Results
2003-23-02: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain Cessna Model 560 airplanes. This action requires disengaging and tie-strapping the pitch trim and autopilot servo (servo 1) circuit breakers. This action also provides an optional inspection and follow-on actions that, if accomplished, terminates the requirement to disengage and tie-strap those circuit breakers. This action is necessary to prevent a single-point failure in the trim system from causing a runaway trim condition that the pilot may be unable to stop by using the autopilot-disconnect switch. This condition could result in loss of control of the airplane. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2003-22-12: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Bombardier Model CL-600-1A11 (CL-600), CL-600- 2A12 (CL-601), and CL-600-2B16 (CL-601-3A, CL-601-3R, and CL-604) series airplanes. This amendment requires revising the airplane flight manual to provide the flightcrew with procedures and limitations for operating the airplane with out-of-tolerance angle of attack (AOA) transducers. This amendment also requires, among other actions, measuring the vane angles and voltage of the AOA transducers; reworking the AOA transducer assemblies; repetitive measurements of the resistance of both AOA transducers; and follow-on and corrective actions, as applicable. This action is necessary to prevent flat spots on the potentiometers of the AOA transducers due to wear, which may cause a delay in the commands for stall warning, stick shaker, and stick pusher operation. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
68-20-07: 68-20-07 DOWTY ROTOL: Amendment 39-664. Applies to Dowty Rotol Propellers (c) R.193/4-30-4/50 installed on Fairchild F. 27A-F-G-J, FH.227 and Fokker F.27 Mk 400, (c) R.257/4-30-4/60 installed on Fairchild FH.227B, FH.227C, FH.227D and FH.227E, and (c) R.184/4-30-4/50 installed on Grumman G-159. Compliance required as indicated unless already accomplished. To prevent failure of the propeller hub driving center, P/N RA 57500, accomplish the following: (a) For all propellers except the (c) R.184/4-30-4/50 propeller, incorporate Dowty Rotol Modification (c) VP.2486, in accordance with Dowty Rotol Service Bulletin No. 61.573B dated June, 1968, or later ARB approved issue, or FAA approved equivalent at the next scheduled overhaul or within the next 4500 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs first. (b) For (c) R.184/4-30-4/50 propellers accomplish the following: (1) For propeller hubs having 2500 or more hours time in service on the effective date of this AD and that have not been modified in accordance with paragraph (5), inspect the hub in accordance with paragraph (3) within the next 50 hours time in service and incorporate the modification specified in paragraph (5) at the next scheduled overhaul or prior to the accumulation of 400 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs first. (2) For propeller hubs having less than 2500 hours time in service on the effective date of this AD and that have not been modified in accordance with paragraph (5), inspect the hub in accordance with paragraph (3) prior to the accumulation of 2550 hours time in service and incorporate the modification specified in paragraph (5) within the next 400 hours time in service or prior to the accumulation of 2500 hours time in service, whichever occurs later. (3) Inspect the rear face of the hub driving center flange with a magnifying glass and by the magnetic particle fluid method in accordance with Dowty Rotol Service Bulletin 61-633 dated June 1968, or later approved ARB issue, or an FAA approved equivalent. (4) If cracked hub driving centers are detected during any inspection, before further flight replace the propeller hub driving center with a serviceable part of the same part number having no cracks. (5) Incorporate Dowty Rotol Modification No. (c) VP.2486 in accordance with Dowty Rotol Service Bulletin No. 61-573A dated June 1968, or later ARB approved issue, or an FAA approved equivalent. The inspection specified in paragraph (3) is not required in hubs modified in accordance with this paragraph. This supersedes Amendment 39-587 (33 F.R. 5866), AD 68-08-05. This amendment becomes effective October 8, 1968.
2020-22-20: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Airbus Helicopters Model AS350B, AS350B1, AS350B2, AS350B3, AS350BA, AS350D, AS350D1, AS355E, AS355F, AS355F1, AS355F2, AS355N, AS355NP, EC130B4, and EC130T2 helicopters. This AD requires visually inspecting each main rotor gearbox (MGB) suspension bar attachment bracket bolt for missing bolt heads. Depending on the outcome of the visual inspection, measuring the tightening torque, removing certain parts, sending photos and reporting information to Airbus Helicopters, and completing an FAA-approved repair is required. This AD was prompted by a report of a missing MGB suspension bar attachment bolt head. The actions of this AD are intended to address an unsafe condition on these products.
70-10-07: 70-10-07 HAWKER SIDDELEY: Amdt. 39-991. Applies to "Heron" Model DH.114 series 2 airplanes which have not incorporated HSA Modification 1093. Compliance is required as indicated. To prevent failure of the nose landing gear locking lever and jack attachment lever, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 150 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD unless already accomplished within the last 150 hours' time in service, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 300 hours' time in service since the last inspection, visually inspect the nose landing gear locking lever (P/N 4UN.41A) and jack attachment lever (P/N 4UN.323A) for cracks. (b) If cracks are found during the inspections required by paragraph (a), before further flight, either replace the cracked lever with a serviceable lever of the same part number or comply with paragraph (c). (c) Unless already accomplished in accordance with paragraph (b), on or before March 1, 1971, replacethe nose landing gear locking lever (P/N 4UN.41A) and jack attachment lever (P/N 4UN.323A) with HSA Modification 1093 levers in accordance with Hawker Siddeley Aviation Ltd. Technical News Sheet Heron (114) No. U.13 dated December 8, 1969, or an FAA- approved equivalent. (d) The inspections required by paragraph (a) may be discontinued following compliance with paragraph (c). (e) Upon request by the operator, an FAA maintenance inspector, subject to prior approval of the Chief, Aircraft Certification Staff, FAA Europe, Africa, and Middle East Region may adjust the repetitive inspection intervals specified in this AD to permit compliance at an established inspection period of the operator if the request contains substantiating data to justify the increase for that operator. Amendment 39-991 effective June 14, 1970. This Amendment (39-1062) becomes effective August 11, 1970.
95-03-14: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Teledyne Continental Motors (TCM) IO-346, IO-520, and IO-550 series reciprocating engines, that currently requires initial and repetitive inspections of the engine mount brackets for cracks, and if found cracked, replacement with improved design engine mount brackets. All engine mount brackets require replacement with improved design engine mount brackets at the next engine removal after the effective date of that airworthiness directive (AD). This amendment clarifies the identification procedures to determine which engine mount brackets must be inspected. This amendment is prompted by reports that the engine mount bracket part numbers, which are ink stamped, can be easily obliterated. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent engine separation from the aircraft due to cracks in the engine mount brackets.
55-09-04: 55-09-04 HAMILTON STANDARD: Applies to All 24260 Propeller Hub Barrels Used on Boeing 377 Aircraft. Compliance required as indicated. As a result of cracks occurring in several 24260 hubs when installed as noted, it is considered desirable to improve the strength characteristics of the hub by reworking and shotpeening the areas subject to such failures. Therefore, in order to minimize the possibility of failures of the nature indicated, accomplish the following: Inspection. Inspect at every overhaul Rework. Rework hubs at the earliest opportunity, but not later than at the next overhaul following June 15, 1955, for hubs with 6,000 or more hours of total operating time. (Hamilton Standard Service Bulletin No. 327 dated November 18, 1954, outlines the required rework.)
96-05-09: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), that is applicable to all Airbus Model A300, A300-600, A310, A330, and A340 series airplanes. The existing AD currently requires an inspection of the sliding side windows in the cockpit to identify suspect windows; and either deactivation of the sliding window defogging system; installation of thermo-sensitive indicators; or replacement of the window. This amendment adds a requirement to replace suspect windows with serviceable windows, which, when accomplished, terminates the requirements of the AD. The actions specified by this amendment are intended to prevent rupture of a cockpit sliding window and subsequent rapid decompression of the fuselage due to fracture of the window as a result of thermal stress created by overheating of the wires of the heating element in a localized area.
50-47-02: 50-47-02 CULVER: Applies to All Models V and V2 Aircraft Equipped With Sensenich Models C2FB3 or C2FB1 Propeller With C276A2, PC276A6, PC276A7 and C276A6 Blades. Compliance required as indicated. (1) Replacement required prior to January 31, 1951. In order to eliminate the continued occurrence of broken blade lag screws and/or cracked blade shanks and ferrules, all C276A2 blades must be retired from service and replaced with blade Model PC276A6, PC276A7 or C276A6. (2) Inspection required every 500 hours of operation after installation of blade Models PC276A6, PC276A7 and C276A6. The propeller blades should be removed from the hub, and the wood blade shank and the split retaining ring groove in the blade ferrule should be carefully inspected for cracks. The lag screws should be check-tightened to 160 inch-pounds torque. Blade with broken lag screws or cracked wood shank or ferrule must be removed from service. The ferrule and all ferrous metallic parts of the hubshould be magnetically inspected. The blades are subjected to excessive vibratory stresses when operation beyond the allowable engine r.p.m. ratings inadvertently occurs. It is recommended, therefore, that the accuracy of the tachometer be checked in order to preclude such operation. Operation between 1,800-2,000 r.p.m. is to be avoided when the nose landing gear is extended. (Sensenich Service Bulletins Nos. 133, 134 and 135 cover these same subjects.) This supersedes AD 47-47-09.
2020-22-06: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 99-01-19 and AD 2004-25-02, which applied to certain Airbus SAS Model A320 series airplanes. AD 99-01-19 and AD 2004-25-02 required repetitive inspections to detect fatigue cracking in certain areas of the fuselage, and corrective action if necessary. AD 2004-25-02 also provided an optional terminating action for the repetitive inspections. This AD continues to require, for certain airplanes, repetitive inspections of the fastener holes for any cracking, and repair if necessary, and provides an optional terminating action for the fastener hole inspections. This AD also revises the applicability to include additional airplanes and requires, for all airplanes, inspections of the emergency exit door structure for any cracking and repair if necessary; as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. This AD was prompted by a report that during full scale tests to support the Model A320 structure extended service goal (ESG) exercise, \n\n((Page 71241)) \n\nseveral cracks were found on both sides of the overwing emergency exit door cut-outs at fuselage section 15. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2003-22-09: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Pratt & Whitney PW4074, PW4074D, PW4077, PW4077D, PW4084, PW4084D, PW4090, PW4090D, PW4090-3, and PW4098 turbofan engines. This AD requires borescope inspection of the No. 3 bearing weep tube, on engines with high oil consumption that troubleshooting procedures fail to determine the source of oil loss. This AD also requires for all engines, initial and repetitive visual inspections of the turbine exhaust case (TEC) in the vicinity of the No 3 bearing oil vent tube for evidence of oil wetting or staining. If the vent tube borescope inspection is unsuccessful due to tube blockage, this AD also requires borescope inspections of the high pressure turbine (HPT) assembly for oil wetting or staining. This AD also requires removal of the HPT assembly and replacement of any heat distressed HPT assembly hardware if oil wetting or staining is found. This AD is prompted by reports of engine HPT assembly hardware being damaged as aresult of thermal distress from oil igniting after leaking from the No. 3 bearing compartment. We are issuing this AD to prevent thermal distressed HPT assembly hardware from remaining in service, which could result in a cracked HPT stage 1 disk or HPT stage 1-2 air seal and an uncontained engine failure.
95-02-11: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9-87 (MD-87) series airplanes. This action requires an inspection to detect chafing or arcing damage to the wiring of the aft right coatroom, the intercostal, and the recirculation duct assembly near longeron 5; and modification of the wiring installation for the aft right coatroom. This amendment is prompted by a report of an electrical fire that started due to a short in the coatroom wiring, which was caused by arcing and chafing damage to the wiring. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent severe damage to the airframe in the event of a fire caused by arcing and chafing damage to the coatroom wiring.
67-31-04: 67-31-04 CESSNA: Amdt. 39-516, Part 39, Federal Register November 29, 1967. Applies to Models 150G and 150H Airplanes, Serial Numbers 15064533 through 15067891. To prevent loss of longitudinal control, unless already accomplished, prior to further flight, remove the glove compartment from the aircraft. If after it is removed the glove compartment is modified, the modification must be approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Federal Aviation Administration, Central Region, before it is reinstalled in the aircraft and the aircraft returned to service. This amendment effective November 29, 1967, for all persons except those to whom it was made effective by air mail letter dated November 17, 1967.
2021-11-04: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain De Havilland Aircraft of Canada Limited Model DHC-8-400, -401, and -402 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report of main landing gear (MLG) retractions after striking an obstacle or severe wheel imbalance after a tire failure. This AD requires inspections for correct height of the lock link over-center stop pin and for correct gaps of the left-hand and right-hand MLG downlock proximity sensors, replacement of the shim if necessary, corrective actions, and installation of a new, improved proximity sensor electronic unit (PSEU) with software changes. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2020-23-01: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all GE Aviation Czech s.r.o. (GEAC) M601D-11, M601E-11, M601E-11A, M601E- 11AS, M601E-11S, M601F, H75-200, H80-100, H80-200, and H85-200 model turboprop engines. This AD was prompted by reports of engine power fluctuations occurring during ground tests. This AD requires the removal and replacement of the fuel control unit (FCU). The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2003-22-11: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for the specified Eurocopter France (Eurocopter) Model AS350B, B1, B2, B3, BA, D, and AS355E helicopters, that currently requires removing certain serial-numbered main servocontrols before further flight. This amendment contains the same requirements but also requires removing certain other main and tail servocontrols on or before 550 hours time- in-service (TIS) or 24 months, whichever occurs first. Also, this amendment adds the Eurocopter Model AS350C, D1, and AS355F, F1, F2, and N helicopters to the applicability. This amendment is prompted by the discovery of a manufacturing defect in another set of servocontrols. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of a main or tail servocontrol in the flight control system and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
2021-09-19: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus SAS Model A319-171N airplanes, Model A320-271N, -272N, and -273N airplanes, and Model A321-271N, -272N, -271NX, and -272NX airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report indicating that during a full scale fatigue test of the forward engine mounts, premature wear was identified on the forward engine mount shackle assemblies; in addition, during bearing replacement, the bearing lock washer was found broken. This AD requires replacing any forward engine mount shackle assemblies having a certain part number with a serviceable part, and re- identifying the engine mount, or replacing any forward engine mount assemblies having a certain part number, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2007-21-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: * * * * * * * * the FAA set-up in January 1999 an Ageing Transport Systems Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ATSRAC) to investigate the potential safety issues in aging aircraft as a result of wear and degradation in their operating systems. Under this plan, all Holders of type Certificates aircraft are required to conduct a design review, to preclude the occurrence of potential unsafe conditions as the aircraft aged. * * * * * The unsafe condition is degradation of the fuel system, which could result in loss of the airplane. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
95-02-08: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 737 series airplanes, that requires modification of certain fuselage support structure for the number 2 galley. This amendment is prompted by results of engineering tests and analyses which revealed that certain fuselage support structure for the number 2 galley is unable to support certain loads that may occur during emergency landing conditions. If the fuselage support structure breaks, the galley may shift and cause blockage of the forward service door (galley door). The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent inability of passengers and crew to exit the airplane through this door after an emergency landing.
96-02-06: 96-02-06 BOEING; MCDONNELL DOUGLAS; LOCKHEED; FOKKER; AND BRITISH AEROSPACE REGIONAL AIRCRAFT LIMITED, AVRO INTERNATIONAL AEROSPACE DIVISION (Formerly British Aerospace, plc; British Aerospace Commercial Aircraft, Limited): Amendment 39-9494. Docket 95-NM-55-AD. Supersedes AD 95-04-01, Amendment 39-9153; and AD 95-09-05, Amendment 39-9208. \n\n\tApplicability: The following models and series of airplanes, certificated in any category, equipped with Honeywell Standard Windshear Detection Systems (WSS): \n\n\nManufacturer and \nModel of Airplane\n\nType of Computer\n\nPart Numbers \nBoeing 727-100 and -200\nStandard Windshear\n(Honeywell STC)\n4061048-902, -903, and-904 \n4068054-901 \n4068060-901 \nBoeing 737-100 and -200\nStandard Windshear\n\n4061048-903, -904, and -905 4068058-903\nBoeing 737-200\t\nPerformance\nManagement\n(Honeywell STC)\n4050730-904 through -911 \n4051819-906 \nBoeing 737-300\nStandard Windshear\n(Honeywell STC) \n4068060-901 \nBoeing 747-100 and -200\nStandard Windshear\n(Honeywell STC) \n4061048-904 \nMcDonnell Douglas\nDC-8-50, -60, and -70\nStandard Windshear\n(Honeywell STC) \n4068046-903 \nMcDonnell Douglas\nDC-9-10, -21, -31\n-41, and -51 \nStandard Windshear\n(Honeywell STC)\n4068046-901, -902\n4068048-901, -902 \nMcDonnell Douglas\nDC-9-80 and MD-88 \nWindshear (OEM TC)\n4059845-902\nMcDonnell Douglas\nMD-90-30 \nWindshear (OEM TC)\n4059845-910 \nMcDonnell Douglas\nMD-11\nFlight Control\n(OEM TC)\n4059001-901 \nthrough -905 \n(with windshear \n\toption selected) \nLockheed L-1011-385-1,\n-385-1-14, -385-1-15,\nand -385-3 \nStandard Windshear\n(OEM TC) \n4068044-901\nFokker F28\nMark 1000, 2000,\n3000, and 4000 \nStandard Windshear\n(Honeywell STC) \n4068052-901\nFokker F28 Mark 0100\nFlight Management\n(OEM TC)\n4052502-951 \n(with windshear \n\toption selected) \nBritish Aerospace Avro\n146-RJ70A, -RJ85A,\nand -RJ100A \nFlight Control\n(OEM TC)\n4068300-902\n \n\tNOTE 1: This AD applies to each airplane identified in the precedingapplicability provision, regardless of whether it has been modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the requirements of this AD. For airplanes that have been modified, altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of this AD is affected, the owner/operator must use the authority provided in paragraph (d) of this AD to request approval from the FAA. This approval may address either no action, if the current configuration eliminates the unsafe condition; or different actions necessary to address the unsafe condition described in this AD. Such a request should include an assessment of the effect of the changed configuration on the unsafe condition addressed by this AD. In no case does the presence of any modification, alteration, or repair remove any airplane from the applicability of this AD. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. \n\n\tTo prevent significant delays in the Honeywell Standard Windshear Detection Systems(WSS) detecting hazardous windshear, which could lead to the loss of flight path control, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tRevise the Limitations Section of the FAA-approved Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) to include the following statement, at the time specified in either paragraph (a)(1) or (a)(2) of this AD, as applicable. This may be accomplished by inserting a copy of this AD in the AFM. \n\n\n"During sustained banks of greater than 15 degrees or during flap configuration changes, the Honeywell Windshear Detection and Recovery Guidance System (WSS) is desensitized and alerts resulting from encountering windshear conditions will be delayed." \n\n\t\t(1)\tFor all Boeing, McDonnell Douglas, Lockheed, and Fokker airplanes specified in the applicability statement of this AD: Within 14 days after March 8, 1995 (the effective date of AD 95-04-01, amendment 39-9153). \n\n\t\t(2)\tFor British Aerospace Model Avro airplanes specified in the applicability statement of this AD: Within 14 days after May 15, 1995 (the effective date of AD 95-09-05, amendment 39-9208). \n\n\t(b)\tWithin 36 months after the effective date of this AD, replace the currently-installed line replaceable unit (LRU) with a modified LRU having new software that eliminates delays in the WSS detecting windshear when the flaps of the airplane are in transition, in accordance with a method approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Accomplishment of this replacement constitutes terminating action for the requirements of paragraph (a) of this AD; after the replacement has been accomplished, the AFM limitation required by paragraph (a) of this AD may be revised to read as follows: \n\n"During sustained banks of greater than 15 degrees, the Honeywell Windshear Detection and Recovery Guidance System (WSS) is desensitized and alerts resulting from encountering windshear conditions will be delayed." \n\n\t(c)\tAs of 18 months after the effective dateof this AD, no person shall install on any airplane an LRU that has not been modified in accordance with paragraph (b) of this AD. An unmodified LRU may be installed up to 18 months after the effective date of this AD, provided that, during that time, the AFM limitation required by paragraph (a) of this AD remains in effect. \n\n\t(d)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Los Angeles ACO. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Los Angeles ACO. \n\n\tNOTE 2: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Los Angeles ACO. \n\n\t(e)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. \n\n\t(f)\tThis amendment becomes effective on February 26, 1996.
2003-22-03: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Rolls-Royce plc (RR) RB211 Trent 768-60 and Trent 772-60 turbofan engines. This AD requires reworking the low pressure (LP) turbine nozzle vane case, the LP turbine bearing support exhaust case, and the support arm bracket assemblies. This AD is prompted by a report of an LP stage 4 blade failure at the blade shank, resulting in severe radial distortion of the rear flange of the LP turbine case and failure of a number of attaching bolts, resulting in enough flange separation to allow the release of high energy debris. We are issuing this AD to prevent possible uncontained LP turbine case failure and damage to the airplane.
2020-22-08: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus SAS Model A320-251N and -271N airplanes; Model A321- 251N, -271N, -272N, -252NX, and -271NX airplanes; Model A330-243, -343, and -941 airplanes; and Model A350-941 and -1041 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of removable \n\n((Page 70052)) \n\ndisplay units (RDUs) found undocked from the hosting display docking stations (DDSs). This AD requires removal of the RDUs or implementation of an operational restriction, and a one-time inspection of the RDU installation onto the DDS and, depending on findings, accomplishment of applicable corrective actions, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
66-22-04: 66-22-04 HILLER: Amdt. 39-280 Part 39 Federal Register September 2, 1966. Applies to Model UH-12D, UH-12E, UH-12E-L, UH-12L, and UH-12L4 Helicopters Equipped With Clutches, Mercury Clutch Corporation P/N's 4578-6 and 4692-6, Clutch Serial Numbers 8584 through 9317. Compliance required within the next 100 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To prevent failures of the mercury clutch due to cracking at the inner corners of driver lug slots in the side plates, accomplish the following: (a) Visually inspect the side plates for cracks using at least 8-power magnification. (b) If cracks are found, replace clutch before further flight with a clutch of the same part number that has been inspected in accordance with this AD and found free of cracks. (Fairchild Hiller Service Information Letters Nos. 3052 and 5009, dated July 20, 1966, pertain to this subject). This directive effective September 2, 1966.
94-05-07: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 747 series airplanes, that currently requires repetitive visual inspections of wire bundles to detect damage due to chafing, and repair of damaged wires. This amendment revises the inspection and repair procedures, and provides a terminating action, which, if accomplished, will eliminate the need for the currently required inspections. This amendment is prompted by data that substantiates the need for new inspection and repair procedures. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent smoke and fire in the cockpit emanating from wire bundles and loss of essential cockpit instruments necessary for continued safe flight and landing of the airplane.
69-20-04: 69-20-04 FAIRCHILD-HILLER: Amdt. 39-849. Applies to F-27 and FH-227 type airplanes certificated in all categories and incorporating rear passenger door spindle, P/N 27-313006-3, -5, -7, or -9. Compliance required within the next 100 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To provide a more positive retention of the passenger door locking mechanism accomplish the following: (a) For F-27 type airplanes with spindle, P/N 27-313006-3, installed in the door lock mechanism, comply with Section D(1) through D(8) of Revision 1 of Fairchild Hiller Service Bulletin No. F-27-52-27 dated June 17, 1969. In place of Step "D(5)", rig the door mechanism in accordance with Fairchild Hiller Service Bulletin No. F-27-52-19, dated June 17, 1969. (b) For F-27 type airplanes with spindle, P/N 27-313006-5, 27-313006-7, or 27-313006-9, installed in the door lock mechanism, comply with Section E(1) through E(8) of Revision 1- of Fairchild Hiller Service Bulletin No. F-27-52-27, dated June 17, 1969. Rig the door mechanism in accordance with Fairchild Hiller Service Bulletin No. F-27-52-19, dated June 17, 1969. (c) For FH-227 type airplanes with spindle, P/N 27-313006-5, 27-313006-7, or 27-313006-9, installed in the door lock mechanism, comply with the "Accomplishment Instructions" of Fairchild Hiller Service Bulletin No. FH-227-52-13, dated June 17, 1969. (d) An equivalent alteration approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Eastern Region may be used in lieu of the foregoing methods. (e) Upon request with substantiating data submitted through an FAA maintenance inspector, the compliance time specified in this AD may be increased by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Eastern Region. This amendment effective November 3, 1969.