Results
89-21-09: 89-21-09 BOEING: Amendment 39-6350. Docket No. 89-NM-56-AD. \n\tApplicability: Model 747 series airplanes, listed in Boeing Service Bulletin 747-53-2289, Revision 1, dated January 26, 1989, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent cabin pressure loss due to fatigue cracks in the skin at body station (BS) 460 just above left and right number 1 main entry doors, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tPrior to the accumulation of 10,000 landings, or within the next 1,000 landings after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 3,000 landings, conduct a high frequency eddy current (HFEC) inspection of the fuselage skin along the aft row of fasteners at the left and right BS 460 circumferential splices between stringers S-14E and S-16 for cracks, in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-53-2289, Revision 1, dated January 26, 1989. If the external doubler modification forward of BS 460 has not previously been installed in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletins 747-53-2181 or 747-53-2105, then also conduct a HFEC inspection of the fuselage skin along the forwardmost row of fasteners of the same skin splice. \n\n\tB.\tTo conduct the inspections required by this AD, remove the paint, using an approved chemical stripper, or ensure that the fastener heads are clearly visible. \n\n\tC.\tIf cracks are found when conducting the inspections required by paragraph A., above, accomplish either paragraph C.1. or C.2., below: \n\n\t\t1.\tPrior to further flight, modify the affected BS 460 circumferential splice in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-53-2289, Revision 1, dated January 26, 1989. Cracks found in the internal splice strap while performing the modification must be repaired in accordance with the 747 Structural Repair Manual (SRM) concurrently with accomplishment of the skin modification. \n\n\t\t2.\tPrior to further flight, perform aninternal HFEC inspection of the aft row of fasteners of the internal splice strap to verify there are no cracks in the internal splice strap. This HFEC inspection must be conducted using a HFEC pencil probe, 360 degrees around the fastener heads, in accordance with Boeing Document D6-7170, Section 51-00-00, Figure 4. Repair the skin cracks prior to further flight, in accordance with the 747 SRM. Continue to inspect the unrepaired areas of the skin in accordance with paragraph A., above. \n\n\t\t\ta.\tIn addition, conduct an internal HFEC pencil probe inspection, 360 degrees around the fastener heads of the aft row of the internal splice strap at all fastener locations between stringer S-14E and S-15 between S-15 and S-16, at intervals not to exceed 1,000 landings, in accordance with the aforementioned Boeing Document. If cracks are found in the internal splice strap, prior to further flight, modify in accordance with paragraph C.1., above. \n\n\t\t\tb.\tPrior to the accumulation of 20,000landings, modify the affected BS 460 circumferential splice in accordance with paragraph C.1., above. \n\n\tD.\tTerminating action for the HFEC inspection requirements of paragraph A., above, consists of modification of the left and right BS 460 circumferential splices between S-14E and S-16 in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-53-2289, original issue, dated October 22, 1987, or Revision 1, dated January 26, 1989. \n\n\tE.\tFor the purpose of complying with this AD, the number of landings may be determined to equal the number of pressurization cycles in which the cabin pressure differential was greater than 1.5 psi. \n\n\tF.\tAn alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), who may add any comments and then send it to the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office. \n\n\tG.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6350, AD 89-21-09) becomes effective on November 13, 1989.
2019-05-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Leonardo S.p.A. Model AB139, AW139, AW169, and AW189 helicopters. This AD requires removing certain part-numbered and serial-numbered tail rotor (T/R) duplex bearings from service. This AD is prompted by a report of a failed T/R duplex bearing roughness inspection. The actions of this AD are intended to address an unsafe condition on these products.
69-23-02: 69-23-02 GENERAL ELECTRIC: Amdt. 39-870 as amended by Amendment 39-1086. Applies to models CT58-100-1, CT58-100-2, CT58-110-1, CT58-110-2, CT58-140-1, CT58-140-2, T58-GE-1 and T58-GE-5 turboshaft engines. Compliance required as indicated. To ensure adequate life limit margin for stage 2 compressor rotor disc shafts the life limits on these parts have been reduced below the figures currently approved. Unless already accomplished, remove from service stage 2 compressor rotor disc shafts prior to reaching the revised life limit or in accordance with the removal schedule given below for those parts which are close to or exceed the limit on the effective date of this AD. Part Numbers Previous Life Limits Revised Life Limits Removal Schedule Above 2,400 hrs. 5,800 Cycles Hrs. Cycles Hrs. Cycles Remove within* 37E500153P101 2,500 8,000 2,500 6,000 100 Hrs. 200 Cycles 37E500213P101 2,500 8,000 2,500 6,000 100 Hrs 200 Cycles37E500213P103 2,500 8,000 2,500 6,000 100 Hrs. 200 Cycles Above 2,950 Hrs. 5,900 Cycles Remove within* 5008T79P01 10,000 40,000 3,000 6,000 50 Hrs. 100 Cycles 37E500153P101M 10,000 40,000 3,000 6,000 50 Hrs. 100 Cycles Above 5,150 Hrs. 8,400 Cycles Remove within* 5005T34P01 5,000 10,000 5,200 8,500 50 Hrs. 100 Cycles 5005T34P03 5,000 10,000 5,200 8,500 50 Hrs. 100 Cycles 5008T79P02 5,000 10,000 5,200 8,500 50 Hrs. 100 Cycles *Time in service or cycles, whichever occurs first after the effective date of this AD. For the purposes of this AD a cycle is considered as any engine operating sequence involving engine start, at least one acceleration to a power required for takeoff and shutdown. Amendment 39-870 effective November 15, 1969. This amendment 39-1086 is effective October 15, 1970.
2007-06-10: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for Rolls Royce plc (RR) RB211-524 series turbofan engines with certain part number (P/N) intermediate pressure compressor (IPC) stage 5 disks installed. That AD currently requires new reduced IPC stage 5 disk cyclic limits. This AD requires the same reduced IPC stage 5 disk cyclic limits, requires removal from service of affected disks that already exceed the new reduced cyclic limit, and, removal from service of other affected disks before exceeding their cyclic limits using a drawdown schedule. This AD also exempts disks reworked to RR Service Bulletin (SB) No. RB.211-72-E182, Revision 1, dated July 30, 2004, and allows an on-wing eddy current inspection (ECI) on RB211-524G and RB211-524H series engines. This AD results from the manufacturer issuing a revised Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) to remove certain disks from applicability, and to allow an on-wing ECI on RB211-524G and RB211-524H series engines. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of the IPC stage 5 disk, which could result in uncontained engine failure and possible damage to the airplane.
2007-06-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an airworthiness authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as an incomplete discharge of the extinguishing agent in the fire zone, which could lead, in the worst case, in combination with an engine fire, to a temporary uncontrolled engine fire. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2021-25-09: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 737-200 and -200C series airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of nuisance stick shaker activation while the airplane was accelerating to cruise speed at the top of a climb. Investigation revealed that the activation was caused when the angle of attack (AOA) (also known as angle of airflow) sensor vanes froze and malfunctioned due to insufficient heat in certain AOA sensors to prevent ice buildup. This AD requires inspecting the AOA sensors for certain part numbers or vane shapes, and replacing any affected AOA sensor with a new or serviceable sensor. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2007-06-09: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD), which applies to certain Boeing Model 737-600, -700, -700C, and - 800 series airplanes. That AD currently requires replacing the point "D'' splice fitting between windows number 1 and 2 with a new splice fitting; performing an eddy current inspection for cracking of the holes in the structure common to the new splice fitting, including doing any related investigative actions; and performing corrective actions if necessary. This new AD adds repetitive inspections for cracking of the skin just below each splice fitting, and related corrective actions if necessary. This AD results from full-scale fuselage fatigue testing on the splice fitting that failed prior to the design objective on Boeing Model 737-800 series airplanes, and a report of a cracked splice fitting on an operational airplane. We are issuing this AD to prevent cracking of the existing fitting, which may result in cracking through the skin and consequent decompression of the flight deck.
98-24-15: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to Bell Helicopter Textron Model 204B, 205A, 205A-1, and 212 helicopters, that currently establishes a retirement life for the main rotor masts (masts) and main rotor trunnions (trunnions) based on time-in-service (TIS) and types of operations. This amendment adds Model 205B helicopters to the applicability; requires creation of component history cards or equivalent records using a Retirement Index Number (RIN) system; establishes a system for tracking increases to the accumulated RIN; and establishes a maximum accumulated RIN for certain masts and trunnions. This amendment is prompted by an accident involving a Model 205A-1 helicopter, in which a mast failure caused a separation of the main rotor from the helicopter. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent fatigue failure of the mast or trunnion and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
2007-06-04: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as two fatigue failures of flap carriage rollpins that occurred on in-service airplanes. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2019-05-01: We are superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2017-11-06, for all Pratt & Whitney (PW) PW2037, PW2037D, PW2037M, PW2040, PW2040D, PW2043, PW2143, PW2643, and F117-PW-100 turbofan engine models. AD 2017-11-06 required initial and repetitive on-wing eddy current inspections (ECIs) of affected engines with certain diffuser and high- pressure turbine (HPT) cases installed. AD 2017-11-06 also required a fluorescent-penetrant inspection (FPI) of the diffuser case rear flange and the HPT case front flange. This AD requires an on-wing ECI of all diffuser case M-flange replacement repairs. This AD was prompted by a rupture of the diffuser-to-HPT case flange. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2007-05-15: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for Teledyne Continental Motors (TCM) GTSIO-520 series reciprocating engines. That AD currently requires initial and repetitive visual inspections of the starter adapter assembly and crankshaft gear and unscheduled visual inspections of the starter adapter assembly and crankshaft gear due to a rough-running engine. That AD also requires replacement of the starter adapter shaft gear needle bearing with a certain bushing and installation of a certain TCM service kit at the next engine overhaul, or at the next starter adapter replacement, whichever occurs first. This AD requires performing the inspection ordered in paragraph (h) of this AD every 100 hours time-in- service (TIS), or annually. This proposed AD results from an error discovered in AD 2005-20-04. We are issuing this AD to failure of the starter adapter assembly and or crankshaft gear, resulting in failure of the engine and possible forced landing.
2007-05-17: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for Pratt & Whitney (PW) JT9D series turbofan engines. That AD currently requires revisions to the Airworthiness Limitations Section (ALS) of the manufacturer's Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA) to include required enhanced inspection of selected critical life-limited parts at each piece-part opportunity. This AD modifies the JT9D series engines ALS sections of the manufacturer's manuals and an air carrier's approved continuous airworthiness maintenance program to incorporate additional inspection requirements. This AD results from the need to require enhanced inspection of selected critical life- limited parts of JT9D series turbofan engines. We are issuing this AD to prevent critical life-limited rotating engine part failure, which could result in an uncontained engine failure and damage to the airplane.
2000-20-20: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 747-400 series airplanes, that requires removal of existing inertial reference units (IRU) and installation of modified IRU's. This amendment is prompted by a report of the failure of the left and center IRU's on a single flight. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent loss of multiple IRU's in flight, which could result in the loss of navigation data during flight. This could compromise the ability of the flight crew to maintain the safe flight and landing of the airplane.
53-07-01: 53-07-01\tde HAVILLAND: Applies to Model DHC-2 (Beaver) Aircraft, Serial Numbers 1 to 483 Inclusive. \n\n\tCompliance required as indicated. \n\n\tThere have been instances of the elevator outboard hinge becoming loose in its attachments to the horizontal stabilizer rib. Rivet holes have becomes enlarged permitting the fitting to "work". The de Havilland Aircraft of Canada, Ltd., in agreement with the Canadian Department of Transport, issued the following mandatory instructions in which the FAA concurs: \n\n\tInspection intervals: 50 hours, pending incorporation of the repair scheme described below. \n\n\tRepair scheme: The repair scheme described herein is not mandatory until a defect appears. (See Fig. 1.) \n\n\n\n\n\n\tThe following parts are required: \n\n\nC2-TP-179ND\nHinge plate\n2 required\n\nC2-TP-181ND\nAngle\n2 required\n1 each \nCR 162-6-8\nCherry rivet\n10 required\nend of\nCR 162-6-10\nCherry rivet\n12 required\nT/P.\nCR 163-6-8\nCherry rivet\n6 required\n\n\n\tProcedure.1.\tRemove tailcone. \n\t2.\tRemove elevator. \n\t3.\tLocate extreme outboard elevator hinges on tailplane. \n\t4.\tDrill out 4 rivets retaining hinge plates. \n\n\tImportant: Do not drill out rivet at point A until angle C2-TP-181ND has been riveted. (See Fig. 1.) \n\n\t5.\tRemove small tab at outboard ends of rear spar on tailplane. \n\t6.\tDrill out 3 rivets at point B securing angle C2-TP-139. (Angle must still remain in position secured by 1 rivet at point A.) \n\t7.\tLocate new angle C2-TP-181ND on spar rear face and flush with outer skin of end rib. \n\t8.\tRivet angles C2-TP-139 and -181ND to spar as shown at point B. \n\t9.\tDrill out rivet at point A. \n\t10.\tMake or secure new hinge plate C2-TP-179ND and assemble as shown. \n\t11.\tAssemble studs to new hinge plates. \n\t12.\tReplace elevator and tailcone. \n\n\t(de Havilland Technical News Sheet Series B, No. 60, dated February 10, 1953, Subject "Tailplane - Elevator Outboard Hinge - Mod. 2/901" covers this same subject.)
2019-03-30: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Empresa Brasileira de Aeronautica S.A. (Embraer) Model EMB-135ER, - 135KE, -135KL, and -135LR airplanes and Model EMB-145, -145ER, -145MR, -145LR, -145XR, -145MP, and -145EP airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of internal corrosion of the stow/transit switches installed in the engine thrust reversers. This AD requires installation of new stow/ transit switches. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
98-13-23: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Airbus Model A300-600 series airplanes, that requires inspections to detect corrosion and cracking of the lower horizontal stabilizer cutout longeron, the corner fitting, the skin strap, and the outer skin; and repair, if necessary. This amendment is prompted by cracking found at the lower corner of the horizontal stabilizer cutout longeron during a full scale fatigue test. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent such cracking, which could result in reduced structural integrity of the horizontal-stabilizer cutout longeron.
2007-05-19: The FAA adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Glasflugel Models H 301 "Libelle,'' H 301B "Libelle,'' Standard "Libelle,'' and Standard Libelle-201B sailplanes. This AD requires you to replace the rudder actuator arm (manufactured according to drawing No. 301-45-10) with an improved design rudder actuator arm (manufactured following drawing No. 301-45-13). This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the airworthiness authority for Germany. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct damage to the rudder actuator arm, which could result in failure of the rudder actuator arm. This failure could result in reduced or loss of rudder control.
2000-20-03 R1: This amendment revises an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Bombardier Model CL-600-2B19 series airplanes, that currently requires installation of shields for the aileron quadrants in the wheel bay of the main landing gear (MLG). This amendment revises the compliance time for the requirements of that AD. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent accumulation of water, ice, or slush on the aileron quadrants and control cable pulleys in the wheel bay of the MLG, which could freeze and result in reduced controllability of the airplane.
2019-03-27: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Dassault Aviation Model Falcon 10 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report indicating that certain wing anti-ice outboard flexible hoses were found damaged, likely resulting from the installation process. This AD requires repetitive detailed inspections of certain wing anti- ice outboard flexible hoses, and replacement of certain wing anti-ice outboard flexible hoses, as specified in an European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Emergency AD, which is incorporated by reference. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
74-10-13: 74-10-13 BOEING: Amendment 39-1845. Applies to all Model 707 and 720 airplanes having 6,000 hrs., or more, time in service, certificated in all categories. \n\tCompliance is required as indicated, unless already accomplished. \n\tTo prevent excessive non-recoverable internal hydraulic leakage in the auxiliary hydraulic system and the possible loss of aircraft direction control at critical air speeds, accomplish the following: \n\tPART I \n\t(a)\tPART I of this AD applies to airplanes which will be used for flight crew training. \n\t(b)\tPrior to further flight for crew training, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 2,000 hours time in service from the last inspection, the airplane auxiliary hydraulic system must be inspected and replaced or reworked, as necessary, in accordance with the following: \n\t\t(1)\tInspect for evidence of internal leakage per the information contained in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 3154 dated April 12, 1974, or later FAA approved revisions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 3154 or by an equivalent method approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Northwest Region. \n\t\t(2)\tAirplanes with an auxiliary hydraulic system having internal leakage equal to or greater than 1.0 GPM but less than 3.0 GPM may not be used in training or revenue service but may only be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a maintenance base for replacement or rework, as necessary, of the defective auxiliary hydraulic system components. \n\t\t(3)\tAirplanes with an auxiliary hydraulic system having 3.0 GPM, or more, internal leakage must have the defective auxiliary hydraulic system components replaced or overhauled, as necessary, prior to further flight. \n\tPART II \n\t(a)\tPART II of this AD applies to airplanes which have not been inspected and reworked, as necessary, in accordance with Amendment 39-1753 (F. R. Doc. 73-25927), AD-73-25-2. \n\t(b)\tWithin 300 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 2,000 hours time in service from the last inspection, accomplish the following: \n\t\t(1)\tInspect for evidence of internal leakage and replace or rework, as necessary, per the information contained in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 3154 dated April 12, 1974, or later FAA approved revisions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 3154 or by an equivalent method approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Northwest Region. \n\t\t(2)\tAirplanes with an auxiliary hydraulic system having internal leakage equal to or greater than 1.0 GPM but less than 3.0 GPM may not be used in revenue service but may only be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a maintenance base for replacement or rework, as necessary, of the defective auxiliary hydraulic components. \n\t\t(3)\tAirplanes with an auxiliary hydraulic system having 3.0 GPM, or more, internal leakage must have the defective auxiliary hydraulic system components replaced or overhauled, as necessary, prior to further flight. \n\tPART III \n\t(a)\tPART III of this AD applies to airplanes which have been inspected and reworked, as necessary, in accordance with Amendment 39-1753 (F. R. Doc. 73-25927), AD-73-25-2. \n\t(b)\tWithin 600 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 2,000 hours time in service from the last inspection, accomplish the following: \n\t\t(1)\tInspect for evidence of internal leakage and replace or rework, as necessary, per the information contained in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 3154 dated April 12, 1974, or later FAA approved revisions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 3154, or by an equivalent method approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Northwest Region. \n\t\t(2)\tAirplanes with an auxiliary hydraulic system having internal leakage equal to or greater than 1.0 GPM but less than 3.0 GPM, may not be used in revenue service but may only be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a maintenance base for replacement or rework, as necessary, of the defective auxiliary hydraulic system components. \n\t\t(3)\tAirplanes with an auxiliary hydraulic system having 3.0 GPM, or more, internal leakage must have the defective auxiliary hydraulic system components replaced or overhauled, as necessary, prior to further flight. \n\tFor the purpose of complying with the repetitive periodic inspection requirement of this AD, the 2,000 hours time in service may be adjusted by submitting substantiating technical data through the FAA assigned maintenance inspector for the approval of the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Flight Standards Division, FAA, Northwest Region. \n\n\tThis AD Amendment 39-1845 supersedes AD 73-25-2. \n\tThis Amendment becomes effective May 14, 1974.
2007-04-01: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as possible installation of undersize rivets in the fuselage roof at STN 180.85, BL 19.67, WL 86.2. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2007-05-09: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: This AD is issued following a nose landing gear collapse during takeoff roll. Several expertises proved that the locking device of the Nose Landing Gear (NLG) actuator rod was on several F406 airplanes not conforming with the installation approved by the manufacturer. There were two different landing gear actuator designs installed on the Model F406 airplanes (Teijin Seiki and Cessna). The actuators used different locking devices to retain the spherical rod-end to the actuator rod. Use of the incorrect locking device could allow the spherical rod-end to disconnect from the actuator rod. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2019-03-18: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus SAS Model A318-111, -112, -121, and -122 airplanes; Model A319- 111, -112, -113, -114, -115, -131, -132, and -133 airplanes; and Model A320-211, -212, -214, -216, -231, -232, and -233 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of cracks that were found after improperly performed magnetic particle inspections of the main landing gear (MLG) sliding tubes were done. This AD requires repetitive general visual inspections of the affected MLG sliding tubes for cracks and replacement if necessary. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
97-01-02: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain Cessna Aircraft Company (Cessna) Model 525 airplanes. This action requires repetitively inspecting the main landing gear (MLG) trunnion pins for proper installation, and either immediately or eventually replacing the existing dry-film lubricated MLG trunnion slot bearings with sealed and self-lubricating bearings. This AD results from an incident where the left MLG collapsed during the landing roll even though the cockpit indications showed that the MLG was in the normal down and locked position. Loss of dry-film lubricant on the MLG trunnion bearings caused this incident. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent MLG collapse caused by trunnion bearing failure, which could result in loss of control of the airplane during landing operations.
81-19-02: 81-19-02 BELL HELICOPTER TEXTRON (BHT): Amendment 39-4208. Applies to all Model 204 and 205 series helicopters certified in all categories (Airworthiness Docket No. 81-ASW-40). To prevent possible failure of main rotor yoke Part Number 204-011-102 (all dash numbers), accomplish the following: a. Unless Bell Helicopter Textron Alert Service Bulletin No. 204-81-11 or 205-81-16, as applicable, has previously been complied with, within 10 days after the effective date of this Airworthiness Directive: (1) Create a component history card for yoke Part Number 204-011-102 (all dash numbers). (2) Record the operating time accumulated on the yoke. If the previous operating time cannot be determined, enter 2,400 hours. (3) Retire yokes with more than 3,300 hours' time on the compliance date of this AD prior to obtaining an additional 300 hours. (4) Retire yokes with less than 3,300 hours' time on the compliance date of the AD on or before attaining 3,600 hours. b. The 3,600-hour life shall continue in effect on all Part Number 204-011-102 yokes. c. Any equivalent method of compliance with this AD must be approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Flight Standards Division, Southwest Region, Federal Aviation Administration. d. In accordance with FAR 21.197, flight is permitted to a base where the requirements of this AD may be accomplished. This amendment becomes effective September 30, 1981.