Results
60-11-06: 60-11-06 LYCOMING: Amdt. 162 Part 507 Federal Register May 27, 1960. Applies to GO-480-C, -G and All GSO-480 Series Engines. Compliance required at first engine overhaul after July 1, 1960. To prevent excessive crankshaft counterweight bushing wear and subsequent detuning of the counterweights, crankshafts with cast counterweights must be modified to incorporate forged counterweights with hardened steel counterweight bushings. (Lycoming Service Bulletin No. 249A covers this same subject.)
64-26-01: 64-26-01\tBOEING: Amdt 830 Part 39 (New) Federal Register November 18, 1964. Applies to Model 727 Series Aircraft. \n\n\tCompliance required as indicated. \n\n\t(a)\tBefore further flight after the effective date of this AD, open the SP-50 autopilot roll and pitch d.c. circuit breakers on panel P-18. \n\n\t(b)\tAt the first scheduled stop where facilities and personnel are available secure these circuit breakers in the off position. \n\n\t(c)\tAutopilot may be reactivated when modified in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 22-7 dated October 27, 1964, or an FAA Western Region Aircraft Engineering Division approved equivalent. \n\n\tThis directive effective upon publication in the Federal Register for all persons except those to whom it was made effective immediately by telegram dated October 23, 1964.
2015-02-04: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Dassault Aviation Model MYSTERE-FALCON 50 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report of an untimely and intermittent indication of slat activity due to chafing of the electrical wiring under the glare shield and behind the flight deck front panel. This AD requires installing two protective plates between the electrical wiring under the glare shield and the engine fire pull handles. We are issuing this AD to prevent chafing of the electrical [[Page 5035]] wiring, which could result in a short circuit and generation of smoke in the cockpit, potential loss of several functions essential for safe flight, and consequent reduced controllability of the airplane.
65-10-01: 65-10-01 FAIRCHILD: Amdt. 39-64 Part 39 Federal Register May 8, 1965. Applies to Model F-27 Aircraft with Center Hinge Wing Flap Asymmetry Switches, P/N 658-001. Compliance required within 25 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. (a) Modify aircraft in accordance with Fairchild Service Bulletin No. 27-19, dated June 6, 1960, or Service Bulletin No. 27-26, dated September 9, 1960, Revision 1, dated March 1, 1965, or an equivalent approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Eastern Region. (b) Upon request of an operator, an FAA maintenance inspector, subject to prior approval of the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Eastern Region, may adjust the compliance time specified in this AD if the request contains substantiating data to justify the increase for such operator. This directive effective upon publication in the Federal Register for all persons except those to whom it was madeeffective immediately by telegram dated April 23, 1965.
60-01-06: 60-01-06 LOCKHEED: Amdt. 85 Part 507 Federal Register January 16, 1960. Applies to All Model 188A and 188C Aircraft Except Serial Numbers: 1001, 1044, 1088, 1090 and Up, For the Wing Station 167 Area Inspections; 1001, 1044, 1057, 1066, 1068 and Up, For the Wing Station 209 Area Inspections. Compliance with the following is required. (a) A daily visual inspection of the No. 4 left and right upper wing surface planks for spanwise cracks. The affected areas are adjacent to the Nos. 2 and 3 nacelle attach angles above wing Stations 167 and 209 main landing gear ribs and near the forward edge of the plank. This inspection may be discontinued when an approved reinforcement designed to prevent cracking is installed.* (b) If cracks are found, FAA approved repair and reinforcement must be accomplished(*) prior to the operation of the aircraft except that the aircraft may be ferried to the base at which the repairs and reinforcement may be performed. Upon installation of an approved reinforcement and repair the aircraft may be returned to service, and the daily inspection discontinued.** (c) An approved reinforcement shall be installed prior to February 1, 1960. This supersedes AD 59-16-06. *Lockheed Service Bulletin No. 88/SB-306 contains an approved reinforcement for the wing Station 209 area. **Eastern Air Lines sketches 62059 and 62259, revised June 25, 1959, contain an approved reinforcement and repair in the wing Station 299 area. Lockheed sketch ALS 82959, Change A, contains an approved reinforcement and repair for the wing Station 167 area.
83-07-24: 83-07-24 BOEING: Amendment 39-4630. Applies to Boeing Model 767 Airplanes VA006- VA012, VA302-VA306, VA501-VA503, VA701-VA702, VA801-VA802, and VA805. To prevent degradation of cargo compartment fire protection system effectiveness, accomplish the following, unless already accomplished.\n \n\tA.\tWithin 30 days after the effective date of this AD, inspect all forward and aft cargo compartment drain valves and rework, if necessary, in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 767-51-1 dated January 14, 1983, or later FAA approved revision. \n\n\tB.\tAircraft may be operated after the 30 day compliance period if the inspection has not been completed, provided no cargo is carried in the affected cargo compartments. \n\n\tC.\tAlternate means of compliance which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tD.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of inspections and/or modifications required by this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the above specified Service Bulletin from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to The Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124, or it may also be examined at FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective April 25, 1983.
2015-02-01: We are superseding airworthiness directive (AD) 2011-23-01 for all Technify Motors GmbH (TMG) models TAE 125-01 and TAE 125-02-99 reciprocating engines with certain part number (P/N) and serial number (S/N) clutch assemblies installed. AD 2011-23-01 required replacement of certain P/N and S/N clutch assemblies. This AD requires the same actions but [[Page 4765]] expands the population of affected P/N and S/N clutch assemblies. This AD was prompted by an additional report of a clutch assembly that malfunctioned due to disk springs that received a nonconforming heat treatment process. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of the clutch assembly, which could lead to failure of the engine, in-flight shutdown, and loss of control of the airplane.
80-18-02: 80-18-02 GROUPEMENT d'INTERET ECONOMIQUE (AIRBUS INDUSTRIE): Amendment 39-3899. Applies to Model A300 series airplanes, certificated in all categories. Compliance is required as indicated. To prevent incorrect pitch trim control operation which could result in pitch trim control runaway and possible loss of control of the airplane, accomplish the following: (a) Before each flight, check the pitch trim system in accordance with the instructions in paragraph 2, "ACCOMPLISHMENT INSTRUCTIONS," of Airbus Industrie Service Bulletin No. A300-22-024, Revision No. 4, dated August 30, 1976, or an FAA-approved equivalent, on airplanes in which the modifications required by paragraph (b) of this AD have not been incorporated. (b) Within the next 750 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, modify the trim handwheel and the wiring between the electronic rack 80VU/STA 1380 and the flight compartment overhead panel, and replace the trim engage unit in accordance with the instructions in paragraph 2, "ACCOMPLISHMENT INSTRUCTIONS," of Airbus Industrie Service Bulletin No. A300-22-025, Revision No. 4, dated May 23, 1979, or an FAA-approved equivalent. (c) After accomplishing the modifications required by paragraph (b) of this AD, comply with the following: (1) At intervals not to exceed 2,000 hours time in service from the last inspection, perform the operational inspection in accordance with paragraph 3.A. of Airbus Industrie Service Bulletin No. A300-22-025, Revision No. 4, dated May 23, 1979, or an FAA- approved equivalent. (2) At intervals not to exceed 6,000 hours time in service from the last inspection, perform the functional inspection in accordance with paragraph 3.B of Airbus Industrie Service Bulletin No. A300-22-025, Revision No. 4, dated May 23, 1979, or an FAA-approved equivalent. (d) After the modifications required in paragraph (b) of this AD have been accomplished, compliance with paragraph (a) of this AD is no longer required. (e) If an equivalent means of compliance is used in complying with paragraphs (a), (b), and (c), that equivalent must be approved by the Chief, Aircraft Certification Staff, AEU-100, Europe, Africa and Middle East Office, FAA, c/o American Embassy, Brussels, Belgium. This amendment becomes effective September 4, 1980.
2014-25-51: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus Model A318, A319, A320, and A321 series airplanes. This emergency AD was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of these airplanes. This AD requires revising the airplane flight manual to advise the flightcrew of emergency procedures for abnormal Alpha Protection (Alpha Prot). This AD was prompted by a report of Angle of Attack (AoA) probes jamming on an in-service Airbus Model A321 airplane. Jamming of the two AoA probes during climb is attributed to water freezing under the AoA vane slinger, and led to activation of the Alpha Prot while the Mach number increased, which resulted in an airplane pitch down per design. We are issuing this AD to ensure that the flightcrew has procedures to counteract the pitch down order due to abnormal activation of the Alpha Prot. An abnormal Alpha Prot, if not corrected, could result in loss of control of the airplane.
T84-18-51: T84-18-51 BELL HELICOPTER TEXTRON, INCORPORATED: Telegram issued September 7, 1984. Applies to Bell Helicopter Textron, Incorporated, Model 214ST helicopters certified in all categories that are equipped with main rotor spindles P/N 214-010-103-003 (Airworthiness Docket No. 84-ASW-42). Compliance is required as indicated. To prevent possible failure of the main rotor spindles, accomplish the following: A. Remove from service any spindle with 1250 or more hours time in service on October 15, 1984, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 1250 hours time in service. B. After the effective date of this AD, for aircraft with spindles which have, or attain, 1250 or more hours time in service, perform a daily inspection of the main rotor spindle as prescribed in Bell Alert Service Bulletin 214ST-84-24 or other FAA approved equivalent procedure. Remove any cracked spindle from service and replace with a serviceable spindle. C. After the effective date of thisAD, replace all spindles having, or attaining 1250 or more hours time in service, within the next 150 hours time in service or October 15, 1984, whichever occurs first. D. The helicopter may be flown to a repair base for the above inspection under the provisions of FAR 21.197. E. Any equivalent means of compliance with this AD must be approved by the Manager, Helicopter Certification Branch, Federal Aviation Administration, Southwest Region. F. Bell Helicopter Textron, Incorporated, Telegraphic Alert Service Bulletin 214ST- 84-23 is an equivalent means of compliance with this AD. This airworthiness directive becomes effective upon receipt.
84-03-07: 84-03-07 McDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-4807. Applies to McDonnell Douglas Model DC-10 and KC-10A (Military) series airplanes, incorporating a horizontal stabilizer single chain differential drive system, certificated in all categories. Compliance required within 6 months after the effective date of this AD, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent uncommanded movement of the horizontal stabilizer following fused drive system shear pin failure, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tModify the horizontal stabilizer drive assembly in accordance with Section 2, Accomplishment Instructions, of McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service Bulletin 27-192, Revision 1, dated August 1, 1983, or later revision approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tNOTE: No additional work is required for those operators who accomplished the original issue of McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service Bulletin 27-192, dated March 17, 1983. \n\n\tB.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of the modification required by this AD. \n\n\tC.\tAlternate means of compliance which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Director, Publications and Training, C1-750 (54-60). These documents also may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 4344 Donald Douglas Drive, Long Beach, California. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective March 19, 1984.
2014-26-04: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain GROB-WERKE Models G115EG and G120A airplanes. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as a defective starter solenoid. We are issuing this AD to require actions to address the unsafe condition on these products.
80-03-10: 80-03-10 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-3673. Applies to Model DC-10, -10F, -30, -30F, -40 series airplanes certificated in all categories. \n\n\tCompliance is required as indicated. \n\n\tTo reduce the probability of complete failure of the stall warning function, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tOn or before 210 days after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished: \n\n\t\t1.\tInstall two (2) auto throttle/speed control computers, each of which receives information from the positions of both outboard wing slat groups, in addition to other previously required inputs, in accordance with design data approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. \n\n\t\t2.\tInstall a stick shaker at the First Officer's position, in addition to that previously required at the Captain's position, with both stick shakers actuated by either auto throttle/speed control computer in accordance with design data approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAAWestern Region. \n\n\t(b)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of modifications required by this AD. \n\n\t(c)\tAlternative inspections, modifications or other actions which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective February 21, 1980.
2014-26-01: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Alpha Aviation Concept Limited Model R2160 airplanes. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as paint adherence defects inside the engine air intake box and cohesion defects inside the laminated ducting from the filter to the air intake box. We are issuing this AD to require actions to address the unsafe condition on these products.
79-11-03: 79-11-03 PRATT & WHITNEY AIRCRAFT OF CANADA: Amendment 39-3477. Applies to Pratt & Whitney Aircraft of Canada, Limited PT6T-3 power sections prior to serial number CP-PS 61324 and PT6T-6 power sections prior to serial number CP-PS 72321. Compliance required within the next 3000 hours in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To preclude automatic fuel control contamination install the P3 air filter and associated parts in accordance with Paragraph 2, Accomplishment Instructions in Pratt & Whitney Aircraft of Canada, Ltd. Engine Service Bulletin No. 5124 thru Revision 3 or approved equivalent procedures and parts. Equivalent procedures and parts must be approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch of the Eastern Region of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). This amendment is effective May 31, 1979.
62-11-01: 62-11-01 GENERAL ELECTRIC: Amdt. 434 Part 507 Federal Register May 3, 1962. Applies to All CJ805-3, -3A, and -3B Engines Equipped With GE P/N 105R684P5 or 105R684P6 Thrust Reverser Actuating Pumps. Compliance required at next engine overhaul. Instances of thrust reverser pump failure have occurred causing the reverser to be inoperative and resulting in asymmetric power conditions upon application of reverse thrust during the aircraft landing roll. To correct this unsafe condition replace reverser pumps GE P/N's 105R684P5 and 105R684P6 with GE P/N 105R684P10 reverser pump, or modify the reverser pumps to conform to the P/N 105R684P10 by reducing the width of the pump drive gears and enlarging the size of the pump shaft oil seal vent in accordance with GE Service Bulletins Nos. (3B)78-1 and (3)78-16. Pumps so modified shall be reidentified as P/N 105R684P10. This directive effective June 4, 1962.
79-10-10: 79-10-10 AYRES CORPORATION (FORMERLY ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL AND SNOW AERONAUTICAL COMPANY): Amendment 39-3469. Applies to all Ayres S-2D and S-2R airplanes certificated in all categories having installed the rudder assembly with the single upper hinge (P/N 54030-87). This AD does not apply to S-2D and S-2R airplanes which have installed a rudder assembly with three upper hinges. \n\n\tCompliance is required as indicated unless already accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent the possible separation of the single upper hinge from the rudder assembly and consequent possible loss of airplane directional control, accomplish the following: \n\n\tWithin 10 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, and at intervals not to exceed 100 hours' time in service and thereafter on all S-2D and S-2R airplanes having an installed rudder assembly with a single upper hinge (P/N 54030-87), perform the visual repetitive inspection in accordance with procedures listed in paragraph 1. \n\n\t1.\tInspection Procedures \n\n\t\t(a)\tRemove rudder assembly from airplane. Remove rudder as outlined in the Ayres (Thrush) Maintenance Manual, Section VII. \n\n\t\t(b)\tStrip fabric and dope from area around upper hinge to facilitate the inspection as shown in Figure 1. \n\n\t\t(c)\tInspect with 10 power magnification in and around weld bead on upper hinge for cracks as shown in Figure 1. \n\n\t\t(d)\tIf no cracks are discovered, comply with paragraph 2. If no cracks are discovered, comply with paragraph 3\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\t2.\tAction required if cracks are discovered \n\n\t\tIf a crack or cracks are detected in the area of the upper hinge, accomplish any one of the available options listed below: \n\n\t\t(a)\tReplace the rudder assembly having the single upper hinge (P/N 54030-87) with the rudder assembly having triple upper hinges (P/N 54030-987) prior to further flight. \n\n\t\t(b)\tModify the single upper hinge rudder assembly in accordance with Ayres Custom Kit No. CK-AG-18 prior to further flight. \n\n\t(c)Replace the cracked single upper hinge rudder assembly with an airworthy single upper hinge rudder assembly prior to further flight and continue the paragraph 1. inspection at intervals not to exceed 100 hours' time in service. \n\n\t\t(d)\tRepair the single upper hinge rudder assembly in accordance with the procedures of Advisory Circular (AC) 43.13-1A, Chapter 2, prior to further flight and continue the paragraph 1. inspection at intervals not to exceed 100 hours' time in service. \n\n\t3.\tAction required if cracks are not discovered \n\n\t\tContinue the paragraph 1. inspection at intervals not to exceed 100 hours' time in service unless options (a) or (b) of paragraph 2. are accomplished. If accomplished, the repetitive inspections may then be discontinued. \n\n\tAyres Service Bulletin SB-AG-15 also pertains to this subject. \n\n\tCompliance with the provisions of this AD may be accomplished in an equivalent manner approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, SouthernRegion. \n\n\tThis amendment is effective May 23, 1979.
2014-25-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 737-100, -200, -200C, -300, -400, and -500 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports from multiple operators that have found fatigue cracking in the corners of the forward galley service doorway. This AD requires repetitive inspections for any cracking of the skin and bear strap doublers in the corners of the forward galley service doorway, and corrective action if necessary. This AD also provides optional terminating actions for certain repetitive inspections. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct fatigue cracking, which could result in rapid loss of cabin pressure.
79-08-03: 79-08-03 CESSNA: Amendment 39-3428. Applies to the following models and serial numbered airplanes certified in all categories: MODELS SERIAL NUMBERS 120, 140 8000 through 15075 and 15200 through 15724 150 15065062 through 15075564 A150 A15000001 through A15000480 170 18000 through 20999 and 25000 through 27169 172 28000 through 29999, 46001 through 47746, 17247747 through 17250572, and 17259224 through 17267584 R172 R1722000 through R1722724 P172 P17257120 through P17257189 175 55001 through 56777 and 17556778 through 17557119 177 17700001 through 17702314 177RG 177RG0001 through 177RG0788 180 30000 through 32999, 50000 through 50355, and 18051608 through 18052770 182 33000 through 34999, 51001 through 51556, and 18254680 through 18265965 185 18500968 through 18503458 188 188-0001 through 188-0572 and 18800573 through 18803046 190, 195 7001 through 7999 and 16000 through 16183 210-5 (205) and 210-5A (205A) 205-0320 through 205-0577206, U206, TU206, P206, TP206 206-0001 through 206-0275, U206-0276 through U206-1444, U20601445 through U20604074, P206-001 through P206-0603, and P20600604 through P20600647 207 20700001 through 20700414 (except those aircraft with factory installed 24-volt electrical system) 210, T210 21058162 through 21061039 and T210-0001 through T210-0454 COMPLIANCE: At the next appropriate inspection prescribed by Federal Aviation Regulation 91.169 following the effective date of this AD, unless previously accomplished. To prevent an inflight electrical system failure, smoke in the cockpit, and/or fire in the wire bundle behind the instrument panel, accomplish the following: A) Disconnect the wire, at the ammeter or at the electrical system bus as applicable, that connects the bus to the cigar lighter receptacle. (The wire is connected to either the bus side or equipment side of a circuit breaker or to the ammeter.) Following the disconnection of this wire either:1) Reconnect the wire to the electrical bus by using an existing or newly installed circuit protection device that is properly rated to protect the wire gauge used for this circuit, or 2) Disconnect the wire from the lighter receptacle at the opposite end and remove it from the airplane, or 3) Protect the wire by insulating its disconnected end, fold this wire end back against the wire bundle in which it is routed and secure it to that bundle. NOTE: For those installations reconnected in accordance with paragraph A 1 the proper rated circuit protection device to be used may be determined by consulting FAA Advisory Circular 43.13-1A. B) Any equivalent method of compliance with this AD must be approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Central Region. Amendment 39-3428 became effective May 21, 1979. This correction becomes effective June 6, 1979.
61-26-03: 61-26-03 PIAGGIO: Amdt. 378 Part 507 Federal Register December 15, 1961. Applies to Models P.136- L1 and P.136-L2 Aircraft, Serial Numbers 196 Through 242. Compliance required within the next 25 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD. The existing fuel vent line is provided with vent holes that are located inside the hull to provide venting in the event of blockage of the external vent outlet by ice or other foreign matter. As a result, fuel and fuel vapor have been detected within the hull constituting a fire and explosion hazard. These vent holes must, therefore, be sealed and other vent antiicing means provided as follows: (a) Install one Mil H-5511 hose or equivalent, 3/4-inch I.D. by 5/8-inch long, and one clamp, AN 737-TW38 or equivalent, over holes in the outboard end of the fuel tank vent line. Sleeve may be slit if necessary but slit must not be over any hole. (b) Install one Piaggio fuel vent anti-icing "bump" or equivalent. (c) Apply anonfuel or water soluble, noncorrosive to aluminum sealing compound to the flange of the anti-icing "bump" and rivet "bump" to the skin forward of the fuel vent outlet using eight AN 470AD4-2, or equivalent, rivets. "Bump" flange should be about 1/8-inch forward of vent outlet flange. "Bump" longitudinal centerline must coincide with fuel vent outlet centerline and be level when aircraft is level. "Bump" must be oriented so that the thick end is forward. This directive effective January 16, 1962.
2014-24-08: We are superseding airworthiness directive (AD) 98-07-07 for all Rolls-Royce plc (RR) RB211-535E4 and RB211-535E4-B turbofan engines. AD 98-07-07 required removing certain part number (P/N) low- pressure (LP) fuel filter-to-high-pressure (HP) fuel pump tube assemblies and installing flexible LP fuel filter-to-HP fuel pump tube assemblies. This AD expands the applicability of AD 98-07-07 to include the RB211-535E4-C-37 turbofan engine and requires removal from service of additional P/N LP fuel filter-to-high-pressure HP fuel pump tube assemblies. This AD was prompted by reports of fuel leaks that have resulted in a number of engine in-flight shutdowns. We are issuing this AD to prevent loss of fuel supply to the engine, which could lead to an in-flight shutdown of one or more engines, loss of thrust control, and damage to the airplane.
60-03-05: 60-03-05 LOCKHEED: Amdt. 95 Part 507 Federal Register February 2, 1960. Applies to All Model L-188 Aircraft. Compliance required by April 1, 1960. Loss of the top cowl panel over the engine tail pipe has occurred in flight due to insecurity of the cowl latches. To prevent recurrence of this difficulty, the following modifications must be accomplished: (a) Modify latch assemblies by replacement of snap ring retention with clevis or shoulder pin design and safety in place. (b) Install position pins and locators to provide more positive alinement of the cowling with the latches when in the closed position. (Lockheed Service Bulletins Nos. 188/295 and 188/365 cover this same subject.)
82-04-01: 82-04-01 BOEING: Amendment 39-4315. Applies to Model 747 series airplanes, line numbers 147, 149, 154 through 535 and those airplanes modified in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin No's. 747-57-2073 or 747-57-2086 or equivalent certificated in all categories which are equipped with fairing mounted (offwing) escape slides. Compliance is required within the next 1200 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD unless already accomplished. \n\n\tTo ensure the proper deployment and inflation of the fairing mounted (offwing) slides, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tRig the fairing mounted (offwing) escape slide inflation firing mechanism in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin No. 747-25A2581, dated September 25, 1981, or later FAA approved revisions. \n\n\tB.\tAircraft may be ferried to a maintenance base for repair in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199. \n\n\tC.\tAlternate means of compliance or other actions which provide an equivalent level of safety maybe used when approved by the Chief, Seattle Area Aircraft Certification Office, FAA Northwest Mountain Region.\n \n\tNOTE: Operators unable to determine the configuration of their airplanes (i.e., modification in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin No. 747-57-2073 or 747-57-2086 or its equivalent) should determine the angle of rotation of the offwing slide fairing door from the closed position to the open position with the flaps in the zero or five unit position. If this angle is not approximately 180 degrees compliance with paragraph A of this AD is required. \n\n\tThe manufacturer's specification and procedures identified and described in this directive are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer, may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. These documents may also be examined at FAA Northwest Mountain Region, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington 98108. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective March 21, 1982.
59-26-01: 59-26-01 HARTZELL: Applies to All HC-12X20 Propellers With Serial Numbers As Indicated Below. These Propellers May Be Installed On Such Aircraft Models As Downer (Republic) RC-3, Grumman G-44, and Navion Series. Compliance required not later than March 1, 1960. To preclude possible failures, remove from service Hartzell hub spiders with Serial Numbers 1 through 4303, 4307 through 4316, 4318, 4319, 4321, 4323, 4324, 4325, 4328, 4329, 4332 through 4336, 4341. After removal, these hub spiders will not be eligible for use in certificated aircraft. Hub spiders with serial numbers other than those listed may be used as replacements. This supersedes AD 53-06-02.
2014-23-11: We are superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2005-13-05, which applied to certain Boeing Model 747-400F series airplanes. AD 2005-13-05 required inspections for cracking of the web, upper chord, and upper chord strap of the upper deck floor beams, and repair of any cracking. AD 2005-13-05 also required a preventive modification of the upper deck floor beams, and repetitive inspections for cracking after accomplishing the modification. This new AD retains these actions and requires a second modification, repetitive inspections for cracking, and \n\n((Page 70442)) \n\nrepair if necessary. This AD was prompted by a determination that the upper chords of the upper deck floor beams at certain stations are structures that are susceptible to widespread fatigue damage, and that certain airplanes with an initial modification require a second modification for the airplane to meet its limit of validity (LOV). We are issuing this AD to detect and correct fatigue cracking in certain upper chords of the upper deck floor beam, which could result in reduced structural integrity of the airplane and rapid decompression or reduced controllability of the airplane.