Results
2010-21-08: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Some cases of failure of engine oil dipsticks, installed on Pratt & Whitney Canada (P&WC) PT6A66 and PT6A66B engines, were detected on P.180 aeroplanes; such failures, due to moisture penetration into the dipstick and subsequent corrosion, can cause incorrect reading of the engine oil low level on the Refuel/Ground Test Panel. If left uncorrected, this situation could lead to in-flight engine failure(s). We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2002-16-08: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), that is applicable to Pratt & Whitney (PW) JT8D models -209, -217, -217A, -217C and -219 turbofan engines. That AD currently requires initial and repetitive fluorescent magnetic particle inspections or fluorescent penetrant inspections of the combustion chamber outer case (CCOC) for cracks, and, if necessary, replacement with serviceable parts. Also that AD requires a one-time material verification of drain and Ps4 bosses, and, if necessary, replacement with serviceable parts. Finally, that AD requires replacement of CCOC's with welded-on bosses with improved, one-piece CCOC's. This amendment requires lower initial inspection thresholds for all CCOC's installed in any JT8D model -209, -217, -217A, -217C or -219 turbofan engine. This amendment is prompted by reports of cracked CCOC's that had accumulated fewer cycles in service than the initial inspection thresholds required by the current AD. Also, a CCOC partnumber was discovered with incorrect material not identified by serial number in JT8D Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) A6359, Revision 2, dated July 31, 2000. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent uncontained failure of the CCOC, which could cause release of debris, damage to the airplane, or fire.
89-09-06: 89-09-06 BRITISH AEROSPACE: Amendment 39-6193. Applicability: All Model BAC 1-11 200 and 400 series airplanes, on which British Aerospace (BAe) main landing gear support structure Modification PM3070 is installed and Modification PM5928 has not been installed, certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. To prevent collapse of a main landing gear, accomplish the following: A. Perform initial and repetitive ultrasonic and eddy current inspections of the main landing gear support beams at initial times and repetitive intervals shown in Table I of this AD using procedures in BAe Alert Service Bulletin 57-A-PM6000, Issue 2, dated February 17, 1988. TABLE I Airplane Identification Modification PM6000 Accomplishment Status Initial Inspection Compliance Time Repetitive Compliance Time Interval After Initial Inspection Serial Numbers up to and including 402 Not Accomplished Whichever occurs later: -within 300 landings after July 30, 1987, (the effective date of AD 87-13-03, Amendment 39-5654); or -within 3 years since installation of new left and right main support beams. Ultrasonic inspection: at intervals not to exceed 12 months. Eddy current inspections: at intervals not to exceed 36 months. Airplane Identification Modification PM6000 Accomplishment Status Initial Inspection Compliance Time Repetitive Compliance Time Interval After Initial Inspection Serial Numbers 403 and subsequent Not Accomplished Whichever occurs later: -within the next 300 landings after July 30, 1987 (the effective date AD 87-13-03 Amendment 39-5654); or -within 6 years since new; or -within 6 years since installation of new left and right main support beams. Ultrasonic inspections: at intervals not to exceed 12 months. Eddy current inspections: at intervals not to exceed 36 months. For all A/P's on which Mod. PM6000 is accomplished prior to assembly of main support beam into wing Accomplished Whichever occurs later: -within 8 years since new; or -within 8 years since new right and left main support beams are installed. Ultrasonic inspections: at intervals not to exceed 2 years. For all A/P's on which Mod. PM6000 is accomplished after assembly of main support beam into wing. Accomplished Within 2 years after installation of Modification PM6000 Ultrasonic inspections: at intervals not to exceed 2 years B. Cracks in the main landing gear main support beam must be repaired, prior to further flight, in a manner approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. C. Installation of main support beam, part number EDO3-5007/8 (Modification PM5928) constitutes terminating action for the requirements of this AD. D. An alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. NOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), who may add any comments and then send it to the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113. E. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of the modifications required by this AD. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to British Aerospace PLC, Librarian for Service Bulletins, P.O. Box 17414, Dulles International Airport, Washington, D.C. 20041. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. This AD supersedes AD 87-13-03 (Amendment 39-5654) which became effective on July 30, 1987. This amendment (39-6193, AD 89-09-06) becomes effective on May 16, 1989.
98-06-31: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Airbus Model A300, A310, and A300-600 series airplanes, that requires inspections to detect cracking of the aft door frame area, and repair, if necessary. This amendment is prompted by issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified by this AD are intended to detect and correct cracks in the aft door frame area, which could result in reduced structural integrity and rapid decompression of the airplane.
2016-07-05: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 747-8 series airplanes. This AD requires an inspection to determine if all oxygen components in the passenger oxygen system are installed, installation of new o-rings, and corrective actions if necessary. This AD was prompted by a report that oxygen tube couplings in the passenger oxygen system could be missing or incorrectly installed. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct oxygen leaks from oxygen tube couplings in the passenger oxygen system, which could result in depletion of emergency oxygen at a faster rate than expected, reduce the passengers' and crews' protection from hypoxia at elevated cabin altitudes, and increase the risk of a fire.
2016-07-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 747-100, 747-100B, 747-100B SUD, 747-200B, 747-300, 747SR, and 747SP series airplanes. This AD was prompted by an evaluation by the design approval holder (DAH) indicating that the upper chords of the upper deck floor beams are subject to widespread fatigue damage (WFD). This AD requires repetitive inspections for cracks at the floor panel attachment fastener holes; repetitive inspections for cracks in the upper and lower chords of the upper deck floor beams at permanent fastener locations; repetitive inspections for cracks in certain repaired and modified areas; and related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. This AD also requires repetitive replacement of the upper chords of the upper deck floor beams, including pre-replacement inspections and corrective action if necessary; and post-replacement repetitive inspections and repair if necessary. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct fatigue cracking of the upper chords of the upper deck floor beams. Undetected cracking could result in large deflection or deformation of the upper deck floor beams, resulting in damage to wire bundles and control cables for the flight control system, and reduced controllability of the airplane. Multiple adjacent severed floor beams could result in rapid decompression of the airplane.
2002-16-21: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 727 series airplanes that have been converted from a passenger- to a cargo-carrying ("freighter") configuration, that requires, among other actions, installation of a fail-safe hinge, redesigned main deck cargo door warning and power control systems, and 9g crash barrier. This amendment is prompted by the FAA's determination that the main deck cargo door hinge is not fail-safe; that certain main deck cargo door control systems do not provide an adequate level of safety; and that the main deck cargo barrier is not structurally adequate during an emergency landing. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent structural failure of the main deck cargo door hinge or failure of the cargo door system, which could result in the loss or opening of the cargo door while the airplane is in flight, and consequent rapid decompression of the airplane, including possible loss of flight control or severe structural damage; and to prevent failure of the main deck cargo barrier during an emergency landing, which could injure occupants.
97-14-10: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Gulfstream Model G-159 (G-I) airplanes, that currently requires modification and repetitive inspections for cracks in the main landing gear (MLG) retract cylinder attachment fittings. This amendment requires installation of improved attachment fittings which, when accomplished, terminates the requirement for the repetitive inspections. This amendment is prompted by the development of a modification that positively addresses the identified unsafe condition. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of the MLG retract cylinder attachment fitting due to fatigue cracking. This condition, if not corrected, could result in the inability to retract the MLG.
91-18-20: 91-18-20 BOEING OF CANADA, LTD., DE HAVILLAND DIVISION: Amendment 39- 8024. Docket No. 91-NM-41-AD. Applicability: Model DHC-7 series airplanes, Serial Numbers 1 through 27, certificated in any category. Compliance: Required, as indicated, unless previously accomplished. To prevent a possible failure of the main landing gear (MLG), accomplish the following: (a) Within one year after the effective date of this AD, remove each MLG upper drag strut assembly from the airplane and perform a non-destructive test in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions, paragraphs 2.D.(1) through (3), of Menasco Canada, Ltd., Service Bulletin No. 32-18, Revision 1, dated June 5, 1980. (1) If there is no evidence of cracking, prior to further flight, overhaul the assembly in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions, paragraph 2.D.(4), of the service bulletin. (2) If cracking is evident, prior to further flight, replace the assembly with a serviceable part, in accordance with the service bulletin. NOTE: The Menasco Canada, Ltd., Service Bulletin references Menasco Mfg. Component Maintenance Manual 32-10-16, dated September 1, 1976, as an additional source of service information for performing overhaul procedures. NOTE: In the referenced Menasco Component Maintenance Manual, procedures are found only for "Repair." For this application, repair is equivalent to overhaul. (b) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), ANE-170, FAA, New England Region. NOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113. (c) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FARs 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order tocomply with the requirements of this AD. (d) The inspection, overhaul, and replacement requirements shall be done in accordance with Menasco Canada, Ltd., Service Bulletin No. 32-18, Revision 1, dated June 5, 1980. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from Boeing of Canada, Ltd., de Havilland Division, Garratt Boulevard, Downsview, Ontario M3K 1Y5, Canada. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue S.W., Renton, Washington; at the FAA, New England Region, New York Aircraft Certification Office, 181 South Franklin Avenue, Room 202, Valley Stream, New York; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L Street N.W., Room 8401, Washington, D.C. This amendment (39-8024, AD 91-18-20) becomes effective on October 15, 1991.
2016-06-13: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus Model A319, A320, and A321 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by investigations that revealed that the cover seal of the brake dual distribution valve (BDDV) was damaged and did not ensure efficient sealing. This AD requires modifying the BDDVs having certain part numbers; modifying the drain hose of the BDDV; checking for the presence of water, ice, and hydraulic fluid; re-identifying the BDDV; and doing related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. We are issuing this AD to prevent damage to the BDDV, which could lead to water ingestion in the BDDV and freezing of the BDDV in flight, possibly resulting in loss of braking system function after landing.