Results
2021-20-09: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2021-03- 03, which applied to certain ATR-GIE Avions de Transport R[eacute]gional Model ATR72 airplanes. AD 2021-03-03 required revising the existing maintenance or inspection program, as applicable, to incorporate new or more restrictive airworthiness limitations. Since the FAA issued AD 2021-03-03, the FAA has determined that new or more restrictive airworthiness limitations are necessary. This AD requires revising the existing maintenance or inspection program, as applicable, to incorporate new or more restrictive airworthiness limitations, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2021-22-04: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2019-21- 10, which applied to all Airbus SAS Model A321-111, -112, -131, -211, - 212, -213, -231, and -232 airplanes. AD 2019-21-10 required a one-time eddy current conductivity measurement of certain structural parts of the outer flaps to determine if the incorrect alloy was used, and replacement if necessary. This AD continues to require a one-time eddy current conductivity measurement of certain structural parts of the outer flaps to determine if the incorrect alloy was used, and replacement if necessary; and also requires a new one-time eddy current conductivity measurement of certain other structural parts of the outer flaps to determine if the parts were properly heat treated, and replacement if necessary; and includes additional affected airplanes; as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. This AD was prompted by a quality control review, which determined that the wrong aluminum alloy was used to manufacture several structural parts and by the issuance of an updated list of suspected parts, including those that may have been improperly heat treated. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
96-11-14: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain Saab Model SAAB 2000 series airplanes. This action requires inspections to detect cracking of the lower rib of the rudder, and repair, if necessary. This action also provides for an optional terminating action, which, if accomplished, terminates the repetitive inspection requirement. This amendment is prompted by reports of fatigue cracking of the lower rib of the rudder. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent such fatigue cracking and subsequent failure of the primary structure of the rudder, which could result in reduced controllability of the airplane.
2012-06-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Bombardier, Inc. Model BD-100-1A10 (Challenger 300) airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports that the horizontal stabilizer trim actuator (HSTA) no-back and the number 1 motor brake assembly (MBA) can both fail dormant. This AD requires revising the airplane maintenance schedule to include new functional tests of the HSTA no-back and HSTA brake system. We are issuing this AD to prevent dormant failure of the HSTA no-back and the number 1 MBA, which along with additional component failure could result in an uncontrollable horizontal stabilizer surface runaway without the ability to retrim, and consequent loss of the airplane.
56-14-02: 56-14-02 DOUGLAS: Applies to All DC3 Series Aircraft Operated at Weights in Excess of 25,200 Pounds. \n\n\tCompliance required as indicated. \n\n\tIt has come to our attention that there are numerous instances wherein DC3 Series Aircraft have been approved for operation at landing and takeoff weights in excess of 25,200 pounds, in accordance with pertinent notes of Aircraft Specifications A-618 or A-669, that have main landing gear axle assemblies installed which are structurally unsatisfactory for the higher weights. The two axle assemblies involved are DACO P/N 5007396, and P/N 5007162 with P/N 5007390 torque collar. \n\n\tTherefore, all DC3 Series Aircraft in which either of these assemblies is installed must be operated at weights not to exceed 25,200 pounds for landing or takeoff (25,346 lbs. if deicers are installed) until satisfactory axle assemblies are installed. Note 9 of DC3 Aircraft Specification A-618 and Note 10 of DC3A Aircraft Specification A-669 contain a list of axle assemblies and the maximum weights for which each is structurally satisfactory.
2021-22-06: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 747-400F series airplanes. This AD was prompted by the determination that more restrictive tasks and limitations are necessary. This AD requires revising the existing maintenance or inspection program, as applicable, to incorporate more restrictive tasks and limitations, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
73-15-01: 73-15-01 SIKORSKY AIRCRAFT: Amdt. 39-1686. Applies to all S-61A, S-61D, S- 61E, S-61V and S-61L Helicopters certificated in all categories. Compliance required as indicated. To prevent fatigue failures of the rear fuselage and pylon hinge fitting assemblies, accomplish the following: (a) For aft fuselage upper and lower hinge fitting assemblies S6120-65118-3, S6120-65118-4, S6120-65118-34, S6120-65121-0, S6120-75702-1 and S6120-75702-2: (1) Within the next 15 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, inspect the hinge fittings in accordance with Section 2A of Sikorsky Service Bulletin No. 61B20-6A dated June 18, 1973 or later approved revisions or an equivalent method approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Federal Aviation Administration, New England Region; (2) Thereafter, on a daily basis inspect the hinge fitting assemblies in accordance with Section 2C of said Bulletin or later approved revisions or an equivalent method approved as above; and (3) At each 150 hours time in service after the initial inspection described in (a)(1) or approved equivalent period inspection, inspect the hinge fitting assemblies in accordance with Section 2G or said bulletin or later approved revisions or an equivalent method approved as above. (b) For aft fuselage upper and lower hinge fitting assemblies and upper and lower pylon hinge fitting assemblies S6120-65118-3, S6120-65118-4, S6120-65118-34, S6120-65121- 0, S6120-75702-1, S6120-75702-2, S6120-66117-0, S6120-66117-2, S6120-66120-0, S6120- 66120-2; (1) Within the next 15 days after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, inspect the aft fuselage hinge fitting lugs and the pylon hinge fitting lugs in accordance with Section 2B of Sikorsky Service Bulletin No. 61B20-6A dated June 18, 1973 or later approved revisions or an equivalent inspection method approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch,Federal Aviation Administration, New England Region. (2) Thereafter, at intervals not to exceed 50 hours time in service from the last inspection, inspect the aft fuselage hinge fitting lugs and the pylon hinge fitting lugs in accordance with Section 2D of said Bulletin, or later approved revisions, or an equivalent inspection method approved as above; and (3) At each 150 hours time in service after the initial inspection described in (b) (1) or approved equivalent period inspection, inspect the aft fuselage hinge fitting lugs and the pylon hinge fitting lugs in accordance with Section 2F of said Bulletin, or later approved revisions or an equivalent inspection method as approved above. (c) If a crack is found, remove and replace the hinge fitting prior to further flight. (d) These inspections are not required on the steel upper hinge fitting assemblies or on any hinge fitting assemblies in the T73 condition. (This supersedes AD 71-11-7) This amendment becomes effective July 27, 1973.
2012-02-13: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Eurocopter France EC130B4 helicopters that have not had Eurocopter Modification 073880 incorporated. This AD is prompted by several reports of cracks in the tailboom/Fenestron junction frame, which could result in structural failure of the tail boom, resulting in detachment of the Fenestron (tail rotor) and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter. We are issuing this AD to correct the unsafe condition on these helicopters.
84-20-04: 84-20-04 BRITISH AEROSPACE, INC.: Amendment 39-4924. Applies to Model DH-114 Heron series 2A, 2DA, and 2X airplanes certificated in all categories. Compliance is required as indicated. To prevent fatigue failure of the tailplane upper pick-up eyebolts, accomplish the following within 90 days after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished: A. Remove the eyebolts, modify the eyebolt holes, and install new eyebolts in accordance with paragraphs 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3, respectively, of British Aerospace Aircraft Group Technical News Sheet No. F.21, Issue 1, dated January 8, 1979. B. Alternate means of compliance which provide an equivalent level of safety maybe used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. C. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of inspections and/or modifications required by this AD.This amendment becomes effective November 5, 1984.
2012-07-03: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for all 328 Support Services GmbH (Type Certificate previously held by AvCraft Aerospace GmbH; Fairchild Dornier GmbH; Dornier Luftfahrt GmbH) Model 328-100 and -300 airplanes. That AD currently requires performing a detailed visual inspection of the cockpit door locking device and the surrounding area for proper installation, and corrective action if necessary. This new AD requires removing or replacing the locking device of the cockpit door; performing operational tests, and repair if necessary; and, for certain airplanes, installing gap filler parts. This AD was prompted by a report that a right-hand power lever jammed in flight-idle position during the landing roll-out, and the airplane was stopped by excessive braking. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct interference with the engine and flight control cables, which could result in reduced controllability of the airplane.