Results
2011-07-08: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Two A340-300 aeroplanes experienced one single door opening of engine number (n[deg]) 3 Thrust Reverser (TR) pivoting door during climb. These events were the result of a primary lock malfunction and incorrect engagement of the secondary lock. * * * * * Deployment of one TR door in flight, particularly during the take-off or go around, could result in heavy buffet at low speed, or could significantly reduce take off performance [and increase pilot workload during takeoff or go around], which would constitute an unsafe condition. * * * * * This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
2006-24-10: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Air Tractor, Inc. Models AT-501, AT-502, AT-502A, AT-502B, and AT-503A airplanes, which supersedes AD 2002-26-05 and AD 2002-11-05 R1. Since we issued AD 2002-26-05 and AD 2002- 11-05 R1, we determined that additional airplanes should be added to the applicability section and determined the safe life for new production airplanes and replacement spar caps should be extended. We also developed an alternative method of compliance (AMOC) to the requirements of this AD. This AD retains the actions required in AD 2002-26-05 and AD 2002-11-05 R1, adds additional airplanes to the Applicability section, extends the safe life for new production airplanes and replacement spar caps, and incorporates an AMOC. We are issuing this AD to prevent fatigue cracks from occurring in the wing lower spar cap before the established safe life is reached. Fatigue cracks in the wing lower spar cap could result in failure of the spar cap andlead to wing separation.
70-02-08: 70-02-08 BRITISH AIRCRAFT CORP.: Amdt. 39-918. Applies to Viscount Models 744, 745D, and 810 series airplanes which have fuselage leading edge frame structure reinforcing plates, P/N 70152-2787/8 or P/N 70152-3311/12 installed. Compliance is required as indicated unless already accomplished. To prevent failure of the fuselage leading edge frame structure, accomplish the following: (a) For airplanes which have reinforcing plates P/N 70152-2787/8 installed, visually inspect the reinforcing plates for cracks within the next 500 landings after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the last 500 landings, or within 1,000 landings after the reinforcing plates were installed, whichever occurs later, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 1,000 landings since the last inspection. If cracks are found, comply with paragraph (c) of this AD within the next 500 landings. (b) For airplanes which have reinforcing plates, P/N 70152-3311/12 installed,visually inspect the reinforcing plates within the next 1,500 landings after the effective date of this AD unless already accomplished within the last 1,500 landings or within 3,000 landings after the reinforcing plates were installed, whichever occurs later, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 3,000 landings since the last inspection. If cracks are found, comply with paragraph (c) of this AD within the next 500 landings. (c) If cracks are found during the inspection required by paragraphs (a) and (b) of this AD, replace the cracked reinforcing plates with new plates P/N 70152-3311/12 by the incorporation of Modification D.3072 Part (d) (for Models 744 and 745D series airplanes) or Modification FG.1928 Part (d) (for Model 810 series airplanes), or FAA-approved equivalents. (d) Upon request by the operator, an FAA maintenance inspector, subject to prior approval of the Chief, Aircraft Certification Staff, FAA Europe, Africa, and Middle East Region, may adjust the repetitive inspection intervals specified in this AD to permit compliance at an established inspection period of the operator if the request contains substantiating data to justify the increase for the operator. (e) For the purpose of complying with this AD, subject to the acceptance by the assigned FAA maintenance inspector, the number of landing may be determined by dividing each airplane's hours' time in service by the operator's fleet average time from takeoff to landing for the type aircraft. (British Aircraft Corp., Ltd., Preliminary Technical Leaflets No. 242, Issue 4 (Model 744 and 745D airplanes) and No. 106, Issue 4 (Model 810 series airplanes) cover this subject and present an approved accessibility scheme to facilitate the inspections required by paragraphs (a) an (b)). This amendment becomes effective February 8, 1970.
73-21-02: 73-21-02 BEECH: Amdt. 39-1733. Applies to Models 95-C55, 95-C55A, D55, D55A, E55 and E55A (Serial Numbers TE-1 through TE-874, TE-877 through TE-879, TE-881 and TE- 883 through TE-885); Models 58 and 58A (Serial Numbers TH-1 through TH-269 and TH-272) airplanes, irregardless of time in service. Compliance: Required as indicated unless already accomplished. To preclude failure or leakage of the flexible hose assemblies between the firewall and engine fuel injection system pump which could release fuel within the engine compartment or adversely affect engine operation, accomplish the following: A) Within 50 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, on those airplanes which have the Stratoflex P/N 156001-8D0100 hose assemblies installed between the firewall and engine fuel injection pump, replace the hose with a Beech P/N 58-920035-(-1), (-5), or (-7) or (-9) or (-11) or field fabricated equivalent of the proper length as determined by the measurementprocedure contained in Paragraph C of this AD. B) Within 25 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, on those airplanes which have Stratoflex P/N 130001-8D0090 or Beech P/N 58-920035-1 hose assemblies installed either in compliance with AD 73-13-03 or by the manufacturer, visually inspect these hoses per instructions contained in Beech Service Instruction No. 0409-282, Rev. II, Part III, to determine whether they are of the proper length for the location in which they are installed. If the above mentioned Service Instruction is unavailable or the inspection outlined is inconclusive, the acceptability of the installed hose may be determined using the measurement procedure contained in Paragraph C of this AD. 1) Prior to further flight, replace any hose having excessive or insufficient length with a Beech P/N 58-920035-(-1), (-5), or (-7) or (-9) or (-11) or field fabricated equivalent hose of the correct length as determined by the procedure contained inthis AD. C) Establish the required hose length as follows: 1) Using a P/N 58-920035-1 hose assembly or equivalent, attach one end of the fuel hose to the fuel pump fitting and align the free end of the hose assembly beside the forward left side of the 45-degree firewall fitting. 2) Compare the flare mating surfaces in the hose fitting and the fitting on the firewall to determine the length required. Hose length is critical. Excess length of 1/8 inch -0 plus 1/8 inch will provide the bow necessary for flexing during engine operation. Beech P/N 58- 920035 hose assemblies are available in 1/8-inch length increments. NOTE: Equivalent hose assemblies may be fabricated to the desired dimensions using Stratoflex Bulk Hose 130-8 and P/N 712-8D fittings following instructions contained in Stratoflex Catalog 103 or equivalent FAA-approved procedures. Stratoflex hose, fittings, and catalogs are obtainable from Stratoflex, Inc., 220 Roberts Cutoff, P.O. Box 10398, Fort Worth, Texas 76114. Aeroquip Type 303 hose is not an acceptable substitute. Beechcraft Service Instruction No. 0409-282, Rev. II or later approved revisions cover this subject. This AD supersedes AD 73-13-03 (Amendment 39-166). This AD becomes effective October 12, 1973.
2011-07-11: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: On two occurrences on Myst[egrave]re-Falcon 50 aeroplanes in service, it was detected that two pipes had been swapped in maintenance at the frame 42 firewall. The swapped lines are the extinguishing system line to engine 2, and engine 2 Low Pressure (LP) bleed line. If the swapping of these two lines is not detected and corrected, in case of engine 2 fire, the fire extinguishing capability would not be operational. * * * * * This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
2011-07-04: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD requires installing new in-line fuses for the fuel level float switch and new in-line fuses for the pressure switch, as applicable, and changing the wiring. The proposed actions would affect the left and right wing forward spars, center wing forward spar, forward auxiliary fuel tank, and aft auxiliary fuel tank, as applicable. This AD was prompted by fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer. We are issuing this AD to prevent the potential of ignition sources inside fuel tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the airplane.
96-11-11: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9 series airplanes, that requires inspection(s) to detect cracking in the nose skin of the fuselage, and various follow-on actions. This amendment also provides for an optional modification, which would defer certain repetitive inspections, if no cracking is detected. This amendment is prompted by reports of cracking in the upper nose skin of the fuselage due to fatigue. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent fatigue-related cracking, which could compromise the structural integrity of the airplane.
86-17-08: 86-17-08 GROB WERKE GmbH (Burkhart Grob): Amendment 39-5399. Applies to Models G103 TWIN II and G103A TWIN II ACRO gliders serial numbers 33879- (K-117) through 34012-(K-245) certificated in any category. Compliance is required as indicated unless already accomplished. To prevent jamming of the outer airbrake pivot lever which could result in the loss of airbrake control, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 10 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, measure the airbrake pivot lever stop pad length in accordance with Part 1 of the "Instructions" section of Grob Technical Information No. TM 315-31, dated October 7, 1985. (b) If a stop pad of a length of less than 36 mm is found during the inspection required by Paragraph (a) of this AD, or if a stop pad is found that can be wedged under the wingskin, before further flight, install a stop pad extension in accordance with part 2 of the "Instructions" section of Grob Technical Information No. TM 315-31, dated October 7, 1985, and Grob Repair Instructions No. 315-31, dated October 7, 1985. Upon request, an equivalent means of compliance with the requirements of this AD may be approved by the Manager, Brussels Aircraft Certification Office, AEU-100, Europe, Africa, and Middle East Office, FAA, c/o American Embassy, 15 Rue de la Loi B-0040 Brussels, Belgium, Telephone No. 513.38.30 ext. 2710 or the Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office, Aircraft Certification Division, FAA, New England Region, 181 South Franklin Avenue, Room 202, Valley Stream, New York 11581, Telephone No. (516) 791-6680. Upon submission of substantiating data by an owner or operator through an FAA maintenance inspector, the Manager, Brussels Aircraft Certification Office or the Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office, may adjust the compliance time specified in this AD. Grob Technical Information No. TM 315-31, dated October 7, 1985, and Grob Repair Instructions No. 315-31, dated October 7, 1985, identified and described in this document, are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). All persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Grob Systems, Inc., Aircraft Division, I-75 and Airport Drive, Bluffton, Ohio 45817. These documents also may be examined at the Office of Regional Counsel, ANE-7, FAA New England Region, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts 01803, Room 311, Rules Docket 86-ANE-32, between the hours of 8:00 am and 4:30 pm; Monday thru Friday, except Federal holidays. This amendment becomes effective on September 10, 1986.
92-23-04: 92-23-04 BEECH: Amendment 39-8404. Docket No. 92-CE-32-AD. Applicability: The following model and serial number airplanes, certificated in any category: Models Serial Numbers 58 and 58A TH-1389 and TH-1396 through TH-1662 58TC and 58TCA TK-147 and TK-151 58P and 58PA TJ-436 and TJ-444 through TJ-497 Compliance: Required within the next 100 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To prevent loss of engine throttle control caused by failure of the engine controls support angle attachment clips, accomplish the following: (a) Modify the engine controls support structure in accordance with the instructions to Beech Kit No. 58-5016-1 S as referenced in Beech Service Bulletin No. 2439, dated May 1992. NOTE 1: Beech Kit No. 58-5016-1 S consists of all the materials and instructions for replacing the engine controls support angle attachment clips with brackets, and may be obtained from the manufacturer at the address specified in paragraph (d) of this AD. (b) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. (c) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an equivalent level of safety may be approved by the Manager, Wichita Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, 1801 Airport Road, Room 100, Wichita, Kansas 67209. The request shall be forwarded through an appropriate FAA Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and send it to the Manager, Wichita Aircraft Certification Office. NOTE 2: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Wichita Aircraft Certification Office. (d) The modification required by this AD shall be done in accordance with the instructions to Beech Kit No. 58-5016-1 S as referenced in Beech Service Bulletin No. 2439, dated May 1992. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from the Beech Aircraft Corporation, P.O. Box 85, Wichita, Kansas 67201-0085. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Central Region, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, Room 1558, 601 E. 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri, or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC. (e) This amendment becomes effective on December 8, 1992.
2011-07-03: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: In early 2005, several reports had been received regarding discovery of cracks in rudder pulley brackets installed on Reims F406 aeroplanes. This pulley bracket, Part Number (P/N) 6015511-1, is installed on aeroplanes with the optional "Camera Hole'' modification. This condition, if not detected and corrected, could result in the loss of rudder control on the airplane. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2011-06-05: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD), which applies to all Model 737-600, -700, -700C, -800, -900, and -900ER series airplanes. That AD currently requires repetitive detailed inspections of the slat track downstop assemblies to verify that proper hardware is installed, one-time torquing of the nut and bolt, and corrective actions if necessary. This new AD also requires replacing the hardware of the downstop assembly with new hardware of the downstop assembly, doing a detailed inspection or a borescope inspection of the slat cans on each wing and the lower rail of the slat main tracks for debris, replacing the bolts of the aft side guide with new bolts, and removing any debris found in the slat can. This AD also removes airplanes from the applicability. This AD results from reports of parts coming off the main slat track downstop assemblies. We are issuing this AD to prevent loose or missing parts from the main slat track downstop assemblies from falling into the slat can and causing a puncture, which could result in a fuel leak and consequent fire.
96-11-08: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to Robinson Helicopter Company (Robinson) Model R22 helicopters, that currently requires installing a low-rotor RPM caution light and resetting the low-RPM warning unit to activate the warning horn and caution light at 94% to 96% revolutions-per-minute (RPM). This amendment requires installation of an improved throttle governor; an adjustment to the low RPM warning unit threshold to increase the RPM at which the warning horn and caution light activate; and, revisions to the R22 Rotorcraft Flight Manual that prohibit flight with the improved throttle governor selected off, except in certain situations. This amendment is prompted by an FAA Technical Panel review of Model R22 accident history data which revealed that main rotor (M/R) blade stall at abnormally low M/R RPM resulted in accidents. The actions specified by this AD are intended to minimize the possibility of pilot mismanagement of the M/R RPM, which could result in unrecoverable M/R blade stall and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
84-02-04: 84-02-04 AIRBUS INDUSTRIE: Amendment 39-4795. Applies to the Model A300 B2-1A, B2- 1C, B4-2C, B2K-3C, B4-103, B2-203, and B4-203 series airplanes, certificated in all categories. To prevent failure of certain main landing gear components, within 180 days after the effective date of this AD or prior to accumulation of the number of landings specified in each paragraph below, whichever occurs later, accomplish the following, unless previously accomplished: A. Prior to the accumulation of 13,000 landings, replace the shock absorber sliding rod attachment fittings, part numbers C61643-4 and C61643-5, with reinforced components in accordance with the instructions of Messier-Hispano-Bugatti (MHB) Service Bulletin 470-32-172, Revision 1, dated June 10, 1981, for aircraft having the serial numbers specified in Airbus Industrie (AI) Service Bulletin A300-32-148, Revision 1, dated December 29, 1978. B. Prior to the accumulation of 5,000 landings, inspect the trunnion on the actuating cylinder side of the hinge arm, part number C65381-2, in accordance with the instructions of MHB Service Bulletin 470-32-386, Revision 1, dated September 30, 1981, on airplanes having serial numbers specified in AI Service Bulletin A300-32-328, dated August 31, 1981. 1. If no corrosion is found, install a seal to improve the lubrication of the hinge arm trunnion in accordance with the instructions of MHB Service Bulletin 470-32-385, dated August 14, 1981 (related to AI Service Bulletin A300-32-326, dated August 31, 1981), and repeat the above inspections at intervals not to exceed 2,000 landings. 2. If corrosion or cracks are found, remove the corrosion and cracks in accordance with the instructions of MHB Service Bulletin 470-32-386, Revision 1, dated September 30, 1981, and install the seal in accordance with paragraph B.1, above. Repeat the above inspections at intervals not to exceed 250 landings. 3. If the depth of material removed when performing the reworkof subparagraph B.2 is greater than one millimeter from the original profile, replace the hinge arm prior to further flight. C. Prior to the accumulation of 6,500 landings and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 400 landings, inspect the lateral inboard trunnion of the hinge arms, part numbers C65381- 2 and C65381-4, for cracks in accordance with the instructions of MHB Service Bulletin 470-32- 442, dated March 31, 1983, for aircraft having serial numbers specified in AI Service Bulletin A300-32-365, dated June 27, 1983. 1. For hinge arms that have incorporated modification MHB 595 in the trunnion located in the inboard position on the actuating cylinder side, the time limit is to be counted from the date of reconditioning. For all other cases, the time limit is to be counted from the day the arm was put into service. 2. The repetitive inspections required in paragraph C, above, may be terminated when the actions described in paragraph 2.C of MHB Service Bulletin 470-32-442, on the inboard, outboard, and forward trunnions are accomplished. D. Alternate means of compliance which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. E. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of inspections and/or modifications required by this AD. This amendment becomes effective February 27, 1984.
2011-06-04: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: During a recent in-service event the flight crew of a Trent 700 powered A330 aircraft [[Page 13076]] reported a temporary Engine Pressure Ratio (EPR) shortfall on engine 2 during the take-off phase of the flight. * * * Data analysis confirmed a temporary fuel flow restriction and subsequent recovery, and indicated that also engine 1 experienced a temporary fuel flow restriction shortly after the initial event on engine 2 * * *. Based on previous industry-wide experience, the investigation of the event has focused on the possibility for ice to temporarily restrict the fuel flow. * * * * * * The scenario of ice being shed and causing a temporary blockage in the engine fuel system may lead to a temporary fuel flow restriction to the engine. This may result in a possible engine surge or stall condition, and in the engine not being able to provide the commanded thrust. * * * * * This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
96-11-03: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 747-200, -300, and -400 series airplanes, that currently requires inspection of each fuel feed line of the outboard engine in the engine strut to determine if interference with an adjacent pneumatic duct clamp has caused damage, and repair or replacement of the fuel feed tube, if necessary. That AD also currently requires inspection and replacement of the adjacent pneumatic duct clamp with a non-rotating type clamp, if necessary. This amendment requires modification of the upper gap area of the strut of the number 1 and 4 engines. This amendment is prompted by a report of fuel leakage in the strut of the number 4 engine due to a high profile clamp that chafed the fuel line. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent chafing of the fuel line in the strut of the number 1 and 4 engines, which could result in rupture of the fuel line and subsequent in-flightengine fire.
96-11-04: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9 and Model DC-9-80 series airplanes, Model MD-88 airplanes, and C-9 (military) series airplanes, that requires modification of the slant panel insulation blankets on the slant pressure panel of the main landing gear. The amendment also requires a visual inspection to detect discrepancies of the left and right seal assemblies of the overwing emergency exit door, and replacement of any discrepant door seal. This amendment is prompted by a report that the flaps and landing gear did not extend or retract properly due to water accumulation in the slant pressure panel area. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent such water accumulation, which could result in the failure of the flaps or landing gear to properly extend or retract.
2011-06-06: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. That AD currently requires you to incorporate operating limitations of maximum operating altitude of 37,000 feet into Section 2, Limitations, of the airplane flight manual (AFM). This AD requires you to incorporate operating limitations of maximum operating altitude of 30,000 feet into Section 2, Limitations, of the AFM. This AD was prompted by several incidents of engine surge. We are issuing this AD to prevent hard carbon buildup on the static vane, which could result in engine surges. Engine surges may result in a necessary reduction in thrust and decreased power for the affected engine. In some cases, this could result in flight and landing under single-engine conditions. It is also possible this could affect both engines at the same time, requiring dual-engine shutdown.
96-10-15: This amendment supersedes Airworthiness Directive (AD) 80-14-06, which currently requires the following on The New Piper Aircraft, Inc. (Piper) Models PA31, PA31-300, PA31-325, and PA31-350 airplanes: repetitively inspecting the outboard flap tracks, wing rib flanges, and the rear spar web at Wing Station (WS) 147.5 on each wing, and modifying the area at WS 147.5 on both wings if any cracks are found as terminating action for the repetitive inspection requirement. The Federal Aviation Administration's policy on aging commuter-class aircraft is to eliminate or, in certain instances, reduce the number of certain repetitive short-interval inspections when improved parts or modifications are available. This action retains the repetitive inspection requirement of AD 80-14-06, and requires modifying the area at WS 147.5 on both wings as terminating action for the repetitive inspection requirement. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent structural failure under certain load conditions caused by cracked areas at WS 147.5, which, if not detected and corrected, could result in loss of control of the airplane.
92-27-17: 92-27-17 SHORT BROTHERS, PLC: Amendment 39-8452. Docket 91-NM-98-AD. Applicability: All Model SD3-30 and SD3-60 series airplanes, certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. To prevent inadvertent engine shutdown, accomplish the following: (a) Within 120 days after the effective date of this AD, lock the left and right low pressure (LP) levers in the open position using securing wires, in accordance with Shorts Service Bulletins SD330- 28-35 (for Model SD3-30 series airplanes) or SD360-28-20 (for Model SD3-60 series airplanes), both dated February 22, 1991; as applicable. (b) Within 120 days after the effective date of this AD, following accomplishment of the modification required by paragraph (a) of this AD, revise the Limitations Sections of the FAA-approved Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) by inserting the following amendments, as applicable: (1) For Model SD3-30 series airplanes: SBH3.3 Amendment p/16 SBH3.6 Amendment p/12 (2) For Model SD3-60 series airplanes: SB4.3 Amendment p/19 SB4.6 Amendment p/12 SB4.8 Amendment p/14 (c) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113. NOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Standardization Branch, ANM-113. (d) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. (e) The locking requirement shall be done in accordance with Shorts Service Bulletin SD330- 28-35, dated February 22, 1991, and Shorts Service Bulletin SD360-28-20, dated February 22, 1991. The revisions to the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) shall be done in accordance with the following list of AFM Amendment Documents and related effective pages: AFM Amendment Document Number Page Number Section Number SBH3.3 Amendment p/16 5, 6 3 7, 42 4 SBH3.6 Amendment p/12 5, 6 3 7, 48 4 SB4.3 Amendment p/19 5, 6 3 7, 50 4 SB4.6 Amendment p/12 5, 6 3 7, 50 4 SB4.8 Amendment p/14 5, 6 3 7, 50 4 This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from Shorts Brothers, PLC, 2011 Crystal Drive, Suite 713, Arlington, Virginia 22202-3719. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 NorthCapitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC. (f) This amendment becomes effective on February 25, 1993.
2022-01-02: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain De Havilland Aircraft of Canada Limited Model DHC-8-400, -401, and -402 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report that the epoxy primer on the internal bore of the nacelle and landing gear attachment pins was not applied, and corrosion on the internal bore of the wing rear spar attachment pins was found. This AD requires doing a detailed visual inspection of the nacelle to wing rear spar attachment pins, and the nacelle and landing gear attachment pins, for any corrosion, and doing all applicable corrective actions. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
52-21-01: 52-21-01 BELL: Applies to Model 47 Helicopters as Noted Below. Compliance required by October 15, 1952. To prevent engine mount shifting on the rubber Lord mounts, the following applicable Lord mount guards must be installed: 1. 178 H. P. Engines - Models 47B, 47B3, and 47D Helicopters. If not already incorporated, install two 47-612-123-1 guards on engine mount. When properly installed, a 5/32 inch torque offset exists between engine mount clamp and rubber Lord mount. This offset is at the rearward side of right hand Lord mount and the forward side of left hand Lord mount. 2. 200 H. P. Engines - All Model 47 Helicopters. Inspect the two 47-612-123-3 guards to be sure they have 7/32 inch ears. If no guards are installed or the ears are less than 3/16 inch they must be replaced with the new type guards. When properly installed, a 1/4 inch torque offset exists between engine mount clamp and rubber Lord mount. This offset is at the rearward side of right hand Lord mount and the forward side of left hand Lord mount. (Bell Service Bulletin No. 79, Revision A, dated July 7, 1952, covers this same subject.) This supersedes AD 52-01-04.
2008-21-10: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the specified Eurocopter France (ECF) model helicopters. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by the aviation authority of France to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The aviation authority of France, with which we have a bilateral agreement, states in the MCAI: "This Airworthiness Directive (AD) is issued following two cases of LH hydraulic power system loss on two AS332 helicopters. In both cases, the pilot received the "low level'' hydraulic failure alarm. The investigations conducted on the two helicopters revealed a hydraulic fluid leak from the hydraulic pump casing. In both cases, incorrect position of the liner of the compensating piston had caused the seals to deteriorate. This incorrect positioning of the liner is due to non- compliant application of the repair process by a repair station. Deterioration of hydraulic pumps causes: The loss of the RH and LH hydraulic power systems in the event of a substantial hydraulic fluid leak from both hydraulic pumps during a given flight. The loss of the hydraulic system concerned, in the event of a substantial hydraulic fluid leak from only one pump.'' This AD requires actions that are intended to address this unsafe condition.
72-20-06: 72-20-06 BELLANCA AIRCRAFT CORPORATION (Champion): Amdt. 39-1530. Applies to the following Bellanca Models and Serial Numbers: Models Serial Numbers 7ECA (0-235-C1 Engine) 840-72 842-72 through 871-72 7GCAA 234-72 through 242-72 244-72 through 246-72 7KCAB 304-72 through 310-72 312-72 through 320-72 322-72 7GCBC (150 HP) 346-72 347-72 349-72 through 361-72 363-72 through 376-72 8KCAB 13-72 15-72 through 37-72 Compliance required as indicated after the effective date of this airworthiness directive, unless already accomplished: To prevent flight controls malfunction including possible loss of control due to cable failure, accomplish the following: A) Effective immediately, all affected aircraft are prohibited from acrobatic flight and must have a placard installed in clear view of pilot which reads as follows: All acrobatic flight, including intentional spins, is prohibited. On all model 8KCAB aircraft, revise the FAA Approved Airplane Flight Manual to delete Sections 1.2.1 through 1.2.7. Insert the following after Section 1.2 Acrobatic Category Limitations: All acrobatic flight, including intentional spins, is prohibited. B) Effective immediately, all affected aircraft with 100 hours or more cumulative flying time and every 100 hours thereafter must have all flight control cables inspected for evidence of wear, fraying, or stretching. If such wear, fraying, or stretching, is found, replace the defective flight control cable before further flight, except that the airplane may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a base where the repair can be made. C) All flight control cables of the affected aircraft must be replaced in accordance with Bellanca Aircraft Corporation Service Letter No. 104, dated September 12, 1972, and subsequent revisions or in accordance with data approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Great Lakes Region. On those airplanes with less than a cumulative flying time of 600 hours, replace cables before reaching 700 hours. On those airplanes with a cumulative flying time of 600 hours or more, replace cables within the next 100 hours flying time. Cable replacement on all affected aircraft must be accomplished by January 1, 1973. All replaced cables must be rendered unusable for any further aircraft applications or handled in accordance with Bellanca Aircraft Corporation (Champion) Service Letter No. 104, dated September 12, 1972, and subsequent revisions. Any cables replaced in compliance with Airworthiness Directive 72-18-03 are exempt from this airworthiness directive. D) The placard required by paragraph "A" may be removed; the revision to the Airplane Flight Manual required by paragraph "A" may be deleted; and the repetitive inspections required by paragraph "B" may be discontinued when compliance with paragraph "C" of this airworthiness directive is accomplished. This amendment becomes effective October 5, 1972.
81-17-04: 81-17-04 HUGHES HELICOPTERS: Amendment 39-4185. Applies to Model 269 helicopters, all models, and TH-55s, certified in all categories, incorporating P/Ns 269A5179 or 269A5179-3 Drive Shaft Coupling Assemblies, and those helicopters incorporating the improved P/N 269A5194 Ring Gear Carrier Assembly. Compliance required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent failure of the main transmission, accomplish the following: (a) For main rotor ring gear driveshaft assemblies, P/N 269A5179 or 269A5179-3: (1) Within 100 hours' additional time in service from the effective date of this AD, or 600 hours total time in service, whichever occurs later, inspect shaft and coupling assembly lower bearing bore and fasteners for evidence of cracks, fretting, or other stress risers, in accordance with Part IIA and IIB of Hughes Service Notice No. N-179 dated July 17, 1981. If cracks, fretting or stress risers are found, replace with P/N 269A5194 assembly reworked per Hughes Notice No. N142.1, prior to further flight. (2) Within 100 hours' additional time in service from the effective date of this AD, or 2,000 hours total time in service for 269C aircraft or 2,500 hours total time in service for 269A/A-1/B/TH-55A aircraft, whichever occurs later, remove and replace shaft and coupling assembly with 269A5194 ring gear carrier assembly reworked per Hughes Notice No. N-142.1 dated May 31, 1977. (b) For main rotor ring gear drive shaft assemblies, P/N 269A5179 not modified per Hughes Notice No. N-114-3 dated September 19, 1977: Within the next 25 hours' additional time in service after the effective date of this AD, or 400 hours' total time in service, or 300 hours since the last inspection performed per paragraph (a) of AD 77-21-10, whichever occurs later, and at intervals not to exceed 300 hours' time in service thereafter, perform a close visual inspection and penetrant inspection of shaft and coupling fastener area per Part IIB ofHughes Notice No. N-179, for fretting, cracking, or other stress risers. If cracks, fretting or stress risers are found, replace with P/N 269A5194 assembly reworked per Hughes Notice No. N-142.1, prior to further flight. (c) For main rotor ring gear drive shaft assemblies, P/N 269A5179 previously modified per Hughes Notice No. N-114.3 at or before the accumulation of 1000 hours' additional time in service since modification per Hughes Notice N-114.3, and at intervals not to exceed 500 hours' time in service thereafter, accomplish the visual and penetrant inspections of the fastener areas, as described in paragraph (b), above. (d) The recurring inspections of paragraphs (b) and (c), above, may be discontinued when P/N 269A5194 assemblies are installed. The service life limit on P/N 269A5194 is 6,000 hours. (e) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate aircraft to a base for the accomplishment of inspections or modificationsrequired by this AD. (f) Alternative inspections, modifications or other actions which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Western Region. The manufacturer's specifications and procedures identified and described in this directive are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). All persons affected by this directive, who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer, may obtain copies upon request to Hughes Helicopters, Inc., Centinela and Teale Street, Culver City, California 90230. These documents may also be examined at FAA Western Region Office, 15000 Aviation Boulevard, Hawthorne, California 90261 and at FAA Headquarters, 800 Independence Avenue, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20591. A historical file on this AD, which includes the incorporated material in full, is maintained by the FAA at its Headquarters in Washington, D.C. and at FAA WesternRegion Office. This supersedes Amendment 39-3060 (42 FR 55882), AD 77-21-10. This amendment becomes effective August 24, 1981.
96-10-11: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9 and DC-9-80 series airplanes, Model MD-88 airplanes, and C-9 (military) series airplanes, that currently requires certain inspections and structural modifications. This amendment requires additional inspections and structural modifications. This amendment is prompted by an evaluation conducted by the Airworthiness Assurance Working Group, which identified additional inspections and structural modifications for mandatory action. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent degradation in the structural capabilities of the affected airplanes.