Results
2010-05-05: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above that would supersede an existing AD. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: A review of the results of the final fuselage fatigue test identified the need for additional and revised safety-related fatigue- and environmental inspections for the fuselage. These additional tasks were introduced by Service Bulletin (SB) ATP-51-002 * * *. As it was determined that these inspections were necessary to maintain the structural integrity of the aeroplane, EASA AD 2006- 0090 [which corresponds to FAA AD 2007-15-08] was issued * * *. Since the original Issue of the SB, three revisions have been published. Revision 1 of the SB included only editorial changes. Revision 2 of the SB corrected the fuselage frame designations in Parts 50 and 50A and extended the allowable time before initial inspection. In addition, the repeat inspection interval in Part 43 of the SB was reduced. In the latest Revision 3 of the SB, the grace period for the initial inspection in Part 50 has been clarified. * * * * * The unsafe condition is fatigue cracking of certain structural elements, which could result in reduced structural integrity of the airplane and consequent rapid decompression of the airplane. This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
67-29-05: 67-29-05 SIKORSKY AIRCRAFT: Amdt. 39-501 Part 39 Federal Register November 1, 1967. Applies to type S61 Helicopters. Compliance required as indicated. To prevent fatigue failures of the Rotary Wing Hub Horizontal Hinge Pins, P/N S6100-23020 and P/N S6110-23320, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 10 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, inspect the horizontal hinge pins in accordance with Sikorsky Service Bulletin No. 61B10-4 dated August 21, 1967 or later revisions approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Federal Aviation Administration, Eastern Region. Equivalent inspections may be approved by an FAA maintenance inspector. (1) If a machining defect is found on the interior surface of the cylindrical part of the pin or on the inner surface of the part of the pin where the damper is attached (sections 1 or 3 of the pin as defined in the Sikorsky Service Bulletin) remove the hingepin from service prior to further flight. (2) If a machining defect is found on the interior surface of the tapered part of hinge pin (section 2 of the pins is defined in the Sikorsky Service Bulletin) inspect the external surface of this tapered section using a magnifying glass (2 power minimum). If a crack is found replace the hinge pin prior to further flight. (3) If a defect is found on the interior surface of the tapered part of the hinge pin (section 2 of the pin is defined in the Sikorsky Service Bulletin) and no crack is detected on the external surface of this section: (i) Perform a daily visual inspection of the external surface of section 2 using a magnifying glass (2 power minimum). If a crack is found remove the hinge pin from service before further flight. (ii) The hinge pin must be removed from service within the next 50 hours' time in service. This amendment effective October 30, 1967.
92-22-06: 92-22-06 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-8392. Docket No. 92-NM-160-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model MD-11 airplanes, Model DC-10 series airplanes, and Model KC-10 (military) airplanes; certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. \n\n\tTo prevent fuel from being dumped below the minimum allowable level, which could lead to an all-engine-out condition, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tFor Model MD-11 airplanes: Within 15 days after the effective date of this AD, accomplish the requirements of paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) of this AD: \n\n\t\t(1)\tRevise the Limitations Section of the FAA-approved Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) to include the following statement. This may be accomplished by inserting a copy of this AD in the AFM. \n\n\t\t"FUEL DUMP\n\n\t\t\t Careful monitoring of the fuel system status and consequences is required during \tdumping operations when electrical malfunctions are present." \n\n\t\t(2)\tRevise the Procedures Section of the FAA-approved AFM to include the following statement. This may be accomplished by inserting a copy of this AD in the AFM. \n\n\t\t"FUEL DUMP \n\n\t\t\tDUMP Switch.................................................. On \n\n\t\t\tNote: The fuel dump is designed to automatically terminate at approximately 40,000 lbs. \ttotal; however, when the Bus DC 2 OFF alert is displayed, the automatic termination feature will be inoperative." \n\n\t(b)\tFor Model DC-10 series airplanes and Model KC-10 (military) airplanes: Within 15 days after the effective date of this AD, accomplish the requirements of paragraphs (b)(1) and (b)(2) of this AD: \n\n\t\t(1)\tRevise the Limitations Section of the FAA-approved AFM to include the following statement. This may be accomplished by inserting a copy of this AD in the AFM. \n\n\t\t"FUEL DUMP \n\n\t\t\tCareful monitoring of the fuel quantity is required during dumping operations when electrical malfunctions are present." \n\n\t\t(2)\tRevise the Procedures Section of theFAA-approved AFM to include the following statement. This may be accomplished by inserting a copy of this AD in the AFM. \n\n\t\t\t"FUEL QTY Indicators...................................... MONITOR \n\n\t\t\t--- \t The fuel dump is designed to automatically terminate at approximately 40,000 lbs. total; however, if the DC BUS 2 OFF light is illuminated, the automatic termination feature will be inoperative." \n\n\t(c)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Los Angeles ACO. \n\n\tNOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Los Angeles ACO. \n\n\t(d)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. \n\n\t(e)\tThis amendment becomes effective on November 3, 1992.
65-24-02: 65-24-02\tBOEING: Amdt. 39-146 Part 39 Federal Register September 30, 1965. Applies to Models 707 and 720 Series Airplanes. \n\n\tCompliance required within the next 1,800 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD unless already accomplished.\n \n\tTo prevent further false indications of thrust reverser operation as a result of malfunction of the thrust reverser indicating light switch and switch wiring, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tOn airplanes equipped with JT3D turbofan engines, modify as follows: \n\n\t\t(1)\tOn airplanes modified in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin No. 1896, dated November 1963, replace each aft thrust reverser indicating light switch with sealed switch, P/N 2HT13, in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin No. 1896, or an equivalent. \n\n\t\t(2)\tOn airplanes not modified in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin No. 1896, replace each aft thrust reverser indicating light switch with sealed switch, P/N 2HT13, in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin No. 1884, dated January 1964, or an equivalent. \n\n\t\t(3)\tInterchange the electrical leads on the forward and aft thrust reverser indicating light switches in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin No. 2170, dated May 1965, or an equivalent. \n\n\t(b)\tOn airplanes equipped with JT3C or JT4A turbojet engines, modify the thrust reverser indicating light switch wiring by interchanging the electrical leads in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin No. 2170 or an equivalent. \n\n\t(c)\tApproval of any equivalent shall be processed through the Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. \n\n\tThis directive effective October 29, 1965.
88-20-02: 88-20-02 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-6025. Applies to Model DC-9-80 (MD-80) series airplanes and Model MD-88 airplanes, certificated in any category, equipped with Janitrol P/N 14J93-350 clamps manufactured after March 1, 1988, including, but not limited to the following airplane factory serial numbers: \n\n\n49462\t\n49584\t\n49658 \n49463\t\t\n49585\n49661 \n49464\t\n49586\t\n49667 \n49509\t\n49592\t\n49668 \n49559\t\n49593\t\n49669 \n49560\t\n49604\t\n49670 \n49561\n49605\t\n49671 \n49562\t\n49617\t\n49672 \n49563\t\n49619\t\n49701 \n49564\t\n49620\n49702 \n49565\t\n49621\t\n49703 \n49566\t\n49622\t\n49704 \n49571\n49623\n49705 \n49572\t\n49624\t\n49707 \n49573\t\t\n49625\n49711 \n49577\t\t\n49644\n49712 \n49578\n49645\t\n49389 \n49579\t \n49646\n\n49583\t\n49657 \n\n\t\n\tNOTE: Additionally, airplanes other than those listed above are affected by this AD, if suspect clamps were installed on engine eighth or thirteenth stage pneumatic manifold end caps as replacement parts. \n\n\tCompliance required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent uncontained separation of engine pneumatic manifold end caps, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tWithin 25 days after the effective date of this AD, inspect both engines' eighth and thirteenth stage pneumatic manifold end cap clamps, Janitrol P/N 14J93-350, for identification markings, and accomplish the following: \n\n\tNOTE: Refer to McDonnell Douglas DC-9 Master Illustrated Parts Catalog 36-10-00, Figure 1A, Item 105, for locations of clamps. \n\n\t\t1.\tClamps with the number "5T400" and a date stamp, or the number "89513", appearing next to Janitrol P/N 14J93-350 are acceptable, and no further action is necessary. \n\n\t\t2.\tClamps with the number "63367" appearing next to Janitrol P/N 14J93-350 must be removed prior to further flight, and replaced with airworthy clamps. \n\n\t\t3.\tClamps with the number "5T400" appearing next to Janitrol P/N 14J93-350, and without a date stamp, must be removed prior to further flight, and replaced with airworthy clamps. \n\n\tB.\tPrior to installation of any eighth or thirteenth stage pneumatic manifold end cap clamp, Janitrol P/N 14J93-350, perform the inspection required by paragraph A., above. Do not install any clamp having the number "63367", or the number "5T400" and no date stamp, appearing next to Janitrol P/N 14J93-350. \n\n\tC.\tAn alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), who may add any comments and then send it to the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office. \n\n\tThis amendment, 39-6025, becomes effective October 11, 1988.
2021-24-05: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus Helicopters Deutschland GmbH Model EC135P2+, EC135P3, EC135T2+, and EC135T3 helicopters. This AD was prompted by reports that certain aft and forward fitting assemblies, which are not approved for installation on certain helicopters, were installed on those helicopters as part of the outboard load system. Operators of those helicopters might not be aware of the applicable overhaul or life limits for those fitting assemblies. This AD requires inspecting the aft and forward fitting assemblies of the outboard load system to determine the part number, re-identifying the part if necessary, inspecting each affected part for damage (which may be indicated by signs of corrosion, mechanical damage, loose rivets, or cracks) and, depending on the findings, corrective actions, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
91-10-08: 91-10-08 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-6990. Docket No. 90-NM-256-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9-81, -82, -83, and -87 series airplanes, and MD-88 airplanes, fuselage Numbers 909 through 1825, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo eliminate a potential fire ignition source in the forward cabin ceiling panel area, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tWithin 90 days after the effective date of this AD, inspect the electrical connectors located above the forward cabin ceiling panel for damage in accordance with Paragraph B. of the "Accomplishment Instructions" of McDonnell Douglas Alert Service Bulletin A33-92, dated October 22, 1990 (hereinafter referred to as "The Service Bulletin"). \n\n\t\t1.\tIf damage is found, prior to further flight, modify the connectors and wires in accordance with Paragraph B, Condition I, of the "Accomplishment Instructions" in the Service Bulletin. \n\n\t\t2.\tIf nodamage is found, reinstall the connectors and reinspect the connectors in accordance with paragraph A. of this AD at intervals not to exceed 6 months. \n\n\tB.\tWithin 2 years after the effective date of this AD, modify the connectors in accordance with Paragraph B, Condition I or Condition II, Option 2, of the Service Bulletin. Accomplishment of these modifications constitutes terminating action for the repetitive inspections required by paragraph A. of this AD. \n\n\tC.\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Los Angeles ACO. \n\n\tD.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes toa base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846; ATTN: Business Unit Manager, Technical Publications C1-HCW (54-60). These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue S.W., Renton, Washington, or the Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3229 East Spring Street, Long Beach, California. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6990, AD 91-10-08) becomes effective on June 11, 1991.
65-15-02: 65-15-02\tBOEING: Amdt. 39-104 Part 39 Federal Register July 2, 1965. Applies to Models 707 and 720 Series Aircraft Listed in Boeing Service Bulletin No. 1822 (R-2). \n\n\tCompliance required as indicated. \n\n\tFatigue cracks have occurred in the lower flanges and web of the outboard flap center carriage, and at the aft attachment of the cam (cove lip door up latch roller cam) to the lower flange on one carriage half. Complete rupture of a carriage can cause the loss of a flap in flight. The Boeing part numbers of the affected parts are listed in Table I of Boeing Service Bulletin No. 1822 (R-2). To preclude the loss of a flap in flight, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tUnless previously modified in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletins Nos. 1822 (R-1) and 1822 (R-1)A or Boeing Service Bulletins Nos. 1535 and 1882 and Boeing Drawing 65- 37509, inspect for crack in flap carriages of the inboard and outboard flaps in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin No. 1822 (R-2), subparagraphs 3. Part I b. (1), (2), and (3) as follows: \n\n\t\t(1)\tWithin the next 25 landings after the effective date of this AD for flap carriages installed on aircraft for 4,000 or more landings on the effective date of this AD, and before the accumulation of 4,025 landings for flap carriages installed on aircraft for less than 4,000 landings on the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the last 175 landings. \n\n\t\t(2)\tConduct repetitive inspections on the following carriages at intervals not to exceed 200 landings from the last inspection: \n\n\t\t\t(i)\tThe center carriages on outboard flaps of 707-100, -100B, -200, -300, - 300B, -300C, and -400, and 720 and 720B Series aircraft. \n\n\t\t\t(ii)\tThe center carriages on inboard flaps of 707-100, -100B, -200, 720 Series and 720B Series aircraft. \n\n\tNOTE: The repeat inspection is not required on any end carriages. \n\n\t(b)\tIf cracks are found, replace the carriage or rework it in accordance with the rework instructions in Part II of Paragraph 3, Boeing Service Bulletin No. 1822 (R-2) before further flight, except that the aircraft may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a base where the repair may be made subject to the limitations specified in subparagraphs 3. Part I b. (4)(a) through (g) of Boeing Service Bulletin No. 1822 (R-2). If end carriages are cracked, approval of the special flight permit shall be coordinated with the Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. \n\n\t(c)\tFor the purpose of complying with this AD, subject to acceptance by the assigned FAA maintenance inspector, the number of landings may be determined by dividing each aircraft's hours' time in service by the operators' fleet average time from takeoff to landing for the aircraft type.\n \n\t(d)\tOn all aircraft having flap carriage drain holes previously reworked in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletins Nos. 1822 (R-1) and 1822 (R-1)A, accomplish the following: \n\n\t\t(1)\tWithin the next 250 hours' time in serviceafter the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, perform a one-time dye penetrant, eddy current, or FAA-approved equivalent inspection of the area surrounding reworked drain holes to ensure that no cracks have developed. \n\n\t\t(2)\tIf cracks are found, replace the carriage or rework it in accordance with (b) of this AD. \n\n\t(e)\tThe repetitive inspections specified in (a)(2) may be discontinued when the rework specified in Part II of paragraph 3. of Boeing Service Bulletin No. 1822 (R-2) is accomplished.\n \n\t(f)\tUpon request of an operator, an FAA maintenance inspector, subject to prior approval of the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region, may adjust the repetitive inspection intervals specified in this AD to allow compliance at an established inspection period of the operator if the request contains substantiating data to justify the increase for such operator. \n\n\tThis supersedes AD 64-18-02.\n \n\tThis directive effective August 1, 1965.
66-24-01: 66-24-01 BOEING: Amdt. 39-290 Part 39 Federal Register September 22, 1966. Applies to Model 727 Series Airplanes. \n\n\tCompliance required within the next 2,500 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. \n\n\tModify stabilizer trim system brake, Boeing P/N 10-60822-1, Western Gear P/N 4472R155, Western Gear Serial Numbers 101 through 225 in accordance with paragraph (2) of Western Gear Service Bulletin "Flight Controls-Stabilizer Brake Assembly Western Gear P/N 4472R155 Install Additional Spacers Under Pawls." \n\n\tThis directive effective October 22, 1966.
89-01-03: 89-01-03 McDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-6099. \n\n\tApplicability: McDonnell Douglas Model DC-10 and KC-10A (Military) series airplanes equipped with wet center wing fuel tanks, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required within 30 days after effective date of this AD, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo detect fuel leaks and prevent retention of fuel in the insulation blankets, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tRemove insulation blankets from the center accessory compartment (CAC) in accordance with the service bulletins listed below: \n\n\t\t1.\tFor Model DC-10 series airplanes: McDonnell Douglas Alert Service Bulletin (S/B) A25-356, dated October 3, 1988. \n\n\t\t2.\tFor Model KC-10A (Military) airplanes: McDonnell Douglas Service Bulletin 53-149, Revision 1, dated April 6, 1988. \n\n\tB.\tInspect the entire wing front spar area for evidence of existing or previous fuel leaks, in accordance with DC-10 Alert Service Bulletin A25-356, dated October 3, 1988. \n\n\tC.\tIfany evidence of fuel leaks is found, conduct a leak check in accordance with DC-10 Alert Service Bulletin A25-356, dated October 3, 1988, to determine if a fuel leak does exist. If a leak is found, repair before fueling the center wing tank for flight. \n\n\tD.\tAn alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\t\tNOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), who may add any comments and then send it to the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office. \n\n\tE.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a maintenance base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service information from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Director of Publications, C1-L00 (54-60). These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington or at 3229 East Spring Street, Long Beach, California. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6099, AD 89-01-03) becomes effective January 19, 1989.
81-25-04 R1: 81-25-04 R1 MITSUBISHI AIRCRAFT INTERNATIONAL, INC. (MAI): Amendment 39- 4274 as amended by amendment 39-4300. Applies to MAI Models MU-2B-25/-26/-26A/-40, serial numbers 313SA, 321SA, 348SA through 453SA, Models MU-2B-35/-36A/-60, serial numbers 652SA, 661SA, 697SA through 799SA, 1501SA through 1538SA, and 1540SA. \n\nCompliance is required as indicated unless previously accomplished. \n\nWithin the next 25 hours' time in service from the effective date of this AD: \n1.\tVisually inspect the engine's electrical wiring to determine if nonshielded and noncolor coded wiring is white or brown (tan). Inspection may be made at connectors P4001 and P4020. Remove spiral wrap as required for inspection. \n\n2.\tIf wires are brown (tan) inspect in accordance with Figure 1 (one) to determine if wires are "tight weave" or "loose weave." \na.\tIf brown (tan) wires are "loose weave," inspect in accordance with paragraph 4. \nb.\tIf brown (tan) wires are "tight weave," no further inspection is necessary and the airplane may be returned to service. \n\n3.\tIf wires are white, open the harness as necessary and inspect wires for identification: \na.\tIf white wires are marked MS 25471-XX (XX indicates wire gauge), inspect in accordance with paragraph 4. \nb.\tIf white wires are marked M 22759/5-XX, no further inspection is necessary and the airplane may be returned to service. \n\n4.\tAfter each 25 hours' time in service, remove wiring harness which incorporates wires affected by paragraph 2a or 3a from the engines and visually inspect all brown (tan) "loose weave" or white insulated MS 25471-XX wires for tight loop, kinks, or bulged deformation. If these conditions are found, replace the wiring harness using one of the procedures in paragraph 5 before further flight. Inspections may be discontinued when wires are replaced using one of the procedures in paragraph 5. \n\n5.\tBefore 300 hours' time in service, after the effective date of this AD, replace all brown (tan) "loose weave" orwhite insulated MS 25471-XX wires with M 22759/8-XX wire using one of the procedures specified in Part 3 of MAI S/B SB036/71-003, Revision A, or alternate means approved by the Chief, Aircraft Certification Division, Southwest Region, Federal Aviation Administration. \n\nA special flight permit may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 to allow flight of the airplane to a location where this AD can be accomplished. \n\nAmendment 39-4274 became effective December 10, 1981. \nThis amendment 39-4300 becomes effective January 21, 1982. \n\n\n\nAD 81-25-04
2010-05-01: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: The Civil Aviation Authority of the United Kingdom (UK) has informed EASA [European Aviation Safety Agency] that significant quantities of Halon 1211 gas, determined to be outside the required specification, have been supplied to the aviation industry for use in fire extinguishing equipment. * * * * * * * * * * * This Halon 1211 has subsequently been used to fill certain * * * portable fire extinguishers that are now likely to be installed in or carried on board ATR aeroplanes. The contaminated nature of this gas, when used against a fire, may provide reduced fire suppression, endangering the safety of the aeroplane and its occupants. In addition, extinguisher activation may lead to the release of toxic fumes, possibly causing injury to aeroplane occupants. * * * * * This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
68-21-04: 68-21-04 BEECHCRAFT: Amendment 39-668. Applies to Models 65-90, 65-A90 and 65-B90 aircraft (Serial Numbers LJ-1 through LJ-406) and 65-A90-1 aircraft (Serial Numbers LM-1 through LM-129). Compliance required as indicated. To reduce the possibility of engine damage and malfunction while operating in icing conditions above 15,000 feet MSL, within one year after the effective date of this Airworthiness Directive, unless already accomplished, accomplish the following: (A) Install seal strips and a spring lockdown assembly on the Inertial Separator Vane and an automatic ignition (re-light) system in accordance with the method outlined in Beechcraft Service Instructions #0115-010 dated October 1, 1968. (B) Equip the airplane with the applicable FAA Flight Manual as set forth in Beechcraft Service Instructions #0115-010 dated October 1, 1968. (C) The Emergency Order Amending Type Certificate No. 3A20 dated May 24, 1968, as amended September 19, 1968, shall remainin force and effect as to each individual aircraft covered by this Airworthiness Directive until paragraphs (A) and (B) have been accomplished. This amendment becomes effective October 17, 1968.
52-02-01: 52-02-01 Convair: Applies to All Model BT-13, -13A, -13B and BT-15 Aircraft With Bronze Rear Spar to Center Section Attachment Fittings. \n\n\tCompliance required as indicated. \n\n\tWhen it has been determined that the rear spar to center section attachment fittings are bronze castings, compliance with this Airworthiness Directive should be effected every 24 hours flying time or every 6 months nonflying time, whichever occurs first. \n\n\t(1)\tInspect visually the rear spar to center section attachment fittings on both sides of the rear spar for evidence of cracks. All cracked fittings (see Figure 1) should be replaced with new fittings of equivalent or greater strength. \n\n\n\n\nFIGURE 1 \n\n\n\t(2)\tA magnet may be used to determine if the fitting is a steel casting. \n\n\t(3)\tFittings that have been made from aluminum alloy forgings can be readily differentiated from those made from bronze castings by visual inspection.
2021-24-04: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Bell Textron Canada Limited (type certificate previously held by Bell Helicopter Textron Canada Limited) Model 505 helicopters. This AD was prompted by the determination that reducing the pressure altitude limitations for certain fuel types is necessary. This AD requires revising the existing Rotorcraft Flight Manual (RFM) for your helicopter. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2010-04-10: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: During the flight test campaign of the A380-861 model (Engine Alliance powered), some cracks were found on the Movable Flap Track Fairing number 6 (MFTF6). These cracks were located at the pivot attachment support-ring and at the U-frame in the attachment area to aft-kinematic. In addition, delamination has been observed within the monolithic Carbon Fibre Reinforced Plastic (CFRP) structure around the pivot support-ring. This condition, if not corrected, could lead to in-flight loss of the MFTF6, potentially resulting in injuries to persons on the ground. * * * * * This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
86-19-10: 86-19-10\tMOONEY AIRCRAFT CORPORATION: Amendment 39-5408. Applies to Models M20 and M20A (all serial numbers) airplanes certificated in any category.\n\n\tCompliance: As indicated in the body of the AD.\n\n\tTo preclude structural failure due to deteriorated wooden structures, accomplish the following:\n\n\t(a)\tWithin the next 30 days after the effective date of this AD, if AD 76-15-01 has not been previously complied with, or within 12 calendar months after the last 12 month repetitive inspection required by AD 76-15-01, whichever is applicable, and each 12 months thereafter accomplish the wood structure proof load tests, modifications and visual inspections specified in paragraphs (d), (e), (f) and (g) of this AD and repair all discrepancies found prior to further flight.\n\n\t(b)\tThe empennage proof load tests and modification and inspection requirements of paragraphs (a), (d) and (e) are not required on airplanes modified with an all-metal empennage installed per Mooney Service Bulletin (S/B) Kit No. M20-170-1.\n\n\t(c)\tWithin the sixth month after the accomplishment of the inspections required by paragraph (a) of this AD, or within 12 calendar months after the last six month interval repetitive inspection required by AD 76-15-01 and each 12 months thereafter, whichever is applicable, accomplish the empennage and wing inspections specified in Parts IIA, III8, III9, and III10 of Mooney S/B No. M20-170A dated February 24, 1969, and repair all discrepancies found prior to further flight.\n\n\t(d)\tOn airplanes not equipped with an all-metal empennage, proof load test the empennage and supporting structure as follows:\n\n\t\t(1)\tApply proof loads to the vertical fin spar as shown in Figure 1 of this AD. Apply the load to the right side and then to the left side. Apply proof loads to the rudder hinges of the fin as shown in Figure 3 of this AD. Apply hinge proof loads to the right side and then to the left side.\n\n\t\t(2)\tAfter the initial proof load testing in paragraph(d)(1) of this AD, at intervals not to exceed one year, apply the proof loads to the vertical fin spar and rudder hinges as shown in Figures 1 and 3 of this AD. Apply the loads in one direction only during each 12 month inspection cycle by applying the loads to the right side at the end of the first interval and alternating load direction similarly thereafter.\n\n\t\t(3)\tIf the empennage fails during the proof loading specified in paragraphs (d)(1) or (d)(2) of this AD, prior to further flight, replace the wood empennage with an all-metal empennage in accordance with the instructions contained in Mooney S/B Kit No. M20-170-1. The empennage is considered to have failed when complete separation of the vertical fin from the horizontal stabilizer occurs, fin spar cracks occur, the hinge separates or loosens from the fin, other wood failures occur, glue joint failures occur, or permanent deformation occurs as shown in Figure 2 of this AD.\n\n\t(e)\tModify and inspect the wood empennage as follows:\n\n\t\t(1)\tIf fin failure did not occur during the proof load application specified in paragraphs (d)(1) and (d)(2) of this AD, prior to further flight, modify the vertical fin and visually inspect the empennage as follows:\n\n\t\t\t(i)\tModify the vertical fin by adding inspection access holes and reinforcing straps in accordance with Parts IB and IC of Mooney S/B No. M20-170A dated February 24, 1969, unless previously accomplished.\n\n\t\t\t(ii)\tVisually, and if necessary using the methods in paragraph (h) of this AD, inspect the empennage in accordance with S/B No. M20-170A dated February 24, 1969, Parts IA and II and repair any discrepancies found prior to further flight.\n\n\t(f)\tPrepare the wing and wing carry-thru structure for inspection in accordance with instructions in Part III of Mooney S/B No. M20-170A dated February 24, 1969, and as follows:\n\n\t\t(1)\tRemove the wing to fuselage fairings and fillets.\n\n\t\t(2)\tRemove all the wing and center section access doors and panels. (Refer to Figure 5 of Mooney Service Bulletin (S/B) No. M20-170A).\n\n\t\t(3)\tRemove the sealing tape at the wing-fuselage joint.\n\n\t\t(4)\tRemove the rear seat and auxiliary fuel tank for access to the wing center section.\n\n\t\t(5)\tRemove flap gap metal seal strips from the top trailing edge of both wings.\n\n\t\t(6)\tDisconnect and remove the wing flaps and ailerons.\n\n\t(g)\tVisually, and if necessary using the methods in paragraph (h) of this AD, inspect the wing and wing carry-thru structure and repair any discrepancies found prior to further flight in accordance with instructions in Part III of Mooney S/B No. M20-170A dated February 24, 1969, and as follows:\n\n\t\t(1)\tInspect the areas around wing to fuselage attach fittings for evidence of deterioration or joint separation.\n\n\t\t(2)\tInspect the flap and aileron attach bolts, bearings, bushings, and hinge fitting attach bolts and bushings for evidence of rust, corrosion, and wear. See Figure 6 in Mooney S/B No. M20-170A dated February 24, 1969.\n\n\t\t(3)\tVisually inspect the wood end-grain surrounding bolt holes for evidence of rust, discoloration, deterioration, and evidence of moisture accumulation at the trailing edges of the wings.\n\n\t\t(4)\tVisually inspect the rear stub spar for glue bond separations, water stains, and wood rot. If these inspections identify any questionable areas in which possible deterioration may exist in the concealed spar caps, prior to further flight, determine the condition of the internal spruce core in accordance with paragraph (h) of this AD. See Note 1 of this AD.\n\n\t\t(5)\tVisually inspect all accessible areas of the main spar from the fuselage center line (BL 0.0) out to left and right wing Station 59.25 for glue bond separations, water stains, and wood rot. If these inspections identify any questionable areas in which possible deterioration may exist in the concealed spruce spar prior to further flight determine the condition of the internal spruce core in accordance with paragraph (h) of this AD. See Note 1 of this AD.\n\n\t\t(6)\tVisually inspect the accessible interior of the wing using a flashlight and mirror, for wood decay, water and/or wood stains, pooled dust/dirt which may indicate evidence of previous standing water, rust or corrosion on metallic surfaces, wood discoloration, and detectable moisture. See Note 1 of this AD.\n\n\t\t(7)\tInspect the upper and lower exterior surfaces of the wing, including the wheel well, for the following: See Note 1 of this AD.\n\n\t\t\t(i)\tIndications that the wood immediately below the fabric is soft or contains excessive moisture (i.e., swollen). Soft wood may be located and/or confirmed by depressing the wing's surface in the vicinity of the area in question with a rounded, blunt instrument and comparing its hardness to that of good wood. Note that any areas being compared must have identical substructure.\n\n\t\t\t(ii)\tIndications that the fabric/paint is delaminating from the wood surface (bubbles, discoloration, boils, softspots and other surface flaws).\n\n\t\t\t(iii)\tCracks or breaks in the paint which could allow water to enter the wing.\n\n\t\t\t(iv)\tAny other exterior damage which would allow water to penetrate the fabric/paint barrier and enter the wood.\n\n\t\t(8)\tVisually inspect the rear spar in all areas it is accessible from the fuselage center line out to the left and right wing tips for wood rot, water stains in wood and glue joint separation. Pay special attention to the area around all flap and aileron hinge supports, including the support ribs, lower wing skins, spars and closeout strips at wing stations 22.0 and 147.0 (flap inboard and outboard hinge support ribs).\n\n\t\t(9)\tInspect all drain holes on the bottom of the wing to ensure they are completely open and free of burrs and/or pieces of fabric.\n\n\t\t(10)\tVisually inspect the fuel scupper areas of the main and auxiliary fuel tank fillers for sealant condition between scupper boxes and wing structure.\n\n\t\t(11)\tCheck main and auxiliary fueltank scupper drains to be sure they are not clogged.\n\n\t\t(12)\tVisually inspect aileron and flap fabric covering under metal gap strips in accordance with Mooney S/B No. M20-29 dated December 4, 1957.\n\n\t\t(13)\tVisually inspect the areas of the upper wing surface trailing edge under flap gap metal seals for fabric or wood deterioration. Be alert for deteriorated wood around screw holes used in holding the metal strip to the wing.\n\n\t\t(14)\tVisually inspect, if necessary repair, and refinish the main landing gear wheel well area in accordance with Mooney S/B No. M20-67 dated February 15, 1960.\n\n\t(h)\tIf during any inspections specified in paragraphs (e) and (g) of this AD there are visual indications of wood deterioration below the surface, prior to further flight, inspect and test these areas to assure their structural integrity by using one or more of the following:\n\n\t\t(1)\tTest for soft/decayed wood with a sharp probe such as an awl or sharp pocket knife.\n\n\t\t(2)\tDisassemble thestructure as necessary to gain access to the area and perform a detailed visual inspection.\n\n\t\t(3)\tTap the wood area in question with a small rounded blunt instrument approximately the size of a small pocket knife. Compare the sound to similar areas that are not suspect. Assuming similar understructure, an abrupt change in sound to a less or non-resilient sound may indicate decay below the surface.\n\n\t(i)\tIf significant structural repair of the wing main spar, rear spar empennage is found necessary as a result of the inspections and tests of the preceding paragraphs, prior to initiation of the repair, contact Mooney Aircraft Corporation, Post Office Box 72, Kerrville, Texas 78028; Telephone (512) 896-6000, or the local Mooney Aircraft Repair Center, or FAA Airplane Certification Office, ASW-150, FAA, Southwest Region, Post Office Box 1689, Fort Worth, Texas 76101; Telephone (817) 624-5164, to arrange for engineering review and approval of the repair design.\n\n\t(j)\tWithin 30 daysafter the accomplishment of the first inspection required by paragraph (a) of this AD, the appropriately rated airframe mechanic who performed the inspection shall fill out and sign the one time reporting form included as Attachment 1 to this AD and mail it to the following address: DOT/FAA, Airplane Certification Branch, ASW-150, Post Office Box 1689, Fort Worth, Texas 76101. (Reporting approved by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) under OMB No. 2120-0056).\n\n\tNOTE: This is a one time only reporting requirement.\n\n\t(k)\tAn equivalent method of compliance with this AD may be used if approved by the Manager, Airplane Certification Branch, ASW-150, FAA, Southwest Region, Post Office Box 1689, Fort Worth, Texas 76101.\n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive may obtain copies of the documents referred to herein upon request to Mooney Aircraft Corporation, Post Office Box 72, Kerrville, Texas 78028, or FAA, Office of the Regional Counsel, Room 1558, 601 East 12th Street, KansasCity, Missouri 64106.\n\n\tNote 1: The surface features described in the paragraphs of this AD may be accentuated by illuminating the surface with a light source at a shallow angle. The following technique may be used by an experienced inspector to detect soft and/or decayed wood in the wing spars. Tap the wing directly above and below the spars with a small rounded blunt instrument approximately the size of a small pocket knife. Start at the outboard end and move inboard, listening to the sound generated by the wing.\n\n\tThe sound quality will change slowly. If the change is abrupt or if the sound is not resilient, the wood directly below the surface may be deteriorated due to decay.\n\n\tNote 2: Shelter - Owners and operators are encouraged to shelter the airplanes, to keep the airplane out of rain storms, and to protect the fabric surface from unnecessary exposure to the deteriorating effects of the sun.\n\n\tNote 3: Maintenance - Owners and operators are encouraged to be selective in who performs maintenance on their airplane. Only personnel extremely experienced in wood airplane inspection and repair should be contacted.\n\n\tNote 4: The inspection intervals required by this AD differ from the inspection intervals shown in Mooney Service Bulletin No. M20-170A. The intervals in this AD are the same as AD 76-15-01 which this AD supersedes.\n\n\tNote 5: Repairs to primary and secondary structure may be accomplished with reference to:\n\n\t\t(a)\tFAA Advisory Circular No. 43-13-1A: Acceptable Methods, Techniques and Practices Aircraft Inspection and Repair, Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Agency 1972; available through the Government Printing Office.\n\n\t\t(b)\tANC-18: Design of Wood Aircraft Structures, Chapter 4, Munitions Board Aircraft Committee June 1951.\n\n\t\t(c)\tMooney Aircraft Corporation Engineering Drawings; the specific drawings required will depend on the affected structural components.\n\n\t\t(d)\tMooney Service Bulletin No. M20-170A dated February 24, 1969.\n\n\tNote 6:\tDesign of major repairs to primary wood structure (main and stub spars and ribs receiving loads such as landing gear loads or loads related to attachment of moveable control surfaces to fixed surfaces or attachment of fixed surfaces to the fuselage) should be reviewed and approved by Mooney Aircraft Corporation or an FAA Designated Engineering Representative having appropriate ratings or by FAA Aircraft Certification Division engineers. This is not intended to apply to those situations wherein a deteriorated part is replaced with an entire new part of like design.\n\n\tThis AD supersedes AD 76-15-01, Amendment 39-2673.\n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective October 6, 1986.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nFIGURE NO. 1 - APPLICATION OF FIN SIDE\nPROOF LOAD ON MAIN SPAR\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nFIGURE 1A\nRECOMMENDED FIN PROOF LOAD METHOD\n(INCLUDING LOWER RESTRAINT)\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nVIEW LOOKING FORWARD\n\nFIGURE NO. 2 - FIN PERMANENT DEFORMATION\nLIMITSFIN SIDE VIEW\n\nFIGURE NO. 3 - FIN - RUDDER HINGE SIDE PROOF\nLOAD APPLICATION\n\n\n86-19-10 ATTACHMENT 1\n\nInspection Results Reporting Form, Mooney M20 and M20A Wood Structure Inspection.\n\nI.\tAirplane Model No. , Serial No. .\n\nII.\tAirplane N-Number .\n\nIII.\tDoes the airplane have a metal empennage installed:\n\tYes NO \t\n\tIf no, go to IV, if yes, skip to V.\n\nIV.\tFor airplanes that have the wooden empennage:\n\n\t- Did the visual inspection of the empennage result in discovery of any failed glue joints, rotted wood or delaminated wood? \n\tYes No \t\n\tIf yes, describe location and extent of problem.\n\t- Did the visual inspection of the empennage result in discovery of any deteriorated paint or fabric covering?\n\tYes No \t\n\tIf yes, describe location and extent.\n\t- Did the visual inspection of the empennage result in discovery of any indications of water inside the empennage?\n\tYesNo \t\n\tIf yes, describe where it got in and where it pooled.\n\t- Did the empennage pass or fail the proof load tests of paragraph (d)?\n\tYes No \t\n\t- This inspection and testing of the wood empennage on this airplane results in the conclusion that its overall general structural condition is:\n\tPoor \t\n\tFair \t\n\tGood \t\n\tExcellent \t\n\t- Make any comments you wish to make about adding or deleting inspections and testing of the wood empennage on M20 and M20A airplanes.\n\nV.\tWing inspection results.\n\t- Did the visual inspection of the wing and wing carry-thru result in discovery of any failed glue joints, rotted wood or delaminated wood?\n\tYes No \t\n\tIf yes, describe location and extent of problem.\n\t- Did the visual inspection of the wing and wing carry-thru result in discovery of any deteriorated paint, fabric covering plugged drain holes or deteriorated scupper box seal?\n\tYes No \t\n\tIf yes, describe problem, location and extent.\n\t- Did the visual inspection of the wing and wing carry-thru result in discovery of any indications of water inside the wing?\n\tYes No \t\n\tIf yes, describe where it got in and where it pooled.\n\t- This inspection of the wing on this airplane results in the conclusion that its overall general structural condition is:\n\tPoor \t\n\tFair \t\n\tGood \t\n\tExcellent \t\n\t- Make any comments you wish to make about adding or deleting inspections of the wing on M20 and M20A airplanes:\nMechanics Name: \t\nFAA Certificate Number: \t\nDate:
48-14-04: 48-14-04 DOUGLAS: Applies to All C-54 Series Aircraft Prior to Model C-54G. \n\n\tCompliance required by November 1, 1948. \n\n\tBecause of fire hazard install a tailpipe shroud deflector on each tailpipe shroud assembly to prevent flame from a zone 1 fire entering the engine accessory section through the space existing between the shroud and cowling. AN 3-3A bolts may be substituted for the AN 3C-3A bolts called out in the Service Bulletin. \n\n\t(Douglas Service Bulletin C-54-289 addendum covers this same subject.)
59-13-06: 59-13-06 DOUGLAS: Applies to the Following Aircraft: DC-6A Serial Numbers 43296, 43297, 43817-43819, 43839-43841, 44063, 44064, 44069-44073, 44076, 44257. DC-6B Serial Number 43257-43259, 43261-43276, 43291, 43292, 43298-43300, 43518-43537, 43539-43547, 43549-43555, 43557-43564, 43738-43741, 43743-43746, 43748-43750, 43820-43822, 43824-43826, 43828-43834, 43836, 43837, 43842, 43844-43847, 44056-44062, 44080-44083, 44087-44089, 44102-44113, 44165-44168 and 44251. \n\n\tCompliance required as indicated. \n\n\tSeveral instances of lower front spar cap cracks have been reported. The cracks involved are located at wing Station 30 at the intersection of lower front spar cap aft tang and wing-to-fuselage attach angle. To date no cracks have been found in the lower center spar cap; however, due to the similarity of the structure, it is logical to assume that cracks can occur in this cap as well as in the lower front spar cap. To detect cracking of the lower front and center spar cap tangs at intersection with lower fuselage attach angle, the following must be accomplished on affected aircraft having in excess of 12,000 flying hours. \n\n\t(a)\tInspect lower front spar caps at nearest maintenance inspection period to 200 flight-hours unless similar inspection has been conducted within last 1,250 flying hours. \n\n\t(b)\tInspect lower front and center spar caps at maintenance inspection period nearest to each succeeding 1,250 flying hours. \n\n\t\t(1)\tAt first 1,250-hour inspection period, holes in aft tank of front spar lower cap and fuselage attach angle should be enlarged and new attachments installed (KIT "A" of Douglas SB A-821 or equivalent). \n\n\t\t(2)\tAt next regularly scheduled overhaul period, holes located in forward tank of front spar lower cap should be enlarged and new attachments installed (KIT "A" of Douglas SB A-821 or equivalent). \n\n\t(c)\tIn event spar cap cracking is found at the 200-hour initial or 1,250-hour repetitive inspection periods, temporary rework per drawing No. 3645935 (KIT "B"), or equivalent, may be accomplished. \n\n\tWith temporary rework installed, inspection must be repeated at the 1,250-hour intervals for a maximum of 3,200 flight-hours at which time permanent rework per drawing No. 5761922 (KIT "C"), or equivalent, must be accomplished. \n\n\t(d)\tAll aircraft not already reworked per (c) must have permanent rework per drawing No. 5761922 (KIT "C"), or equivalent, accomplished within the next 6,400 flying hours. \n\n\t(e)\tAfter installation of KIT "C", operators may revert to normal repetitive inspection periods not to exceed 3,200 flying hours. \n\n\t(Douglas Service Bulletin DC-6 No. A-821 dated March 19, 1960, covers this same subject.) \n\n\tNOTE: This AD is not presently applicable to aircraft Serial Numbers 43548 and 43152 since they are not currently under U. S. registry. However, compliance with this AD will be required at the time application is made for recertification of such aircraft in the U.S.
2021-23-12: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all transport and commuter category airplanes equipped with a radio (also known as radar) altimeter. This AD was prompted by a determination that radio altimeters cannot be relied upon to perform their intended function if they experience interference from wireless broadband operations in the 3.7-3.98 GHz frequency band (5G C-Band). This AD requires revising the limitations section of the existing airplane/ aircraft flight manual (AFM) to incorporate limitations prohibiting certain operations requiring radio altimeter data when in the presence of 5G C-Band interference as identified by Notices to Air Missions (NOTAMs). The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2021-24-03: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus Helicopters Model AS355NP helicopters. This AD was prompted by a report of mechanical deformation found on the protective cover (also referred to as switch guard) of the ''SHEAR'' control pushbutton installed on a co-pilot collective stick of a Model EC225LP helicopter, caused by incorrect handling; due to having an identical design switch guard installed on the pilot collective stick, Model AS355NP helicopters are also affected. This AD requires replacement of the protective cover of the ''SHEAR'' control pushbutton, and re- identification of the pilot collective stick, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2010-04-16: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: The Civil Aviation Authority of the United Kingdom (UK) has informed EASA [European Aviation Safety Agency] that significant quantities of Halon 1211 gas, determined to be outside the required specification, have been supplied to the aviation industry for use in fire extinguishing equipment. * * * * * * * * * * * This Halon 1211 has subsequently been used to fill P/N [part number] 1708337B4 portable fire extinguishers that are now likely to be installed in or carried on board aircraft. The contaminated nature of this gas, when used against a fire, may provide reduced fire suppression, endangering the safety of the aircraft and its occupants. Inaddition, extinguisher activation may lead to release of toxic fumes, possibly causing injury to aircraft occupants. * * * * * This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
76-14-07 R2: 76-14-07 R2 CESSNA: Amendment 39-2760 as amended by Amendment 39-2778 is further amended by Amendment 39-5124. Applies to Models 210 thru 210J (Serial Numbers 57001 thru 57575, 21057576 thru 21059199) and Models T210F thru T210J (Serial Numbers T210-0001 thru T210-0454) airplanes. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless already accomplished. \n\n\tTo decrease the possibility of main landing gear extension failures, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tOn Model 210 and 210A (Serial Numbers 21057001 thru 21057840) airplanes with 1,000 hours or more time in service or upon accumulation of 1,025 hours time in service on those aircraft with less than 1,000 hours time in service: \n\n\t\t1.\tWithin 25 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD and within each 25 hours time in service thereafter, inspect Part Numbers 1241004-1 and 1241004-2 landing gear saddles for cracks using dye penetrant procedures in accordance with the instructions outlined in Paragraph E. of this AD. Particular attention should be given to the critical areas shown in Figure 1 of this AD. When all modifications specified in Paragraph A.3. have been accomplished, the requirements of this Paragraph A.1. are no longer applicable. \n\n\t\t2.\tPrior to further flight, replace any cracked saddles found during any inspection required by Paragraph A.1. \n\n\t\t3.\tWithin 100 hours time in service after August 16, 1976, or prior to April 1, 1977, whichever occurs later, and thereafter at each 1,000 hours time in service replace P/N's 1241004-1 and 1241004-2 main landing gear saddles with new components having the same P/N's in accordance with Cessna Service Letter SE 75-26 dated December 5, 1975, or later approved revisions. \n\n\tB.\tOn Models 210B thru 210G (Serial Numbers 21057841 thru 21058936) and T210F and T210G (Serial Numbers T210-0001 thru T210-0307) airplanes with 1,000 or more hours time in service or upon accumulation of 1,025 hours time in service on those aircraft with less than 1,000 hours time in service: \n\n\t\t1.\tWithin 25 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD and within each 25 hours time in service thereafter, inspect P/N's 1241423-1 and 1241423-2 main landing gear saddles for cracks using dye penetrant procedures in accordance with the instructions outlined in Paragraph E. of this AD. Particular attention should be given to the critical area shown in Figure 2 of this AD. When all modifications specified in Paragraph B.3. have been accomplished, the requirements of this Paragraph B.1. are no longer applicable. \n\n\t\t2.\tPrior to further flight, replace any cracked saddles found during any inspection required by Paragraph B.1. \n\n\t\t3.\tWithin 100 hours time in service after August 16, 1976, or prior to April 1, 1977, whichever occurs later, replace P/N's 1241423-1 and 1241423-2 main landing gear saddles with improved saddles of the same part number in accordance with Cessna Service Letter SE 75-26 dated December 5, 1975, or later approved revisions. \n\n\tNOTE (1): The improved main landing gear saddle for Models 210B thru 210G, T210F and T210G aircraft is identified in Figure 3 accompanying this AD. \n\n\tC.\tOn those airplanes having improved main landing gears saddles installed per Paragraph B. and on Models 210H and 210J (Serial Numbers 21058937 thru 21059199) and Models T210H and T210J (Serial Numbers T210-0308 thru T210-0454) airplanes, within the next 100 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, for airplanes with over 1,200 hours time in service or upon accumulation of 1,300 hours time in service for those airplanes with less than 1,200 hours time in service, and at each annual inspection thereafter, inspect the P/N's 1241423-1 and 1241423-2 main landing gear saddles for cracks using dye penetrant procedures in accordance with the instructions outlined in Paragraph E. of this AD. Particular attention should be given to the critical area shown in Figure 2 accompanying this AD. Replace any saddles showing evidence of cracks. \n\n\tD.\tOn those airplanes on which main landing gear saddles have been replaced, base the compliance time for Paragraphs A., B., and C. on the new saddles time in service rather than the airplane time in service. \n\n\tE.\tPerform the dye penetrant inspections required by Paragraphs A.1., B.1., and C. of this AD as outlined in either procedure 1 or 2 below: \n\n\t\t1.\tProcedure 1: Place the airplane on jacks, disconnect the main landing gear doors, retract \nthe landing gear and perform dye penetrant inspection of the saddle fittings from underneath the airplane, or: \n\n\t\t2.\tProcedure 2: With the airplane in normal ground attitude, remove the inspection cover in the floorboard area of the airplane and perform dye penetrant inspection of the saddle fittings from inside the airplane. \n\n\t\t\tRefer to applicable Cessna Maintenance Manual instructions for disconnecting main landing gear doors and removal of inspection cover in floorboard area. \n\n\tF.\tAn equivalent means of compliance with this AD may be used if approved by the Manager, Aircraft Certification Office, Federal Aviation Administration, 1801 Airport Road, Room 100, Mid-Continent Airport, Wichita, Kansas 67209; telephone (316) 946-4400. \n\n\tG.\tInstallation of main landing gear saddles part numbers 1294151-1 and 1294151-2 in lieu of part numbers 1241423-1 and 1241423-2 constitutes an equivalent means of compliance for this AD. \n\n\tNOTE (2): A significant savings of manhours will result if initial compliance with this AD and modifications required by AD 76-04-01 are accomplished at the same time. \n\n\tNOTE (3): It is imperative that new saddles required to comply with this AD be ordered immediately to assure that a sufficient supply of saddles will be available for modification of all aircraft on or before April 1, 1977. The purpose of this admonishment is to forewarn owners/operators to avoid grounding of their aircraft for failure to comply with this AD by April 1, 1977.Amendment 39-2760 became effective August 16, 1976. \n\n\tAmendment 39-2778 became effective December 2, 1976. \n\n\tThis Amendment 39-5124 becomes effective August 28, 1985.
66-14-04: 66-14-04 PRATT & WHITNEY: Amdt. 39-247 Part 39 Federal Register June 8, 1966. Applies to Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Wasp Jr. and R-985 Series Engines. Compliance required at the next engine overhaul after the effective date of this AD unless already accomplished. To prevent failure of the cam reduction drive gear assembly and resultant loss of engine power, replace cam reduction drive gear assembly, P/N 3965, with cam reduction drive gear, P/N 331098. (Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Service Bulletin No. 1671, Supplement No. 1, Revision A, revised November 24, 1959, pertains to this subject.) This supersedes AD 62-11-05. This directive effective July 9, 1966.
2010-04-07: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: During acceleration up to One Engine Inoperative (OEI) 30-second rating, one event of flight loss of full automatic control occurred on an Arriel 2S1 engine. The selection of OEI 30-second rating on engine 1 was triggered by the automatic detection of an OEI situation further to a transient deceleration of engine 2. The transient deceleration of engine 2 was caused by the untimely reset of its digital electronic control unit (DECU). Once this reset was completed, engine 2 resumed its nominal operation. Afterwards the aircraft then continued its flight safely with its engine 1 operating in manual control mode. The loss of full automatic control of engine 1 was caused by loss of steps of the stepper motor controlling the fuel metering valve inside the Hydro-mechanical Unit (HMU). It has been found that high accelerations, notably up to OEI 30- second rating, increase the risk of loss of steps of the HMU stepper motor. Therefore, this event has led to the consideration of the following unsafe condition at aircraft level: In-flight loss of full automatic control of the engine induced by the loss of steps of the stepper motor during acceleration up to OEI 30-second rating, further to an actual OEI situation on the other engine (such as a power loss event). We are issuing this AD to prevent loss of full automatic control of the engine during acceleration up to the OEI 30-second rating. This condition could result in reduced controllability of the helicopter.