Results
2005-13-24: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all AvCraft Dornier Model 328-100 airplanes. This AD requires modifying the electrical wiring of the fuel pumps; installing insulation at the hand flow control and shut-off valves, and other components of the environmental control system; and installing markings at fuel wiring harnesses. This AD also requires revising the Airworthiness Limitations section of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness to incorporate new inspections of the fuel tank system. This AD is prompted by the results of fuel system reviews conducted by the airplane manufacturer. We are issuing this AD to reduce the potential of ignition sources inside fuel tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the airplane.
2001-18-08: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all Boeing Model 767-300 series airplanes modified by supplemental type certificate SA7019NM-D, that requires modification of the in-flight entertainment (IFE) system to install a switch to remove power from the IFE system, and revision of flight crew and cabin crew procedures. This action is necessary to ensure that the flight crew and cabin crew are able to remove electrical power from the IFE system when necessary and are advised of appropriate procedures for such action. Inability to remove power from the IFE system during a non-normal or emergency situation could result in inability to control smoke or fumes in the airplane flight deck or cabin. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
74-17-01: 74-17-01 SARGENT INDUSTRIES, PICO DIVISION: Amendment 39-1913. Applies to Sargent Industries, Pico Division Regulator P/N 30001 incorporated in passenger evacuation slides and slide/rafts on aircraft certificated in all categories. \n\n\tNote: This regulator is installed in, but not limited to, Pico, Air Cruiser and International Inflatable slides on B-707, B-727, B-737, DC-6, DC-7, DC-8, DC-9, DC-10, and L-188 aircraft. \n\n\tCompliance required within two years after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent delayed actuation of regulator P/N 30001, modify the Sargent Industries, Pico Division regulator, P/N 30001, in accordance with Sargent Industries, Pico Division Service Bulletin 25-51, dated March 14, 1974, or an equivalent modification approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective September 16, 1974.
74-17-05: 74-17-05 GRUMMAN AMERICAN AVIATION CORPORATION: Amendment 39- 1920 as amended by amendment 39-2263 is further amended by Amendment 39-2359. Applies to Grumman Model G-1159 airplanes certificated in all categories. Compliance required within the next 10 hours' time in service after receipt of telegram dated July 17, 1974, unless already accomplished or noted otherwise. Any equivalent method of compliance with this AD must be approved by Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Southern Region. Deactivate the ground spoilers by accomplishing the following: 1. Remove the electrical connector on the ground spoiler solenoid operated control valve P/N 1159 SCH 230-1. Cap and stow. Placard control valve "INOPERATIVE". 2. Pull and lock out ground spoiler circuit breaker (2 amp) (Pilot's Circuit Breaker Panel). 3. Disconnect the ground spoiler actuators from the solenoid actuated control valve by either of the following methods: 1st METHOD (A) Removehydraulic line P/N 1159H20014-770 GRSU-6 which connects the ground spoiler control valve to hydraulic flow divider P/N 1159 SCH 255-1. (B) Remove AN815-6 union from flow divider. Remove restrictor-filter P/N H962-041 from the control valve and install in open port of flow divider using P/N 1159H20011- 6 O-ring. Leave port open to atmosphere. Plug open port of control valve with P/N AN814-6DL plug and P/N 1159HZ0011-6 O-ring. Safety plug. (C) Plug both ends of line removed and place line and union in storage, OR 2nd METHOD (A) Disconnect restrictor-filter P/N H962-041 from the control valve. Leave restrictor-filter attached to the hydraulic line P/N 1159H20014-770 GRSU-6 and open to the atmosphere. Secure the hydraulic line and restrictor-filter. (B) Plug the control valve with P/N AN814-6D plug and P/N 1159H20011-6 O-ring. 4. Without hydraulic system pressure applied, check that the ground spoiler cylinders are locked. This may be accomplished byapplying an upward force of approximately 50 pounds to the trailing edge surface of the ground spoiler. There shall be no motion of the cylinder piston. If the piston extends, readjust the cylinder terminal end until a locked condition results. 5. Repeat item 4 with "Combined" hydraulic system pressure applied. 6. Install following placard adjacent to the Ground Spoiler Hydraulic Pressure Arming Switch with the words "GROUND SPOILERS INOPERATIVE". 7. To prevent the Speed Brake/Take-Off warning from sounding during landing incorporate Grumman Interim Aircraft Service Change (ASC) 181 "Speed Brake/Flap Warning - Ground Disable" by September 13, 1974. The "NO GRD SPOILER" light will be inoperative. 8. Follow the Airplane Flight manual procedures for selection of ground spoiler switch, "armed" for take-off, to prevent hydraulic system pressure fluctuations in the event of failure of the left engine during take-off. For flight operation with the ground spoilers inoperative, attention is directed to the following limitations in the AFM: Page 1-9, Anti-Skid Brakes. The airplane will not be dispatched with the anti- skid system inoperative. Page 1-10, Takeoff with 10 degree flaps. No takeoff will be made when using 10 degree flaps. Page 1-27, Note at bottom of page. Add 680 feet to the required field length or subtract 680 feet from the available field length in determining allowable weight. Landing field lengths in AFM are unchanged - See AFM Page 4-126. In order to reactivate the ground spoilers, Grumman ASC 180 - Flight Controls (ATA No. 27) "Reactivation of Ground Spoilers" or equivalent approved by Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Federal Aviation Administration, Southern Region, must be complied with. Amendment 39-1920 was effective August 9, 1974, and was effective on receipt for all recipients of the telegrams dated July 17, 1974, and July 25, 1974, and the letter of July 29, 1974, which contained this amendment. Amendment 39-2263 became effective on July 18, 1975. This amendment 39-2359 becomes effective September 1, 1975.
2005-13-21: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all Cessna Model 650 airplanes, that requires inspecting to determine the part number of the actuator control unit (ACU) and replacing the ACU with a new, improved ACU if necessary. This AD also requires revising the Limitations section of the airplane flight manual. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent uncommanded movement of the horizontal stabilizer, which could result in reduced controllability of the airplane. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
69-13-04: 69-13-04 PIPER AIRCRAFT CORP: Amdt. 39-826. Applies to PA-31 and PA-31-300 airplanes, serial numbers 31-2 through 31-259. Compliance required as indicated: Modify the landing gear warning system to comply with FAR 23.729(e) (formerly CAR 3.359) as follows: (a) Within the next 100 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, modify the aircraft in accordance with instructions contained in Piper Kit 760-250 dated October 23, 1968, or an alternative method approved by the Chief, Engineering & Manufacturing Branch, FAA Eastern Region. Effective July 3, 1969, revised September 3, 1969.
2005-13-20: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 747-400, -400D, -400F; 767-200, -300, -300F; and 777-200 and -300 series airplanes. This AD requires installing a jumper wire between the wiring of the fire extinguisher switch and the fuel shutoff switch for each engine, and other specified actions. This AD is prompted by a certain combination of conditions, which could cause the fuel spar shutoff valves to remain partially open. We are issuing this AD to prevent a latent open circuit that could leave the fuel spar shutoff valve in a partially open position when the engine fire switch is activated, which could result in fuel from the engine feeding an uncontrolled fire in the engine or the strut.
75-14-02: 75-14-02 MESSERSCHMITT BOELKOW BLOHM GMBH: Amendment 39-2246. Applies to Messerschmitt Boelkow Blohm (MBB) Model BO-105 Helicopters certificated in all categories. Compliance is required as indicated. To prevent failure in service of certain main rotor hub quadruple nuts due to cracks resulting from manufacturing defects, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next twenty hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, determine the production lot number of the two installed main rotor hub quadruple nuts, P/N 105- 14101.19 and .20. NOTE: Quadruple nuts are identified "VIERFACHNUSS" on P/N drawings. Production lot number of nuts is set forth as first two digits of serial number recorded in MBB individual aircraft historical record document, under the heading of Main Rotor Head Assembly No. 105-14101. (b) If the lot number determined in accordance with paragraph (a) of this AD is 06 or 07, or if the lot number cannot be determined, before further flight, except that the aircraft may be flown in accordance with FAR Section 21.197 and 21.199 to a base where the work can be performed, remove the two quadruple nuts and replace with serviceable parts of the same part number. (Messerschmitt Boelkow Blohn BO-105 Alert Service Bulletin No. 9 covers this same subject). This amendment is effective upon publication in the Federal Register as to all persons except those persons to whom it was made immediately effective by the telegram dated May 14, 1975, which contained this amendment.
56-11-01: 56-11-01 de HAVILLAND: Applies to All Model 104 "Dove" Aircraft. Compliance required by May 31, 1956. As a result of the two accidents caused by pilots feathering the wrong propeller after engine failure, the British Air Registration Board has classified the following as an essential modification. The FAA concurs. The left-hand needle (oil pressure) of the combined oil pressure and temperature gage for the starboard engine could be mistakenly interpreted as applying to the port engine. To minimize the possibility of such confusion either Part A or part B of Dove Modification 879 must be incorporated as soon as possible but not later than May 31, 1956: Part A. To turn the instruments clockwise through 90 degrees and put temporary markings on the instrument bezel. Part B. To turn the instruments clockwise through 90 degrees and re-mark the dials to give correct presentation or to fit modified instruments with vertical lettering and figures. (Dove Modification 879 is covered in de Havilland Service Technical News Sheet Series CT (104) No. 132 dated April 13, 1956.)
68-13-01: 68-13-01 PIPER: Amendment 39-613. Applies to PA-31 and PA-31-300 type Aircraft Serial Numbers 31-2 through 31-220 inclusive 31-222, 31-223, 31-225, 31-228, 31-234, 31-237, 31-238, 31-240, 31-242 and 31-243. To preclude in-flight fire attributed to arcing from electrical wires to the fuel crossfeed line behind the fuel control panel in the cockpit accomplish the following within the next (5) hours time in service after the effective date of this airworthiness directive unless already accomplished. A. Remove fuel control panel cover assembly P/N 41448-00 and inspect all wiring for chafing or interference at the fuel crossfeed line, the spar structure and the fuel control cable. Also inspect for chafing of the fuel crossfeed line against the spar structure and the P/N 41448-00 cover. Replace all chafed wires and any fuel crossfeed line chafed or worn in excess of 10 per cent (approximately .003 inch) of the wall thickness. B. Reroute wiring and secure fuel crossfeed line to assure adequate clearance in accordance with Piper Service Bulletin No. 278 (Kit No. 760216) or later FAA approved revision or in accordance with an FAA approved equivalent modification. (Piper Service Bulletin No. 278 dated May 27, 1968 covers this subject). This amendment is effective June 25, 1968 and was effective upon receipt for all recipients of the telegram dated May 29, 1968 which contained this amendment.
2005-13-23: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for Eurocopter France (Eurocopter) Model EC 155B, SA-365N and N1, AS-365N2, and AS 365 N3 helicopters. That AD currently requires inspecting the hydraulic brake hose (hose) for crazing, pinching, distortion, or leaks at the torque link hinge and replacing the hose, if necessary. That AD also requires inspecting the hose and the emergency flotation gear pipe to ensure adequate clearance, and adjusting the landing gear leg, if necessary. This amendment requires the same actions as the existing AD and adds another model helicopter to the applicability. This amendment is prompted by notification by the manufacturer and the European Authority that another affected model helicopter, the Model EC155B1, may have the same unsafe condition and should be added to the existing AD. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of a hose, resulting in failure of hydraulic pressure to the brakes on the affected landing gear wheel, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter during a run-on landing.
74-25-09: 74-25-09 HAMILTON STANDARD: Amendment 39-2037. Applies to Hamilton Standard Model 54H60 propellers with the following serial numbers installed on, but not limited to, Lockheed Models L-382 and L-188 type aircraft: Propeller Model 54H60-81 214617, 215113, 215205, 215284, 215443, 215498, 215550, 215551, 216141, 216394, 217337, 223669, 223810 Propeller Model 54H60-91 233124, 233135, 233156 thru 233175, 233210 thru 233221, 233295 thru 233298, 233335 thru 233346 Propeller Model 54H60-117 213240, 215104, 215253, 215442, 217294, 217846, 219020, 219497, 220052, 221334, 221945, 222715, 223351, 223570, 223882, 223885, 224146, 224327, 224724, 224730, 225367, 225514, 225540, 225603, 225634, 225857, 226279, 226480, 227098, 227104, 227212, 227945, 228146, 228304, 228385, 229197, 230076, 230415, 230454, 231098, 231099, 231103, 231247, 231254, 231484, 231825, 231830, 233152 thru 233155, 233186 thru 233209, 233224 thru 233231, 233246 thru 233273, 233299 thru 233334, 234146To preclude failure of undersize oil transfer tubes and possible loss of propeller control remove P/N 536496, oil transfer tube, before further flight, unless already accomplished. Replace with a P/N 536496 oil transfer tube which has been inspected using a Hamilton Standard inspection tool, P/N HSD506611T501, or by FAA approved equivalent method, and which meets or exceeds minimum wall thickness requirements of Hamilton Standard Alert Service Bulletin HS Code 54H60-A68. The manufacturer's specifications identified and described in this directive are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(i). All persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents may obtain copies upon request to the Hamilton Standard Division, United Aircraft Corporation, Windsor Locks, Connecticut 06096. These documents may also be examined at FAA, New England Region, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts 01803. This amendment becomes effective upon publication in the Federal Register for all persons except those to whom it was made effective immediately by telegram.
95-19-16: 95-19-16 DASSAULT AVIATION: Amendment 39-9378. Docket 94-NM-200-AD. Applicability: Model Mystere-Falcon 900 series airplanes having serial numbers 53 through 139 inclusive, equipped with Fairchild Model F800 flight data recorders, installed in accordance with Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) SA7255SW-D; certificated in any category. NOTE 1: This AD applies to each airplane identified in the preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the requirements of this AD. For airplanes that have been modified, altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of this AD is affected, the owner/operator must use the authority provided in paragraph (c) of this AD to request approval from the FAA. This approval may address either no action, if the current configuration eliminates the unsafe condition; or different actions necessary to address the unsafe condition described in this AD. Such a request should include an assessment of the effect of the changed configuration on the unsafe condition addressed by this AD. In no case does the presence of any modification, alteration, or repair remove any airplane from the applicability of this AD. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. To prevent loss of electrical power to the airplane due to generator outage, accomplish the following: (a) At the next scheduled inspection, but no later than 60 days after the effective date of this AD, modify the electrical power installation for the flight data recorder, in accordance with paragraph 3.C.(1), Part 900-54-1, of Falcon Jet Corporation Service Bulletin 900-54 (F900 31-30), dated October 14, 1994, or Revision 1 (F900-31-1), dated November 17, 1994. Prior to further flight subsequent to the accomplishment of this modification, perform the checks and tests in accordance with paragraph 3.D.(1), Part 900-54-1, of either service bulletin.(b) Within 1 year after the effective date of this AD, replace the currently installed socket box for ground power with a reworked socket box, in accordance with paragraph 3.C.(2), Part 900-54-2, of Revision 1 of Falcon Jet Corporation Service Bulletin 900-54 (F900 31-1), dated November 17, 1994. Prior to further flight, subsequent to the accomplishment of this installation, perform the checks and tests, in accordance with paragraph 3.D.(2), Part 900-54-2, of Revision 1 of the service bulletin. (c) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113. NOTE 2: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Standardization Branch, ANM-113. (d) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. (e) The actions shall be done in accordance with Falcon Jet Corporation Service Bulletin 900-54 (F900 31-30), dated October 14, 1994; or Falcon Jet Corporation Service Bulletin 900-54, Revision 1 (F900 31-1), dated November 17, 1994. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. Copies may be obtained from Falcon Jet Corporation, P.O. Box 967, Little Rock, Arkansas 72203-0967. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC. (f) This amendment becomes effective on November 2, 1995.
66-05-02: 66-05-02 HAWKER SIDDELEY: Amdt. 39-185, Part 39, Federal Register January 28, 1968. Applies to de Havilland Model 104 Dove Series Airplanes. Compliance required within 150 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD. As a result of cracking of eye ends used in the rudder and elevator trim tab connecting rod assemblies, accomplish the following unless already accomplished. (a) Remove eye ends, P/N's CM.2A and CM.2B, and inspect for cracks visually or by use of other FAA-approved methods. (b) Replace cracked parts with uncracked parts of the same part number before further flight. (Hawker Siddeley Aviation, de Havilland Division T.N.S. Dove (104) Series CT (104) No. 187 or later ARB-approved issues cover this same subject). This directive effective February 27, 1966.
67-28-03: 67-28-03 de HAVILLAND: Amdt. 39-494, Part 39, Federal Register October 21, 1967. Applies to Type DHC-6 Aircraft. Compliance required as indicated. To preclude loss of the horizontal stabilizer, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 15 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, check that each of the four horizontal tailplane to aft fuselage 5/16 inch diameter bolts, P/N's NAS 625-36 and NAS 625-53, are torqued to a value of 225 to 250 inch-pounds. If correct, no further action is necessary. If loose, comply with (b). (b) Re-torque loose bolts to a value of 225 to 250 inch-pounds and recheck every 7 hours' time in service to assure that this value is maintained. (c) The check required by (b) may be discontinued when a modification, approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Eastern Region is incorporated. (d) Upon request with substantiating data submitted through an FAA maintenance inspector, the compliance times specified in this AD may be increased by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Eastern Region. This amendment effective October 21, 1967.
2001-17-21: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model 717 series airplanes, that requires repetitive inspections of the rod ends of the spoiler hold-down actuators for breakage along the intersection of the thread runout and the outer spherical surface of the lug; and replacement of any broken rod end of the spoiler hold-down actuators with a new rod end. This AD also requires replacement of the rod ends of the spoiler hold-down actuators with new rod ends, and reidentification of the spoiler hold-down actuators, which constitutes terminating action for the repetitive inspections. This action is necessary to prevent failure of the rod ends of the spoiler hold-down actuators due to fatigue, which could result in loss of the back-up protection of the spoiler float hold-down and unavailability of monitoring for an uncommanded spoiler movement. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition. \n\n\tThe incorporation by reference of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 717-27A0010, dated August 15, 2000; Boeing Service Bulletin 717-27-0013, dated January 30, 2001; and Boeing Service Bulletin 717-27-0013, Revision 01, dated February 28, 2001; as listed in the regulations, is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of October 1, 2001.
67-28-01: 67-28-01 AERO COMMANDER: Amdt. 39-492, Part 39, Federal Register October 10, 1967. Applies to Models 560E, 680, 680E, and 720 Airplanes. Compliance required within the next 25 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD unless already accomplished. To detect cracks in the lower front spar cap between wing station 67 and 86 on each wing, accomplish either (a) or (b) of the following: (a) Perform visual and dye penetrant inspection in accordance with Aero Commander Service Bulletin Number 92 dated September 29, 1967. To facilitate inspection, a top wing access door may be installed in accordance with instructions contained in Aero Commander's letter to all owners and operators dated October 3, 1967. (b) Inspect in accordance with procedures approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Southwest Region, Fort Worth, Texas. If cracks are detected during above inspections, contact Aero Commander for approved repair or repairin accordance with a method approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Southwest Region, Fort Worth, Texas. Upon completion of the inspection, positive or negative findings including total time in service shall be forwarded to the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Southwest Region, Fort Worth, Texas. This amendment effective upon publication in the Federal Register for all persons except those to whom it was made effective immediately by air mail letter dated October 5, 1967.
67-26-04: 67-26-04 WESTON GARWIN CARRUTH: Amdt. 39-479, Part 39, Federal Register September 16, 1967. Applies to Aircraft Equipped with Model 22-374 Series Altimeters, except those Altimeters which have been Modified and Marked with a White : "M-1" on the Back of the Instrument. The Unmodified Model 22-374 Series Altimeters are known to have been installed in Cessna Model 150G, 172H, 180H, 182J, 182K, 185E, 188, A188, P206A, P206B, TP206A, TP206B, TU206A, U206A, U206B, TU206B, 210F, 210G, T210F, T210G, 337B, T337B, Serial Nos. 310L-0018 through Serial No. 310L-0182, Serial Nos. 320E-0055 through Serial No. 320E-0276, Serial Nos. 320F-0001 through Serial No. 320F-0016, Serial Nos. 401-0014 through Serial No. 401-0022, Serial Nos. 402-0032 through Serial No. 402-0122, Serial Nos. 411-0240, 411-0241, 411-0243, 411-0246, Serial Nos. 411A-0255 through Serial No. 411A-0276 Aircraft, Reference Cessna Service Letter 67-52 dated September 23, 1967. Beech Model H-18 Serial Nos. BA743 through BA750,A23-A Serial Nos. M992 through M1064, A23-19 Serial Nos. MB154 through MB272 except MB266 and MB268, A23-24 Serial Nos. MB125 through MB272, V35 Serial Nos. D8250 through D8567 and D8571 except 35-C33 Serial Nos. CD1045 through CD1114, 35-C33A Serial Nos. CE80 through CE174, 56TC Serial Nos. TG1 through TG5, TG8 through TG10, A65 Serial Nos. LC257 through LC268, 65-B80 Serial Nos. LD332 through LD348, LD351 and LD352, 65-88 Serial Nos. LP43 through LP45, 65-A90 Serial Nos. LJ237 thru LJ304, 65-A90-1 Serial Nos. LM2 through LM37, LM39, LM41 and LM42, 95-C55 Serial Nos. TE186 through TE433, D95A Serial Nos. TD665 through TD687, and TD689 through TD704 Aircraft, Beech Model 95-B55, Serial Nos. TC-1005 through TC-1039 Aircraft, Mooney Model M20C, Serial Nos. 670001 through 670149, M20E, Serial Nos. 1177, 1199, 1217, 1268, 1273, 1277, 1281, 1283, 1286 through 1288, 1290, 1292, 1293, 1295 through 1308, 670001 through 670062, M20F, Serial Nos. 660001 through 660004, 670001 through 670486, Model M22, Serial Nos. 670001 through 670003 Aircraft. Aero Commander Model 500B, 500U, 680FL, 680FLP, 680T Aircraft, Bell Model 47G-2A, 47G-2A1, 47G-3B-1, 47G-4, 47G-4A, 47G-5, 206A Helicopters. The unmodified Model 22-374 Series Altimeter may have also been installed in other Aircraft as a replacement part since June 1, 1966. Compliance required as indicated. To prevent loss of reliable altitude information, accomplish the following: (a) Unless already accomplished, within 12 months after the effective date of this AD: (1) Modify altimeter by replacing balance arm assembly with an assembly identified by an M-1 stamped on the brass portion thereof available from Weston Instruments, Inc., Weston-Garwin Carruth Division in accordance with Weston Instrument, Inc., Weston-Garwin Carruth Division Service Bulletin 600-0002 or equivalent approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Central Region, FAA or (2) Replace the altimeter with an altimeter known to be airworthy. (b) Until the altimeter is modified or replaced in accordance with paragraph (a) of this AD, for those aircraft equipped with only one operative unmodified Weston-Garwin Carruth Model 22-374 Series Altimeter, (1) on and after the effective date of this AD, flight is limited to those conditions in which flight is maintained with visual reference to the ground and when flight visibility is 3 miles or better, and (2) within 10 hours flight time after the effective date of this AD a placard must be installed on the instrument panel in plain view of the pilot which states "This aircraft is limited to operations in those conditions in which flight is maintained with visual reference to the found and when flight visibility is 3 miles or better." (c) On and after the effective date of this AD, for those aircraft equipped with unmodified Weston-Garwin Carruth Model 22-374 Series Altimeter(s) the pilot shall accomplish the following in order to determine if the altimeter(s) is operative: (1) Prior to the commencement of flight, check the altimeter reading(s) against the known field elevation at the appropriate altimeter setting(s). If a deviation of more than 100 feet is observed in the altimeter reading and the aircraft is equipped with only one altimeter, further flight is prohibited until the altimeter is replaced with an altimeter known to be airworthy. If such a deviation is observed in one altimeter on an aircraft equipped with two unmodified Weston-Garwin Carruth Model 22-374 Series Altimeters, flight may only be accomplished in accordance with paragraph (b) of this AD. (2) During flight, check the altimeter(s) for erroneous or erratic reading(s). If such reading(s) are observed and the aircraft is equipped with only one altimeter, flight may be continued in accordance with subdivision (1) of paragraph (b) of this AD to the next point of intended landing. Flight beyond that point may be conducted only in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a base where repairs can be accomplished. If such reading(s) are observed in only one altimeter on an aircraft equipped with two unmodified Weston-Garwin Carruth Model 22-374 Series Altimeters, and the other altimeter is operative, flight may only be accomplished in accordance with paragraph (b) in this AD. This amendment effective September 18, 1967. Revised October 27, 1967.
73-11-03: 73-11-03 INTERNATIONAL INFLATABLES COMPANY: Amdt. 39-1642. Applies to aircraft incorporating International Inflatables Company regulator, P/N 70003. NOTE: This regulator has been FAA-approved as a replacement for International Inflatables regulator P/N 68240, the subject of AD 71-14-03. Both regulators are used on various International Inflatables passenger evacuation slides, installed in but not limited to, BAC 1-11, B-707, B-727, DC-8, DC-9, and L-188 aircraft. Compliance required as indicated. To determine the presence of corrosion in regulator P/N 70003, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 60 days after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the last 60 days, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 120 days from the last inspection, visually inspect the International Inflatables Company regulator P/N 70003 for any evidence of corrosion both inside and outside of the regulator assembly, or an equivalent inspection approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA, Western Region. If there is any evidence of corrosion, replace the regulator prior to further flight with a previously inspected (per this AD) and corrosion-free regulator or an FAA-approved regulator. Do not return to service any regulator exhibiting evidence of corrosion. (b) After the effective date of this AD, and prior to the installation of an International Inflatables Company regulator P/N 70003 in any aircraft, inspect that regulator per (a), above. (c) Submit a written report of the inspection results of each corroded regulator to the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA, Western Region, P.O. Box 92007, World Way Postal Center, Los Angeles, California, 90009. The report should include: serial number, date of manufacture, time in service, shelf time, date of last overhaul or inspection, and description of the corrosion. Inspection reports of regulators that are not corroded are not required. (Reportingapproved by the Bureau of the Budget under BOB No. 04-R-174) This amendment becomes effective June 22, 1973.
2005-13-14: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all McDonnell Douglas Model MD-90-30 airplanes. This AD requires replacing existing dual anti-skid control manifolds (DACM) with new, improved or reworked and reidentified DACMs; inspecting the inlet filters and other components of the DACMs for damage; replacing any damaged DACM components with new or serviceable components; and flushing/cleaning the braking system prior to replacing the inlet filters. This AD is prompted by reports of multiple incidents of blown tires on landing while using maximum autobrake. We are issuing this AD to prevent metallic fibers from the first stage filter of the servo valves inside the DACM from becoming lodged in the first stage nozzle of the servo valve, which could lead to tire failure during high speed/high energy braking and possible subsequent runway departure.
67-23-05: 67-23-05 GRAVINER: Amdt. 39-454, Part 39, Federal Register August 1, 1967. Applies to Automatic Fire Extinguishers Installed on, but not Necessarily Limited to, the Airplanes Listed: P/N's 112A, 147A, and 1137A Installed on BAC 1-11 200 and 400 Series Airplanes; P/N 132A Installed on Short Bros. Skyvan SC-7, Series 2 Variant 200; and P/N 142A Installed on Hawker Siddeley DH-125 Series Airplanes. \n\n\tCompliance required as indicated. \n\n\tTo prevent failure of Graviner fire extinguisher containers, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tWithin the next 25 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the last 500 hours' time in service for fire extinguisher containers with a stamp date October 1965 or before, or unless already accomplished within the last 1,500 hours' time in service for fire extinguisher containers with a stamp date later than October 1965, visually inspect Graviner automatic fire extinguisher containers for cracks orleaks and weight in accordance with Graviner Alert Service Bulletin No. 26-A30, Issue No. 2, dated April 21, 1967, or later ARB-approved issue, or FAA-approved equivalent. \n\n\t(b)\tRepeat the inspection specified in paragraph (a) at intervals not to exceed 500 hours' time in service from the last inspection for fire extinguisher containers with a stamp date October 1965 or before. For fire extinguisher containers with a stamp date later than October 1965, reinspect in accordance with paragraph (a) once between 1,400 and 1,500 hours' time in service after the initial inspection. \n\n\t(c)\tReplace all defective fire extinguisher containers with fire extinguisher containers of the same part number with a stamp date later than October 1965 before further flight. \n\n\tThis AD supersedes AD 67-17-04. \n\n\tThis amendment effective August 1, 1967. \n\n\tRevised August 12, 1967.
70-02-09: 70-02-09 NORTH AMERICAN: Amdt. 39-927. Applicable to operators of North American Sabreliner Models NA-265-40 and -60 with thrust reversers installed. With ten (10) hours time in service or not later than December 29, 1969, whichever occurs first, unless already accomplished since December 19, 1969, perform the "Engine-Thrust Reverser Rigging Inspection" described in North American Alert Wire dated December 19, 1969, or an equivalent inspection approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. This amendment is effective upon publication in the Federal Register for all persons except those to whom it was made effective immediately by telegram dated December 24, 1969.
75-16-23: 75-16-23 PATTEN/PAN AVION: Amendment 39-2295. Applies to Pan Avion and Patten/Pan Avion models LSR-174 ( ) and LSR-174 (2) Evacuation Slides, Serial Numbers 473 through 524. Compliance required as indicated. To prevent loss of pressure in the evacuation slide inflation system, within 500 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, replace the Patten/Pan Avion inflation hoses, part numbers 1500-11A on model LSR-174 ( ) and 1600-19 on model LSR-174 (2), with inflation hoses, part numbers 1500-54 on model LSR-174( ) and 1600-23 on model LSR-174 (2) in accordance with Patten/Pan Avion Service Bulletin 27-75 dated February 20, 1975, or later FAA approved revision. This amendment becomes effective August 11, 1975.
2005-13-05: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 747-400F series airplanes. This AD requires initial detailed and open-hole high frequency eddy current inspections for cracking of the web, upper chord, and upper chord strap of the upper deck floor beams, and repair of any cracking. This AD also requires a preventive modification of the upper deck floor beams, and repetitive inspections for cracking after \naccomplishing the modification. This AD is prompted by reports of fatigue cracking found on the upper deck floor beam to frame attachment points. We are issuing this AD to prevent fatigue cracks in the upper chord, upper chord strap, and the web of the upper deck floor beams and resultant failure of the floor beams. Failure of a floor beam could result in damage to critical flight control cables and wire bundles that pass through the floor beam, and consequent loss of controllability of the airplane. Failure of the floor beam also could resultin the failure of the adjacent fuselage frames and skin, and consequent rapid decompression of the airplane.
67-23-07: 67-23-07 TOST: Amdt. No. 39-449, Part 39, Federal Register July 20, 1967. Applies to Tost Type Universal 53 Glider Tow Couplings with Serial Numbers 1 through 29999, Installed on Schempp-Hirth Models Standard Austria S, SH, and SH-1; Scheibe Flugzeugbau Models L-Spatz 55, Bergfalke II 55, and SF 26A; and Alexander Schleicher Models Ka 6 CR, Ka 6 E, K 7, and K 8 B gliders. Compliance required within the next 100 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To reduce the release load on the glider coupling when the tow cable imposes asymmetrical loads, replace, in accordance with Tost Modification No. 2/65, dated November 9, 1965, or FAA-approved equivalent, the bracket type automatic releases of the tow coupling with ring type automatic releases that conform to the Luftfahrt-Bundesamt approved type certificate 60.290/11 or later approved issue, or FAA-approved equivalent. This amendment effective August 19, 1967.