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65-06-04: 65-06-04 EUREKA WILLIAMS: Amdt. 39-44 Part 39 Federal Register March 6, 1965. Applies to All Aircraft with Life Preservers or Liferafts Equipped with Eureka Williams Survivor Locator Light Model EW-101-WL-( )-8 with a Yellow Polyethylene Lower Battery End Cap. Compliance required within 30 days after the effective date of this AD unless already accomplished. To prevent further damage to life preservers or liferafts from acid emitted from survivor locator light batteries, accomplish the following: (a) Inspect life preservers and liferafts for acid damage from survivor locator light batteries. Repair or replace damaged life preservers and liferafts before further service. (b) Replace survivor locator light with FAA-approved lights other than Eureka Williams EW-101-WL-( )-8 lights with a yellow polyethylene lower battery end cap before further service. NOTE: Number denoted by empty brackets varies with lead length. All lights with yellow caps were manufactured after December 9, 1964, and are stamped with manufacturer codes 1-65, 2-65, or 12-64. (Eureka Williams Service Bulletin No. ADV SCI 101-1 dated February 19, 1965, covers this subject.) This directive effective March 6, 1965.
47-10-17: 47-10-17 LOCKHEED: (Was Mandatory Note 19 of AD-763-3.) Applies to All Model 49 Serials Up to and Including 2075. Compliance required prior to resumption of cabin supercharger operation. Prior to resumption of cabin supercharger operation, the following Lockheed Service Bulletins must be complied with: 49/SB-107, revised November 22, 1946 - Replacement of Cabin Supercharger Drive Shafts. 49/SB-141, revised August 7, 1946 - Replacement of Cabin Supercharger. 49/SB-156, revised September 17, 1946 - Installation of Supercharger Oil Temperature Indicator. The revision dates given for these three Bulletins are later than those listed in the Supplement to AD-763 (Special) dated September 25, 1946. Aircraft on which the cabin supercharging equipment was rendered operative in accordance with that Supplement should be checked for compliance with these later revisions dates within the next 150 hours of operation.
2003-16-11: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the specified MD Helicopters, Inc. (MDHI) model helicopters that requires reducing the life limit of the main rotor drive shaft (drive shaft) and changing the life limit on the component history card or equivalent record. This amendment is prompted by the review of final fatigue test data, which indicates that the life limit of the drive shaft should be reduced by 2000 hours time-in-service (TIS). The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of the drive shaft, loss of drive of the main rotor system, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
45-04-01: 45-04-01\tBOEING: (Was Service Note 1 of AD-704-1.) Applies to 314 Aircraft. \n\tThe 24SRT aluminum alloy tubular members must be inspected for stress corrosion and fatigue cracks by visual and x-ray methods in accordance with the instructions listed below: STRESS CORROSION CRACKS \n\tINSPECTION PERIODS AND LOCATIONS \n\t\t(a)\tInspection required every 250 hours of operation or 60 days, whichever occurs first. Inspect the visible portion of all readily accessible aluminum alloy 24SRT members for cracks. \n\t\t(b)\tInspection required every 750 hours of operation or 120 days, whichever occurs first. Inspect the visible faces of all aluminum alloy 24SRT tubing structure for cracks. In addition, inspect by x-ray the inaccessible face of the spar chord members from Station 6 to Station 13 which is hidden by the wing skin attach to the chord (i.e., chord face areas hidden by gusset plates used to attach web members are excluded). \n\t\t(c)\tInspection required annually. Inspect by x-ray all inaccessible portions of 24SRT spar chord members for their entire length. This inspection period may coincide with the inspection periods in paragraph (b) above. \n\tINSPECTION PROCEDURES \n\tThe required visual inspection for new or elongated cracks shall be done in a manner satisfactory to FAA. The following procedure is an acceptable method for making these visual inspections: \n\t\t(a)\tClean the surfaces of the members with a rag as necessary and closely examine the members (especially around gussets) with the naked eye. Direct a light on each member at varying angles so that no defects will be overlooked. Make certain to inspect all sides of each member using a mirror where necessary. \n\t\t(b)\tExamine any suspicious indication with a magnifying glass (10 power or over preferred). A crack will appear to have jagged edges and considerable depth. A scratch will appear to have smooth edges and the bottom of the groove should be visible. \n\t\t(c)\tIf a new crack is found, the finish (if otherRoxalin Clear Primer) should be removed around the crack to facilitate inspection. Extreme care should be exercised while stripping areas immediately adjacent to gusset plates in order to prevent the stripping solvent from entering the inaccessible regions between the gussets and members. The crack should be further inspected for corrosion and its length measured to the nearest 1/16 inch. The two ends of a stress corrosion crack should be marked with a sharp indelible pencil, and Roxalin Clear Primer No. 3200 brushed over the stripped area. \n\t\t(d)\tInspect known cracks for elongation by noting the pencil lines placed at the previous ends of each crack the same as for new cracks. (See (c) above.) \n\tThe required x-ray inspections should be done with suitable equipment and by a company or personnel that have demonstrated to the FAA that their procedure will adequately show the condition of the hidden faces of the chord members. \n\tIDENTIFICATION AND LIMITS \n\tStress corrosion typesof failures are denoted by longitudinal fissures in the members. These cracks may have a small transverse component. They vary in length and, as time elapses, may run together or continue from one rivet hole to another. If stress-corrosion cracks are within certain limits the airplane may be operated without reinforcing the affected member; however, if the magnitude, direction, or location of the crack is such as to violate any of the following provisions, the affected member shall be reinforced or replaced in a manner satisfactory to the FAA. \n\t\t(1)\tNo crack should be allowed to exceed 8 inches in length. Diagonal (or transverse) cracks should in no case extend transversely in the member for a distance greater than the largest rivet or bolt diameter in the nearest fitting. \n\t\t(2)\tCracks should not be allowed in joints, fittings, rivet holes, reduced sections, etc., unless it can be determined that the affected area is not critical or that adequate margins of safety exist to compensate for such cracks. \n\t\t(3)\tIf two or more parallel cracks exist in the same face, none should exceed 6 inches in length. \n\t\t(4)\tIf numerous small longitudinal cracks exist in one face of a member but are not joined by diagonal or transverse cracks, the length of the member so affected should not exceed 12 inches. \nFATIGUE CRACKS \n\tINSPECTION PERIODS AND LOCATIONS. \n\tInspection required every 35 hours of operation. Inspect the visible portions of all the wing spar 24SRT diagonal tube members, between Stations 1 and 30 on the front spar and between Stations 5 and 23 on the rear spar, for fatigue cracks at intervals not to exceed 35 hours flight time. \n\tINSPECTION PROCEDURES. \n\tSame as parts (a) and (b) of the inspection procedures for stress-corrosion cracks. \n\tIDENTIFICATION AND LIMITS. \n\tFatigue types of failures are denoted by fine hairline transverse cracking in the members. These cracks generally emanate from rivet holes under gussets and progress transversely or diagonally around the periphery of the tube. They may also originate from a longitudinal crack, scratch or other stress-raising discontinuity. In case fatigue cracks of any length are found, the defective member should be reinforced before flight is continued and upon arrival at the home base, the member should replaced. A proposed repair to take care of this contingency should be submitted to the FAA for approval. It shall also be the operators' responsibility to keep a record of all the cracks on each airplane. This record shall be revised periodically to show the status of existing cracks and to record newly developed cracks. Copies of the original reports and all revised pages should be submitted to the FAA for examination.
2018-14-02: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 777-200, -200LR, -300, and -300ER series airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports that additional areas of Boeing Material Specification (BMS) 8-39 flexible urethane foam were found during a routine inspection. This AD requires an inspection for foam insulation on the dripshield above the overhead panel support structure and replacement if necessary. For certain airplanes, this AD also requires replacement of foam insulation on the overhead panel support structure. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products. \n\n((Page 31651))
47-49-11: 47-49-11 LOCKHEED: (Was Service Note 11 of AD-763-3.) Applies to Models 49, 649, and 749 Serials as Noted. At periods not to exceed 50 hours of operation, inspect the following fuel system elements to determine that they are tight and will not permit leakage or other hazardous conditions: (a) Fuel dump valve shaft gland nuts (Serials up to and including 2075). (b) Valves on drain lines from outboard portion of inboard fuel tanks, fuel system crossfeed lines, and cabin heater fuel lines (Serials 2047 to 2088, inclusive, and 2501 to 2503, inclusive). If safety wiring of these items is provided, the required inspections may be discontinued. (Lockheed Service Bulletin 49/SB-215 covers part (a), and Lockheed Service Instruction 49/SI-10A covers part (b).)
48-12-02: 48-12-02 DOUGLAS: Applies to All C54-DC Serial and the Following DC-4 Airplanes: 42904 Through 42943, 42948 Through 42952, 42982 Through 42996, 43065 Through 43068, 43071, 43072, 43093, 43094, and 43102. \n\n\tTo be accomplished not later than the date established in accordance with the provisions of Special Civil Air Regulation Serial Number SR-329, or any subsequent regulation affecting this compliance date. \n\n\tAs a result of investigation of heater fires, the following changes are to be accomplished in the nose and cabin heater installation: \n\n\t1.\tInstall steel firewall at Station 260 (cabin forward bulkhead) from ceiling level to top of bulkhead to provide isolation between heater compartment and the space between cabin ceiling and top of fuselage. Also, replace present wood panels under heaters with metal panels. \n\n\t(Douglas Service Bulletin DC-4 No. 47 covers this same subject.) \n\n\t2.\t(a)\tInstall all heater control components in airtight steel containers. \n\t\t(b)\tReplace present heater fuel supply pumps with a single electric driven pump attached to No. 2 main fuel tank. \n\n\t\t(c)\tProvide shrouds around all heater fuel line fittings in fuselage. \t \n\n\t\t(d)\tInstall a fire detector and extinguisher system for the nose heater and cabin heaters. \n\n\t(Douglas Service Bulletins DC-4 Nos. 64 and 64 addendum cover this same subject.) \n\n\tIn some cases, operators have obtained approval from FAA Regional Offices for systems which differ in arrangement and detail from the above provisions. Designs which have been separately approved in this manner are considered to meet the intent of this Note. \n\n\tThis supersedes AD 46-39-02.
2005-19-19: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 737-300, -400, -500, -600, -700, -700C, -800 and - 900 series airplanes. This AD requires installing an updated version of the operational program software (OPS) and certain other software in the flight management computers (FMCs); and doing configuration checks to ensure that certain software is properly installed and doing other specified actions. This AD also requires reinstalling software, if necessary. This AD results from one operator reporting FMC map shifts on several Model 737-400 series airplanes with dual FMCs, using OPS version U10.4A. We are issuing this AD to prevent the FMC from displaying the incorrect actual navigation performance value to the flightcrew, which could prevent adequate alerting of a potential navigation error. This condition could result in a near miss with other airplanes or terrain, or collision if other warning systems also fail.
65-04-01: 65-04-01 BELL: Amdt. 39-36 Part 39 Federal Register February 17, 1965. Applies to Model 47 Series Helicopters Equipped With Transmissions Serial Numbers B12-885 through B12-969. Compliance required within 25 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless previously accomplished in accordance with Bell Helicopter Company Service Bulletin No. 141SB. Some of the P/N 47-620-535-1 outer races installed in the freewheeling clutch of transmissions listed herein may not have been tempered properly. To eliminate the possibility of excessive wear of these races and subsequent malfunction of the freewheeling clutch, conduct a hardness test on these races as described by Bell Service Bulletin No. 141SB. If the hardness does not fall within the limits prescribed by the bulletin, replace the outer race with one which is within the limits before further flight. This directive effective February 17, 1965.
2018-12-03: We are superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2013-11-09 for all Safran Helicopter Engines, S.A., Arrius 2B1 and 2F turboshaft engines. AD 2013-11-09 required the repetitive replacement of the fuel injector manifolds and privilege injector, or only the privilege injector. This AD retains the repetitive hardware replacement requirements of AD 2013-11-09, but only allows replacement pipe injector preferred assembly, part number (P/N) 0 319 73 044 0, on the Arrius 2F engines. This AD was prompted by reports of engine flameouts as a result of reduced fuel flow due to the presence of coking. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.