Results
77-01-07: 77-01-07 PRATT & WHITNEY AIRCRAFT: Amendment 39-2807. Applies to all Pratt & Whitney Aircraft JT9D-3A, -7, -7H, -7A, -7AH, -7F and -20 turbofan engines containing fifth stage turbine hubs, P/N 704705, 714905, 718905, 719205, and 726805. Compliance required as indicated. To prevent cracking and possible failure of fifth stage turbine hubs, the cyclic life limits on these parts have been reduced below the figures currently approved. Unless already accomplished, remove from service fifth stage turbine hubs prior to reaching the revised life limit listed below or within the next 25 cycles in service after the effective date of this AD, whichever is later. Hub Part Number Previous Life Limit (Cycles) Revised Life Limit (Cycles) 704705 15,000 7,000 714905 15,000 6,000 718905 8,000 5,000 719205 8,000 5,000 726805 8,000 5,000 Upon request of the operator, an FAA maintenance inspector, subject to prior approval of the Chief, Engineering & Manufacturing Branch, New England Region, may adjust the 25 cycle compliance interval to permit compliance at an established inspection period of the operator if the request contains substantiating data to justify the increase for that operator. (NOTE: Pratt & Whitney Alert Service Bulletin No. 4671 pertains to this subject.) This amendment becomes effective upon publication in the Federal Register.
66-03-02: 66-03-02 HUGHES: Amdt. 39-181, Part 39, Federal Register January 14, 1966. Applies to Models 269A, 269A-1, and 269B Helicopters. Compliance required within the next 100 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To eliminate a possible navigational hazard, accomplish the following: (a) On helicopters with the 12-volt electrical system, remove the existing tail position light bulb and replace it with General Electric No. 1777 bulb or FAA-approved equivalent. (b) On helicopters with the 24-volt electrical system, remove the existing bulb and replace it with a Grimes No. 1683 bulb or FAA-approved equivalent. (Hughes Service Notices Nos. 2A-54 (269A), 2A-1-21 (269A-1 and (2B-22), (269B) dated October 28, 1965, pertain to this same modification.) This directive effective January 14, 1966.
90-18-05: 90-18-05 BOEING: Amendment 39-6713. Docket No. 89-NM-280-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model 767 series airplanes, line numbers 002 through 299, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required within the next 18 months after the effective date of this AD, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent structural failure of the vertical stabilizer from overpressurization in the event of a rupture of the fuselage under the dorsal fin, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tInstall a cover plate and a panel assembly over the lightening and access holes in the vertical stabilizer forward closure rib, in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767- 55A0007, dated June 22, 1989. \n\n\tB.\tAn alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be submitted directly to the Manager, Seattle ACO, and a copy sent to the cognizant FAA Principal Inspector (PI). The PI will then forward comments or concurrence to the Seattle ACO. \n\n\tC.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW, 5th Floor, Renton, Washington, or Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue SW, 2nd Floor, Renton, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6713, AD 90-18-05) becomes effective on October 9, 1990.
78-11-09: 78-11-09 SHORT BROTHERS LIMITED: Amendment 39-3217. Applies to Model SD3-30 airplanes, S/Ns 3003 through 3010, certificated in all categories. Compliance required prior to accumulating 5000 landings or within 100 landings after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, unless already accomplished. To prevent failure of the main landing gear swivel assembly, remove the swivel sub- assembly, P/N 17684-1, -3, -7, -9, or -9A, the flange collar, P/N SD3-40-0023, and associated fasteners and replace with a swivel sub-assembly, P/N 17684-13, flanged collar, P/N SD3-40- 0040xB, and new fasteners all in accordance with paragraph 2, "Accomplishment Instructions", of Short Brothers Limited Mandatory Service Bulletin SD3-32-03, Revision 3, dated March 3, 1978, or an FAA-approved equivalent, and paragraph 10, "Accomplishment Instructions" of Menasco Manufacturing Service Bulletin 32-8, Revision 1, dated January 24, 1978, or an FAA- approved equivalent. This amendmentbecomes effective June 6, 1978.
97-03-13: 97-03-13 CASA: Amendment 39-9918. Docket 96-NM-89-AD. Applicability: All Model C-212 series airplanes, certificated in any category. NOTE 1: This AD applies to each airplane identified in the preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been otherwise modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the requirements of this AD. For airplanes that have been modified, altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of this AD is affected, the owner/operator must request approval for an alternative method of compliance in accordance with paragraph (d) of this AD. The request should include an assessment of the effect of the modification, alteration, or repair on the unsafe condition addressed by this AD; and, if the unsafe condition has not been eliminated, the request should include specific proposed actions to address it. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. To prevent the settings for therudder pedals from restricting the flight crew in its ability to move the rudder to its maximum certified deflection, which could result in insufficient deflection and consequent reduction in controllability of the airplane, accomplish the following: (a) As of the effective date of this AD, prior to each flight, adjust the left and right rudder pedal setting mechanisms in accordance with CASA Flight Operation Instructions COM 212-245, Revision 1, dated November 16, 1993, until the modification required by paragraph (b) of this AD has been accomplished. (b) Within 6 months after the effective date of this AD, modify the left and right rudder pedal assemblies by installing stops and other parts, in accordance with CASA Service Bulletin SB-212-27-47, Revision 1, dated April 13, 1994. Accomplishment of this modification constitutes terminating action for the repetitive adjustments required by paragraph (a) of this AD. (c) For CASA Model C-212 series airplanes listed in CASA Service Bulletin SB-212-27-47, Revision 1, dated April 13, 1994: Within 6 months after the effective date of this AD, replace the attachment rails for the pilot and co-pilot seats in accordance with CASA Service Bulletin SB-212-27-47, Revision 1, dated April 13, 1994. (d) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113. NOTE 2: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Standardization Branch, ANM-113. (e) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. (f) The actions shall be done in accordance with CASA Flight Operation Instructions COM 212-245, Revision 1, dated November 16, 1993; and CASA Service Bulletin SB-212-27-47, Revision 1, dated April 13, 1994, which contains the following list of effective pages: Page Number Revision Level Shown on Page Date Shown on Page 1-5, 8, 14-17, 19-23, 26, 34, 35 1 April 13, 1994 6, 7, 9-13, 18, 24, 25, 27-33 Original September 14, 1993 This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. Copies may be obtained from Construcciones Aeronauticas, S.A., Getafe, Madrid, Spain. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street,NW., suite 700, Washington, DC. (g) This amendment becomes effective on March 14, 1997.
96-10-10: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Jetstream Model 4101 airplanes, that requires inspections of the handrail assembly at the main entrance door to detect loose or missing rivets, abnormal movement between the handrail pivot-tube and the spigot that attaches to the bearing assembly, and cracks on the handrail pivot-tube. It also requires repair or replacement of the assembly, if necessary, and provides for two optional terminating actions. This amendment is prompted by a report indicating that fatigue cracks and loose rivets were found on the handrail assembly of the main passenger entrance door on an in-service airplane. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent these conditions, which can lead to the failure of the door handrail assembly; such failure could allow the door to fall free and subsequently cause injury to people on the airplane or on the ground.
94-25-11: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Jetstream Model 4101 airplanes, that requires installation of additional venting between the flight deck and the passenger compartment. This amendment is prompted by results of an engineering analysis that revealed there was insufficient venting in the forward stowage and wardrobe assembly. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent injury to the crew resulting from structural failure of the bulkhead between the flight deck and the passenger compartment in the event of windshield failure and subsequent rapid decompression.
90-22-06: 90-22-06 AIRBUS INDUSTRIE: Amendment 39-6775. Docket No. 90-NM-12-AD. Applicability: All Model A300-B2, A300-B2K, and A300-B4 series airplanes, certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. To prevent reduced structural capability of the horizontal stabilizer, accomplish the following: A. Perform a visual inspection of the upper skin and spar web joining parts of the trimmable horizontal stabilizer (THS), in accordance with either the "preferred" or "alternative" method as described in Airbus Industrie Service Bulletin A300-55-0035, dated September 11, 1989, as follows: 1. For airplanes that have accumulated less than 11,000 landings, perform the initial inspection within 1,000 landings after the effective date of this AD, or prior to the accumulation of 11,400 landings, whichever occurs first. 2. For airplanes that have accumulated 11,000 or more landings, but less than 16,000 landings, perform the initial inspection within 400 landings after the effective date of this AD, or prior to the accumulation of 16,200 landings, whichever occurs first. 3. For airplanes that have accumulated 16,000 or more landings, perform the initial inspection within 200 landings after the effective date of this AD. B. If the "preferred inspection method" (THS support fitting removed), as specified in Airbus Industrie Service Bulletin A300-55-0035, dated September 11, 1989, is used to accomplish the inspection required by paragraph A. of this AD, proceed as follows: 1. If a crack indication is found in the top integral skin, accomplish the following: a. If the crack extends to the outer box top skin, repair prior to further flight in a manner approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113. Perform repetitive inspections at intervals approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113. b. If the crack does not extend to the outer box top skin, and there is no crackin the joining part, prior to further flight, accomplish either subparagraph (1) or (2), below: (1) Revise the FAA-approved Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) to impose the operational limits specified in the service bulletin for Vmo/Mmo and CCI, and install placards showing these limits in a prominent position in the cockpit until a permanent repair is made. Thereafter, repeat the inspection every 350 landings. Stop drill the ends of the crack and cold-expand the stop drill holes when the crack length is between the limits specified in the service bulletin; or (2) Repair in accordance with the service bulletin. After repair, conduct repetitive high frequency eddy current (HFEC) inspections of the visible area of the integral top skin and the reinforcing plate web finger areas at intervals not to exceed 7,500 landings. c. If the crack does not extend to the outer box top skin, and a crack is detected in the joining part, repair prior to further flight, in accordance withthe service bulletin. After repair, conduct repetitive HFEC inspections at intervals not to exceed 7,500 landings, in accordance with the service bulletin. 2. If no crack indication is found in the top integral skin, accomplish the following: a. If no crack indication is found in the joining part, repeat the inspection required by paragraph A. of this AD at intervals not to exceed 6,000 landings. b. If a crack indication is found in the joining part, repair prior to further flight, in a manner approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113. After repair, conduct repetitive HFEC inspections at intervals not to exceed 7,500 landings, in accordance with the service bulletin. C. If the "alternative inspection method" (THS support fitting installed), as specified in Airbus Industrie Service Bulletin A300-55-0035, dated September 11, 1989, is used to accomplish the inspection required by paragraph A. of this AD, proceed as follows: 1. If a crack indication is found in the top integral skin, accomplish the following: a. If the crack extends to the outer box top skin, repair prior to further flight in a manner approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113. b. If the crack does not extend to the outer box top skin, remove the THS support fitting and inspect the joining part using an HFEC inspection technique, in accordance with the service bulletin. (1) If the joining part is cracked, repair prior to further flight, in accordance with the service bulletin. After repair, conduct repetitive HFEC inspections at intervals not to exceed 7,500 landings, in accordance with the service bulletin. (2) If the joining part is not cracked, prior to further flight, accomplish either subparagraph (a) or (b), below: (a) Revise the FAA-approved Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) to impose the operational limits specified in the service bulletin for Vmo/Mmo and CCI, and install placards showing these limits in a prominent position in the cockpit until permanent repair is made. Thereafter, repeat the inspection every 350 landings. Stop drill the ends of the crack and cold-expand the stop drill holes when the crack length is between the limits specified in the service bulletin; or (b) Repair in accordance with the service bulletin. After repair, conduct repetitive HFEC inspections at intervals not to exceed 7,500 landings, in accordance with the service bulletin. 2. If no crack indication is found in the top integral skin, repeat the inspection required by paragraph A. of this AD at intervals not to exceed 1,700 flights. D. An alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. NOTE: The request should be submitted directly to the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, and a copy sent to the cognizant FAA Principal Inspector (PI). The PI will then forward comments or concurrence to the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113. E. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Airbus Industrie, Airbus Support Division, Avenue Didier Daurat, 31700 Blagnac, France. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue S.W., Renton, Washington. This amendment (39-6775, AD 90-22-06) becomes effective on November 21, 1990.
76-26-01: 76-26-01 ROLLS-ROYCE (1971) LTD: Amendment 39-2790. Applies to RB.211-22B engines. Compliance is required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent hazards of H.P. turbine disc failure from cracks in the disc bore surface, accomplish the following: (a) For engines not incorporating Rolls-Royce Service Bulletin RB.211-72-3225--with H.P. disc serial numbers CQDY 779, 794, 802, 824, 829, 840, 851, 933 and 952 installed--inspect the H.P. disc bore in accordance with Rolls-Royce Alert Service Bulletin RB.211-72-A4303 dated December 3, 1976, or an FAA-approved equivalent, as follows: (1) For engines that have accumulated in excess of 2,400 flight cycles, inspect within 10 flight cycles after the effective date of this AD. (2) For engines that have accumulated in excess of 1,000 flight cycles but less than 2,401 cycles, inspect within 80 flight cycles after the effective date of this AD. (3) For other engines, inspect within the next 250 flight cycles after the effective date of this AD. (b) For engines not incorporating Rolls-Royce Service Bulletin RB. 211-72-3225--with H.P. disc serial numbers CQDY 750 and higher, and serial numbers CQDY 577, 624 and 742 (but excluding the serial numbers listed in paragraph (a) of this AD) installed--that have accumulated in excess of 2,300 flight cycles, inspect the H.P. disc bore in accordance with Rolls-Royce Alert Service Bulletin RB.211-72-A4303 dated December 3, 1976, or an FAA-approved equivalent, within the next 100 flight cycles after the effective date of this AD. (c) For engines incorporating Rolls-Royce Service Bulletin RB.211-72-3225--with H.P. disc serial numbers CQDY 790, 791, 887, 972, 1002, 1016, 1030, 1073 and CQDY 1106 and higher installed--inspect the H.P. disc bore in accordance with Rolls-Royce Alert Service Bulletin RB.211-72-A4303 dated December 3, 1976, or an FAA-approved equivalent, as follows: (1) For engines that have accumulated in excess of 1,000flight cycles, inspect within the next 10 flight cycles after the effective date of this AD. (2) For engines that have accumulated in excess of 700 flight cycles but less than 1,001 flight cycles, inspect within the next 50 flight cycles after the effective date of this AD. (3) For engines that have accumulated in excess of 400 flight cycles but less than 701 flight cycles, inspect within the next 80 flight cycles after the effective date of this AD. (4) For all other engines inspect within the next 250 flight cycles after the effective date of this AD. (d) For engines incorporating Rolls-Royce Service Bulletin RB.211-72-3225--with serial numbers CQDY 750 and higher (except those covered in paragraph (c) of this AD) installed--that have accumulated in excess of 900 flight cycles, inspect the H.P. disc bore in accordance with Rolls-Royce Alert Service Bulletin RB.211-72-A4303 dated December 3, 1976, or an FAA-approved equivalent, within the next 100 flight cyclesafter the effective date of this AD. (e) For engines inspected under paragraphs (a) and (b) of this AD, which are found to be serviceable in accordance with the acceptance standards of Rolls-Royce Alert Service Bulletin RB.211-72-A4303 dated December 3, 1976, or an FAA approved equivalent, either - (1) Continue to inspect the H.P. disc bore in accordance with Rolls-Royce Alert Service Bulletin RB.211-72-A4303 dated December 3, 1976, or an FAA-approved equivalent, at intervals not to exceed 2,800 flight cycles; or (2) Rework the H.P. discs in accordance with Rolls-Royce Service Bulletin RB.211-72-4447 dated October 7, 1976, or an FAA-approved equivalent. (f) For engines inspected under paragraphs (c) and (d) of this AD which are found serviceable in accordance with the acceptance standards of Rolls-Royce Alert Service Bulletin RB.211-72-A4303 dated December 3, 1976, or an FAA-approved equivalent, either - (1) Continue to inspect the H.P. disc bore in accordance with Rolls-Royce Alert Service Bulletin RB.211-72-A4303 dated December 3, 1976, or an FAA-approved equivalent, at intervals not to exceed 1,500 flight cycles; or (2) Rework the H.P. discs in accordance with Rolls-Royce Service Bulletin RB.211-72-4447 dated October 7, 1976, or an FAA-approved equivalent. (g) Replace those discs found not to be serviceable during any inspection required by this AD before further flight with - (1) A serviceable FAA-approved disc that has been reworked in accordance with Rolls-Royce Service Bulletin RB.211-72-4447 dated October 7, 1976, or an FAA-approved equivalent; or (2) A serviceable FAA-approved disc that has not been reworked in accordance with Rolls-Royce Service Bulletin RB.211-72-4447 dated October 7, 1976, or an FAA-approved equivalent. If the disc installed pursuant to this subparagraph has a serial number specified in paragraph (a), (b), (c), or (d) of this AD, continue to inspect the disc at the interval specified in paragraph (e)(1) or (f)(1) of this AD, as appropriate. (h) For the purpose of this AD, the number of flight cycles equals the number of flights that involve an engine operating sequence consisting of engine starting, takeoff operation, landing and engine shutdown. This amendment becomes effective January 3, 1977.
2009-15-16: This document publishes in the Federal Register an amendment adopting airworthiness directive (AD) 2009-15-16 that was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of the McDonnell Douglas Corporation airplanes identified above by individual notices. This AD requires modifying the flight deck door. This AD is prompted by a report indicating that certain equipment of the flight deck door is defective. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of this equipment, which could jeopardize flight safety.
2010-14-01: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Model 747-100, 747-100B, 747-100B SUD, 747-200B, 747-200C, 747-200F, 747-300, 747-400, 747-400F, 747SR, and 747SP series airplanes. This AD requires reworking or replacing certain duct assemblies in the environmental control system (ECS). This AD results from reports of duct assemblies in the ECS with burned Boeing Material Specification (BMS) 8-39 polyurethane foam insulation. This proposed AD also results from a report from the airplane manufacturer that airplanes were assembled with duct assemblies in the ECS wrapped with BMS 8-39 polyurethane foam insulation, a material of which the fire retardant properties deteriorate with age. We are issuing this AD to prevent a potential electrical arc from igniting the BMS 8-39 polyurethane foam insulation on the duct assemblies of the ECS, which could propagate a small fire and lead to a larger fire that might spread throughout the airplane through the ECS.
96-15-06: 96-15-06 PRATT & WHITNEY: Amendment 39-9714. Docket 96-ANE-19. Applicability: Pratt & Whitney (PW) JT8D-200 series turbofan engines incorporating affected first stage fan hubs, Part Number (P/N) 5000501-01, identified by any of the following Serial Numbers: T50693, T50823, T50827, R32926, R32960, P66756. These engines are installed on but not limited to McDonnell Douglas MD-80 series aircraft. NOTE: This airworthiness directive (AD) applies to each engine identified in the preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the requirements of this AD. For engines that have been modified, altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of this AD is affected, the owner/operator must request approval for an alternative method of compliance in accordance with paragraph (b) of this AD. The request should include an assessment of the effect of the modification, alteration, or repair on the unsafe condition addressed by this AD; and, if the unsafe condition has not been eliminated, the request should include specific proposed actions to address it. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. To prevent the initiation and propagation of a fatigue crack, fracture of the fan hub, uncontained engine failure, and damage to the aircraft, accomplish the following: (a) Prior to further flight, remove from service all affected first stage fan hubs, P/N 5000501-01, identified by Serial Numbers listed in the applicability paragraph of this AD, and replace with serviceable parts. (b) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Engine Certification Office. The request should be forwarded through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Engine Certification Office. NOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this airworthiness directive, if any, may be obtained from the Engine Certification Office. (c) This amendment becomes effective September 3, 1996, to all persons except those persons to whom it was made immediately effective by priority letter AD 96-15-06, issued July 16, 1996, which contained the requirements of this amendment.
95-19-18: 95-19-18 TWIN COMMANDER AIRCRAFT CORPORATION: Amendment 39-9379; Docket No. 95-CE-20-AD. Applicability: The following airplane models and serial numbers, certificated in any category. Models Serial Numbers 680T and 680V 1473 through 1720 680W 1721 through 1850 681 6001 through 6072 690 11001 through 11079 690A 11100 through 11344 690B 11350 through 11566 690C 11600 through 11735 690D 15001 through 15042 695 95000 through 95084 695A 96000 through 96100 695B 96201 through 96208 NOTE 1: This AD applies to each airplane identified in the preceding applicability revision, regardless of whether it has been modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the requirements of this AD. For airplanes that have been modified, altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of this AD is affected, the owner/operator must request approval for an alternative method of compliance in accordance with paragraph (c) of this AD. The request should includean assessment of the effect of the modification, alteration, or repair on the unsafe condition addressed by this AD; and, if the unsafe condition has not been eliminated, the request should include specific proposed actions to address it. Compliance: Required within the next 50 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To prevent structural damage to the airplane caused by excessive turbulence, which could result in loss of the airplane, accomplish the following: (a) Install the placard (to the windshield centerpost) and incorporate the airplane flight manual/pilot operating handbook (AFM/POH) revisions that are included with the kits presented below. The placard and AFM/POH revisions provide warnings to the airplane operator of the importance of observing the Turbulent Air Penetration and Maneuvering speeds: Kit No. Model Affected SB220-1 680T SB220-2 680V SB220-3 680W SB220-4 681 SB220-5 690 SB220-6 690A SB220-7 690B SB220-8 690C SB220-9 690D SB220-10 695 SB220-11 695A SB220-12 695B NOTE 2: Twin Commander Service Bulletin No. 220, dated February 1, 1995, relates to the subject of this AD, and references the SB220 service kits specified above. (b) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. (c) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an equivalent level of safety may be approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 1601 Lind Avenue S.W., Renton, Washington 98055-4056. The request shall be forwarded through an appropriate FAA Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Seattle ACO. NOTE 3: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Seattle ACO. (d) All persons affected by this directive may obtain copies of the kits referenced above that include the placard and the AFM revisions upon request to the Twin Commander Aircraft Corporation, 19010 59th Drive, NE., Arlington, Washington 98223; or may examine this document at the FAA, Central Region, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, Room 1558, 601 E. 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri 64106. (e) This amendment becomes effective on October 25, 1995.
2010-12-09: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Honeywell International Inc. auxiliary power unit (APU) models GTCP36- 150(R) and GTCP36-150(RR). This AD requires inspecting the fuel control unit (FCU) differential pressure (Delta P) sleeve bore for erosion, replacing the FCU if it fails the inspection, and installing a fuel deflector on the Delta P sleeve of the FCU. This AD results from eight reports of fuel leakage from the FCU. We are issuing this AD to prevent fuel leakage in the APU compartment, which could lead to ignition of fuel vapor, creating a fire and explosion hazard resulting in injury, and damage to the APU and the airplane.
96-03-06: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Jetstream ATP airplanes, that requires inspections to detect fatigue cracking and corrosion in the gussets of the rear passenger door and rear baggage door apertures, and replacement of the gussets, if necessary. This amendment is prompted by fatigue tests which indicated that fatigue cracking and corrosion can occur in these gussets. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent degradation of the structural integrity of the fuselage pressure vessel due to the problems associated with cracking and corrosion in the gussets of the rear passenger door and rear baggage door apertures.
2010-11-11: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Model 60 airplanes. This AD requires revising the Tire-Servicing section of the airplane maintenance manual and revising the Tires Limitation section of the airplane flight manual to incorporate revised procedures for servicing tires and checking for proper tire inflation. This AD results from a report of the main landing gear tires blowing out during a takeoff roll. We are issuing this AD to prevent tire failure, which could result in failures of the braking and thrust reverser systems. In a critical phase of operation such as takeoff, loss of airplane control may result.
90-24-10: 90-24-10 BOEING OF CANADA, LTD., DE HAVILLAND DIVISION: Amendment 39- 6813. Docket No. 90-NM-14-AD. Applicability: Model DHC-7 series airplanes, Serial Numbers 1 through 10, and 12 through 27, certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. To prevent corrosion and reduced structural capability of the wings accomplish the following: A. Within 180 days after the effective date of this AD, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed one year, perform a low frequency eddy current inspection of the inboard and outboard fuel tank lower wing skins in accordance with the procedure specified in Part 6, Chapter 57-10- 01, of the de Havilland DHC-7 Nondestructive Testing (NDT) Manual, PSM 1-7-7A. B. If corrosion is found as a result of the inspections required by paragraph A. of this AD, accomplish the following. Accomplishment of these actions constitutes terminating action for the repetitive inspections of the inboard and/or outboard fuel tank area, as appropriate, required by paragraph A. of this AD. 1. If corrosion is found in the inboard fuel tank, prior to further flight, permanently remove the inboard fuel tank foam blocks, restore any corroded areas, and modify the stringers in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions, Steps 3, 4, and 5, of de Havilland Service Bulletin 7-57-33, dated July 21, 1989. 2. If corrosion is found in the outboard fuel tank, prior to further flight, permanently remove the outboard fuel tank foam blocks, restore any corroded areas, and modify the stringers in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions, Steps 3, 4, and 5, of de Havilland Service Bulletin 7-57-33, dated July 21, 1989. C. If no corrosion is found, within three years after the effective date of this AD, permanently remove the inboard fuel tank foam blocks and modify the stringers in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions, Steps 3 and 5, of de Havilland Service Bulletin 7-57-33 (), dated July 21, 1989. D. Accomplishment of the removal and modification actions specified in paragraph C. of this AD, constitutes terminating action for the repetitive inspections of the inboard fuel tank lower wing skins required by paragraph A. of this AD. E. Accomplishment of the removal and modification actions specified in the Accomplishment Instructions, Steps 3 and 5, of de Havilland Service Bulletin 7-57-33 (), dated July 21, 1989, for the outboard fuel tanks, constitutes terminating action for the repetitive inspections of the outboard fuel tank lower wing skin required by paragraph A. of this AD. F. An alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, New England Region. NOTE: The request should be submitted directly to the Manager, New York ACO, and a copy sent to the cognizant FAA Principal Inspector (PI). The PI will then forward comments or concurrence to the Manager, New York ACO. G. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Boeing of Canada, Ltd., de Havilland Division, Garratt Boulevard, Downsview, Ontario M3K 1Y5, Canada. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue S.W., Renton, Washington, or at the FAA New England Region, New York Aircraft Certification Office, 181 South Franklin Avenue, Room 202, Valley Stream, New York. This amendment (39-6813, AD 90-24-10) becomes effective on December 24, 1990.
95-26-06: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 series airplanes. This AD requires either that the control circuit breaker of the left fuel pump valve be opened and collared, or that the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) be revised to prohibit autoland operation below 100 feet above ground level (AGL). Additionally, this action requires an inspection of the fuel system control panel (FSCP) to detect any mis-wiring, and modification or replacement of the FSCP. This AD also provides for an optional terminating modification for the requirements of the AD. This amendment is prompted by a report of improper wiring of the FSCP during production of these airplanes. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent degradation of the automatic landing system during flight due to improper wiring of the FSCP.
2010-11-14: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: During ERJ 190 airplane full scale fatigue test, cracks were found in some structural components of the airplane. Analysis of these cracks resulted in modifications on the airplane Airworthiness Limitation Items (ALI), to include new inspections tasks or modification of existing ones and its respective thresholds and intervals. Failure to inspect these components according to the new tasks, thresholds and intervals could prevent a timely detection of fatigue cracks. Undetected fatigue cracks in these areas could adversely affect the structural integrity of these airplanes. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafecondition on these products.
2010-10-26: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: A specific batch of nose landing gear (NLG) and NLG door selector valves, part number (P/N) 601R75146-1 (Kaiser Fluid Technologies P/N 750006000), may have had their end caps incorrectly lock-wired and/or incorrectly torqued during assembly. This condition can lead to the end cap backing off, with consequent damage to a seal and internal leakage within the valve. Subsequently, if electrical power is transferred or removed from the aircraft before the NLG safety pin is installed, any pressure, including residual pressure, in the No. 3 hydraulic system can result in an uncommanded NLG retraction. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
76-09-10: 76-09-10 SCHEMPP HIRTH and BURKHART GROB: Amendment 39-2602. Applies to Standard Cirrus gliders, certificated in all categories, serial numbers 1 through 510, 528, and 529 for Schempp Hirth gliders and serial numbers 1G through 544G for Burkhart Grob gliders. Compliance is required within the next 100 flights after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To prevent possible jamming of the aileron control system and consequent loss of roll control, accomplish the following: (a) Install an SAE 1024 steel safety brace in the fuselage frame between the airbrake lever bearing and the left diagonal strut in accordance with Step 2 of the paragraph entitled "Instructions" of Schempp Hirth Technical Note 278-17, dated December 8, 1975, or an FAA- approved equivalent. (b) For the purpose of this AD, a flight is a sequence consisting of a takeoff operation and landing. This amendment becomes effective May 20, 1976.
2010-11-12: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD), which applies to certain Model MD-11 and MD-11F airplanes. That AD currently requires a one-time inspection to determine if metallic transitions are installed on wire harnesses of the tail tank fuel transfer pumps, and to determine if damaged wires are present; and repair, if necessary. That AD also requires repetitive inspections of the repaired area; and a permanent modification of the wire harnesses if metallic transitions are not installed, which would terminate the repetitive inspections. This new AD requires modifying the case grounding for the alternate fuel pump of the tail tank, the leak detection thermal switch grounding for the number 2 engine, and wire braid grounding in the empennage and number 2 engine inlet. This AD also removes one airplane from the applicability of the existing AD. This AD results from reports that the wire assembly for the alternate fuel pump is missing a case ground wire, and the lightning protection wire braid for wire assemblies located in the empennage and number 2 engine inlet are grounded improperly. We are issuing this AD to prevent insufficient grounding of the fuel pump, which in combination with an electrical failure within the fuel pump and a compromised electrical bond could cause a fuel tank ignition, resulting in consequent fire or explosion. \n\nDATES: This AD becomes effective July 6, 2010. \n\tThe Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of a certain publication listed in the AD as of July 6, 2010. \n\tOn January 18, 2000 (64 FR 69389, December 13, 1999), the Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain other publications listed in the AD.
96-07-12: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. (BHTI) Model 214ST helicopters with certain tailboom assemblies and a certain emergency float kit installed, that requires initial and repetitive inspections of the tailboom for cracks until modifications of the tailboom are accomplished. This amendment is prompted by several reports of cracks in the lower aft skin of the tailboom assembly. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent cracks in the tailboom assembly, which could result in structural failure of the tailboom and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
94-01-15: 94-01-15 BOEING: Amendment 39-8797. Docket 93-NM-138-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model 747 series airplanes with a stretched upper deck, all line numbers up to and including line number 980; certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. \n\n\tTo prevent the bulb seal from coming off the fascia panels and being ingested into the turbofans of the escape systems on the stretched upper deck (SUD), which could impede the inflation of the escape slide during an emergency situation, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tWithin 6 months after the effective date of this AD, install an aluminum seal retainer on the bulb seal attached to the fascia panel of the escape systems on the SUD, in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-25A3056, dated July 12, 1993. \n\n\t(b)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO). Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Seattle ACO. \n\n\tNOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Seattle ACO. \n\n\t(c)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. \n\n\t(d)\tThe installation shall be done in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-25A3056, dated July 12, 1993. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC. \n\n\t(e)\tThis amendment becomes effective on March 3, 1994.
2010-10-09: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Turbomeca Arriel 1B, 1D, 1D1, and 1S1 turboshaft engines. That AD requires initial and repetitive relative position checks of the gas generator 2nd stage turbine blades on Turbomeca Arriel 1B (that incorporate Turbomeca Modification (mod) TU 148), Arriel 1D, 1D1, and 1S1 turboshaft engines that do not incorporate mod TU 347. That AD also requires initial and repetitive replacements of 2nd stage turbines on Arriel 1B, 1D, and 1D1 engines. This AD requires lowering the initial and repetitive thresholds for replacement of 2nd stage turbines on Arriel 1B, 1D, and 1D1 engines. This AD results from reports of new cases of failures of 2nd stage turbine blades since we issued AD 2008-07-01. We are issuing this AD to prevent the failure of 2nd stage turbine blades, which could result in an uncommanded in- flight engine shutdown, and a subsequent forced autorotation landing or accident.