Lockheed Drawing No. 841318B, as applicable. (d) For the purpose of complying with this AD, subject to acceptance by the assigned FAA maintenance inspector, the number of landings may be determined by dividing each airplane's hours' time in service by the operator's fleet average time from takeoff to landing for the airplane type. (e) Upon request of the operator, an FAA maintenance inspector, subject to prior approval of the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region, may adjust the repetitive inspection intervals specified in this AD to permit compliance at an established inspection period of the operator if the request contains substantiating data to justify the increase for that operator. This directive effective April 16, 1966. Revised April 15, 1966. Revised September 23, 1966.
2006-25-06: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Fokker Model F27 Mark 500 airplanes. This AD requires an inspection to determine whether certain main landing gear (MLG) drag stay units (DSUs) are installed. This AD also requires an ultrasonic inspection to determine if certain tubes are installed in the affected DSUs of the MLG, and related investigative/corrective actions if necessary. This AD results from a report that, due to fatigue cracking from an improperly machined radius of the inner tube, a drag stay broke, and, consequently, led to the collapse of the MLG during landing. We are issuing this AD to prevent such fatigue cracking, which could result in reduced structural integrity or collapse of the MLG.
66-27-01: 66-27-01\tBOEING: Amdt. 39-297 Part 39 Federal Register November 2, 1966. Applies to Models 707-300B and -300C Series Airplanes, Serial Numbers 18922, 18926, 18937, 18953, 18960, 18964, 18975, 18976, 18977, and 18991.\n \n\tCompliance required within the next 300 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. \n\n\tVisually inspect the inboard aileron center hinge clevis for cracks or evidence of hammer-peening using a glass of at least 5-power in accordance with Section 3 of Boeing Service Bulletin No. 2377 or later FAA-approved revision or an equivalent approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division: FAA Western Region. Replace cracked parts and parts showing evidence of hammer-peening before further flight with a new part of the same part number or a part inspected in accordance with this AD and found free of cracks and evidence of hammer-peening.\n \n\tThis directive effective November 2, 1966.
2007-03-19: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD), which applies to certain Bombardier Model CL-600-2B19 (Regional Jet Series 100 & 440) airplanes. That AD currently requires repetitive detailed and eddy current inspections of the main fittings of the main landing gears (MLG) to detect discrepancies, and related investigative/ corrective actions if necessary. The AD also currently requires servicing the shock strut of the MLGs; inspecting the shock strut of the MLGs for nitrogen pressure, visible chrome dimension, and oil leakage; and servicing any discrepant strut. This new AD requires installing a new, improved MLG main fitting, which terminates the repetitive inspection and servicing requirements of the existing AD. This AD results from stress analyses that showed certain main fittings of the MLGs are susceptible to premature cracking, starting in the radius of the upper lug. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct premature cracking of the main fittingsof the MLGs, which could result in failure of the fittings and consequent collapse of the MLGs during landing. DATES: This AD becomes effective March 15, 2007. The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the AD as of March 15, 2007. On August 13, 2004 (69 FR 41421, July 9, 2004), the Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of Bombardier Alert Service Bulletin A601R-32-088, including Appendices A, B, and C, dated February 20, 2003.
2007-03-09: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all of the airplanes identified above, that requires revising the FAA-approved maintenance program to include a new airplane maintenance manual task that specifies a detailed inspection after each ram air turbine (RAT) retraction. This AD also requires, for certain airplanes, a one-time inspection to detect breaks in the bottom flange fitting of the RAT and corrective actions, if necessary; for certain airplanes, an adjustment of the ejection jack; and, for certain other airplanes, replacement of the aluminum part with an improved steel part. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of the RAT yoke fitting, which could result in the loss of RAT function and possible loss of critical flight control in the event of certain emergency situations. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
59-06-02: 59-06-02 DOUGLAS: Applies to All Model DC-7 Series Aircraft. \n\n\tCompliance required by first block overhaul after receipt of parts but not later than December 1, 1959. \n\n\tSeveral instances have occurred wherein the green indicator light for one of the main landing gear failed to go on when the landing gears were extended. In one case, after landing, it was noted that the left gear downlatch was not fully engaged and the ground lock safety pin could not be installed. Subsequent investigation and laboratory tests revealed that the orifice check valve could malfunction due to contaminants in the hydraulic fluid of sufficient quantity and size (approximately 0.003-inch diameter) and thereby prevent full extension of the gear. \n\n\tTo overcome this difficulty, remove existing orifice check valve assembly, P/N 4498423-503 (Mineral Oil Aircraft), or P/N 4498423-5503 (Skydrol Aircraft), from each main landing gear actuating cylinder and replace with new orifice check valve assembly, P/N 2230565-5-093 (Mineral Oil Aircraft), or P/N 4481262-5-093 (Skydrol Aircraft). (Douglas Service Bulletin DC-7 No. 353 dated January 30, 1959, covers this same subject.)