Results
75-16-19: 75-16-19 FLUG-und FAHRZEUGWERKE A.G.: Amendment 39-2293. Applies to Diamant HBV gliders, all serial numbers, and Diamant 16.5 gliders, S/N 011 through 069, except 030, 031, 036, 058, 067, and 068, certificated in all categories. Compliance is required within 25 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To prevent jamming of the rudder, accomplish the following: (a) Visually inspect and measure the fin fairing overlap of the rudder nose for right full rudder to assure an overlap of more than 0.4 inc. (10 mm) in accordance with Flug-und Fahrzeugwerke A.G. Service Bulletin No.2, dated May 15, 1970, or an FAA-approved equivalent. (b) If fin fairing overlap measured in accordance with paragraph (a) of this AD is less than 0.4 in. (10 mm), modify (lengthen) the rudder nose by bonding fiberglass strips to the nose in accordance with Flug-und Fahrzeugwerke A.G. Service Bulletin No.2, dated May 15, 1970, or an FAA-approvedequivalent. This amendment becomes effective August 12, 1975.
97-16-02: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to Robinson Helicopter Company (Robinson) Model R44 helicopters. This action requires inspections of the belt tension actuator switches (up-limit switches) for proper operation, and replacement if necessary; and replacement of a certain part-numbered clutch assembly. This amendment is prompted by six occurrences of prematurely worn sprag clutches. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent failure of the sprag clutch to lock in the driving direction, which would result in loss of power to the main rotor system and a subsequent forced landing; or failure of the sprag clutch to unlock in the overrunning direction, which, if combined with engine failure, would result in an inability to autorotate and a subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
2005-14-01: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus transport category airplanes. This AD requires an inspection to determine if suspect part numbers (P/Ns) and serial numbers of certain Thales Avionics equipment are installed, and replacement of any suspect part with a modified part having a new P/N. This AD is prompted by reports of loss of the digital distance radio magnetic indicator and subsequent loss of both very high frequency omnidirectional range indicators, both distance measuring equipment, and one centralized maintenance computer. We are issuing this AD to prevent loss of navigation indications on the primary flight display requiring continuation of the flight on emergency instruments, which could lead to reduced ability to control the airplane in adverse conditions.
75-16-13: 75-16-13 MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES, LIMITED: Amendment 39-2286. Applies to Mitsubishi MU-2B-20/-25 (serial numbers 201 through 311 except 285, 291, 301, 305, and 309), and MU-2B-30/-35 (serial numbers 541 through 650 except 559, 612, 632, 645, and 648) airplanes certificated in all categories. Compliance is required within the next 100 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To prevent fatigue failure of the wing flap main actuator jack screw, accomplish the following: (a) Irrespective of the airplane total hours time in service, inspect the left and right wing flap main actuator jack screws for cracks, replace the jack screws that are found cracked, and realign all the main actuator gear box housing units in accordance with the instructions contained in Mitsubishi MU-2 Service Bulletin No. 167 as revised January 9, 1975 (hereinafter MU-2 Service Bulletin 167), or an equivalent approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing District Office, FAA, Pacific-Asia Region. (b) During the realignment process, ensure there is a nominal clearance of 2.0 mm (.080 inch), and under no circumstances less than 0.5 mm (.020 inch), between the main actuator gear box housings and wing rear spar. (c) For airplanes equipped with a rubber bearing pad between a main actuator gear box housing and the wing rear spar, accomplish the modification of the main gear box and removal of the rubber pad, as described in paragraph 3.l(7) or paragraph 3.2 1(b) of MU-2 Service Bulletin 167, as applicable, prior to realignment of the main gear box housings. NOTE: MU-2 Service Bulletin 167, paragraphs 4 and 5, and the appropriate Mitsubishi MU-2 Maintenance Manuals contain information on adjustment and operational check of the flap system. This amendment becomes effective August 5, 1975.
2005-13-36: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Learjet Model 23, 24, 24A, 24B, 24B-A, 24C, 24D, 24D-A, 24E, 24F, 24F-A, 25, 25A, 25B, 25C, 25D, 25F, 28, 29, 31, 31A, 35, 35A (C- 21A), and 36 airplanes. This AD requires a one-time inspection of the center ball of the aileron control cable or cables for a defective swage, and corrective actions if necessary. This AD is prompted by a report indicating that an aileron cable failed on one affected airplane when the cable underwent a tension check. We are issuing this AD to prevent severe weakening of the aileron cable, and consequent reduced controllability of the airplane.
97-15-10: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to AlliedSignal Inc. (formerly Garrett Engine Division and Garrett Turbine Engine Company) TPE331 series turboprop engines equipped with Woodward fuel controls, that requires revising the applicable Emergency Procedures or Abnormal Procedures Section of the applicable Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)-approved Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) or Pilot's Operating Handbook (POH) to include a paragraph relating to a non-responsive power lever. In addition, this AD requires replacing or reworking orifice fittings and restrictors, which would constitute terminating action to the requirement to revise the applicable AFM. This amendment is prompted by reports of occasional icing of the inlet Pt2 sensor, which can produce an erroneous (high) pressure signal to the fuel control, causing little or no response to power lever movement. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent a non-responsive power lever and lack of control of engine power.
82-18-10: 82-18-10 FLIGHT EQUIPMENT AND ENGINEERING CORPORATION: Amendment 39-4450. Applies to 639 and 675 series seats of the model and serial numbers listed below manufactured in accordance with FAA Technical Standard Order (TSO) C-39a, Aircraft Seats and Berths, and installed in aircraft certificated in any category. These seats are believed to be installed in, but not necessarily limited to, Douglas Model DC-9 Series and Boeing Model 737 Series airplanes. \n\n\nModel No.\nSerial No. \n639NL\n19654 thru 19661 \n639-3WL\n19476 thru 19499, 19940, 22273 \n639-3WR\n19500 thru 19523, 19941, 22274 \n639-3XL\n19524, 19525 \n639-3XR\n19526, 19527 \n639-3ZR\n19530, 19531 \n639-3AAL\n19532, 19533 \n639-3AAR\n19534, 19535 \n639-3ABL\n19536, 19537 \n639-3ABR\n19538, 19539 \n639-3ACL\n19540, 19541 \n639-3ACR\n19542, 19543 \n639-3AER\n19662, 19663 \n639-3AQL\n21050 thru 21063 \n639-3AQR\n21064 thru 21077 \n639-3ASL\n21078 \n639-3ASR\n21079 \n639-3ATL\n21080 \n639-3ATR\n21081 \n639-3AUR\n21082 \n639-3AVL\n21083 \n639-3AVR\n21084 \n639-3AWL\n21085 \n639-3AWR\n21086 \n639-3AXR\n21087 \n639-3AZL\n21090 \n639-3AZR\n21091 \n639-3BBL\n21289 thru 21299, 21332 thru 21342 \n639-3BBR\n21300 thru 21310, 21343 thru 21353 \n639-3BCL\n21311, 21354 \n639-3BCR\n21312, 21355 \n639-3BDL\n21313, 21356 \n639-3BDR\n21314, 21357 \n639-3BEL\n21315, 21325 \n639-3BER\n21316, 21326 \n639-3BFL\n21317, 21327 \n639-3BGR\n21318, 21328 \n639-3BHL\n21319, 21358 \n639-3BHR\n21320, 21331 \n639-3BKR\n21323, 21331 \n675-3AR\n21494 thru 21526, 21680 thru 21707, 21766 thru 21793, 22152 thru 22172, 22233 thru 22238, 22873 thru 22883, 23025 thru 23029 \n675-3BL\n21527 thru 21529, 21708, 21709, 21794, 21795, 22173, 22174, 22884, 23030 \n675-3BR\n21530 thru 21532, 21710, 21711, 21796, 21797, 22175, 22176, 22885, 23031\n675-3CL\n21533 thru 21535, 21712, 21713, 21798, 21799, 22177, 22178, 22886, 23032 \n675-3CR\n21536 thru 21538, 21714, 21715, 21800, 21801, 22179, 22180, 22887, 23033 \n675-3DL\n21539 thru 21541, 22888, 23034675-3DR\n21542 thru 21544, 22889, 23035 \n675-3EL\n21545 thru 21547, 22890, 23036 \n675-3FR\n21548 thru 21550, 22891, 23037 \n675-3GL\n21551 thru 21553, 21716, 21717, 21802, 21803, 22892, 23038 \n675-3GR\n21554 thru 21556, 21718, 21719, 21804, 21805, 22893, 23039 \n675-3JR\n21563 thru 21565, 22896, 23042 \n675-3KR\n21724, 21725, 22333, 23043, 23197 \n675-3MR\n21726, 21727, 22239, 22240, 23044 \n675-3NL\n21728, 21729, 22241, 22242, 22334, 23045, 23197 \n675-3NR\n21730, 21731, 21810, 21811, 22243, 22244, 23046 \n675-3PL\n21732, 21733, 22245, 22246, 23047 \n675-3PR\n21734, 21735, 22247, 22248, 23048 \n675-3QL\n22181 \n675-3QR\n22182 \n675-3SR\n22183 \n675-3TR\n22184 \n675-3UL\n21812, 21813, 23049 \n675-3UR\n21814, 21815, 23050 \n675-3AL\n21461 thru 21493, 21652 thru 21679, 21738 thru 21765, 22128 thru 22151, 22227 thru 22232, 22862 thru 22872, 23020 thru 23024\n\n\tCOMPLIANCE: Required within 60 calendar days after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. \n\n\tTo assure the seat attachment meets strength requirements of TSO C-39a, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tReplace existing P/N 31620 track lock fittings with P/N 33667 fittings having increased strength. \n\n\t(b)\tAirplanes may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a location where this AD may be accomplished. \n\n\t(c)\tAn alternate means of compliance with this AD may be used if approved by the Chief, Atlanta Certification Office, FAA, P.O. Box 20639, Atlanta, Georgia 30320. \n\n\tFlight Equipment Service Bulletin No. 675-25-63 dated April 6, 1982, Subject: Replacement of Leg Frame Rear Floor Track Fitting - Replacement of, pertains to the subject matter of this AD. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective October 4, 1982.
69-06-01: 69-06-01 FAIRCHILD-HILLER: Amdt. 39-734. Applies to Type F-27 Airplanes Serial Numbers 1 through 124 inclusive. Incorporating Cutler Hammer P/N 6046 H46 Relay in Flap Control System. Compliance required as follows: To prevent hazards associated with flap drive system failure whereby the flaps are driven off the drive screw jacks, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 200 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, and thereafter at 200 hour intervals from the date of the last inspection, open cover of wing flap system motor relay and visually inspect all contacts. Any finding of contact pitting or discoloration of contacts requires replacement of the relay with an unused part. The inspection may be terminated upon completion of the requirement of paragraph (b) of this AD. (b) Within the next 500 hours time in service after the effective date of the AD, unless already accomplished, rewire the flap drive circuit in accordance with Fairchild Hiller F- 27 Service Bulletin F-27-27-67 dated February 1, 1969, for F-27 aircraft, or later revisions approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Eastern Region, or perform an equivalent modification approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Eastern Region. (c) Upon request with substantiating data submitted through an FAA Maintenance Inspector, compliance time may be increased by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Eastern Region. This amendment is effective March 26, 1969.
2005-13-37: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Fokker Model F.28 Mark 0070 and 0100 airplanes. This AD requires repetitive inspections for damage of the drive rod assembly of the aileron tab on each aileron actuator; repetitive measurements of the clearance between the aileron hydraulic lines and the drive rod; and related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. This AD is prompted by a report of an aileron 2 fault caused by severe wear of the polyamide washer that is part of an anti-rotation bush assembly in the aileron attachment lug. We are issuing this AD to prevent excessive wear of the polyamide washer of the aileron actuator bush assembly, which could result in aileron flutter and loss of control of the airplane.
2010-23-12: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: * * * * * Investigation conducted by Thales on * * * probes revealed oil residue between the stator and the rotor parts of the AoA [angle of attack] vane position resolvers. This oil residue was due to incorrect cleaning of the machining oil during the manufacturing process of the AoA resolvers. At low temperatures, this oil residue becomes viscous (typically in cruise) causing lag of AoA vane movement. Such condition could lead to discrepant AoA measurement. If not corrected, and if two or three AoA probes were simultaneously affected and provided wrong indications of the AoA to a similar extent, it could lead to a late activation of the angle ofattack protection, which in combination with flight at high angle of attack would constitute an unsafe condition. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.