Results
2018-14-06: We are superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) (AD) 2017-07- 10 for certain American Champion Aircraft Corp. (ACAC) Model 8KCAB airplanes. AD 2017-07-10 required fabrication and installation of a placard to prohibit aerobatic flight, inspection of the aileron hinge rib and support, and a reporting requirement of the inspection results to the FAA. This AD requires repetitive inspections of the aileron hinge support, installation of the aileron hinge support reinforcement kit, and incorporation of revised pages into the service manual. This AD was prompted by a report of a cracked hinge support and cracked hinge ribs, which resulted in partial loss of control with the aileron binding against the cove. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
95-19-04 R1 RES: This amendment rescinds an existing Airworthiness Directive (AD), applicable to certain Learjet Model 35, 35A, 36, 36A, 55, 55B, and 55C airplanes. That AD currently requires installation of a placard on the instrument panel in the cockpit to advise the flightcrew that the Omega navigation system may be inoperative at certain engine speeds. That AD also provides for an optional installation of certain band reject filters, which eliminates the need for the placard. The requirements of that AD were intended to prevent excessive deviation from the intended flight path due to loss of navigation signals, which could result in a potentially low-fuel condition or a traffic conflict. Since the issuance of that AD, use of the Omega navigation system has been permanently discontinued; therefore, the original unsafe condition no longer exists.
68-21-06: 68-21-06 SIKORSKY: Amendment 39-671. Applies to S-61A, S-61L, S-61N Type Helicopters. (a) Within the next ten hours time in service after the effective date of this Airworthiness Directive unless already accomplished, deactivate the automatic flight control system (AFCS) by disconnecting the power sources to the AFCS system and the channel monitor panel as follows: (1) Pull circuit breakers for electric power to the channel monitor panel and the AFCS system and safety the circuitbreaker buttons in the tripped position. (2) Disconnect electrical connectors at the aux. servos and secure to wire bundle. Electrically ground all three pins on each plug on the aux. servos. (b) For Models S-61L and S-61N, the AFCS may be reactivated when Sikorsky Service Bulletin No. 61B55-10A, dated October 4, 1968, or later FAA approved revision, or equivalent alteration approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Eastern Region. (c) For Model S-61A, the AFCS maybe reactivated when an alteration approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Eastern Region is incorporated. This amendment is effective October 24, 1968, and supersedes the telegram dated September 17, 1968 on this subject.
2020-26-14: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 75-16-20, which applied to all Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd., Model MU-2B, MU-2B-10, MU-2B-15, MU-2B-20, MU-2B-25, MU-2B-26, MU-2B-30, MU-2B-35, and MU-2B-36 airplanes. AD 75-16-20 required repetitive inspections of the propeller pitch control (PPC) lever for security and proper rigging. This AD requires \n\n((Page 85507)) \n\nmodification and repetitive inspections of the PPC lever linkage. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2006-13-13: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Boeing Model 737 airplanes. This AD requires revising the airplane flight manual to advise the flightcrew of improved procedures for pre- flight setup of the cabin pressurization system, as well as improved procedures for interpreting and responding to the cabin altitude/ configuration warning horn. This AD results from reports that airplanes have failed to pressurize, and that the flightcrews failed to react properly to the cabin altitude warning horn. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of the airplane to pressurize and subsequent failure of the flightcrew to recognize and react to a valid cabin altitude warning horn, which could result in incapacitation of the flightcrew due to hypoxia (lack of oxygen in body) and consequent loss of airplane control.
2006-13-15: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Mitsubishi Heavy Industries MU-2B series airplanes. This AD requires you to do the following: Remove and visually inspect the wing attach barrel nuts, bolts, and retainers for cracks, corrosion, and fractures; replace any cracked, corroded, or fractured parts; inspect reusable wing attach barrel nuts and bolts for deformation and irregularities in the threads; check the minimum breakaway torque of reused wing attach barrel nuts; replace any deformed or irregular parts; and install new or reusable parts and torque to the correct value. This AD results from a recent safety evaluation that used a data-driven approach to evaluate the design, operation, and maintenance of the MU-2B series airplanes in order to determine their safety and define what steps, if any, are necessary for their safe operation. Part of that evaluation was the identification of unsafe conditions that exist or could develop on the affected type designairplanes. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct cracks, corrosion, fractures, and incorrect torque values in the wing attach barrel nuts, which could result in failure of the wing barrel nuts and/or associated wing attachment hardware. This failure could lead to in-flight separation of the outer wing from the center wing section and result in loss of controlled flight.
2018-14-08: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 777-200LR series airplanes. This AD requires revising certain documents to provide revised operating limitations. For certain airplanes, modification of the water and fuel scavenge systems in the fuel tanks, electrical changes in the main equipment center, and installation of new electrical load management system (ELMS2) software is an acceptable alternative to the documents revision. This AD was prompted by reports of unreliable performance of the water and fuel scavenge systems. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2006-13-16: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 727 airplanes. This AD requires repetitive measurements of the freeplay of the left and right outboard aileron balance tabs and of the upper and lower rudder tabs, and related investigative/corrective actions if necessary. This AD also requires repetitive lubrication of the hinge bearings and rod end bearings of the outboard aileron balance tabs. This AD results from reports of freeplay-induced vibration of the outboard aileron balance tabs and rudder tabs. We are issuing this AD to prevent excessive vibration of the airframe during flight, which could result in divergent flutter and loss of control of the airplane.
69-22-01: 69-22-01 BRITISH AIRCRAFT CORPORATION: Amdt. 39-863. Applies to BAC 1-11 200 and 400 Series Airplanes. Compliance required as indicated unless already accomplished. To prevent a malfunction of the ventral stairway door, accomplish the following: (a) Inspect ventral stairway starboard hinge bolt (M.M. 52-10) for signs of looseness or insecurity within the next 100 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD unless already accomplished within the last 550 hours' time in service and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 650 hours from the last inspection. (b) If during the inspection required by paragraph (a), the starboard hinge bolt (M.M. 52-10) is found to be insecure or to have rotated loose, secure the hinge bolt before further flight in accordance with BAC 1-11 Alert Service Bulletin 52-A-PM 3701, dated March 24, 1969, or later ARB-approved issue, or FAA-approved equivalent. (c) The repetitive inspection required by paragraph (a) may be discontinued after the hinge bolt has been secured in accordance with paragraph (b). This amendment becomes effective November 17, 1969.
2020-26-09: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all The Boeing Company Model 737-100, -200, -200C, -300, -400, and -500 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report of cracks found in fastener holes at a certain station of the center wing box. This AD requires repetitive external surface high frequency eddy current (HFEC) inspections and repetitive external surface ultrasonic inspections; or repetitive internal detailed inspections; of a certain station of the center wing box for any cracking, and repair if necessary. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2020-25-06: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Bombardier, Inc., Model BD-100-1A10 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report that corrosion was found on the shock strut cylinders during unscheduled maintenance of the nose landing gear (NLG). This AD requires a modification of the NLG shock strut cylinder. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
70-10-01: 70-10-01 BEECH: Amdt. 39-986 as amended by Amendment 39-1222. Applies to all 99 Series Airplanes (Serial Numbers U-1 through U-114). Compliance: Required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent a fire hazard, accomplish the following: Within the next 50 hours' time in service after the effective date of the AD, modify the printed circuit boards in the edge lighted instrument panels in accordance with either Beechcraft Service Instruction No. 0203-351 or any other method approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Federal Aviation Administration, Central Region. Amendment 39-986 became effective May 12, 1970. This Amendment 39-1222 becomes effective June 3, 1971.
2006-13-14: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the specified Bell Helicopter Textron Canada (BHTC) model helicopters. This action requires initial and repetitive inspections of each tail rotor counterweight bellcrank (bellcrank) with a specified part number and serial number. If external damage, a crack, roughness, or looseness between the bearing set and bellcrank is found or if bearing set axial play exceeds 0.015 inch, this action requires replacing the bellcrank with an airworthy bellcrank with two prefix letters in the serial number. This amendment is prompted by reports of failure and subsequent loss of a weighted portion of the bellcrank and reports of certain replacement bellcranks having design flaws. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent bellcrank failure, loss of a weighted portion of the bellcrank, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
2000-06-05: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) applicable to Eurocopter France Model SA330F, SA330G, SA330J, AS332C, AS332L, AS332L1, and AS332L2 helicopters. This action requires replacing certain tail rotor blades before further flight after April 30, 2000. This amendment is prompted by loss of control of a helicopter due to a lightning strike on a tail rotor blade. This condition, if not corrected, could result in loss of a tail rotor blade and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter
2009-18-06: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: During operation in icing conditions, an asymmetric configuration of the de-icing boots was detected, occurring during the inflation and deflation check of the de-icing system. This was found to be due to an unexpected failure mode in the pneumatic and de-icing system's control electronic logic. This condition, if not corrected, could affect the de-icing capabilities of the boots installed on the wing and horizontal stabilizers, potentially leading to loss of control of the aircraft. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
72-21-05: 72-21-05 CANADAIR: Amendment 39-1536. Applies to all Canadair CL-44 type aircraft certificated in all categories. Compliance required as indicated. Within the next 100 hours in service after the effective date of this Airworthiness Directive, unless already accomplished within the last 1900 hours in service and at intervals not exceeding 2000 hours in service from the last inspection accomplish the following: 1. Inspect the horizontal stabilizer rear spar to fuselage attachment fittings, P/N 44A45022A and B, for cracks in accordance with Paragraph 3.4 of Canadair Service Information Circular No. 379-CL44, dated 7 July 1971, or equivalent inspection approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Eastern Region. 2. Replace cracked parts before further flight with parts of the same part number or FAA-approved equivalent parts approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Eastern Region, except that the airplane may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a base where the repair can be performed. Upon request, with substantiating data submitted through an FAA maintenance inspector, the replacement intervals specified herein may be adjusted by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Eastern Region. This amendment is effective October 17, 1972.
2006-13-10: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) that supersedes AD 92-07-05, which applies to certain Raytheon Aircraft Company (Raytheon) (formerly Beech) 65, 90, 99, and 100 series airplanes. AD 92-07-05 currently requires you to inspect the rudder trim tab for proper moisture drainage provisions, and if the correct drainage provisions do not exist, before further flight, modify the rudder trim tab. This AD results from receiving and evaluating new service information that requires the actions of AD 92-07-05 for the added serial numbers LJ-1281 through LJ-1732 for the Model C90A airplanes. This AD retains all the actions of AD 92-07-05 and adds serial numbers LJ-1281 through LJ-1732 for the Model C90A airplanes in the applicability section. We are issuing this AD to prevent water accumulation in the rudder trim tab, which could result in a change in the mass properties and possibly a lower flutter speed of the airplane. A lower airplane flutter speed could result in failure and loss of control of the airplane.
2006-13-08: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus Model A330-200, A330-300, A340-200, and A340-300 series airplanes; and Model A340-541 and A340-642 airplanes. This AD requires an inspection for anti-fretting material contamination of the Halon filters and plumbing parts of the flow metering system (FMS) and flow metering compact unit (FMCU) in the lower deck cargo compartment (LDCC) and bulk crew rest compartment (BCRC), as applicable; other specified actions; and corrective actions if necessary. This AD results from a report that the FMS and FMCU of the fire extinguishing system may be blocked by anti-fretting material contamination. We are issuing this AD to prevent such anti-fretting material contamination, which could reduce the effectiveness of the fire extinguisher system to discharge fire extinguishing agents and to lower the concentration of Halon gas in the LDCC or BCRC in a timely manner. An ineffective fire extinguisher system in the event of afire could result in an uncontrollable fire in the LDCC or BCRC.
2018-14-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Bombardier, Inc., Model CL-600-2C10 (Regional Jet Series 700, 701, & 702) airplanes; Model CL-600-2D15 (Regional Jet Series 705) airplanes; Model CL-600-2D24 (Regional Jet Series 900) airplanes; and Model CL- 600-2E25 (Regional Jet Series 1000) airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports indicating that corrosion was found on the main landing gear (MLG) retraction actuator brackets and their associated pins. This AD requires an inspection of the retraction actuator brackets, their associated pins and hardware, and the mating lugs on the MLG outer cylinder for any corrosion, and replacement if necessary. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
65-05-01: 65-05-01 AERO PRODUCTS: Amdt. 39-42 Part 39 Federal Register March 4, 1965. Applies to Model A6441FN-606 Propeller Blades with Serial Numbers 3999 or below. Compliance required as indicated. To detect propeller blade cracks and prevent blade failure, accomplish the following: (a) When propeller roughness is reported, aircraft shall not be flown, except for evaluation flight to determine cause of propeller roughness, until cause of roughness is corrected. Only essential persons shall be carried during an evaluation flight. (b) Except as provided in (c), inspect by X-ray the cuff area of blades in accordance with Aero Products Propeller Service Bulletin No. 82 dated October 15, 1959, or later FAA- approved revisions at the following times unless already accomplished: (1) X-ray blades which had 10,000 or more hours' time in service on January 6, 1965, within 120 hours' time in service after January 6, 1965. (2) X-ray blades which had 8,000 or more butless than 10,000 hours' time in service on January 6, 1965, within 180 hours' time in service after January 6, 1965. (3) X-ray blades which had less than 8,000 hours' time in service on January 6, 1965, prior to the accumulation of 8,180 hours' time in service. (c) The following blades are not required to be initially X-rayed as required by (b) - (1) Blades shipped from Allison or after December 23, 1964; (2) Blades which had 10,000 or more hours' time in service on January 6, 1965, that have been magnafluxed externally and internally in the A and B thrust member cavity by any overhaul facility within the last 250 hours' time in service before January 6, 1965; (3) Blades which had less than 10,000 hours' time in service on January 6, 1965, that have been magnafluxed externally and internally in the A and B thrust, member cavity by any overhaul facility within the last 750 hours' time in service before January 6, 1965; or (4) Blades which have been modified in accordance with (e). The repetitive inspections required by (d) for blades 0.150 inch thickness or greater must be accomplished until modified in accordance with (e)(3). (d) Repeat the X-ray inspection required by (b) for blades with thrust member minimum thickness in the "A" area at last overhaul of 0.150 inch or greater thickness at the following times until modified in accordance with (e): (1) X-ray blades which had 10,000 or more hours' time in service on January 6, 1965, at intervals not to exceed 250 hours' time in service. (2) X-ray blades which had 8,000 or more but less than 10,000 hours' time in service on January 6, 1965, at intervals not to exceed 750 hours' time in service until the blade has accumulated 10,000 hours' time in service. Thereafter, X-ray at intervals not to exceed 250 hours' time in service. (3) X-ray blades which had less than 8,000 hours' time in services on January 6, 1965, at intervals not to exceed 750 hours' time inservice. (e) Modify the cuff of blades to provide an inspection window in accordance with Allison Commercial Service Letter No. 167, dated February 12, 1965, or later FAA-approved revisions at the following times based on thrust member thickness in the "A" area at last overhaul unless already accomplished: (1) Modify blades 0.144 inch thickness or less within 100 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD. (2) Modify blades 0.145 inch to 0.149 inch thickness within 250 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD. (3) Modify blades 0.150 inch thickness or greater within 500 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD. (f) Visually inspect the blade shank surface within the cuff window for cracks in accordance with Allison Commercial Service Letter No. 167 or later FAA-approved revisions at the time modification required by (e) is made, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 25 hours' time in service. (g) Remove cracked blades from service and report immediately by telephone or telegram to the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Central Region, Kansas City, Missouri. (h) Remove blades from service according to the following schedule based on thrust member minimum thickness in the "A" area at last overhaul: (1) Remove from service blades 0.144 inch thickness or less which had 10,000 or more hours' time in service on February 17, 1965; within 50 hours' time in service after February 17, 1965. (2) Remove from service blades 0.144 inch thickness or less which had less than 10,000 hours' time in service on February 17, 1965, prior to the accumulation of 10,050 hours' time in service. (3) Remove from service blades 0.145 inch to 0.149 inch thickness which had 12,000 or more hours' time in service on February 17, 1965, within 50 hours' time in service after February 17, 1965. (4) Remove from service blades 0.145 inch to 0.149 inch thickness which had less than 12,000 hours' time in service on February 17, 1965, prior to the accumulation of 12,050 hours' time in service. (i) Upon the request of the operator, an FAA maintenance inspector, subject to the prior approval of the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Central Region, may adjust the repetitive intervals specified in this AD to permit compliance at an established inspection period of the operator if the request contains substantiating data to justify the increase for such operator. NOTE. - "A" area is identified in Allison-Aero-products Overhaul Manual, Section 63-6- 0, Pages 315 and 316. This supersedes AD 65-01-01. This directive effective March 4, 1965.
51-21-02: 51-21-02 PIPER: Applies to All Model PA-12 Airplanes. Compliance required not later than October 15, 1951, and each 100 hours of operation thereafter unless reinforcements are installed. Carefully inspect aileron hinge brackets to false spar attachment fittings, P/N N10931, (3 per wing), for cracks at the bend between the channel and flat portions of the fittings. If cracked fittings are found, add reinforcement bracket P/N 12047. With reinforcement brackets P/N 12047 installed, special inspections may be discontinued. (Piper Service Bulletin No. 107, dated September 24, 1948, covers this same subject.)
68-17-03R1: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) to revise AD 68-17-03, which applies to all Pilatus Aircraft Ltd. (Pilatus) PC-6 series airplanes. AD 68-17-03 requires you to repetitively inspect the rudder end rib for cracks and replace the rudder end rib with a modified rudder end rib when you find cracks. Installing the modified rudder end rib terminates the repetitive inspection requirements of AD 68-17-03. Under a licensing agreement with Pilatus, Fairchild Republic Company (also identified as Fairchild Industries, Fairchild Heli Porter, or Fairchild-Hiller Corporation) produced Model PC-6 series airplanes (manufacturer serial numbers 2001 through 2092) in the United States. AD 68-17-03 was intended to apply to all affected serial numbers of Model PC-6 series airplanes listed on Type Certificate Data Sheet (TCDS) No. 7A15, including the Fairchild-produced airplanes. Consequently, this AD clarifies that all models of the PC-6 airplane on TCDS No. 7A15 (including those models produced under the licensing agreement by Fairchild Republic Company) are included in the applicability. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct cracks in the rudder end rib, which could result in failure of the rudder end rib. This failure could result in loss of rudder control.
2006-13-02: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain EMBRAER Model ERJ 170 airplanes. This AD requires inspecting for excess sealant applied to the attachment bolts of the negative pressure relief valve, and performing corrective actions if necessary. This AD results from reports that excess sealant was applied to the attachment bolts of the negative pressure relief valve, which interfered with the valve's movable diaphragm. We are issuing this AD to prevent incorrect operation of the negative pressure relief valve, which could result in negative pressures that exceed the structural strength limits of the airframe and lead to reduced structural integrity of the airplane.
2018-13-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain International Aero Engines (IAE) PW1133G-JM, PW1133GA-JM, PW1130G-JM, PW1127G-JM, PW1127GA-JM, PW1127G1-JM, PW1124G-JM, PW1124G1-JM, and PW1122G-JM turbofan engines. This AD requires a one-time visual inspection of the engine fan hub for damage, and removal of parts if damage or defects are found that are outside the serviceable limits. This AD was prompted by reports of damage to the engine fan hub. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
57-15-02: 57-15-02 CURTISS-WRIGHT: Applies to all Model C-46 Series aircraft. Compliance required as indicated. Due to repeated service failures of H-3-38-M1 wheel assemblies (Hayes and/or Goodrich Model No. 1900M), the following action is required: 1. At each 100 to 125 hours, conduct a visual inspection of the demountable flange in the area of the lightening holes with the aid of a flashlight or equivalent. If cracks are detected, the flange must be either retired or reworked in accordance with paragraphs 3.5.2.2.1 and 3.5.2.2.2 of Goodrich Manual No. 14932. 2. Unless already inspected within the period specified herein, all H-3-38-M1 wheel assemblies (used or unused) must be disassembled and inspected prior to installation and thereafter at each 85th landing or regular periodic inspection period nearest to 330 hours, whichever occurs first. (a) Visually inspect the lock ring groove area for corrosion. All corrosion in this area must be removed by hand working with No. 300 sandpaper or equivalent, remachining or grinding away of metal is not permitted. Corrosion in the lock ring groove area of the wheelbase can be removed only to a depth of 0.015 inch from the original surface of the groove. Should corrosion and pitting be in excess of this dimension, the wheelbase must be retired from service. The nominal lock ring groove diameter in the wheel is 17.250 inches. After corrosion cleanup this diameter should not be less than 17.220 inches. The O.D. of the wheelbase in the lock ring groove area and the bottom of the lock ring groove should be concentric within 0.015 inch. The lock ring groove should be retreated to prevent corrosion at every wheel disassembly per treatment specified in B.F. Goodrich Service Letter No. 1022 or equivalent. Note: The original rim lock ring, P/N G85-30, was of tubular steel construction and cadmium plated for rust prevention. This lock ring causes an electrolitic reaction between the magnesium and steel when exposed to moisture and is therefore conducive to corrosion. These lock rings have been superseded by a new solid aluminum type of the same part number. (b) Inspect the following critical areas for cracks using Zyglo, dye penetrant or equivalent method. All paint must be removed using a stripping agent of the waxless solvent type that does not react chemically with magnesium. (1) Brake drum mounting register, (2) tire bead radius of the fixed flange, (3) tire bead seat radius of the demountable flange, (4) radius of the demountable flange step, (5) flange retaining ring groove in the wheel, and (6) rim lock ring. All parts with cracks in any of the critical areas must be retired from service. Rim lock rings P/N G85-30 with cracks must be replaced with the solid aluminum part or equivalent. 3. The following should be accomplished at the first disassembly of wheel unless already accomplished: (a) The lock ring groove area should be steam cleaned with high pressure steam to insure that this area had not been previously reworked and refinished by filling corroded areas with metal putty. Corroded areas may only be reworked in accordance with item 2(a) above. (b) Rework all demountable flanges by removing the sharp edges of the lightening holes in accordance with Goodrich Service Letter No. 1022. This supersedes AD 56-17-1.